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Introduction to the international
politics of the Middle East
This book and the study of the Middle East
This study takes the Middle East to be constituted around an Arab
core, with a shared identity but fragmented into multiple territorial
states; the core is flanked by a periphery of non-Arab states –
Turkey, Iran and Israel – which are an intimate part of the region’s
conflicts and an integral part of its balance of power (Cantori and
Spiegel 1970; Ismael 1986: 5–13). Because the Middle East’s unique
features defy analyses based on any one conceptual approach to
international relations, this study will deploy a combination of
several to capture its complex reality.
The Middle East is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chron-
ically war-prone and the site of the world’s most protracted con-
flicts. It appears to be the region where the anarchy and insecurity
seen by the realist school of international politics as the main feature
of states systems remains most in evidence and where the realist par-
adigm retains its greatest relevance. Yet neo-realism’s1 a-historical
tendency to assume states systems to be unchanging, made up of
cohesive rational actors, and everywhere the chief determining
factor in shaping state behaviour is quite inadequate to understand
the Middle East. The regional system, recent and unconsolidated,
has been contested by its units as much as it has shaped them and
realism’s assumption that conflict is chiefly the inevitable by-
product of a states system’s anarchy misses the main causes of the
Middle East’s exceptional war and instability.
Rather, this study will argue that the roots of conflict and much
state behaviour are to be found in the peculiar historical construc-
tion of the regional system. One aspect of this was an extremely
damaging form of core–periphery relations. The insights of struc-
turalism,2 the approach to international relations most concerned
with such relations, are invaluable to understanding how the
Middle East was entrapped in a core-dominated system not of its
own making, whose flaws generate intense conflict and whose con-
straints limit the ability of local peoples to pursue their own desti-
nies and solutions. A second aspect of this was the unique misfit
between identity and sovereignty, nation and state, inflicted on the
region, a conundrum better addressed by constructivism.3 Its insis-
tence that systemic structures are not just material configurations
of power and wealth and include the cultural norms that derive
from identity, helps to understand how the region’s powerful
supra-state identities lead to a unique contestation of the state sov-
ereignty which underlays the stability of other regional states
systems.
Secondly, this study will argue that the state and sub-state levels
are at least as important as the system level in shaping state behavi-
our. Pluralism’s4 problematising of the state points to how far
realism’s assumption of cohesive units pursuing agreed ‘national
interests’ can be misleading in a region where states have been frag-
mented and permeable: whether states become such ‘rational actors’
is, in fact, highly contingent on a process of state formation that is
very much incomplete. The consequent importance of analysing
state formation, domestic politics and leadership world views makes
the pluralist method of disaggregating the state especially relevant
in analysis of the Middle East.
Finally, while the Middle East’s conflicts are chiefly rooted in
societal-level reactions to the flawed architecture of the region, this
study acknowledges that, once differential reactions are institution-
alised in inter-state rivalry and war becomes pervasive, then, as
realism expects, the security dilemma increasingly shapes regional
relations, motivates the consolidation of states, and forces state
elites to follow ‘reason of state’. In this situation, the balance of
power does, indeed, become the main key to regional order.
This book will survey the international relations of the Middle
East through an examination of three of its central aspects or prob-
lems: (1) The emergence of a unique regional system, itself a product
of core–periphery relations (treated in chapter 2) and the conflict of
identity and sovereignty (examined in chapter 3); (2) The determi-
nants of Middle Eastern states’ international behaviour: chapter 4
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examines state formation and chapter 5 the foreign policy process
in the Middle East. Chapter 6 uses comparative analysis to elucidate
how the interaction between the system level and particular state
formation paths shapes similarities and differences in states’ inter-
national behaviour. (3) War and order: chapter 7 examines wars,
attempts to create regional order and how these have impacted on
the structure of the regional system, which, in turn, has reshaped the
states that make it up. Chapter 8 assesses the renewed destabilising
impact of international attempts to reshape the regional order in an
age of unipolarity and globalisation.
Core–periphery relations
According to structuralist analyses, the Middle East, once an inde-
pendent civilisation, was turned, under imperialism, into a periph-
ery of the Western-dominated world system. As the location of both
Israel and of the world’s concentrated petroleum reserves, the
Middle East remains an exceptional magnet for external interven-
tion which, in turn, has kept anti-imperialist nationalism alive long
after de-colonisation. The region remains, as Brown (1984) argues,
a uniquely ‘penetrated system’.
A starting point for understanding the persistence of highly
unequal core–periphery relations even after the retreat of imperial
armies from the region, is Galtung’s (1971) structural model of
imperialism. In his view, two mechanisms sustain penetration by the
Western ‘core’: (1) the core created and left behind client elites and
classes which have an interest in dependent relations, and (2)
regional states were linked to the core, in feudal-like north–south
relations, while horizontal (south–south) relations were shattered.
Indeed, imperialism’s fragmentation of the Middle East into a multi-
tude of weak states dependent on core states for security against
each other, and its division of the unified regional market into small
economies exporting primary products to the core and dependent
on imports from it, approximates Galtung’s model. According to
Moon (1995), the effect of such a structure on the foreign policy
making of dependent states is to create a ‘constrained consensus’
from the overlap of local elites’ economic interests, world views
(through Western education), and threat perceptions (fear of radical
movements) with those of core elites. As a result, rather than bal-
ancing against intrusive external power, as realism might expect,
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dependent elites typically ‘bandwagon’ with a global patron to
contain more immediate regional or domestic threats.
However, core–periphery relations merely set the outside param-
eters within which Middle East regional politics are conducted.
Moreover, far from being static, they are constantly contested and
periodically stimulate anti-imperialist movements which, if they
take state power, attempt to restructure these relations. Whether
nationalist states can do this, however, depends on systemic struc-
tures. When there is a hegemonic power (UK, USA) able to ‘lay
down the law’ on behalf of the world capitalist system (in the
Middle East ensuring its access to cheap energy), and especially if
the regional system is simultaneously divided (the usual condition),
it is easy for external powers to exploit local rivalries to sustain
their penetration of the region. Conversely, when the core was
split, as under Cold War bi-polarity, nationalist states were able to
exploit superpower rivalry to win protection, aid and arms from
the number two state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), enabling them to pursue nationalist foreign policies, and
to dilute economic dependency. Moreover, as Thompson (1970)
has shown, the Middle East is a partial exception to Galtung’s
feudal model in that, while fragmented economically and politi-
cally, it enjoys trans-state cultural unity which nationalist states
have exploited to mobilise regional solidarity against the core.
Thus, the conjuncture of the Cold War and the spread of Pan-
Arabism allowed Nasser’s Egypt to sufficiently roll back imperial-
ist influence to establish a relatively autonomous regional system.
Additionally, in the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), south–south solidarity produced exceptional
financial power that, while failing ultimately to raise the region
from the economic periphery, arguably transformed the position of
the swing oil producer, Saudi Arabia, from dependence into asym-
metric interdependence. However, favourable conditions for
regional autonomy have, particularly since the end of the oil boom
and Cold War, been largely reversed. The West’s restored ability to
intervene militarily and impose economic sanctions and loan con-
ditionality has revived key features of the age of imperialism at the
expense of regional autonomy. No analysis of the international pol-
itics of the region can be convincing that does not take account of
the profound impact of the ongoing struggle for regional autonomy
from external control.
4 The international politics of the Middle East
Between identity and sovereignty: the construction of a regional
system
In the Westphalian states system, on which the Middle East regional
system was ostensibly modelled, the principle of state sovereignty is
usually accompanied by a rough correspondence of identity and ter-
ritory. The consequent ‘nation-state’ provides the basis of the state’s
legitimacy and underlies acceptance of the norm of sovereignty. This
correspondence is assumed, if only as an ideal type by the realist
school of analysis, to make possible a relative consensus on the
national interest that is thought to shape a state’s foreign policy.
In the Middle East, however, imperialism’s arbitrary imposition
of state boundaries produced a substantial incongruence between
territory and identity, with the result that loyalty to the state was
contested by sub-state and supra-state identities. This built irreden-
tism into the fabric of the system: in many states, the trans-state con-
nections of sub-state groups and dissatisfaction with borders
generated protracted conflicts which spilled over in state-sub-state
or inter-state wars, e.g. the role of the Kurds in conflicts between
Turkey and Syria, Iran and Iraq. Additionally, as constructivist anal-
ysis shows, Pan-Arab norms deriving from a shared supra-state
identity became as important in shaping Arab state behaviour as the
distribution of material power stressed by realism. The contradic-
tion between the global norm of sovereignty, in which state interests
are legitimately the object of foreign policy, and the regional norms
of Pan-Arabism (or, to a lesser extent Pan-Islam) which expect these
interests to be compatible with the values of the indigenous supra-
state identity community, have caught Arab foreign policy making
elites, in Korany’s (1988: 165) words, between the logics of raison
d’état and of ‘raison de la nation’. While they have tenaciously
defended the sovereignty of their individual states, legitimacy at
home has depended on their foreign policies appearing to respect
Arab-Islamic norms. For more ambitious states, supra-state identity
presented the opportunity to assert regional leadership by cham-
pioning Pan-Arab or Islamic causes.
While this ‘dualism’ is a constant, the relative balance between
supra-state identity and state sovereignty has evolved – been ‘con-
structed’ – over time by the interactions of states and the actions of
state builders, in favour of the latter (Barnett 1998). Several forces
interacted to define this evolution. Imperialism and the creation of
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Israel stimulated Pan-Arabist movements crossing state boundaries,
which created conditions for competition between states over Pan-
Arab leadership. Although Pan-Arabism enjoined co-operation
among Arab states it was, ironically, constructed out of this compe-
tition for Pan-Arab leadership. Nasser’s disproportionate ability to
mobilise trans-state support in this contest allowed the assertion of
Egyptian hegemony in the region and Cairo’s construction of a ‘Pan-
Arab regime’ which constrained the sovereign right of states to seek
security outside regional collective arrangements. At the same time,
however, this competition stimulated state elites’ defence of sove-
reignty through anti-hegemonic (anti-Cairo) balancing and encour-
aged state formation aiming to immunise states from trans-state
ideological penetration. The rivalries of Arab leaders, expressed in
disagreements over Arabism and unleashing the Pan-Arab ‘outbid-
ding’ that brought on the disastrous 1967 defeat by Israel, helped
‘de-construct’ the Pan-Arab regime. Thereafter, the regularity of war
and much increased insecurity greatly accelerated the impulse of the
individual Arab states to fall back on self-help and power balanc-
ing, while trans-state rent flows released by the oil boom helped con-
solidate states, making them much less vulnerable to Pan-Arab or
Islamic ideological penetration. Although attempts were made to
agree on a form of Arabism, defined in Arab summits, compatible
with sovereignty, the divergent routes Arab states took to protect
themselves from war and to exit from it ‘deconstructed’ Pan-Arab
constraints on reason of state. Islamic solidarity, institutionalised in
the Islamic Conference Organisation has been unable to substitute
for Arabism. As realism expects, heightened insecurity moved the
system toward the Westphalian model, but this evolution, far from
inevitable, was a ‘constructed’ outcome of internal state-building
and of inter-state relations and, to this day, is far from complete. No
analysis of the Middle East can succeed without taking account of
the identity-sovereignty dynamic that constitutes the regional
system.
States and foreign policy
Especially in the Middle East, the state cannot be assumed, as
realism does, to be a unitary actor responding chiefly to system-level
determinants (external threats and opportunities). Indeed, where
this model of the state does not hold, foreign policy may be more
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immediately shaped by domestic conflict or may sacrifice state inter-
ests to supra-state ideological causes. An understanding of the beha-
viour of states, therefore, requires analysing how state formation
affects foreign policy and opening the black box of decision-
making.
State formation
Analysis of a state’s formation is, for several reasons, crucial in
understanding its international behaviour. First, whatever the con-
straints put on states by their systemic environment, there is never
only one possible response to it. Thus, while some states challenge
the status quo, others support it; indeed, the same states may change
from supporters to challengers, as Iran and Iraq did after their
respective revolutions. This points to how the initial composition of
regimes, notably whether their dominant social forces are essentially
satisfied or dissatisfied, locks states into differential (status quo or
revisionist) reactions to the system. This, in turn, is shaped by such
factors as whether or not, at its formation, a state’s boundaries satis-
fied its identity and whether the dominant social forces incorporated
into the regime were of privileged or plebeian origin. Once set on
a particular tangent, subsequent evolution is ‘path dependent’:
although changes in the composition of the ruling coalition are
bound to alter a state’s original policy bias, and although systemic
pressures may deflect it from its course, initial – revisionist v. status
quo – foreign policy directions have proven quite durable.
Second, Middle East states, new and artificial, have started off so
fragmented, unstable and permeable to trans-state forces that
realism’s unitary rational actor confronting an external chess board
cannot be assumed and is only one possible product of a contingent
state formation process. Indeed, the dominant models of Middle
East foreign policy analysis assume low state formation: the ‘leader-
dominant model’ views leaders as free to translate their personal
idiosyncrasies into policy (Clapham 1977) while what might be
called the ‘domestic vulnerability model’ (Calvert 1986; David
1991) assumes regimes, facing greater threats at home than abroad,
adopt belligerent or rhetorical foreign policies to appease domestic
opinion. In both cases foreign policy rationality is sacrificed. Neither
model is adequate, however: even authoritarian regimes face domes-
tic constraints and, particularly in the Middle East, even domes-
tically unstable states must attend to external enemies. Indeed,
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because their strength determines whether the region’s states become
actors in or victims of their ‘rough neighbourhood’, both internal
and external threats have spurred significant efforts to consolidate
states and there is evidence that this has endowed decision-making
elites with greater autonomy to make rational decisions and greater
capacity to implement them. As such, in explaining states’ foreign
policy behaviour, it is necessary to differentiate their levels of state
formation. In summary, the direction and the effectiveness of Middle
East states’ foreign policies are intimately connected with their inter-
nal formation.
Foreign policy determinants: state and system interaction
Foreign policy behaviour can only be adequately explained as the
product of an interaction between the state’s domestic needs and the
states system in which it operates. Thus, while state formation deter-
mines what a state wishes to do, it is, as realism observes, the system
level that determines what it can do. Each state’s behaviour is, thus,
differentially shaped by its specific position in its systemic environ-
ments, notably by varying levels of dependency on the international
system and by varying power positions in the regional system. Over
the long run, a state’s systemic position tends to reinforce or divert
its foreign policies from the original direction built in by its forma-
tion; yet a state’s power position, far from being static, is, itself, a
product of its level of state formation.
Given this complex interaction, foreign policy makers, in trying
to maximise their autonomy and security, must omni-balance (David
1991) between conflicting determinants at three different levels: 1)
geopolitical threats and opportunities concentrated in the regional
environment; 2) the need to maintain domestic legitimacy (by repre-
senting identity and protecting autonomy); and 3) the need to
acquire international resources and protection, for which states may
well become dependent on the core. In attempting to balance these
pressures, elites face potential contradictions: most notably, respon-
siveness to domestic demands for autonomy of the West clashes with
states’ dependency on core powers.
The decision-making process 
According to David (1991), foreign policy decisions are a product of
rational choice, for example, elites’ assessments of whether the main
threat to regime security lies in domestic opposition or external
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threats: thus, if it is stronger at home they may appease external
powers to get the protection and resources needed to cope with the
greater internal threat. However there are always likely to be several
possible rational choices in any given situation and elites’ percep-
tions of rationality are shaped by the identity embodied in a state’s
foreign policy role (Holsti 1970). To the extent elites are socialised
into such roles, they give foreign policy some consistency over time.
Moreover, where elites disagree over policy, choices will be deter-
mined by the power distribution among them and their various con-
stituencies as structured by the state’s governing institutions. The
interests and differential weight carried in the policy process by such
constituencies as public opinion, business, the military, and the dip-
lomatic corps will bias the direction of choices. The rationality of
choices will also be shaped by the degree to which the structure of
decision-making allows a balance between elite autonomy and cohe-
sion, on the one hand, and openness to input and accountability, on
the other. Finally, the personality, values and perceptions of the top
leaders are an immediate determinant of choices while the skills and
policy instruments at their disposal help determine the outcomes of
policy implementation.
The regional system: conflict and order
The character of the regional order is the product of its original
external imposition and the collective interactions and conflicts of
the states that contest or defend it over time. That order, in turn,
shapes the character and behaviour of its parts, the states. 
Roots of conflict
Conflict was literally built into the Middle East regional system, but
not simply because of the anarchy of a states system, as neo-realism
holds. Rather, it was the external imposition of a very flawed system
that generated at least four durable sources of conflict: the struggle
against imperialist control, the frustration of identity by the arbi-
trary imposition of borders, the struggle over Palestine and the
struggle over control of the region’s oil. The irredentism and revi-
sionism fostered by these conflicts became pervasive in Middle
Eastern societies and when the power machineries of different states
were captured by social forces or identity groups on opposing sides
of these issues, conflict was institutionalised at the inter-state level.
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This took exacerbated forms in the cases of settler states, with their
built-in expansionary impulses (Israel); artificial states, with their
built-in frustration (Iraq); and revolutionary states with their built-
in ambition to export their revolutions (Nasserist Egypt, Khomeini’s
Iran). Once, as a result, war became a recurring feature of the
regional system and states were entangled in the security dilemma,
wherein the attempt of each to protect itself only made it a greater
threat to its neighbours, a Hobbesian-like system was, indeed, ‘con-
structed’. Such a system (its insecurity, power imbalances) arguably
becomes, itself, a source of war. Today, there is not a single state
that has not come to feel a military threat from one or more of its
neighbours.
The problem of order building
Order in states systems may be built on shared identity and norms
where an ‘international society’ is emerging (Bull 1995), or, that
lacking, by a contractual ‘international regime’ if there is sufficient
interdependence of interests (Krasner 1983). Constructivists have
charted the Middle East’s first indigenous attempt to create a regional
order, the Pan-Arab ‘regime’. Rooted in the Arab world’s common
identity, this ‘regime’ enjoined co-operation, enforced by Egyptian
hegemony, against shared threats and external domination while
limiting inter-Arab conflict to ideological rivalry (Barnett 1998; Sela
1998). Pan-Arabism helped establish a relatively autonomous
regional system, but had no mechanism for bridging the Arab-non-
Arab gap. Moreover, because Egyptian hegemony threatened other
states, it induced anti-hegemonic balancing which undermined Pan-
Arab solidarity and encouraged nationalist outbidding; this led,
inadvertently, to war, the deconstruction of Arabism, much increased
insecurity, and states’ increasing resort to sovereign self-help. The
nascent Arab ‘international regime/society’ started to unravel.
Where a system of states shares little more than mutual security
vulnerability, the default mechanism for sustaining order is the
balance of power, a built-in equilibrium mechanism, in neo-realist
thinking, that tends to preserve the system, even in the absence of
shared norms. As Rustow (1984: 598) argues, ‘while many Middle
Eastern countries individually nurse expansionist or hegemonic ambi-
tions, all of them collectively, by their preference for the weaker side
and their readiness to shift alignments regardless of ideology, offer
strong support for the status quo’. This supposedly self-balancing
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mechanism in fact depends on state actors adhering to the reason of
state deemed rational in the realist tradition: by adopting ‘realistic’
goals (subordinating ideology to the realities of the power balance)
and by increasing capabilities or striking alliances to counter threats.
Crucially, however, realism argues that systemic insecurity tends to so
shape state behaviour, in part because regimes that play by realist rules
are successful and imitated and regimes which violate them tend to
suffer disaster and are replaced. Indeed, all these tendencies became
operative in the Middle East as insecurity-inducing wars became
regular occurrences, stimulating the rise of national security states
and the replacement of ideology by reason of state in foreign policy
formulation. Alliance formation and power balancing blunted the
ambitions of hegemonic powers and, while this often failed to keep
the peace, it did preserve the states system. The system, thus, shaped
its parts for survival in a dangerous environment and they, in seeking
to preserve themselves, became agents of system maintenance, much
as neo-realism anticipates (Waltz 1979: 74–7). This dynamic pushed
the region toward a classic ‘Westphalian’ system in which power over-
shadowed shared (Arab) norms as the main determinant of state beha-
viour and regional order.
In pluralist thinking, order results from the taming of the power
struggle through complex interdependence, perhaps facilitated by a
benign hegemon (Keohane and Nye 1977). Interdependence is fos-
tered by trans-state economic ties and interests; is associated with
the rise of internationalist coalitions inside states, which see peace
as essential to joining world markets (Solingen 1998); and may be
reinforced by democratisation which deters war through increased
ideological homogeneity, internal constraints on leadership, and the
trans-state interactions of open societies (Doyle 1995). In these con-
ditions, international regimes are more readily constructed and
adhered to. In the Middle East, however, realist solutions to the
problem of order remain more relevant than elsewhere because, as
Yaniv (1987) argues, transnational norms restraining inter-state
conduct are the least institutionalised there. This, in turn, is argu-
ably because the conditions which pluralists expect to generate
power-taming norms – democratic cultures and economic interde-
pendence – are absent or weak in the region and its few democratic
states are no more pacific than their authoritarian counterparts.
To be sure, economic liberalisation has increased the influence of
internationalist-minded infitah (economic opening) bourgeoisies in
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several states. However, as realism argues, only when threat declines
does the pursuit of economic gain displace security atop state
agendas. As long as the region’s high-profile conflicts continue to
generate insecurity, no spread of the ‘zone of peace’ will soon
rewrite the now-dominant realist rules of Middle East international
politics.
Notes
1 Realism is the traditionally dominant school of International Relations
theory. States are seen as unitary rational actors advancing their national
interests amidst the insecurity of the anarchic international arena.
International politics is a struggle for power; war is an ever-present pos-
sibility and order depends on a balance of power. Decision-maker ration-
ality means careful ‘realistic’ matching of goals and resources – what
might be called ‘reason of state’. In its neo-realist version, the anarchy-
induced insecurity of states systems is seen as the main determinant of
the behaviour of the state units. The classic application of realism to the
region is Walt (1987).
2 Structuralism, as used here, refers to the broad view, inspired by
Marxism, that the hierarchical structure of the international capitalist
system determines state options. Specifically, in the international eco-
nomic division of labour the ‘core’ (developed) states subordinate and
exploit the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) or ‘periphery’, whose func-
tion is to supply the former with primary products (and cheap labour).
The system is maintained by trans-state alliances between dominant
classes in the core and the periphery and by the economic dependency of
LDCs. Dependency theory and World Systems theory are seen here as
varieties of structuralism. Important works that apply structuralism to
the Middle East include Alnasrawi (1991), Amin (1978), Bromley (1990
and 1994), Ismael (1993) and Keyder (1987).
3 Constructivism argues that a states system entails an inter-subjective (cul-
tural, not material) set of norms and expectations created by the interac-
tions of states. The system, in turn, shapes (constitutes) the identities of
states and this, not simply power considerations, explains their behavi-
our. The classic application of constructivism to the Middle East is
Barnett (1998). 
4 Pluralism acknowledges a plurality of forces shaping international rela-
tions besides states. Indeed, seeing states as less than unitary actors, it
focuses on the role of sub-state domestic actors, such as competing
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bureaucracies, interest groups, and public opinion, as determinants of a
state’s behaviour. It also stresses the role of leadership beliefs and images,
including the irrationality caused by misperceptions. And, it acknowl-
edges the impact of supra-state (the EU) and trans-state (transnational
corporations) actors, as well as the role of ‘international regimes’ and
complex interdependence in constraining states, especially in deterring
warlike behaviour. See Korany, Noble and Brynen (1993) for approaches
which ‘unpack’ the Middle East state.
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Core and periphery: 
the international system and 
the Middle East
The Middle East has been profoundly shaped by the international
system, or more precisely, the great powers, which dominate its
developed ‘core’. The nineteenth-century expansion of capitalism
and imperialism into the region reflected a combination of superior
Western technological, market, and military power which pene-
trated and eventually reduced the Middle East to an economic
periphery of the core and imposed a very flawed Western state
system on it. Even after independence, Western capitalism contin-
ued to penetrate the Middle East: the region’s strategic transit
routes, oil resources, the creation of Israel, a Western bridgehead,
and the relative power vacuum issuing from regional fragmentation
– all continued to draw in external powers. 
Leon Carl Brown (1984: 3–5, 16–18) has argued that the Middle
East became a penetrated system, one subject to exceptional influ-
ence and intervention from the outside but which could not be fully
subordinated or absorbed. Fred Halliday (1988) observes that, from
the time of the Eastern question, great power competition over the
Middle East has been more enduring than in any other Third World
region. As Brown stresses, local players have always tried to manip-
ulate such rivalry for their own agendas. But equally, imperialism’s
fragmentation of the region into rival states often harbouring irre-
dentist grievances against each other, its implantation of client elites
and new class structures against local resistance and the creation
and military enforcement of the state of Israel, have kept the region
divided and dependent on external powers. Moreover, when there
has been a hegemon on the world scene, it has tended to dominate
the region on behalf of a relatively united ‘core’. The first of these
hegemons, Great Britain, came near to imposing an imperial order
in the Middle East (Brown 1984: 112–39). After the interval of bi-
polarity, in which the Arab world attained considerable autonomy,
the sole American hegemon has returned to its attempt to establish
a Pax Americana in the region. The result, according to Barry Buzan
(1991), is that the Islamic Middle East is the only classical civilisa-
tion that has not managed to re-establish itself as a significant world
actor since the (formal) retreat of Western empires. 
As Sadeq al-Azm has noted, the Arabs and Muslims, viewing
themselves as a historically great nation and bearers of God’s true
religion, find it hard to accept their domination by the West (Arab
Studies Quarterly, 19:3, 1997, 124). As such, external intervention
and its often damaging consequences has stimulated an on-going
reaction manifested in nationalist and Islamic movements, in the
rise of revisionist states, and in the attempts of regional states to
assert autonomy and to restructure dependency relationships. To
many Arabs and Muslims, the struggle with imperialism, far from
being mere history, continues, as imperialism reinvents itself in new
forms. The Middle East has become the one world region where
anti-imperialist nationalism, obsolete elsewhere, remains alive and
where an indigenous ideology, Islam, provides a world view still
resistant to West-centric globalisation. This dynamic explains much
of the international politics of the region.
The age of imperialism and the imposition of the Middle East
states system
The first major expression of Western expansion into the region was
the growing threat to the Ottoman Empire, ultimately ending in the
transformation of the regional system from a universal suprana-
tional empire to a system of states ostensibly meant to represent sep-
arate nationalities. While local rulers were by no means passive in
this process, they were increasingly likely, in the face of superior
Western power, to become victims or clients rather than autono-
mous actors. 
Ottoman Turkey: from supranational empire to defensive
modernisation
The Ottoman system was the antithesis of the European nation-state
system. It was a patrimonial empire headed by a Sultan-Caliph
whose rule was legitimated by the implementation of the Islamic
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law, the outward sign of the supranational Islamic umma. The
ruling elite’s multi-national origins reflected the universalistic aspect
of the state: Greeks were prominent in the bureaucracy; Mamluks
(slave soldiers) of Christian origin rose to top military and political
office, while in the provinces Turkish landed notables and Arab
religious leaders (ulama) linked state and society. The quarters of
trading cities, peasant villages, tribes, and a mosaic of religious
minorities were self-contained communities enjoying autonomy
under their own leaders. The empire embraced Christians in the
Balkans, Turks in Anatolia, and Arabs in the Fertile Crescent, Egypt,
and North Africa.
Ethnic nationalism was a foreign concept. While semi-
independent territorial states sometimes emerged in the provinces
when the imperial centre weakened, since the boundaries of such
units fluctuated with the power of the time, there was usually little
popular identification with them. Rather, people identified them-
selves as Muslims (or members of a minority ‘millet’), and as inhab-
itants of some sub-state ‘little community’. They were regarded by
the rulers as ra′aya (flocks) to be both protected and fleeced, not
politically active citizens ready to defend a nation. Foreign policy
was ‘imperial’: the Ottomans regarded the West as Dar al-harb – the
sphere of war – against which the Sultan waged jihad (holy war) in
continual expansion. However, once a balance of power was estab-
lished with the West, ‘normal’ diplomatic relations between sove-
reign states emerged (Ahmad 1993: 15–23; Keyder 1987: 7–23;
Mansfield 1991: 23–34).
By the 1700s, the Ottoman Empire was in decline. Its economy
was being enervated by Western economic encirclement and pene-
tration. In capturing the East–West trade routes, the West diverted
the economic surplus on which Ottoman civilisation had been built;
subsequently, the penetration of Western manufactures undermined
traditional industries (Bromley 1994: 46–85; Issawi 1982: 138–55;
Owen 1981: 3–9, 92). Western military encroachment was con-
stant, beginning with Russian advances on the northern frontiers.
Internal disintegration, which allowed local Muslim warlords
to carve out semi-independent principalities – most notably
Muhammed Ali in Egypt – was hastened by the rise of nationalist
movements among Christian minorities in the Balkans, beginning
with the Greek war of independence, spreading thereafter to the
Slavic peoples.
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The Ottoman response to this threat was ‘defensive modernisa-
tion’. Reforming sultans and viziers promoted selective change,
chiefly military modernisation – enough to reinforce without dis-
rupting the traditional order. But military modernisation required or
led to broader changes: bureaucratic centralisation, improved tax
collection, conscription, the modern education to train modern offi-
cials. The result was the rise of a small modern middle class affected
by Western ideas of nationalism and democracy. Military officers,
as the first to be educated and entrusted with the mission of Otto-
man defence against the West, made up the vanguard of the early
modernising nationalist groups. Middle-class opinion came to see
the survival of the empire as dependent on a constitutional system,
which would allow creation of a citizenry with political rights,
hence a stake in the defence of the empire. At the turn of the nine-
teenth century, the Young Turk Movement, looking for radical solu-
tions to reverse the empire’s decline, led the Revolution of 1909
which forced a constitution and parliament on the Sultan.
Ultimately Ottoman modernisation failed. The costs of moder-
nisation led to foreign debt giving Western bankers leverage over the
Ottoman state. This took an extreme form in semi-independent
Egypt where the Muhammed Ali dynasty’s debt led to British and
French control over Egyptian finances and eventually the British
occupation of the country. In the remaining Ottoman domains, debt
repayment became a heavy drain on the economic base of the
empire. At the political level, the reformers failed to create a new par-
ticipant community. With the bulk of the masses still encapsulated
in ‘traditional’ communities, they were handicapped by a narrow
social base and soon split between ‘democrats’ and ‘authoritarian-
nationalists’ who believed democracy would only empower tra-
ditional leaders. The modernisation of political identity – the
construction of an identity that could mobilise the empire’s diverse
groups against the external threat – proved an insurmountable task.
The first attempt – to replace Islam with Ottomanism, a secular
loyalty that cut across ethnic and religion diversity – was limited in
appeal to the educated Muslim elite; it failed to attract the Christian
minorities who were turning to ethnic nationalism while for the
Muslim masses, alienated by the taxes and conscription imposed by
the modernisers, it was no substitute for identification with the
Islamic umma. Ultimately, the Young Turk elite turned to linguistic-
based nationalism – Turkification – but this was incompatible with
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a multi-national state and, fatally, it split the two main – and pre-
dominately Muslim – peoples of the empire, the Arabs and Turks.
This allowed the British to engineer the World War I Arab revolt that
contributed to the collapse of the empire (Ahmad 1993: 23–45;
Bromley 1994: 53–5; Brown 1984: 21–81; Keyder 1987: 25–69;
Mansfield 1991: 35–84, 114–35, 149–66).
Formation of the post-Ottoman successor states
The collapse of the empire opened the way for the establishment of
a Western-style states system in the region: boundaries were drawn,
for the most part by Western imperial powers, but indigenous forces
attempted to fill the vacuum as well and their success or failure put
Middle Eastern states on very different paths. 
In the Turkish-speaking Anatolian heartland of the empire,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a military hero of the collapsed empire, re-
vived the Young Turk movement and the remnants of the Ottoman
army and bureaucracy and initiated a relatively successful adapta-
tion to the Western nation-state system. Ataturk nationally mobil-
ised the emerging Turkish nation to fight off Western and Greek
designs on Anatolia. He then invested the vast nationalist legitimacy
won in this war of independence in the establishment of a secular
Turkish national republic. Identity was based on a combination of
ethnicity/language (Turks) and territory (residents of Anatolia)
(Ahmad 1993: 46–71; Owen 1992: 26–31). In the absence of an
indigenous bourgeoisie, Ataturk launched statist economic moder-
nisation that laid the foundations of economic independence.
He defended Turkish autonomy in foreign policy by playing off
the great powers, Bolshevik Russia, Britain, France and Germany
while avoiding entanglements in their rivalries (Keyder 1987:
71–115). In Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted to imitate Ataturk
as a nationalist modernizer, although Iran was less developed and
subject to the rival influences of Russia and Britain which controlled
its oil. 
In the Arab world, no smooth adaptation to independent state-
hood was possible. Only in the Arabian peninsula did Arab inde-
pendence survive: in the northern mountainous part of Yemen and
also in the arid heartland and Hijaz where an indigenous state-
builder, Ibn Saud, used Islamic identity to forge a new state.
Elsewhere, the Arab world fell victim to creeping conquest and
occupation. The piecemeal dismemberment of the Arabic-speaking
18 The international politics of the Middle East
Ottoman realms by the British and French, begun decades before
World War I, with Algeria (1830s), Egypt (1880s), Tunisia (1881),
and Morocco (1912), was crowned by the post-war establishment
of ‘mandates’ in the Fertile Crescent.
In the process of imperial competition and boundary drawing, the
Arab world was fragmented into a multitude of small states that were
bound to be politically and militarily weak. This was all the more so
because these states fitted very imperfectly with indigenous identity.
While some such as Egypt and Morocco had traditional roots, others
were seen by people as artificial: notably in historic Syria, which was
dismembered into four ministates – Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and
Jordan. The natural post-imperial loyalties were still those most
familiar from the Ottoman era, that is, to the small group (tribe, sect,
village) or to Islam rather than to the newly created territorial states,
few of which were regarded as nation-states by their inhabitants. It
was in Palestine, however, that imperialism left its most enduring
mark. There, Zionist settler colonialism under British imperial aus-
pices sparked a struggle over the land, leading eventually to the
uprooting and peripheralisation of the native Palestinian population.
The collapse of the (Ottoman) state that had embodied the Islamic
umma, discontent with the new ‘artificial’ boundaries, and the colon-
isation of Palestine spurred the emergence of the Arab nationalist
movement which preached the doctrine that the Arabs (roughly
defined as Arabic speakers) constituted a nation entitled to an inde-
pendent state or, if several states, that these ought to be grouped in
an Arab national confederation. Arabism would provide a solution
to the modernisation of identity in the Arab core of the region but it
was, of course, at odds with the Western states system being imposed
there.
The imposition of the state system was paralleled by the fragmen-
tation and more thorough incorporation of the regional economy
into the world capitalist system as part of the ‘periphery’: the role
of the new states in the world division of labour was that of primary
product exporters and importers of manufactured goods. Thus,
Egypt became a plantation producing cotton for Europe’s textile
industries; later began the exploitation of local oil reserves by
Western Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to fuel industrialisa-
tion in the West (Amin 1978). At the same time, imperialism com-
pleted the formation of an Arab ruling class. Private ownership of
land accorded to urban notables and tribal chiefs consolidated a
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large landed magnate class while turning formerly independent
peasants into tenants. A ‘comprador’ class of international traders
was enriched as middlemen between the West and the local
economy. Limited modernisation – the spread of urbanisation,
infrastructure, education, and the most rudimentary industrialisa-
tion – left traditional society relatively untouched outside the big
cities (Amin 1978: 1–50; Ayubi 1995: 86–99; Bromley 1994:
62–85).
State apparatuses were also implanted in the new states. A polit-
ical elite recruited from the new upper classes wavered between
collaboration with imperialist power and leading independence
movements against it. The personnel of the military and bureau-
cratic machinery needed to establish order were recruited from and
expanded a state-dependent middle class. The legitimacy of the new
ruling elites depended on their ability to win full independence from
their imperial patrons, but everywhere they were either perceived as
clients of imperialism or were in one way or another discredited by
nationalist failures: in Egypt it was the failure of the Wafd to get the
British out, in Syria, the loss of the Palestine war which discredited
the first-generation ruling elite. In essence, imperialism both created
and then helped de-legitimise the new state establishments almost
from their birth (Ayubi 1995: 99–133; Owen 1992: 8–23). 
The first reaction against this deformation of the region was the
rise of rival ideological movements each offering different solutions
to its multisided crisis: the national problem, the legitimacy crisis
and the challenges of economic backwardness and dependence.
Liberal nationalism, which first dominated elite circles (1900–
1920s), advocated the adoption of the Western formula – secular
democratic states, capitalist economies – as the key to national
strength; but, embraced chiefly by the new upper classes, it declined
as their failures cost them ideological hegemony. Reacting against
liberalism was an Islamic resurgence in the 1930s, beginning with
the rise of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt which insisted that a return
to Islamic practices held the key to strength; but the movement
failed to achieve hegemony among the rising educated middle class.
Simultaneously, communist and socialist movements captured the
loyalties of many intellectuals and parts of the small industrial
working class. In the first decades after World War II, as regional
states won political independence but failed to achieve political
strength, the Arab nationalist movement was captured by the new
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middle class, radicalised, and turned against the ruling dynasties
and oligarchies. This Pan-Arabism, combining a more radical and
illiberal nationalism with demands for Arab unity and populist
social reform, achieved ideological hegemony among both the new
middle class and mobilising sections of the masses (Hourani 1970;
Khadduri, 1970; Sharabi 1970). 
The fragility of upper-class-based regimes and the Arab nation-
alist mobilisation of the middle class against them ushered in two
decades of political instability (1945–67) expressed by military
coups and the rise of radical parties. The military overthrew mon-
archies and oligarchies across the region but, except in Nasser’s
Egypt, could not consolidate stable states until the 1970s. Lacking
traditional or democratic legitimacy, these precarious republics
sought it through Arab nationalist ideology, pursuing Pan-Arab
unionist projects, challenging Western influence, and championing
the Palestine cause. However, the failure of unity schemes and the
1967 defeat by Israel shattered the ideological hegemony of Arab
nationalism, depriving the populist republics of a secure basis of
legitimacy. This prepared the way for the revival of an alternative
supra-state ideology, political Islam, which, like Arabism, condi-
tioned regime legitimacy on defence of regional autonomy against
Western domination. 
De-colonisation and the Cold War
De-colonisation and the bi-polar Cold War between the USA and
the USSR transformed the terms of international penetration in the
Middle East. To be sure, given the exceptional concentration of
Western interests there – oil, transit routes, and the protection of
Israel – the Western great powers had no intention of leaving the
region in the wake of Arab political independence. The Cold War
actually raised the stakes as the USSR was perceived to challenge the
West’s regional interests. Indeed, the Cold War began when the
Truman Doctrine, responding to Soviet pressures for a share of
Iranian oil and access to the Turkish straits, extended Western pro-
tection to these states. Thereafter ‘containment’ of Soviet commu-
nism’s ‘threat’ to the region drove the United States (US) and
Western policy. In this contest, oil, Israel and ‘containment’ were
intimately linked: the Soviets had to be denied control of Middle
East oil through which they could strangle Western Europe but
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Western support of Israel inflamed pro-Soviet sentiment in the
region and increased the threat to oil. 
As direct imperialist control in the region faltered after World
War II, nationalist movements and regimes sought to fill the gap and
exploit Soviet power as a counter to the West. In these conditions,
the Western powers had to find new, subtler ways of protecting their
interests than hitherto but, at least initially, their efforts proved
largely counterproductive. The unfolding of the relation between
the great powers and the region during the Cold War will be
explored below through an analysis of the two main regional
attempts to restructure a more equal relation with the ‘core’,
namely: (1) the rise and fall of Nasserite Pan-Arabism, and (2) the
rise and containment of OPEC. 
The Arab nationalist decade and the retreat of the West (1956–67)
By the early 1950s, most Arab states were nominally independent.
But they remained subordinated to the old imperial powers owing
to the continued rule of client elites needing Western protection
from domestic threats and the economic dependency of the region
on the West. Moreover, the ex-colonial powers retained the ability
to intervene militarily if their interests were threatened, facilitated
by their possession of bases in and treaties with many regional
states. The British and French sought to retain their bases and, as
the perceived Soviet threat increased, the US joined them in an
effort to establish a new pro-Western regional order: the Tripartite
Declaration of May 1950 guaranteed the Arab–Israeli status quo
and made arms deliveries conditional on an Arab–Israeli peace,
while the project for a regional security organisation – what
would become the Baghdad Pact and Central Treaty Organisation
(CENTO) – aimed at harnessing regional states to the containment
of the Soviet Union. 
The first watershed in the contest between great power domi-
nance and regional autonomy was the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser
who challenged Western control over the area in the name of Arab
nationalism. Nasser’s starting point was his drive to throw off
British domination of Egypt, in particular its continued military
presence in the Suez Canal zone. The West needed Egypt if its
Middle East security arrangements were to be accepted and Egypt
first tried to use this leverage to negotiate a British evacuation.
However, influenced by the rise of the non-aligned movement,
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Nasser came to view the proposed anti-Soviet pact as a neo-imperi-
alist effort to establish indirect Western control. It would entangle
the region in the Cold War and possibly make it a battlefield, as it
had damagingly been made in the previous two world wars. Egypt
was also alienated by the West’s refusal to sell Egypt arms needed
for security against an activist Israel or provide aid unless it made
peace with Israel and joined the proposed pact (Gerges 1994: 21–5).
As such, Egypt put forth an alternative to the West’s plans, a project
for a collective Arab security pact within the framework of the Arab
League.
Nuri al-Said of Iraq led the pro-Western forces which believed the
West too strong to resist and that Western alignment could be traded
for aid and concessions on Israel. Chafing at Egyptian domination
of the Arab League, aware of the proximity of the Soviet ‘threat’,
and, seeking to capitalise on his close British connection, Nuri pro-
posed that Arab security be realised through links to the West and to
the ‘northern tier’ of Turkey and Iran. Egypt would, however, accept
no such alignment as long as British forces remained in the Suez
Canal zone and Nasser insisted the Arab states collectively reject
pro-Western pacts unless they could be made compatible with de-
colonisation and a settlement with Israel involving major Israeli con-
cessions on borders and repatriation of the Palestinian refugees. The
Arab League agreed and stipulated that no alliance should be con-
cluded outside the Arab collective security pact. When Iraq joined
the Baghdad Pact without winning Western support against Israel, it
was perceived to have broken Arab ranks (Maddy-Weitzman 1993:
147–54; Barnett 1998: 103–20).
Ironically, the British-led Western drive to create the Baghdad
Pact invited, rather than contained, Soviet penetration (Evron 1973:
129–72). Since the Soviets’ interest in ‘leaping over’ the wall of
Western ‘containment’ coincided with that of the emerging Arab
nationalist regimes seeking to evade pressures to join the pact,
Moscow was willing to provide generous economic aid and arms to
substitute for that which the West was making conditional on trea-
ties, bases, and an Israeli peace (Telhami 1990: 58–62). The catalyst
of an emerging new alignment between Moscow and Arab nation-
alism was Israel’s 1955 raid on Egyptian positions in Gaza; this was
perceived in Cairo as punishment for its obstruction of the pact and
came at a time when Egypt was being denied Western arms while
French supplies to Israel threatened to upset the balance of power.
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Egypt, therefore, successfully sought arms from the East – as well as
new markets for its cotton for which prices in the West were declin-
ing. This opened the door to Soviet penetration of the region. The
Czech arms deal was decisive in swinging the region against the
Baghdad Pact since it demonstrated the option of obtaining arms
other than through Western alignment. The breaking of the Western
arms embargo, seen as a great victory over imperialism in the Arab
world, began Nasser’s rise as a Pan-Arab hero. It put pro-Western
regimes under such enormous pressure from domestic nationalist
sentiment orchestrated from Cairo that conservative elites in Jordan
and Lebanon did not dare join the Baghdad Pact despite their desire
for Western protection, and Arab nationalists came to power in
Syria (Barnett 1998: 115–20; Cremeans 1963: ch. 6; Gerges 1994:
21–5; Walt 1987: 61–2).
The US Under Secretary of State Dulles, seeing the world in
starkly bi-polar terms, viewed small powers as natural clients and
Arab non-alignment as creating a power vacuum the Soviets would
fill. Although Dulles tried to distance the US from European impe-
rialism and recognised that support for Israel was a major liability
in winning over the Arabs, he did not appreciate the extent to which
Arab fears of Israel and desire for real independence were more
important to rising nationalist opinion than any remote Soviet
threat (Brown 1984: 176; Gerges 1994: 50–1). He wavered between
an impulse to punish Egypt for its obstruction of Western plans and
fear that this would drive the country into Soviet arms. Although he
entertained the notion that Nasser might be a credible alternative to
communism who could be enticed away from a Soviet alignment
with economic aid, in the end he opted to punish him for obstruct-
ing the pact by withholding aid for the building of the Aswan High
Dam. In this way, Dulles unwittingly unleashed a chain of events
that unravelled Western control of the region. Nasser’s response was
to nationalise the Suez Canal and claim the transit dues to finance
the Dam. This reinforced the view of Britain and France that Nasser
was a mortal threat to their remaining positions in the Arab world.
The nationalisation of the Canal unleashed such a tide of Pan-Arab
support that even the pro-Western Arab states were forced to
applaud it in front of domestic opinion. Nuri warned that Nasser’s
appeal was putting the stability of the Iraqi pillar of the pro-Western
order at risk and France was alarmed by Nasser’s encouragement of
rebellion in Algeria. A sign of the new post-imperialist climate was
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British realisation that Western public opinion would not accept a
reoccupation of Egypt; but the Hitler analogy that British Prime
Minister Eden applied to Nasser convinced him Egyptians would
welcome Nasser’s removal in a quick strike and allow a friendly
leader to be put in power. The British–French–Israeli tripartite inva-
sion failed in part because the superpowers opposed it: the Soviets
threatened war while the US, fearing it would endanger the pro-
Western states that guarded the oil and turn the Arabs to the Soviets,
applied economic pressure on its allies. The outcome transformed
the region. Nasser was now the unrivalled hero of Arab national-
ism, Egypt and Syria, now recipients of Soviet arms and aid, were
de-aligned from the Western camp, and the remaining influence of
the old imperial states was destroyed. The colonial era was deci-
sively superseded by a new bi-polar era that allowed greater inde-
pendence to small states (Barnett 1998: 123–9; Cremeans 1963, ch.
6; Gerges 1994: 47–71; Ionides 1960: ch. 8; Love 1969). 
As Britain’s influence collapsed while Nasser’s burgeoned,
Washington perceived a growing threat of collaboration between
Nasserism and communism. The US responded with the Eisenhower
Doctrine, which offered support to Middle Eastern states suppos-
edly threatened by communism but was, in fact, the doctrinal jus-
tification for an American attempt to contain Arab nationalism. The
Jordan crisis of 1957, the doctrine’s first test, provided one model
for confronting Nasser’s attempts to roll back Western influence in
the Arab world. In that crisis, the elected Arab nationalist Nabulsi
government and its military allies initially forced King Hussein
into the pro-Egyptian camp and threatened to curb royal power.
However, the Arab subsidies needed to substitute for the Western
ones that kept Jordan aligned with the West, were not forthcoming.
King Hussein’s royal coup against his own government had US
support, Israel warned it would intervene against any Arab threat to
Jordan, and Jordan’s Western subsidy was restored. Jordan’s client
status was starkly exposed but the episode showed that nationalist
opinion could be defeated by a combination of external support and
royal dictatorship. Jordan’s restoration of its Western alignment was
paralleled by growing Saudi alarm at a similar pro-Nasser mobilisa-
tion of nationalist opinion in Arabia. This allowed the US to sponsor
a new ‘King’s Alliance’ pitting Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia against
republican Egypt and Syria (Cremeans 1963: ch. 7; Gerges 1994:
79–90; Ionides 1960: ch. 16; Walt 1987: 67–71).
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The Jordanian approach did not, however, prove effective when
applied in Syria. Washington, alarmed at the potential of commu-
nism there, gave backing to conservative politicians and encouraged
Turkish and Iraqi pressures and plots against Syria’s nationalist
government. However, the USSR warned Turkey, Nasser sent token
troops to bolster Syria, and aroused nationalist opinion further mar-
ginalised Syria’s remaining conservative politicians. Even conserva-
tive Arab governments disassociated themselves from US policy and
the Saudis intervened with Washington to dampen the crisis. Soviet
support for Syria in the crisis raised the prestige of Syrian commu-
nists and Syria’s Arab nationalists, feeling caught between Western
and communist pressures, turned to union with Egypt for protec-
tion from both. Hailed as a Pan-Arab achievement across the region,
the United Arab Republic (UAR) strengthened Nasser and threat-
ened remaining Western influence. Thus, Western intervention
amidst bi-polarity had proved counterproductive, actually strength-
ening unfriendly nationalist forces and weakening pro-Western
elites. Abd al-illah, Regent of Iraq, warned that Arab nationalism
was so strong it would sweep the pro-Western states away if no
countermeasure were taken. Dulles feared the UAR would expand
and take in Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, creating a
single Arab state ultimately under Soviet influence; if the supply of
oil fell under the control of such a nationalist state, the threat to
Western interests would be acute (Gerges 1994: 79–96; Mufti 1996:
82–9, 100–2; Walt 1987: 67–71). 
The first test of the UAR’s potential as the nucleus of a Pan-Arab
concert came in the 1958 Lebanon crisis in which President
Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in the hope of embroil-
ing the US on his side in an intra-elite struggle in which his rivals got
Egyptian support. Then, in a major turnabout, the 1958 Iraqi revo-
lution, sparked by the Hashemite regime’s close identification with
the West, brought down the pillar of the pro-Western order in the
region. Rather than protecting the Hashemite regime, its adherence
to the Baghdad Pact, combined with its failure to challenge the
Iraq Petroleum Company concessions, inflamed domestic opinion
against it and Iraqi army units dispatched to prop up the Jordanian
monarchy turned on their own government. The new revolutionary
regime’s first acts included withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and a
demand for changes in the oil concession (Barnett 1998: 133–6;
Gerges 1994: 38–9; 101–35). The US considered military interven-
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tion but the new leaders assured the West its oil interests would
be secure (Alnasrawi 1991: 74). At Nasser’s request the Soviets
conducted manoeuvres in the Caucasus to deter US intervention;
Washington could see no credible alternative leadership which could
be readily ensconced against an aroused public and the attempt to
do so could bring a risky showdown with the Soviet Union (Gerges
1994: 116; Walt 1987: 75). However, convinced that all pro-Western
regimes were endangered, the US landed troops in Lebanon while
British paratroopers reinforced King Hussein’s regime. Bi-polarity
had only partially constrained the capacity of the West to project
military power: if the Iraqi revolution indicated that restoring client
regimes was deemed too risky and costly – at least when vital inter-
ests were not threatened – propping up client states was still possible
and cost-effective.
The West’s declining control over events in the Middle East nev-
ertheless left it temporarily chastened. Dulles observed that you
could not stand in front of the Arab nationalist tide, only contain its
threat to US interests until such time as events deflated it (Mufti
1996: 180–93). In fact, this soon happened as the Iraqi revolution-
ary leader, Abd al-Karim Qasim, challenged Nasser’s Arab leader-
ship and the two strongest nationalist states turned into bitter rivals.
The failure of Iraq to join the UAR dashed Pan-Arab expectations
and, together with the stabilisation of pro-Western governments in
Jordan and Lebanon, checked the Pan-Arab tide that had hitherto
seemed so irresistible (Walt 1987: 75–9). Ironically, this check to
Nasser’s regional ambitions enhanced his ability to manipulate
global bi-polarity. Soviet backing of Qasim precipitated a quarrel
with Nasser who saw this as imperialist meddling in his sphere of
influence. While Cairo and Moscow needed each other too much to
let this proceed very far, it nevertheless revived American interest in
Arab nationalism as a possible barrier to communism. Nasser
exploited this to acquire US aid, especially food aid vital to Egypt’s
burgeoning population. Althogether, between 1954 and 1965,
Egypt exploited superpower rivalry to extract over $1 billion in eco-
nomic aid from the two sides. Their competition gave Egypt a new
freedom from overt dependence on or constraints from either super-
power (Gerges 1994: 129–30; Walt 1987: 160;). 
The outcome of this decade of struggle for the Middle East was
the emergence of a much more autonomous Arab states system than
hitherto. The West failed to mobilise the area against communism
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because the Arabs, even conservative Arab states, saw the security
threat to be less from the East, than from Israel, regional rivals or
the West itself. Nasser’s Egypt managed not only to block the West’s
attempts to harness the region through an anti-Communist alliance
but was able to nationalise a strategic Western-controlled transit
point, the Suez Canal, and precipitate a wave of Arab nationalism
that forced a rollback of Western bases and treaties across the
region.
It was bi-polarity that provided the conditions for this success.
Without Soviet countervailing power, the Suez invasion would
probably not have been aborted and Nasser would have been over-
thrown. But his survival, seen as a successful challenge to Western
imperialism in the Arab world, endowed him with legitimacy at
home, thereby consolidating the Arab world’s strongest state at a
time when the other Arab regimes remained weak and dependent.
This enabled Nasser to use Arab nationalism to mobilise the Arab
masses against their own rulers, making it very risky for the West’s
regional allies to overtly stand against him or for the West to again
militarily intervene against Egypt. The West and its allies were, thus,
forced to compete with Nasser on the plane of ideological struggle
where they were no match for him; indeed, overt identification with
the West became a grave political liability for the West’s clients.
Nasser’s unique trans-state appeal forced the relative unification of
the formerly fragmented Arab world against external influence.
Then, in a sort of virtuous circle, his Pan-Arab stature, making
Egypt the pivotal Arab state, boosted Cairo’s ability to exploit
superpower rivalries to win aid and influence in world capitals
(Gerges 1994: 35–40). This combination of regional unity and core
rivalry maximised the Arab world’s autonomy and stature in the
international system. 
Bi-polarity similarly provided the shelter in which a new crop of
Arab nationalist regimes subsequently arose. The Cold War enabled
these states to extract the resources from the superpowers, especially
the USSR, needed to entrench themselves politically and to dilute
their economic dependency on the West. The end result was a pat-
tern of superpower alliances with ideologically compatible Middle
East regimes that replicated Cold War divisions. The region was
polarised into pro-Western states (Israel, Turkey, Iran, conservative
Arab states) and pro-Soviet ones (radical Arab nationalist states).
Given Cold War competition, even in unequal patron-client rela-
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tions between a global superpower and a regional power, the ‘tail’
frequently ‘wagged the dog’, the smaller state exercising influence
over the larger which needed it as part of global rivalries, especially
if the client could threaten to switch sides (Evron 1973: 129–39;
159–61, 173–91; Gerges 1994: 21–40, 245–51; Walt 1987: 162–3,
171).
In this new era, aid, trade and diplomacy eclipsed military inter-
vention as the means by which competing powers tried to maintain
their influence in the region. Although intervention did not entirely
cease – there were eleven cases from 1956 to 1973 – the checks each
of the two superpowers placed on the freedom of action of the other
made intervention the instrument of last resort. Given the impor-
tance of arms for security in a high-conflict region, arms transfers
increasingly became their favoured substitute instrument of influ-
ence. The West initially tried to condition delivery of arms on
Arab acceptance of a Western alliance and Israel. Once the Soviets
broke the Western arms monopoly, the relation between arms sup-
pliers and recipients became less asymmetric. Thereafter, the Soviet
Union’s willingness to provide arms to client states became its single
most important instrument of influence. However, although Egypt
and Syria were relatively dependent on the USSR for arms and
support against Israel, this translated into no durable Soviet domes-
tic influence: Sadat’s 1972 expulsion of the Soviet advisors showed
how much Egypt merely sought to use the USSR for its own agenda
(Rubinstein 1977). Much the same pattern characterised American
deliveries to Israel. 
The West, for its part, increasingly relied on alliances with states
of the non-Arab periphery to counter the Arab radicalism in the core
of the region. In the 1950s Turkey played this role, pressurising
radical Syria, while in the 1970s, the Shah of Iran acted as Western
gendarme in the Gulf, notably intervening in Oman to suppress a
Marxist rebellion. But it was Israel which proved to be the most
durable, albeit ambiguous, surrogate for Western power in the
region. The exceptional network of support – virtually strategic
depth – which Israel enjoyed for its assertive regional role, repeat-
edly inflamed anti-Western sentiment in the region. Nevertheless,
Israel came to be regarded by the US as a ‘strategic asset’. US policy
was to keep Israel militarily superior to any combination of Arab
states and, in return, Israeli power was used to deter challenges to
Western interests such as the Arab nationalist threats to Jordan.
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Israel came to serve American interests in more subtle ways, too:
after its 1967 conquest of Arab lands, the inability of the Arab states
to recover their territories with Soviet arms made them increasingly
dependent on US diplomacy to do so; this gave the US its opening,
through Sadat’s Egypt, to the Arab heartland, enabling it, after a
long period of declining influence, to restore much of its contested
power in the region.
The 1967 war and the revival of Western influence
The 1967 Arab–Israel war was the initial precipitant of a chain of
events that brought a revival of Western power in the Middle East.
The war had its own regional causes but was facilitated by American
reaction to Nasser’s growing success. Nasser’s ability to use bi-polar-
ity to shield his ambitions declined as he pushed his challenge to
Western interests further without securing sufficient Soviet protec-
tion. First, Egypt had long propagated the principle that Arab oil
was for all the Arabs, not the patrimony of the client sheikhs and
Western oil companies (Cremeans 1963, ch. 8); the 1963 Egyptian
intervention in Yemen to support the republican revolution and
Egypt’s support for radical nationalism in British Aden and the Gulf
region seemingly gave practical teeth to this doctrine. It was seen as
a threat to Saudi Arabia and to Western control of Gulf oil and ended
a brief period of amicable Egyptian–US relations in the early 1960s.
In the period when Arabism seemed irreversible and communism the
greater threat, Washington had been willing to experiment with a tilt
toward Arab nationalists but ultimately as the aims of Arab nation-
alism proved incompatible with Western interests, particularly con-
trol of oil, the US turned against it. President Johnson cut off US
food aid and Nasser, perceiving an imperialist counter-offensive,
responded by stirring up anti-US radicalism in the Middle East and
Africa and seeking a closer Soviet alignment (Evron 1973: 58). This
prepared the way for Washington’s complicity in Israel’s 1967 strike
at Egypt (see chapter 7). Once the scale of the Israeli victory became
apparent, the US saw it as an opportunity to destroy or gravely
weaken Nasser, strengthen conservative states, force Arab accep-
tance of Israel and resurrect US influence in the region. Israel’s emer-
gence from the war as a regional great power suggested a strategic
alliance with it might be a viable basis on which to rest American
Middle East policy (Gerges 1994: 230–1; Parker 1993: 3–35).
As Israel’s strategic value in US eyes soared, Washington deferred
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to Israeli insistence on making withdrawal from the territories it
occupied in the war conditional on Arab acceptance of Israel and of
territorial adjustments in its favour; as such, the great powers did
not, as in 1956, impose an Israeli withdrawal from conquered Arab
territories. While Israel was now in a much stronger position to
resist any such superpower pressures, the ‘loosening’ of the bipolar
system and muting of superpower competition in the Third World,
had also made the US less concerned at offending the Arabs (Evron
1973: 175–6). Indeed, the US began to supply Israel with increas-
ingly sophisticated weapons which would allow it to keep control
of the territories (Walt 1987: 105–8). As the US overtly took sides
with Israel, the Arab nationalist states were pushed into greater
dependency on Moscow. The Arabs’ need for the Soviets allowed
Moscow to acquire a strong regional presence by the early 1970s,
including advisors, bases, treaties, and naval power projection.
Thus, the 1967 war opened the door to an increased military depen-
dency of regional states and growing superpower penetration. 
After 1967, Nasser was keen to manipulate bi-polarity to extri-
cate himself from the humiliation of Israeli occupation of the Sinai.
As Heikal wrote, with the regional balance tilted so much toward
the Israelis, Egypt had to raise the conflict to the international level
where the (Soviet–American) power balance was more equal by
more deeply committing the Soviets on Egypt’s side. Nasser hoped
to derive leverage from Moscow’s stake in the region and the fact
that, as Heikal (1978a: 30) put it, the Soviets had an ‘obsession with
America’. But, although the Soviets rearmed Egypt, they procrasti-
nated in supplying the offensive weapons needed to match Israel’s
and enable the military recovery of the occupied territories and
instead urged a political settlement. They had little confidence in
Arab fighting capabilities and feared Egypt would entrap them in
the conflict and in a possible superpower showdown; moreover, the
Soviets did not want to jeopardise their detente relationship with the
United States (Riad 1982: 95–7, 144–6). The Arabs’ greater depen-
dency on the Soviets and the latter’s investment in detente seemed
to dilute Arab leverage over Moscow. Egypt showed, however, that
it could upset the seeming satisfaction of the superpowers with the
post-1967 status quo. 
The first episode in this effort, Nasser’s 1969 War of Attrition
against Israeli forces occupying Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, aimed to
force the superpowers to intervene. Nasser hoped the USSR could
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be brought to provide greater support by the tacit threat that Egypt
would otherwise be defeated in the confrontation with Israel, thus
destroying the Soviet’s credibility as an ally. He also sought to dem-
onstrate to the Americans the dangers of increased Soviet penetra-
tion and even superpower confrontation that could result from
allowing the Sinai occupation crisis to fester. When Israel responded
to Egyptian artillery attacks on its forces on the east bank of the
Suez Canal by bombing Egyptian cities, Nasser flew to Moscow,
threatening resignation if the Soviets did not provide the air defence
and support troops needed to stop the Israeli escalation. In fact, the
Soviets provided SAM-3s and Soviet pilots and support troops;
neither Soviet troops or such sophisticated weapons had ever before
been deployed outside the Soviet Bloc. Israel, realising the magni-
tude of the Soviet involvement, stopped the deep penetration
bombing. To defuse the situation, the US, in the Rogers Plan, pro-
posed a ceasefire and a broader settlement of the Arab–Israeli con-
flict. Nasser’s internationalisation of the conflict did not, however,
break the occupation stalemate (Evron 1973: 96–101, 185–6; Riad
1982: 103–7; Smith 1996: 217–20; Walt 1987: 108–10).
Meanwhile, indeed, the US relationship with Israel grew ever
closer despite certain conflicts of interest between them. To get even
small Israeli concessions, such as acceptance of the Rogers Plan, the
US had to pledge ever more support to Israel (Walt 1987: 108–10).
Israel’s arms dependency gave the US little leverage over it owing to
the Israelis’ penetration of US domestic politics and a tacit threat to
escalate the conflict or even to ‘go nuclear’ if the US abandoned
them (Evron 1973: 178–80). President Nixon and his Secretary of
State, Henry Kissinger, developed a strategy that would make a
virtue of Washington’s weak leverage over Israel: by keeping Israel
too strong to be defeated with Soviet arms, they aimed to force the
Arabs to accept a settlement close to Israel’s terms; at the same time,
they positioned the US as the only power which could theoretically
influence Israel to accept a settlement, thereby seeking to marginal-
ise the Soviets from Middle East diplomacy (Brown 1984: 183; Walt
1987: 119). While the increased Soviet military presence in the
region was crucial to the Arabs’ attempt to balance Israel’s post-
1967 regional supremacy, the stalemate gravely undermined
Moscow’s prestige as a reliable ally and unleashed in Egypt the anti-
Soviet sentiment that Anwar al-Sadat would exploit to switch super-
power patrons after Nasser’s death.
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Sadat, on assuming power, came to believe that the Soviets pre-
ferred the status quo, which kept Egypt dependent, and that detente
had reduced their willingness to make commitments comparable to
the Americans’ support of Israel. He tried to get a closer Soviet com-
mitment through a Treaty of Friendship but his purge of Ali Sabri
and other Egyptian allies of the Soviets was seen in Moscow as a bid
for US support and reduced their incentive to assist him. Sadat’s
1972 expelling of Soviet advisors was meant as a signal to Kissinger
and to get the superpowers competing again for Egypt. This failed
to shift Washington, which was satisfied with the pro-Israeli status
quo, but it did get the increased Soviet arms deliveries that made
possible the crossing of the canal in the 1973 war. That war, in turn,
forced the US to adjust its policy to take account of Egyptian inter-
ests (Riad 1982: 211–43; Sela 1998: 136–8; Smith 1996: 226–8). 
The 1973 war led to a major alteration of superpower relations
with the region as the US successfully used the outcome to restore
the influence it had lost with the rise of Arab nationalism. On the
face of it, the war and the associated oil embargo threatened US
interests. It vastly increased Arab financial power and generated an
unprecedented Arab solidarity behind a Cairo–Damascus–Riyadh
axis which seemed well positioned to extract major changes in
America’s pro-Israeli policy. But Kissinger’s intervention in the con-
flict masterfully neutralised this threat. Kissinger’s immediate objec-
tives were to get the oil embargo lifted and to end the possibility of
a renewed war which could intensify the threat to American inter-
ests. Believing a comprehensive settlement to be impractical, he
aimed to use partial settlements to achieve these aims. In the longer
term, he aimed to marginalise the Soviet Union in the region by
detaching Egypt from its Soviet alliance. 
Kissinger was not displeased that the war had produced a more
even Egyptian–Israeli power balance more conducive to compro-
mise on both sides and he sought to drag Israel into the partial con-
cessions, principally to Egypt, that would relieve pressure on it for
a comprehensive settlement. This would also start the process of
detaching Egypt from its Soviet alliance and from the Arab–Israeli
power balance; without Egypt the Arabs could not wage war and
an Egypt lacking Soviet support and dependent on the US was no
threat to Israel and could become a powerful force for regional de-
radicalisation. The return of the occupied Sinai to Egypt as a part of
this process would demonstrate to the Arabs that the US alone could
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get Israel to make territorial compromises but only if they in return
were prepared to abandon radical Arab nationalism and their Soviet
alignments. Sadat’s strategy coincided with Kissinger’s since he
chose to use the leverage the war gave him to make his own gains
at the expense of his Arab partners. Believing that the Soviets could
provide neither the economic nor the diplomatic help Egypt needed
and that the US ‘had the cards’ to force Israel to make concessions,
Sadat started a dramatic shift in Egypt’s global alignments toward
Washington. His strategy was to compete with Israel for US favour
by showing Egypt to be a more effective US surrogate in the Middle
East. His first service to Washington was getting the oil embargo
lifted after the first disengagement in the Sinai. Once Sadat became
convinced that his realignment with the US was not enough to over-
come the power of the Zionist lobby in Washington and get enough
pressure on Israel to fully evacuate the Sinai, he sought to appease
Israel and its American supporters through the trip to Jerusalem
and, finally, by conceding a separate peace at the expense of Syria
and the Palestinians. After the fall of the Shah he made a bid to
replace Iran as US regional surrogate, claiming that the USSR had
become the main threat to the region. In return for Sadat’s service
in ending the Arab threat to Israel and marginalising the Soviet
Union from regional diplomacy, the US mediated the return of the
Sinai and provided Egypt with a substantial yearly subsidy (Brown
1984: 184–90; Sela 1998: 158–70; Sheehan 1976; Smith 1996:
230–3; Telhami 1990: 62–71; Walt 1987: 177–8). 
Egypt’s saga provides key evidence on the dynamics of interna-
tional-regional power relations in an age of bi-polarity. Despite
Egypt’s dependence on external power, its strategic importance
endowed it with considerable capacity to manipulate and extract
benefits from the superpowers. Nasser, even when highly dependent
on Soviet protection took his own decisions – the War of Attrition,
accepting the Rogers Plan; when Sadat ordered Soviet advisors out
of Egypt, they not only meekly departed but Moscow later provided
him with the extra weapons needed to cross the Suez Canal
(Rubinstein (1977: 334). Sadat’s crossing of the Canal showed how
a local power could upset a damaging status quo that suited the
superpowers, forcing Washington to intervene and satisfy Egypt’s
non-negotiable demands (Brown 1984: 242). Once Sadat had the US
engaged, he did whatever was necessary to keep the US on Egypt’s
side. There can be few more classic examples of bandwagoning
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than Sadat’s policy: if you cannot effectively balance a threatening
power, you appease it (Walt 1987: 177–8). Sadat’s acceptance of
an American-sponsored separate peace with Israel successfully
exploited superpower rivalry to extract tangible gains or at least to
cut Egypt’s losses in the regional power struggle. The cost, however,
was that, by abdicating Egypt’s Arab leadership and fragmenting the
Arab world, and by marginalising the Soviet Union’s competitive
position in the region, Sadat did major damage to the very condi-
tions which allow regional actors such leverage with core powers,
namely, a conjunction of unity in the ‘periphery’ and rivalry at the
‘core’. It would be Sadat’s successors and peers, however, who
would pay the price.
The political economy of dependency: is oil different?
According to dependency theory and other versions of Marxist
structuralism, underlaying great power political penetration of the
Middle East is a network of economic dependency that keeps the
region underdeveloped and subordinate to the advanced capitalist
‘core’. The Middle East economies do exhibit many of the classic
features of dependency. They are mainly primary product produc-
ers, often dependent on a single export such as cotton or oil. To the
significant extent that they fail to process their raw materials into
finished high-value products, their human capital remains underde-
veloped and their economies dependent on the ‘core’ countries for
technology and manufactured goods. Dependency links the interests
of their economically dominant classes – whether large agricultural
exporters or partners of transnational corporations – to those in the
core, while detaching them from the stake local populations have in
a ‘national’ form of development. Dependency creates a ‘feudal’
pattern of trade and investment linking individual states to the core
economies rather than to each other, thereby retarding regional eco-
nomic investment and trade. 
According to dependency theory, economic dependence not only
keeps states underdeveloped, it also keeps them politically weak.
Dependent states cannot, except at considerable cost and risk,
pursue autonomous foreign policies if these displease their patrons.
The feudal pattern of economic dependency destroys the economic
base of regional political solidarity that would be needed to restruc-
ture the power balance with the core. The overlap of the interests of
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dominant classes with the core powerfully works to align the foreign
policies of dependent states with those of the Western core, despite
widespread resentment of the West among local populations. To be
sure, in states such as Nasser’s Egypt or Islamic Iran, where plebe-
ian elites came to power from outside the economically dominant
classes, regimes challenged Western interests. Moreover, convinced
that they could not sustain nationalist foreign policies without eco-
nomic independence, they also undertook state-led industrialisation
aimed at reducing dependence on primary product exports, and
tried to diversify dependency among a number of rival outside eco-
nomic powers. Thus, Egypt was able to pursue a nationalist foreign
policy that advanced the autonomy of the whole Arab world, but
only as long as it had a strong domestic economic base, supported
by accumulated World War II surpluses and Soviet aid. However,
once Egypt became dependent on American aid and fell into increas-
ing Western debt, its foreign policy did a somersault: from being the
main state resisting Western influence, it became under Sadat, the
bridge by which Western influence came back into the region, seem-
ingly vindicating dependency theory. 
Arguably, however, OPEC, a striking case of sustained regional
co-operation against the core by once seemingly dependent states,
might be said to refute dependency theory. OPEC’s ability to engi-
neer massive increases in oil prices, the Arab producers’ ability to
use oil as a political weapon without suffering military intervention
and the accumulation of seemingly enormous ‘financial power’ in
the hands of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states seemed to
show that the age of imperialism was dead and that dependency had
been superseded by interdependence between the core and the oil-
producing Middle East. Indeed, the period of OPEC success was
arguably a window of opportunity situated between the decline of
Arab nationalism and the current era of restored Western hegemony
when the dependency relationship could have been radically restruc-
tured. Why this did not happen takes some explanation. 
From ‘seven sisters’ to OPEC
The main legacy of colonialism and the underlying problem of the
Middle East, according to Dilip Hiro, is that ‘six families put in
place by British imperialism and propped up by the West control
thirty four percent of the world’s oil reserves’ (Frankel 1991; Hiro
1991b). Through them two Western powers, the US and the UK,
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controlled the oil of the Middle East, and the changing balance in
their relative control reflected the transition in global hegemony
between them: thus before World War II, the US controlled 15 per
cent of Middle East oil and Britain 70 per cent; by the early 1950s,
the US controlled 60 per cent and Britain 30 per cent (Tibi 1998:
93). Under this order, the function of the Middle East was to provide
cheap fuel for the core’s industrialisation and military power: oil
was the key to British naval supremacy and to Axis defeat in World
War II while post-war Western Europe was rebuilt on cheap Middle
Eastern oil. Oil is the world’s biggest business and is central to other
industries such as chemicals, plastics and automobiles; those who
control it are the richest of global capitalists (Yergin 1991: 21–6),
and nowhere are these more concentrated than in the United States.
The centrality of oil to the Middle East has, therefore, meant its
dependence on the most powerful of Western TNCs. For most of the
twentieth century, the transnational producer cartel – the ‘seven-
sisters’ oligopoly of Anglo-American oil companies – controlled
almost all the world’s oil production. The companies obtained
control of Middle East oil on extremely favourable terms (Spero
1990: 261–2): their power came from their monopoly of production
technology and marketing infrastructure, and from long-duration
concessions, usually extracted under political pressure, which fixed
low prices and prevented competitors from entering production. In
addition, their collusion and their joint ownership of the operating
companies in the individual countries – the Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO) was controlled by Texaco, Socol, Exxon and
Mobil – meant the divided Middle East states separately confronted
a unified cartel. The ability of the companies to increase output in
one country and decrease it in another gave them great leverage over
governments dependent on them for revenues and the stability of
their economies and regimes. Thus, they were able to unilaterally set
output and prices. For example, their ability to drive down the price
of Arabian light from $2.18/barrel in 1948 to $1.80 in 1960 while
increasing the price in the US from $2.68 to $3.28 allowed them to
reap enormous profits (Alnasrawi 1991: 72–6).
The backing given the oil companies by their home governments
made the system seem unassailable. This was dramatically demon-
strated in the failure of the first challenge to it, Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadeq’s nationalisation of Iranian oil: the compa-
nies’ boycott of Iranian oil – replaced by their increased pumping in
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the Arab Gulf – caused an economic crisis preparing the way for the
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIA)–engineered overthrow of
his nationalist government (Cottam 1979). Despite this, the strug-
gle for control of oil was on-going and while it ensured continual
Western interference in the area, Western control was never wholly
secure. The Suez invasion was in good part over control of the
jugular artery of oil supply from the Gulf to Europe (Kubursi and
Mansur 1993: 8). The West was poised to risk war over Iraq after
the 1958 coup had the Iraqis not pledged to ‘respect Western oil
interests’ (Sifry 1991: 27–33). The 1967 Arab–Israeli war generated
immense popular sentiment for the nationalisation of oil. Indeed, a
brief oil embargo was rapidly abandoned because excess US capac-
ity made it immune to such pressures; but a precedent had been set
(Alnasrawi 1991: 76–7). The vulnerability of oil supply routes was
demonstrated by the closing of the Suez Canal after the war and by
the simultaneous sabotage of the Saudi pipeline across Syria to
which the radical Bathist government refused to permit repairs
(Dorraj 1993: 20).
As Middle East states acquired marginally greater autonomy
owing to decolonisation and the bi-polarity that gave them some
protection from overt Western intervention, they were able to
adjust the extremely unfavourable terms of agreements reached
under imperial rule. Thus, in the 1950s concession agreements were
amended, splitting profits 50–50; this tripled state revenues, but
since oil prices were stable and the prices of manufactured imports
steadily rose, the producers’ terms of trade deteriorated over time.
In 1959–60, price reductions by the companies, amidst an oil glut,
sparked the founding of OPEC in an effort to check the companies’
right to unilaterally set prices, but it had little immediate impact.
In 1961, when Iraq expropriated non-utilised areas of the Iraq
Petroleum Company’s concessions, the company froze Iraq’s export
of crude oil (Alnasrawi 1991: 72–3; Korany and Akbik 1986: 147;
Spero 1990: 264–5).
By the beginning of the 1970s, increased demand, especially as
the US became an oil importer, unmatched by expansion in capac-
ity, put upward pressure on prices, creating favourable conditions
for producers. But it took the rise of a new radical nationalist
regime, catapulted to power by the 1967 war, with the political will
to take advantage of these conditions to precipitate a shift in the
balance of power toward the producing states. The new Libyan rev-
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olutionary regime negotiated a much more favourable deal on prices
and revenues by inviting in smaller independent oil firms, thereby
bypassing the cartel, while unilaterally imposing production cuts; in
1972 Ba’thist Iraq followed by nationalising the Iraq Petroleum
Company. This encouraged greater political will in the OPEC states
and prompted the oil companies to allow them to buy shares in local
subsidiaries; in 1972 Saudi Arabia started buying into ARAMCO
and soon achieved majority control (Vassiliev 1998: 390). Middle
East states were finally acquiring stakes in their own natural
resources; their newly-found co-operation was starting to balance
the power of the cartels and rising demand for oil was shifting
market conditions in their favour (Spero 1990: 265–7). 
From oil embargo to oil bust 
It was the Arab political solidarity and nationalist arousal unleashed
by the October 1973 war, however, that pushed an unlikely actor,
Saudi Arabia, to take the next steps, using cartel power to raise
prices and putting oil in the service of foreign policy. The US failure
to temper its support for Israel despite Egyptian peace initiatives
threatened Saudi Arabia as Arab opinion was radicalised after
1967. After the October war broke out and the US sent massive mil-
itary aid to Israel, ignoring Saudi pleas for a more even-handed
approach, the Saudis had to make a difficult choice: while they were
loath to jeopardise their strategic relation with the US, they could
not afford, in the climate of euphoria from Arab war successes, to
be stigmatised as a reactionary regime less concerned with the Arab
cause than the defence of American interests (Alnasrawi 1991:
83–93).
In this climate, Arab OPEC states unilaterally raised the price of
oil 70 per cent from $3 to $5/barrel while cutting output and embar-
going shipments to the US; the resulting oil shortage allowed them
to raise the price of a barrel of oil to $11.65 in December 1973. This
was a turning point in which price and supply decisions were trans-
ferred from the companies to the OPEC producing countries. In the
1970s, OPEC would attain a dominant share of world oil produc-
tion (50–65 per cent), exports (90 per cent), and oil reserves (65–75
per cent). At first it seemed that there had been a restructuring of
power between Third World states and Western multinationals that
could be a precedent for a new deal between core and periphery
(Alnasrawi 1991: 76–84, 100, 186–7; Korany and Akbik 1986,
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138–65; Spero 1990: 267–9, 279). Simultaneously, the Arabs’
ability to challenge Israel militarily was a psychological shock to it
and its backers which, combined with the oil embargo, potentially
lent the Arab states the leverage to get a land-for-peace settlement
with Israel. The oil embargo was, the Arab oil states announced, to
remain in place until Israel’s US backer forced it to withdrew from
the occupied territories and satisfy Palestinian rights. 
In the event, however, the oil weapon proved less than decisive in
changing Washington’s pro-Israeli policy. The US, a large oil pro-
ducer itself, was not directly threatened or damaged enough to force
it into such an abrupt policy turnabout; only about 15 per cent of
its energy consumption was from Arab imports at the time of the
embargo (Spero 1990: 265). To be sure, the oil price hikes and
the oil weapon initially appeared to be a serious indirect threat to
the US since they weakened Western Europe in the face of the per-
ceived Soviet threat and challenged American control of Middle
East oil. In reality, US policy makers distinguished between the
increased price of oil, which was a matter of bargaining and oil’s
unacceptable political use. In fact, the embargo was quickly lifted.
After the first disengagement on the Egyptian front, Sadat insisted
that US policy had changed and that Washington should be re-
warded; this was enough to relieve popular pressure on the producer
states to keep the embargo in place since there had still been no
movement on the Syrian front and Palestinian rights were not even
on the agenda (Alnasrawi 1991: 93–8). The Nixon administration
may have actually welcomed the price rises in the hope it could
manage the new situation to encourage oil exploration outside the
Middle East, undermine European and Japanese competition, pre-
cipitate a recycling of petrodollars through US banks, thereby
restoring declining American control of world financial resources,
and stimulate American exports to the oil producers. Western con-
sumers and workers certainly did suffer from the oil price increases
but the most powerful US corporations – the oil companies, banks
and arms exporters – made huge profits from them or from the recy-
cling of petrodollars. And US oil producers were the largest funders
of the Republican Party and the Nixon, Reagan and two Bush cam-
paigns (Kubursi and Mansur 1993: 10–13). Meanwhile, blame for
the resulting economic dislocation could be put on OPEC.
Many Arabs continued to expect that the West’s need for oil, the
tacit threat of a new embargo, and the Saudis’ special relationship
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with the US could still deliver the US pressure on Israel needed to
achieve a peace settlement. In the end, however, the Saudis were neu-
tralised by their American relationship. Even while the oil embargo
was in place, the Saudis opted to deepen their special relation to the
US and a deal was formalised in the mid-1970s when it became less
politically dangerous. Saudi Arabia would use its role as ‘swing pro-
ducer’ to moderate oil prices, deploy the new influence its immense
wealth gave it to de-radicalise Arab politics, and recycle its petro-
dollars through US financial institutions. The US, in return, would
provide military protection and the technology to develop and
diversify the Saudi economy; certainly the Saudis were led to expect
the US would seriously attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict
(Alnasrawi 1991: 109–13, 120–1, 127; Kubursi and Mansur 1993:
13; Spero 1990: 270). The American strategy was, in Bromley’s
(1994: 112) words, to integrate the Gulf oil states as ‘relays in a met-
ropolitan circle of capital’ under which they would invest their sur-
pluses in the core and thereby acquire a stake in its economic
stability. Washington’s strategy proved remarkably successful. 
First, the oil boom accelerated the Western penetration of Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf region, generating powerful domestic interests
with a stake in relations with the West. Thus, the ruling families in
the oil monarchies, with their major assets held abroad, arguably
became junior partners of a ‘global bourgeoisie’. Eighty-four per
cent of Arab oil earnings was channelled into Western banks and
investments. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait between them held $210
billion outside the region in the late 1970s. Saudi Arabia became the
largest investor in US banks, treasury bonds and real estate, with
$133 billion invested, yielding an income of $10 billion/year.
Investment by the Arab Gulf states in the US alone may have even-
tually reached $1 trillion (Aarts 1994: 3; Vassiliev 1998: 398–404).
Such investment in the core, in giving the Gulf elites a direct, often
personal, stake in the health of the Western economy, created an
incentive to moderate oil prices, thus limiting the revenues poten-
tially usable to develop the Arab world. Moreover, the sharp increase
in governmental spending on foreign imports and contracts fostered
classes of middlemen – bankers, lawyers, subcontractors for oil com-
panies, import-exporters, agents for Western firms – who made up
rent-seeking bourgeoisies enriching themselves on relations with the
West (Alnasrawi 1991: 21; Paul 1986: 18–22). At the same time, oil
also allowed local populations to be politically de-mobilised: thus,
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in Saudi Arabia the formerly radical middle-class nationalist move-
ment and the militant trade unions were peripheralised by the pat-
ronage and welfare spending oil revenues made possible (Vassiliev
1998: 474–82).
Second, oil much increased the security dependency of the Gulf
oil producers on the West. The combination of super-riches, weak-
ness and contested nationalist credentials, especially after the
Iranian revolution, turned these states to the West for protection in
a more overt and intensified way than hitherto. As part of the recy-
cling deal, the Arab oil producers spent a large part of their sur-
pluses – 32 per cent of their oil revenues from 1974 to 1998 – on
purchases of expensive and sophisticated Western arms. While in
1974 Saudi arms purchases absorbed only 7.5 per cent of the value
of its oil exports, in 1985 they absorbed 88 per cent; Saudi Arabia
alone accounted for 36 per cent of total American foreign arms sales
in 1977–82 (Alnasrawi 1991: 35, 114; Gause 1997; Vassiliev 1998:
398–9). These purchases deepened Saudi dependency on the US for
spare parts, upgrading, and contractors to run sophisticated equip-
ment. They were accompanied by a massive and intimate American
penetration of the Saudi military: sophisticated weapons systems
required extensive Saudi–American military planning and a large
(30,000–100,000-man) US training mission provided one US mili-
tary advisor for every six Saudi soldiers. American contractors
became involved in a vast array of imported development projects
from hospitals to water supplies, petrochemical complexes to
military bases (Cordesman 1984: 202, 205, 243, 349, 371, 380;
Vassiliev 1998: 441–4).
Expensive Western arms purchases were a Saudi way of buying
protection: they made Saudi control of oil acceptable in the West
and deepened the West’s stake in Saudi security. Thus, despite
having to conduct a fierce lobbying struggle against Zionist influ-
ence in the US Congress to get delivery of F-15s, the Saudis preferred
them over the readily obtainable French equivalent, because of the
decade of US political commitment to Saudi Arabia that the deal
would institutionalise (Cordesman 1984: 206; Dawisha 1979: 28).
The Saudis did not actually acquire autonomous control of many of
the new weapons systems. To get sophisticated aircraft they had to
agree to restrictions imposed to appease Israel; the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) intelligence-gathering air-
craft were operated by Americans and arguably gave the US a Saudi-
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financed flying base in the region which could be used for interven-
tion against Middle East states (Alnasrawi 1991: 111–17). Western
arms suppliers were candid that these arms deliveries contributed
little to the kingdom’s defence (Vitalis 1997); indeed, in 1990 Saudi
Arabia still could not, apparently, hope to deter a Iraqi invasion and
was forced to finance direct US intervention. After the second Gulf
War, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states signed new agreements
expanding basing for American forces used against Iraq. With the
return of foreign bases and protectorates, the pre-nationalist era
appeared to have been restored in the region. 
Arguably, Saudi oil policy was part and parcel of this new rela-
tionship. This policy reflected the al-Saud’s view of their responsibil-
ity to reconcile the interests of oil producers and consumers, ensure
the stability of oil markets and even protect the global economy
against the threats of inflation and recession from high energy
prices. The al-Saud came to see Western and Saudi interests as nearly
indistinguishable: oil price rises that damaged the Western economy
would damage Saudi investments, reduce demand for oil and stim-
ulate oil exploration in non-OPEC countries. The Saudis’ ‘swing
position’, that is, their unique ability, based on their huge pro-
duction capacity, large financial reserves and small population, to
manipulate prices by contracting or expanding production, gave
them powerful leverage to impose their will on other OPEC mem-
bers. They repeatedly used this to ensure stable oil supplies at
‘reasonable prices’ for the West. This meant confronting the OPEC
price hawks who, with large populations and ambitious develop-
ment plans, wanted to raise prices to maintain their real purchasing
power as inflation drove up the price of imports (Alnasrawi
1991:129; Spero 1990: 270). Thus, in 1975, the Saudis blocked the
desire of most OPEC members to increase oil prices to maintain
income amidst inflation and the declining value of the dollar. While
the real value of OPEC income declined perhaps 30 per cent, Saudi
threats of or actual over-production froze oil prices in the second
half of the 1970s (Dawisha 1979: 28–30). A second oil shock was
set off in 1978–80 owing to the Iranian revolution and the Iran–Iraq
war, which took some 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd.) off the
world market at a time of rising demand. Yet by 1980, the Saudis
had swamped the oil market with a 2.5 million bpd. oil surplus
(Alnasrawi 1991: 215). 
By the early 1980s, an oil glut had set in and market prices began
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to fall as a result of high Saudi and new non-OPEC production com-
bined with reduced demand from earlier high prices which had
sparked improved energy efficiency and recession in consumer
countries. Once prices started downward and maintaining them
meant cuts in production and revenues, the conflicting interests of
the OPEC states undermined their co-ordination (Alnasrawi 1991:
187–8). Countries started cheating on their quotas and, partly to
protect its market position, Saudi Arabia increased its production.
As OPEC production increased from 18.5 to 22.5 million bpd., the
price fell in 1988 to $13/barrel – in real terms below the pre-1974
level (Spero 1990: 284). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused oil
prices to briefly rise to $40/barrel as Iraqi and Kuwaiti production
stopped but the Saudis filled the gap and prices again fell (Aarts
1994: 6; Alnasrawi 1991: 198), dropping to a rock bottom $11 per
barrel in 1998 at a time when break-even costs averaged $15 per
barrel (The Middle East, March 1998, p. 35; May 1998, pp. 16–17).
Seemingly, OPEC power had been broken with the complicity of
the main OPEC producer. The al-Saud’s oil policy was pursued not
only at the immediate expense of other Middle East oil producers
but at cost to the country itself. Thus, Oil Minister Zaki Yamani
admitted that Saudi Arabia was pumping more than was rational
since oil in the ground was more valuable than assets in Western
banks (Alnasrawi 1991 133). By 1985 the Kingdom’s revenues had
plunged from $120 to $43 billion/year (Alnasrawi 1991: 208–12).
State budget revenues fell 32 per cent from 1981 to 1985 (Vassiliev
1998: 453). As a result of the Kuwait war and post-war arms pur-
chases, Saudi Arabia actually went into debt and had to begin liq-
uidating assets (Sadowski 1991). In 1998, the Saudi government,
suffering from a $12 billion budget deficit, was forced to reschedule
debt repayments and cut domestic spending. Arab financial power
had evaporated.
Not surprisingly, therefore, in the end, oil and OPEC did little to
alter the power imbalance shaped by the dependency system or to
challenge the dominance of core interests over the region. Saudi
Arabia had failed to use its leverage to achieve the agreed objective
of the Arab states, an equitable settlement of the Arab–Israeli con-
flict. Indeed, the oil embargo’s main ‘achievement’ was to empower
Sadat to engineer a separate Israeli–Egyptian peace that weakened
the Arab world to the advantage of Israel and the US. Subsequent
Arab impotence during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon showed that
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the Arab oil states had squandered whatever leverage they had once
had from the oil weapon. 
Oil, dependency, and the failure of regional development
It is a major irony that the effect of oil has been to deepen rather than
relieve the dependency of the region, with a host of negative devel-
opmental consequences (Kubursi 1999). To be sure, oil potentially
offered the opportunity to overcome economic dependency and
stimulate Pan-Arab economic development. According to Heikal
(1975: 261–2), the oil boom ushered in the triumph of tharwa –
resources, wealth – over thawra – revolutionary ideology; where oil-
less nationalist regimes failed economically, could not their Western-
friendly oil-rich rivals succeed in generating a regional economy
which would, better than nationalist ideology, lead to regional
strength? After all, oil revenues meant that the Middle East, or at
least its oil states, enjoyed capital surpluses, potentially sparing them
the haemorrhages of capital from interest on loans or the repatriated
profits of foreign investment from which other LDCs suffered.
While the Arab states individually lacked the ingredients of develop-
ment, on a regional basis they were much better endowed. The oil
states lacked skilled labour and arable land, but they had surplus
capital, while capital-poor states such as Egypt and Morocco pos-
sessed cheap semi-skilled labour and some states, notably Sudan,
had vast agricultural land. They had only to put these factors of pro-
duction together on a regional market and through joint investment
ventures.
Indeed, during the oil boom, the Arab world became the only Third
World region characterised by substantial intra-regional flows of
capital and labour, generating new interdependencies (Shafiq 1999).
The oil states transferred about 15 per cent of their capital surpluses
to the non-oil Arab states in the form of development and defence aid
while infitah policies opened the latter’s state-dominated economies
to external Arab investment. By 1989, there were 252 joint compa-
nies or projects with $17.9 billion in capital (another $12.3 billion if
firms with non-Arab partners are counted). There were also Pan-Arab
development funds with an additional $24.2 billion in assets. The
World Bank calculated that in the period of 1976–89 Arab govern-
mental and fund development assistance to needy Arab countries was
around $5.1 billion/year, totalling $70.8 billion (Sayigh 1999: 243).
This was accompanied by a rhetorical commitment to enhanced
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regional planning and co-operation through several Pan-Arab eco-
nomic institutions.
In addition, massive labour migration took place from poor to
rich states, which acquired manpower for their ambitious oil-
financed development while worker remittances flowed back to
stimulate the economies of the labour-exporting states. From 1970
to 1980 the number of Arabs working in other Arab countries had
swelled from 648,000 to nearly 4 million. In 1984 as many as
3 million Egyptians were working in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf. As many as a million Yemenis were working in the oil coun-
tries as well as large numbers of Jordanians, Palestinians and
Syrians. In 1980 two-thirds of the Kuwaiti labour force was made
up of non-Kuwaiti Arabs and half of the teachers in Saudi schools
were non-Saudi Arabs (Gause 1992: 462–4). About 70 per cent of
the Gulf labour force was made up of migrants, about 55 per cent
of which were Arabs. Due to migration, cross-regional income
inequalities from the oil boom were arguably significantly less than
they otherwise would have been (Shafiq 1999: 288–91, 296). 
Yet, despite the apparent advantage of oil reserves, the region
failed, non-oil Turkey and Israel aside, to produce a single credible
candidate for Newly Industrialised Country status for several
reasons. The oil industry remained an enclave in most local econo-
mies with few backward or forward linkages to stimulate develop-
ment and, using relatively small numbers of largely expatriate
labour, did little to upgrade human capital. Oil deepened technolog-
ical dependency, encouraging the wholesale import of material tech-
nology packaged by foreign consultants and contractors without
actual transmission of the technology itself (Sayigh 1999). In an Arab
version of the Dutch disease, industry and agriculture suffered from
rising labour costs and scarcities while excessive revenues were fun-
nelled into construction and services. The raised exchange values of
currencies deterred industrial and agricultural exports and flooded
domestic markets with cheap imports (Chatelus 1993: 152–4;
Chaudhry 1997: 186; Kubursi 1999: 310). Although oil permitted
large investments in health and education it reduced the incentive to
capitalise on these (Kubursi 1999: 311). The secure rent derived from
Western investments fostered a rentier mentality – satisfaction with
easy short-term profits which deterred risk-taking entrepreneurship
in the region (Padoan 1997: 184). And the oil money was seemingly
squandered: Arab gross fixed capital formation of $2,000 billion
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over the 1980–2000 decades produced only $380 billion in com-
bined Gross National Product (GNP).
What the oil boom did generate was a massive expansion in vul-
nerability to the world market. As measured by foreign trade/Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), vulnerability to the world market rose
from 50 to 84 per cent in the 1970–82 period; the geographic con-
centration of the foreign trade of the Arab states with the West also
increased: the West took 66 per cent of exports and provided 75 per
cent of imports in 1983. At the same time, oil generated a boom in
consumption demand, well beyond the productive capability of
local economies to meet, which translated into a massive import
dependency. In non-oil states the ratio of consumption to GDP for
1976–86 ranged between 80 and 96 per cent, in good part funded
by oil transfers, but inevitably leading to trade deficits and debt.
Food self-sufficiency fell: with 4 per cent of the world population,
the Arab world imported 29 per cent of the world’s cereal imports
(Alnasrawi 1991: 177). Regional states’ dependence on oil revenues
– instead of taxes and domestic investment – also made them
extremely vulnerable to big fluctuations in oil prices and declines in
oil revenues. In the 1980s, the terms of trade for manufacturing
imports turned against the region as oil prices softened while the
cost of imports never similarly declined. In fact, if the $355 billion
accumulated between 1972 and 1981 in the hands of the oil produc-
ers is adjusted by the import price index, it amounted to only $160
billion (Alnasrawi 1991: 102–7, 164–6, 177). 
When oil revenues fell sharply after 1986 and imports could not
be cut without risking political stability, a wave of borrowing was
unleashed. The ratio of external debt to GNP of the region increased
from 10 per cent in 1975 to 46 per cent in 1988 (Alnasrawi 1991:
165–6). Debt as a proportion of GNP was among the highest in the
world in five countries – Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Jordan.
Debt became a mechanism of capital drain to the core as debt service
of $38.7 billion exceeded new loans of $22.3 billion in 1983–8 while
the proportion of new loans devoted to interest payments increased.
Increased debt, combined with the export of capital, gave outside
donors and investors increased leverage over the terms of new loans
to the region (Alnasrawi 1991: 175; Chatelus 1993: 148, 154–7).
The austerity this enabled the IMF to impose for the sake of debt
repayment first hit investment levels, then state spending on health
and education, food subsidies and state employment. This, attacking
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the very basis of the ‘social contract’ in Middle Eastern states,
sparked ‘food riots’ across the region. Capital, previously exported
on a massive scale, was now being re-imported at the cost of debt,
concessions to foreign investment and the same dependency typical
elsewhere in the periphery.
At the same time, the positive potential of oil to foster Pan-Arab
integration was never realised. Pan-Arab investment and joint ven-
tures remained limited and no Arab investment market or Pan-Arab
bourgeoisie emerged since most Arab capital surpluses were recy-
cled to the West. According to Riad Ajami (Christian Science
Monitor, 27 August 1990), of the oil producers $125 billion in
direct foreign investment, only 3 per cent was invested in the Arab
world. Of total private Arab foreign investment, said by Ayubi
(1995: 161) to be $400 billion in 1989, 80 per cent went to the West
and only 10 per cent to the Arab world (Alnasrawi 1991: 163). By
the 1990s, 98 per cent of private Arab foreign investment was
outside the region. 
There are various reasons for this. The huge oil revenues earned
exceeded the immediate absorptive capacity of the region although
the capital transferred to the non-oil Arab countries nevertheless
filled only a third of these countries’ long-term needs. The state-
centric economies of the non-oil states were not entirely investor
friendly, although all of them were economically liberalising and
actively courting investors. The inescapable fact is that the oil pro-
ducers perceived their economic interest to lie in the West where
their deposits enabled them to live easily on rents rather than in the
region where risks and bureaucratic obstacles were high and entre-
preneurship was needed to turn a profit. On top of that, the oil
boom generated an off-shore Arab banking system, which, integrat-
ing Arab finances to the world economy, acted as a conduit for
capital flight. The region has the world’s highest rate of capital flight
to GDP – 100 per cent (Padoan 1997: 186). 
In other ways, too, oil failed to generate an inter-Arab economy.
Labour migration declined as a motor of regional interdependence
as oil prices fell. The proportion of regional trade barely increased
from the pre-oil era. The low proportional volume of intra-regional
trade to total trade is, of course, partly a function of the high propor-
tion of oil exports, but oil also fuelled the tendency of the oil states
to import from outside the region. Regional planning needed to
produce trade complementarity failed. There was little co-ordination
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of the oil era’s major regional investments in the petrochemical
industry, even though much of it was in the similar GCC states which
ended up duplicating each other’s facilities (Sayigh 1999). By the
1990s Arab trade was being polarised between two poles, with the
Maghreb increasingly trading with the EU and the Gulf with East
Asia.
While oil did not propel enough economic integration to gener-
ate an objective Pan-Arab interest that could override the stake of
regimes and dominant classes in the dependency relation, the geo-
graphical mal-distribution of oil reserves actually differentiated the
interests of the Arab states into oil and non-oil, rich and poor. Until
the 1970s, this had not been the case: in 1962, the oil states’
GNPs/capita averaged $270 and the non-oil states $164; the oil pro-
ducers accounted for only 36 per cent of Arab GNP and Egypt’s
GNP was double Saudi Arabia’s (Alnasrawi 1991: 17). Non-oil pro-
ducers had larger more diversified and advanced economies. But
from 1972 to 1974 Saudi income increased from 74 per cent of
Egypt’s to 234 per cent and by 1981 the share of the oil states in
Arab GNP had increased to 75 per cent (Alnasrawi 1991: 19), with
90 per cent of Arab oil revenues accruing to states whose combined
populations made up less than 10 per cent of the Arab world. By
1985, the 9.4 per cent of the Arab population in the GCC states got
45 per cent of the Arab GNP (Alnasrawi 1991: 156). Kuwait’s
$24,000 GNP/capita was 20 times Egypt’s. While oil states had
$220 billion in external assets, the rest of the Arab countries were
$112 billion in debt (Brown 1984: 256; Khalidi 1991a: Christian
Science Monitor, 19 February 1991). As a result, the Arab world
faced its own version of the north–south gap but, being based purely
on fortuitous factors rather than development or strength, was more
unnatural and probably even less legitimate. It is ironic that, gener-
ally, the most developed and populous Arab states with the human
resources and potential for diversified economies lacked capital;
while oil wealth was concentrated in the small tribal societies
lacking the human and natural diversity for development
(Alnasrawi 1991: 191).
The rich–poor cleavage enervated the notion of a common Arab
interest. The rich had an objective interest in solidifying the separ-
ate sovereignties which protected their accidental super privilege
while the poor Arab states still had a stake in an Arabism which
might entitle them to a share of the oil wealth. It is not accidental
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that Egypt and Syria long promoted the notion of oil as the common
Arab patrimony which should be used to promote Pan-Arab power
and prosperity and on which they had a claim as the main Arab mil-
itary powers that had incurred the costs of defending the Arab
world against Israel. In their subsidisation of the front-line states,
the Gulf states did seem to acknowledge a certain Pan-Arab obliga-
tion but it was for them self-evident that oil was the property of the
producing states and transfers would be at their discretion and
entail a political quid pro quo. The rich Gulf states not only have no
interest in a major redistribution, but the wealth gap is what gives
them counter-leverage over the advanced states, without which they
would become mere peripheries of the region. 
The conflict over the distribution of oil wealth had profoundly
damaging consequences for Arab security as well as Arab develop-
ment. In their dealings with their main ally, Egypt, in the mid-1970s,
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait concluded that their aid allowed Egyptians
to live a subsidised life and forced Egypt to agree to International
Monetary Fund (IMF) cuts in subsidies. This caused Egypt’s 1977
food riots and was a major factor in Sadat’s decision to shift his eco-
nomic dependence to the US in return for the separate peace with
Israel, thus rupturing the Arab world’s political solidarity. Moreover,
the reversal in the flow of oil resources to the non-oil states once oil
prices fell, caused economic stagnation and austerity in the poor
states, producing social unrest and resentment of the oil sheikhs who
people believed were squandering ‘Arab’ oil money or siphoning
it into foreign banks. This sentiment was effectively articulated
by Saddam Hussein and may have led him to believe the Arab
world would tolerate his absorption of Kuwait (Farsoun 1991;
Khalidi 1991a: 168–9; Edward Said in Christian Science Monitor,
13 August 1990). The Gulf war crisis – particularly the expulsion of
Palestinian, Jordanian and Yemeni workers from Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia – showed that the rich states manipulated access to capital
and jobs by other Arabs for their own political ends. They were seen
to deliberately replace Arab workers, who they feared might have
hidden political demands and some claim to a stake in the countries
where they worked, with Asian workers who were sure to return
home at the end of their short-term contracts.
The massive inter-Arab inequalities generated by oil make
extremely salient the function of the regional states system in main-
taining unequal – and external – control over the region’s main
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natural resource, oil (Bromley 1994: 106–18). To many people in
the region, the state system is seen, not as an expression of natural
national differences, but as a system of Western-constructed borders
designed to protect small, privileged populations in the Gulf against
demands for a wider distribution of oil revenues to the Arab popu-
lation. That militarily powerful poorer states are contiguous to
these extremely wealthy states with low military capability makes
for an anomalous and unstable situation wherein such insecure
regimes were inevitably dependent on protection by the world
hegemon, first Britain now the US, for their very survival. This struc-
ture embodies the classic dependency alliance between the ‘core of
the core’ (Western MNCs and governments) and the ‘core of the
periphery’ (Gulf sheikhs and citizens) at the expense of the periph-
ery (the Arab masses, the non-citizens in the Gulf). 
Renewed military penetration 
The decline of Arab oil power was paralleled by restoration of the
Western political-military penetration in the Gulf which had here-
tofore been much diluted. Indeed, after the 1970s withdrawal of the
British from the Gulf, this prize region threatened, from the Western
point of view, to become a power vacuum in which radicalism could
thrive. Under the Nixon Doctrine, Washington tried to fill it by
building up such regional surrogates as Iran under the Shah.
However, the fall of the Shah seemed to destroy the main pillar of
US policy in the Gulf. Washington’s inability to save him or force
the release of the American hostages taken in Iran and Lebanon
showed the limits of superpower influence in the Middle East. 
The US was, however, able to use local conflicts to restore its
position in the Gulf. The Iran–Iraq war neutralised the two main
anti-imperialist powers that had the potential to assert Gulf hege-
mony in place of Western influence. The US aimed to contain the
war’s spread, prevent victory by either side, and allow the two
warring states to wear each other down. When Iraq had the upper
hand, Washington traded arms for hostages with Iran, but when
Iran took the offensive, it tilted toward Iraq. Iraq’s dependence on
the Gulf oil states to prosecute its war with Iran and its accompany-
ing detente with Washington neutralised what had once been an
Arab nationalist obstacle to American penetration; Baghdad’s new
tilt toward Washington, in turn, enabled the pro-American Gulf
states to become much more overt in their American alignment
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without incurring Arab nationalist disapprobation. Washington
also successfully used the Arab Gulf states’ fear of Iran to strengthen
its Gulf alliances and presence. AWACS aircraft were introduced
into Saudi Arabia and bases established in Oman; as the ‘tanker
war’ escalated in 1986, Kuwait asked for international protection
(re-flagging) of its tankers, facilitating the injection of increased US
naval forces into the Gulf (Stork and Wenger 1991). After the
second Gulf War, the vulnerability of the Gulf’s oil rich but militar-
ily weak states made them so dependent on the West for security
against Iraq that it was inconceivable the oil weapon could again be
used in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Neither Arab nationalism nor oil were able to overcome the legacy
of fragmentation and dependency inflicted on the region by the West
and neither proved able to restore the Arab world or the Islamic
Middle East as a major world power. During the period when Cold
War splits in the core restrained Western intervention while Pan-
Arabism and later OPEC and the oil weapon relatively united the
region, the Middle East enjoyed considerable autonomy and carried
some weight in the international system. However, as the region
again fragmented, with the decline of Arabism, the drive to auton-
omy was reversed. The US was able to use the region’s economic
failures and conflicts, particularly the threat to the Arab states from
the non-Arab periphery, to contain the two main attempts – from
Arab nationalist Egypt and Islamic Iran – to challenge its hegemony.
The failure of nationalist economic development undermined the
economic base of independent foreign policies, most crucially in
Egypt. This facilitated Washington’s ability to exploit Israeli power
and diplomatic and economic aid to turn Egypt from a regional
buffer against American influence into a conduit for it. Similarly, the
US used Saudi Arabia’s need for protection from states such as Iran
and Iraq to enlist it in the moderation of oil prices and the neutral-
isation of the oil weapon. The core’s ‘bridgehead’ in the region was,
in the end, actually reinforced by the oil boom which gave the Gulf’s
ruling families a much greater stake in the core while dividing Arab
states between rich and poor. Washington needed only the with-
drawal and collapse of Soviet countervailing power to sweep all
before it; with the core relatively united behind the sole American
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hegemon and the region fragmented, many of the features of the
imperialist age started to be restored. This outcome could not be
attributed to the sagacity of American policy makers; with few ex-
ceptions, such as Kissinger’s Machiavellian manipulations, America
came out on top in spite of its own policy and, as Quandt (2001:
72) put it, ‘sometimes at extraordinary cost to the peoples of the
Middle East’. The continuing impact of the international system on
the region in the post-Cold War era is analysed in chapter 8.
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3
Identity and sovereignty in 
the regional system
The divergence of identity and territory: retarded nation-building? 
In the Westphalian model that European expansion ostensibly
globalised, a relative congruence between identity and sovereignty,
between nation and state, endows states and the states system with
legitimacy. Social mobilisation creates, in modernising societies,
receptivity to identification with larger communities – nations –
potentially coterminous with a state; in an age of nationalism, such
identity communities seek a state and state leaders seek to forge a
common national identity among their populations. Where the
drive to bring state and nation into correspondence is obstructed,
irredentist conflicts tend to destabilise regimes and foster inter-state
conflict. Nowhere is the divergence of identity and state sharper
than in the Middle East. There popular identification with many
individual states has been contested by strong sub- and supra-state
identities, diluting and limiting the mass loyalty to the state typical
where it corresponds to a recognised nation (Ayoob 1995: 47–70;
Hudson 1977: 33–55). 
Historically, identification with the territorial state has been
weak, with popular identify tending to focus on the sub-state unit –
the city, the tribe, the religious sect – or on the larger Islamic umma
(Weulersse 1946: 79–83). This is because states, the product of
outside conquerors, imported slave-soldiers without local roots, or
religio-tribal movements, typically disintegrated after a few genera-
tions and when a new wave of state-building came along the states’
boundaries were often radically different. Moreover, in an arid envi-
ronment of trading cities and nomadic tribes, peoples, notably the
Arabs, lacked the defined sense of territorial identity and attachment
to the land associated with peasant societies. The important excep-
tions, those societies with substantial peasantries – Turkey, Iran and
Egypt – are those where contemporary states most closely approxi-
mate national states. 
Aggravating the situation was the way the contemporary states
system was imposed at the expense of a pre-existing cultural unity
deriving from centuries of rule by extensive empires ruling in the
name of the Islamic umma. Where, historically, a common supra-
state identity had embraced local communities and a mosaic of
identity groups around an imperial centre, Western imperialism’s
creation of artificially bounded states divided the region into a
multitude of competing state units. Instead of the natural processes
of sorting out boundaries through war and dynastic marriage which
took place in the northern world, the boundaries of the modern
Middle East state system were arbitrarily imposed and frozen by the
Western powers according to their own needs, not indigenous
wishes (Ayoob 1995: 33). This process disrupted a multiplicity of
regional ties while reorienting many economic and communications
links to the Western ‘core’. In reaction, new supra-state ideologies,
expressive of the lost cultural unity, were increasingly embraced:
Pan-Arabism by the Arabic-speaking middle class and political
Islam among the lower middle classes. Both, at various times,
challenged the legitimacy of the individual states and spawned
movements promoting the unification of states as a cure for the frag-
mentation of the recognised community. The result has been that the
Arab world constitutes, in Kienle’s argument, a system of territorial
states, but not, so far, nation-states (Hudson 1977: 33–55; Kienle
1990: 1–30; Korany, 1988: 164–78). 
At the same time, all the states of the region suffered competition
from the mosaic of sub-state identities on which the state boundar-
ies were haphazardly imposed. There are ethnic minorities in all
Middle East countries, notably the Kurds, spread between Iraq,
Iran, Turkey and Syria, and the Berbers, who spill across North
African boundaries. Iran is the premier multi-ethnic society, its
Persian core flanked by Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs and
Baluchis. Religious pluralism is even more striking: Sunni Muslims
are the majority community in the Arab world, but not in particu-
lar states (Lebanon, Iraq) while Shi’a Muslims, the majority in Iran,
spill across the Arab region where they are pivotal minorities or
deprived majorities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Lebanon. Several
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Shi’a offshoots, notably the Druze, Ismailis and Alawis are histori-
cally important in Syria and Lebanon, while the Zaydis dominate
Yemen. Offshoots of the purist Kharijites are to be found in Oman
(Ibadies). A multitude of Christian minorities, divided by the lan-
guages of their liturgies or allegiances to Eastern Orthodoxy or
Rome, are scattered across the region. 
Where, as is frequent, such identity groups spill across borders
– becoming ‘trans-state’ – the lack of correspondence between
borders and identity may foster irredentism. This, in turn, may gen-
erate inter-state conflicts as states contest each others’ borders or
‘interfere’ in each others’ ‘domestic’ affairs by supporting irreden-
tist groups, a practice which may escalate into actual military con-
frontation between states. The best example of this is the case of the
Kurds who have been regularly used by their host states in their
rivalries with each other and who have attempted to exploit these
state rivalries in their struggle for national rights; this has regularly
led to inter-state conflict, notably between Syria and Turkey and
between Iran and Iraq. In Lebanon where a multitude of sects, never
effectively subsumed by a common Lebanese identity, led to civil
war, each warring sect sought outside patrons, thereby making
Lebanon a battlefield between other states, notably Israel and Syria
(Ayoob 1995: 7, 47–70; Gause 1992: 444–67). 
Against this reality must be set a century of ongoing state forma-
tion. The consolidation of regimes in individual states created vested
interests in the new fragmentation. State builders struggled to
contain the penetration of their territory by trans-state forces and
tenaciously defended their sovereignty against either a redrawing of
boundaries or the sub-state autonomy that might satisfy minority
demands. The individual Arab states have outlasted the Pan-Arab
movements that sought a solution to the ‘one nation-many states’
dilemma by merging them in Arab unionist projects such as the abor-
tive UAR between Egypt and Syria. States effectively balanced
against efforts to export Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic revolution. The
insecurity of the states system spurred state formation and a greater
acceptance at elite levels of mutual respect for sovereignty. Moreover,
the international system, in guaranteeing state borders, obstructed
Bismarkian attempts at forceful absorption of neighbouring states,
such as Saddam Hussein’s attempt to absorb Kuwait. Thus, the
borders imposed at the birth of the state system remain largely intact.
The durability of the states system does not necessarily imply the
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stability or legitimacy of the individual states which, indeed, have
suffered from chronic legitimacy deficits ultimately rooted in the
shallowness of popular identifications with them. If, however, the
states are here to stay, as seems likely, the challenge of state-builders
is to reconcile such individual statehood with popular identity.
This may, indeed, be happening for identities are plastic and that
which triumphs in a state is the ‘constructed’ product of contesta-
tion by rival leaders and movements. State-builders who command
the instruments of socialisation – mass media, mass education –
enjoy a decisive advantage in promoting a certain identity among
the rising generation. However, it is by no means the case that all
identities have equal chances of success; rather, the pre-existence of
linguistic unity, facilitating social communication between elites and
masses of a particular group (while obstructing it across groups),
and historic memories of a common community give decisive advan-
tage to some identities over others that may appear ‘artificial’, such
as a ‘Babylonian’ identity for Iraq or the Ottomanism that ulti-
mately proved impotent against Slavic, Arab and Turkish national-
isms having linguistic roots. Given the greater popular credibility of
Arab-Islamic identity over most alternatives, rulers in the contem-
porary Arab states vacillate between legitimising themselves as
Arab-Islamic leaders and relying on state identities; they cannot
fully rely on Arabism or Islam since their borders are not congruent
with the Arab or Islamic communities, and adherence to Arabism
may sacrifice state interests; yet they cannot fully rely on state iden-
tities which lack sufficient credibility (Anderson 1991: 72). They
may try to overcome this dilemma by ‘statising’ a supra-state iden-
tity as the official state ideology, as when Ba’thist Syria claims to be
the special champion of Arabism or Saudi Arabia of Islam. 
While the multitude of identities from which citizens can choose
seems compatible with a post-modern world, the considerable
extent to which this means states cannot depend on being their
citizens’ primary political loyalty, has pushed state-builders into
authoritarian strategies. The more stable Arab states have, with few
exceptions, advanced through a process of primitive power accumu-
lation, in which authoritarian state-builders established tightly knit
ruling cores through extensive use of sub-state loyalties (kin, tribe,
sect) while exploiting supra-state identities – Arabism and Islam –
as official ideologies. But this is a vicious circle: such reliance on top-
down state building has limited the mass mobilisation that was a
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crucial ingredient in the West’s prototype nation-building and comes
at the expense of the democratic inclusion and minority rights which
could, in principle, generate a sense of common territorial citizen-
ship from which new state-centric identities might develop. As such,
most Middle Eastern states still face powerful competition for the
loyalty of their citizens from both sub- and supra-state identities and
these remain powerful tools for the mobilisation of opposition
against state establishments. Significantly, nation-building has pro-
ceeded with most success in Turkey, Israel and Iran where indige-
nous state-builders were able to determine borders and ensure a
rough correspondence between them and the dominant identity. 
Alternative identities and foreign policy
Pan-Arab nationalism and its rivals
There was every reason why an Arab identity would be uniquely
compelling for the citizens of most of the Arab states. These states,
mostly successors of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, retained a cultu-
ral similarity. Most important, a common Arabic language – the
critical ingredient of nationhood – existed. The ‘awakening’ of Arab
identity was a product of the spread of mass education and literacy,
especially in the 1950s and often by the Egyptian teachers recruited
across the Arab world who helped form the educated middle class.
The spread of a standardised Arabic in newspapers and radio made
the language more homogeneous, stunting the evolution of national
dialects as the linguistic basis of separate nations. The recent advent
of Arab satellite TV has sharply reinforced cross-border participa-
tion in a common discourse. All this makes the Arab world, in
Noble’s (1991: 56) words, a ‘vast sound chamber’ in which ideas
and information circulate widely. In addition, similar food, mar-
riage and child-rearing practices, music and art are recognisable
region-wide. Extended family ties frequently crossed borders and
cross-border immigration has been constant: in the 1950s there
were major flows of Palestinian refugees; since the 1970s labour
migration to the Gulf oil-producing states has been substantial.
Niblock (1990) argues that the interests of the separate states are
too intertwined – by labour supply, investment funds, security,
water, communications routes, and the Palestine issue – for them to
develop self-sufficient coherence. Long after the creation of the Arab
states system, Noble (1991: 57) could credibly argue that the Arab
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world was less well represented by realism’s impenetrable ‘billiard
balls’ in which governments insulated domestic society from foreign
influence than by a set of interconnected organisms separated only
by porous membranes. 
As a result, supra-state identities – Arabism and Islam – are, for
many people, more emotionally compelling than identification with
the state. There is a widespread feeling of belonging to a distinct
Arab World (al-’alam al-arabi). According to a 1978 survey of
respondents throughout the Arab world, 78 per cent believed the
Arabs constituted a nation, 53 per cent believed the state boundar-
ies were artificial and the vast majority supported doing away with
them in favour of a larger, perhaps decentralised state (Korany
1987: 54–5). Arabism is enshrined in state constitutions: Jabbour
found thirteen Arab constitutions which defined the nation as the
Arab nation, with only Lebanon and Tunisia referring to a Lebanese
and Tunisian nationhood (Ayubi 1995: 146). Uniquely in the Arab
world, not this or that border, but state boundaries in general, have
been seen by many Arabs to be arbitrarily and externally imposed
at the expense of Arabism, and hence lack the legitimacy and sanc-
tity they enjoy elsewhere. At the level of formal ideology, this senti-
ment was manifest in the doctrines of Pan-Arab nationalism which
viewed all Arabic speakers as forming a nation, the states of which
ought to act in concert or be confederated, or, in its most ambitious
form (as in Ba`thism), be merged in a single state embracing this
nation.
It is not that most Arabs adamantly reject contemporary state
boundaries and even Arab nationalists have not necessarily insisted
on a single Arab state. But the extreme fragmentation of the region
is viewed as a divide and rule strategy by imperialism and a cause of
Arab weakness. Historical memories of greatness under unity and
experience that the Arabs are successful when they act together (e.g.
the 1973 war and use of the oil weapon), and are readily dominated
when divided, keep Arabism alive. So does the sense of common vic-
timisation: the Crusades are part of every school boy or girl’s histor-
ical world view; the loss of Palestine is seen as a common Arab
disaster; and the 1967 war shamed all Arabs, not just the defeated
front-line states. In the 1990s, the suffering imposed on Iraqis by the
Western economic sanctions was not seen as the affliction of another
nation which, however regrettable, was not the business of Syrians
or Tunisians, but as humiliation and pain inflicted on members of
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the same community. On the other hand, the relative success of Arab
armies in the 1973 war inspired solidarity across the region and all
Arabs shared Lebanon’s euphoria at Israel’s evacuation of southern
Lebanon under Hizbollah pressure in June 2000. 
As against these Pan-state sentiments, there have always been ter-
ritorial fault lines in the region which could potentially underlie iden-
tities supportive of territorial-based (as opposed to linguistically or
ethnically-based) separate nations. Harik (1987: 19–46) argued that
a viable basis of statehood (or even nationhood) exists in a multitude
of geographical entities with distinct historical experiences: where
minority sects established autonomous regimes (Yemen, Oman,
Lebanon); where tribal or tribal-religious movements founded
regimes (Saudi Arabia); where Mamluk elites achieved autonomy as
Ottoman power declined (Tunisia, Algeria). The Western imposition
of the contemporary state system on these ‘proto-nations’, defining
permanent boundaries that protected them from absorption and,
endowing them with ruling elites and state apparatuses, crystallised
their individuality.
The result is that multiple levels of identity co-exist in varying
ways, from cases where identification with the separate states over-
shadows without wholly displacing Arabism to those where state
identities remain subordinate to the sense of being an Arab. At the
first end of the continuum is an oil city-state such as Kuwait where
Farah’s study (1980: 141–2) found state identification came first
(24.3 per cent), then religious affiliation (14.4 per cent) and Arabism
last. If Kuwait were acknowledged to be a mere part of the Arab
nation, then Kuwaiti oil would be an Arab patrimony to be equita-
bly shared with other parts of the Arab nation, not least the legions
of Arab expatriates working in Kuwait. The geographically separate
Maghreb has always identified less with Arab nationalism than
local statehood. Some Tunisian writers defend the idea of a distinct
Tunisian nation and Morocco has a long history under an indepen-
dent dynasty (Ayubi 1995: 144). Yet in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war
Morocco’s pro-Western ruler thought it to his domestic advantage to
send a contingent of troops to the far-off Syrian front; and the strong
reaction in the Maghreb to the 1991 Western attack on Iraq showed
that Arab–Islamic identities remain powerful, if usually latent.
In Egypt where a strong sense of territorial identity is based on
the Nile valley and a history of statehood predating the Arabs, theo-
rists such as Louis Awad contrast the ‘reality’ of an Egyptian nation
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with the ‘myth’ of an Arab nation (Ayubi 1995: 144). Yet Egyptian
identity is Arab-Islamic in content, and attempts to construct alter-
native definitions of Egyptianness – -‘Pharaonic’ or ‘Mediterranean’
– have failed. Thus, even in the late 1970s when Egypt was with-
drawing from Pan-Arab commitments and engaged in bitter dis-
putes with other Arab states, a survey of high-status Egyptians
(normally less receptive to Arabism) indicated that, although 71.3
per cent identified with Egypt first, 71.1 per cent said Egypt was a
part of the Arab nation, indeed the natural leader of the Arabs
(Hinnebusch 1982: 535–61). This strong sense of kinship with the
Arab world meant that decisions taken purely on grounds of state
interest – Egypt’s separate peace with Israel, membership in the Gulf
War coalition – which would be perfectly natural were Egypt a con-
solidated nation-state, were extremely controversial and probably
damaging to regime legitimacy. 
In many Mashreq cases, where externally imposed borders cor-
responded to no history of independent statehood, much less
nationhood, Arabism was the dominant identity. It is no accident
that the main Pan-Arab nationalist movement, Ba’thism, was born
in Syria, and was most successful there and in Iraq and Jordan. If
the natural geo-historical unit, bilad ash-sham (historic and geo-
graphical Syria), might have supported a viable nationhood, its arti-
ficial fragmentation into four mini-states prevented the truncated
rump from becoming a strong uncontested focus of identity; the
attempt to generate a non-Arab Syrian national identity by the
Syrian Social Nationalist Party came to nothing, although when a
Pan-Syrian identity is defined as Arab in content, it carries reso-
nance. In Iraq, the opposite case of an artificial state constructed by
throwing rival communal groups together, Arabism was embraced
by some as the only satisfying solution. 
Inter-Arab politics amidst supra-state identity: the contest of Pan-
Arabism and state sovereignty
The power of supra-state identity and the absence of nation-states
arguably makes for a different, even unique, kind of regional system
in the Arab core of the Middle East. Rather than an international
system of self-contained national communities whose borders dis-
tinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the Arab world might better be
seen as an ‘overarching Arab polity’ within which the individual
states constitute a set of semi-permeable autonomous units (Kienle
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1990: 9, 27; Sela 1998: 9–10). Yet, these units are sovereign and the
supra-state community, lacking a common centralised authority, is
‘anarchic’. Combining sovereignty with shared identity and norms,
this system is closer to Bull’s (1995) ‘international society’, than to
an ‘international system’ defined merely by mutual vulnerability and
insecurity; but supra-state identity in the Arab world is arguably
stronger than in Bull’s Western-inspired model. In such a system,
where sovereign states are embedded in a supra-state community,
state actors arguably must respond both to the competitive dynam-
ics of the state system and to the norms deriving from shared iden-
tity (Barnett 1998: 10–11; 25–7).
In this system, as constructivist Michael Barnett (1998) argues,
shared Arab identity infuses the content of the foreign policy roles
which states assume and generates norms that constrain state sove-
reignty. The core issues that define Arabism are rejection of Western
domination, defence of the Palestine cause, the desirability of Arab
unity, and the expectation that the Arab states should act in concert
in world politics in defence of all-Arab interests. Because the actions
of one state regarding common Arab issues affects them all, all have
an interest in participating in the definition of all-Arab interests and
norms through Arab collective institutions such as the Arab League
and the Arab summit system (Barnett 1998: 2, 7; Sela 1998: 12;
Thompson 1970).
Yet, just because the Arab world has made up a single political
arena, region-wide inter-state conflict has been endemic. Because
boundaries lacked the impenetrability or sanctity of the Westphalian
system, with ideological influences and trans-state movements
readily crossing state lines, each state was highly sensitive to and vul-
nerable to the actions of others. In this context, aspirations for Pan-
Arab leadership were realistic and rivals had an incentive to
manipulate trans-state ideological appeals in ways that would be
ineffective and viewed as a violation of sovereignty in a conventional
states system. The game was played by ideological or symbolic com-
petition in which leaders ambitious for Pan-Arab leadership, trum-
peting their own Arab credentials and impugning those of rivals,
sought to sway public opinion and to mobilise the Arab ‘street’ to
pressure (even overthrow) rival governments from below. The effec-
tiveness of such cross-border appeals to the populations of other
states was itself testimony to the existence of common identities and
norms transcending borders. 
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Such a unique context should make the conduct of inter-Arab
politics qualitatively different from international politics, but how
far this is so is a matter of controversy between constructivists and
realists like Stephen Walt who, in his classic realist study, The Origin
of Alliances (1987), insists that the region demonstrates the univer-
sality of realist rules. For him, Arabism was not a constraint on sov-
ereignty but an instrument of power used, much like an army, by
stronger states pursuing their ‘national interests’ against weaker
ones. The reality is, however, far more complex than this and there
is evidence that inter-Arab state behaviour has departed in key ways
from that typical in a conventional states system. 
Inter-Arab competition was intense, but it was quite different
from a conventional ‘realist’ power struggle. It was not chiefly over
territory or other tangibles but over the desired normative order of
the Arab system. Crucially, the typical currency in this struggle – in
stark contrast to that between the Arab and non-Arab Middle East
– was not military power but ideological appeal: it was legitimacy,
derived from being perceived to observe the norms and play roles
grounded in Arabism, which gave the power to affect outcomes
(Barnett 1998: 2, 6, 16; Noble 1991: 61). The struggle over the
Baghdad Pact was not resolved by the distribution of military power
but by Nasser’s winning the normative debate over the desired
regional order (Barnett 1998: 16). Nasser’s blessing was sought and
his censure feared not because of his army but because he was seen
as the guardian of Arab nationalist norms and could bolster or
subvert the domestic legitimacy of other leaders. Before Nasser,
Egypt had enjoyed no such advantage over its Arab rivals and after
he died, Egypt’s trans-state power dissipated overnight; for while its
material power had barely changed, his successor had none of the
moral authority that had enabled him to make Egypt a pole of
attraction for the populations of other states (Hudson 1999: 86). 
To speak of a supra-state community assumes that common
norms, regimes, or collective institutions, to some extent substitute
for the absent common government in constraining the use of vio-
lence in political competition. In the inter-Arab game, low-level vio-
lence was part of the inter-Arab game: Arab nationalist activists
who tried to subvert or overthrow governments in other states were
sometimes recruited and supported by revisionist states, chiefly
Nasser’s Egypt; but this was a struggle over the balance of political
opinion, not a contest of military forces, and arguably, such conduct
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was borderline between what would be expected in a states system
and what would be acceptable in a political community. 
Walt rightly argues that, even at the height of Pan-Arabism, bal-
ancing against the Egyptian hegemon was pervasive within the Arab
world, at the expense of co-operation for common interests. This
was practised not just by the conservative monarchies but even by
ostensibly Pan-Arab regimes in Syria and Iraq when Nasser posed a
threat to them. However, what he neglects is that the threat from
Nasser was not military and that the balancing took the form of
propaganda and, in the long run, the state-building needed to
immunise regimes from Pan-Arab ideological penetration. More-
over, Pan-Arab norms did put far greater restraints on state actors
than the rules of sovereignty in a Westphalian state system, exclud-
ing certain non-Arab alliance partners which might have made sense
from a power-balancing perspective, notably alliances of the weaker
Arab monarchies with Israel against stronger radical republics. Pan-
Arabism was initially constructed in the successful struggle to
require the Arab states to adhere to a Pan-Arab collective security
pact rather than a Western-dominated one (the Baghdad Pact). 
Finally, Pan-Arabism was never merely a state instrument, not
even of Nasserite Egypt, which most successfully exploited it. Pan-
Arab movements, trans-state in organisation and ‘multi-state’ in
composition, were autonomous of Cairo; they used Nasser as much
as he used them and they constantly pressured him into increasing
his commitment to the common cause against his own better judge-
ment. Even if Arabism was manipulated to serve the interests of
states in their competition more than to advance all-Arab interests,
this competition tended, Barnett argues, to establish norms of beha-
viour that constrained all states.
The bottom line is that the embedding of a states system in a
supra-state community built an enduring tension into the Arab
system between the logic of sovereignty, in which each separate
state, insecure amidst the anarchy of a states system, pursues its own
interests and security, often against its Arab neighbours, and the
counter norm which expects states sharing an Arab identity to act
together for common interests. Given this enduring rivalry between
the norms of sovereignty and Pan-Arabism, what weight should be
given to each was inevitably a product of contestation. Moreover,
because Pan-Arab norms were themselves never fixed and had to be
adapted to changing conditions, they were always open to consid-
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erable interpretation: what kinds of foreign policies were compat-
ible with Arabism – that is, how far ties to the West were permitted,
the conditions of a settlement with Israel, etc. – was never self-
evident. As such, Pan-Arabism itself developed over time through
what Barnett (1998: 6, 28, 40) calls inter-Arab ‘dialogues’. And, as
a result of this process, the balance between Pan-Arabism and sov-
ereignty altered, swinging first against sovereignty and then back in
its favour. 
While the ingredients of Arab identity long existed, it was, ironi-
cally, inter-Arab leadership competition that played a central role in
the overt ‘construction’ of Arab identity and the institutionalisation
of its norms. In the 1950s and 1960s, a process of ‘outbidding’ took
place in which rival state leaders sought to mobilise mass support by
escalating the standards and radicalising the goals of Arabism. This
led to demands first for more militancy toward imperialism and
greater integral unity between Arab states (as embodied in the UAR
and subsequent unity projects) and later for greater militancy on
behalf of the Palestine cause. Once begun, this was a game that all
parties had to play in order to win or retain popular support. Even
status quo elites were forced to protect their domestic support
against external subversion by asserting or defending their own Arab
nationalist credentials (Barnett 1998: 47–52; Kienle 1990: 1–30).
This provided conditions for a Pan-Arab hegemon to emerge as
Nasser, having attained the status of a Pan-Arab hero, sought to
institutionalise Pan-Arabism in an informal ‘international regime’
which laid down a foreign policy consensus on core Arab issues
largely enforced by Egypt but which outlived the decline of the
Egyptian hegemon by at least a decade (Jourjati 1998; Telhami 1990:
84–106).
This contest between Arabism and sovereignty was not exclu-
sively played out at the inter-state level and a state’s adoption of
Pan-Arabism (or not) was in good part a result of internal power
struggles. The most successful political movements inside the Arab
states in the 1950s mobilised their constituents under the banner of
Arabism: radical versions of Arabism were normally the ideologi-
cal weapon of rising social forces with an interest in change, specif-
ically the new middle class challenging the oligarchy in the 1950s.
Ex-plebeian elites newly arrived in power, especially in states inse-
cure in their separate identity or those with the potential for
Pan-Arab leadership, used Pan-Arabism to legitimise their often
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precarious rule. Sovereignty, on the other hand, was the ideology of
satisfied social forces, normally traditional elites on the defensive
and without the potential for Pan-Arab leadership.
At a certain point, however, Pan-Arabism began an apparent
decline or at least underwent a reinterpretation to the advantage of
sovereignty. This ‘de-construction’ was, in the first instance, a result
of the interaction of state leaders. Over time the competition and
insecurity natural in a states system, particularly where regimes were
vulnerable to trans-state subversion, reinforced the territorial diffe-
rentiation between the individual states; moreover, from the begin-
ning, those states whose sovereignty was threatened by Nasser’s
attempt to impose Pan-Arab uniformity formed anti-hegemonic alli-
ances against Cairo. Also, inter-Arab rivalry, forcing competitors
to act on their Pan-Arab rhetoric, ‘entrapped’ Arab leaders in un-
realistic or risky commitments potentially costly or damaging to the
interests of the individual states. This tendency climaxed in the pro-
vocative rhetoric by which Syria and Egypt blundered into the 1967
war with Israel. Once the costs of outbidding had become prohibi-
tive and were incurred by many individual states, the scene was set
for a mutual de-escalation of ideological competition. Especially
after 1967, formerly radical elites, now fighting for their very survi-
val at home, agreed with conservative counterparts to make the
Arab summits system the arena for a mutual deflation of the stan-
dards of Arabism. The most portentous outcome of this was the col-
lective legitimisation of a political settlement with Israel in return for
its evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967. The normative
balance started to shift from Arabism toward sovereignty, notably
in the growing acceptance of the view that Pan-Arab norms had
to be defined by an inter-elite consensus in which the interests of the
individual states would inevitably be prioritised. The Arab sum-
mits became a system through which attempts were made to recon-
cile agreement on common Arab interests with state sovereignty
(Barnett 1998: 40–52; Sela 1998: 3–8).
However, the much-increased insecurity issuing from Israel’s over-
whelming post-1967 superiority and the growing militarisation of
the conflict increasingly encouraged a resort to ‘self-help’ among the
front-line states. While this insecurity could, in principle, have issued
in the strengthening of Arab collective solidarity against the common
Israeli threat, the relative ineffectiveness of collective institutions
stimulated, instead, the build-up of individual state capabilities and
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the individual search for diplomatic exit from war and occupation.
Although this did not rule out such alliances as that between Syria
and Egypt in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, thereafter the same Egypt
that had once enforced Pan-Arab standards now pioneered their sac-
rifice to individual state interests in its acceptance of a separate peace
with Israel. This, in dramatically increasing the insecurity of other
Arab states, notably Syria, encouraging them to similarly look to self-
help through militarisation. The Iran–Iraq war had a similar effect in
the Gulf. The increase in threats and in state capabilities from the
arms race unleashed by these wars between Arab and non-Arab
states, moreover, started to militarise inter-Arab disputes as well, and
these were now more often over territory than Arab legitimacy: there
were only ten such conflicts between 1949 and 1967 but nineteen
between 1967 and 1989 (Barnett 1998: 203). Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait marked a new order of magnitude in this tendency. In this
new environment where survival depended more on raw military
power than success in ideological competition, the world of construc-
tivism was giving way to that of realism.
Finally, the 1970s oil boom had an ambivalent but mostly dele-
terious effect on Arabism. On the one hand, it generated trans-state
movements of labour and capital that, to an extent, integrated the
Arab world; oil aid was used to heal inter-Arab conflicts, making the
summit system more effective. On the other hand, oil differentiated
the interests of the Arabs into rich and poor, detached the oil pro-
ducers’ interests from the Pan-Arab interest, and funded arms races
that increased security dilemmas between Arab states. At the domes-
tic level, oil financed a decade of state-building which made states’
populations less susceptible to trans-state ideological mobilisation
and allowed the formerly Pan-Arab middle classes to be co-opted by
the individual states. As the Pan-Arab mobilisation of the public
declined, elites were freer to put state interests over Pan-Arab inter-
ests in their foreign policies. Ironically, Pan-Arab movements were
transformed into state parties and Arabism became an official ideol-
ogy used to legitimise the sometimes state-centric policies of individ-
ual states. 
Political Islam and the international relations of the Middle East
Whether political Islam – which rose parallel with the decline of
Arabism from the late 1970s – constitutes a functional substitute for
Arabism as a supra-state ideology is a matter of debate. It is far from
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clear that Islam similarly detracts from the legitimacy of the individ-
ual states. Vatikiotis (1987: 42–4) argues that Islam withholds legit-
imacy from nationally separate states in the name of a Pan-Islamic
umma and that its call for the rule of God deters the sense of
national citizenship that could solidify identifications with a terri-
torial state. Others, however, argue that Islam takes distinctive
‘national’ forms compatible with individual statehood as well as
secularisation and democratisation (Eickelman 1998; Ibrahim
1997). Middle Eastern rulers have routinely used Islam to legitim-
ise their regimes. To be sure, political Islam has become the main
ideology of protest and Islamic movements constitute the main
political opposition in most Middle East states. In some ways, just
as Pan-Arabism was the ideology of the rising middle class before it
acquired a stake in individual states, so political Islam is that of the
marginalised petty bourgeoisie and masses who have been left out
of state patronage networks, have carried the heaviest costs of the
post-oil-boom structural adjustments in the region and who there-
fore remain susceptible to a supra-state ideology. But Islamic move-
ments typically seek to Islamise the state, not to abolish it and
arguably their objection is to the secularity of the individual states,
not to their existence. Where regimes permit it, Islamists join the
political process to work toward the Islamisation of public life,
and states, in responding to this by Islamising their rhetoric, as well
as their education, law and media, have arguably satisfied some
Muslim discontent with the secular state; even when Islamists are
excluded from politics, they often seek to create their own civil
society – schools, welfare societies, businesses – in order to Islamise
the state from the bottom up. This partial Islamisation of the state
may be bringing it into greater congruence with society. In other
cases, such as Syria or Algeria, regimes, battle hardened by facing
down Islamic movements, now present more obdurate articles to
Islamic revolution than heretofore. Facing stronger states than their
Pan-Arab analogues ever did, Islamic movements have arguably
been forced to concentrate on creating Islamic societies within indi-
vidual states rather than seeking a Pan-Islamic order. 
The impact of Islam on the international behaviour of states is
even more ambiguous. Although secular Arabism and political Islam
have ideologically incompatible visions of domestic order, and
although the boundaries of the Arab and Islamic worlds are not coter-
minous, the foreign policy preferences of political Islamists and Arab
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nationalists largely reinforce each other. Islam and Arabism both pri-
oritise Arab or Islamic unity over individual reason of state; both
insist on economic and cultural autonomy of the Western-dominated
world system and both reject the legitimacy of Israel. Nationalist and
Islamic identities overlap. Thus, radical Islamic movements such as
the Movement of the Islamic Resistance (HAMAS) and Hizbollah are
as much manifestations of Arab national resistance to Israel as they
are of Islamic resurgence; Islam has become the ideology of trans-
state terrorist networks that are animated by grievances almost indis-
tinguishable from those of Arab nationalism: the Western presence in
the Gulf, the victimisation of Iraq, the Palestine cause.
To be sure, Islamic movements have not, even where Islamists
managed to gain access to the levers of power (as in Turkey in 1997)
or amassed influence in the legislature (as in Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Yemen), been able to force a significant Islamisation of
the foreign policy of states. Yet, given the continued legitimacy def-
icits of the individual states and their inability to find a credible legit-
imising substitute for Arabism or Islam, state elites still need to
be seen to defend Arab–Islamic norms in the face of a public
now aroused by Islamic rather than Pan-Arab movements. Even if
regimes can now more easily weather dissent in the streets than hith-
erto, there is still a legitimacy cost to be paid for openly violating
such norms and in certain circumstances Islamic activists have been
able to call leaders to account for that; arguably the assassination of
Sadat was in part for his separate peace with Israel while the Islamic
rebellion against Asad’s Syria was in part a result of the legitimacy
loss suffered by the regime for its intervention in Lebanon against
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), keeper of the Palestine
cause (Noble 1991: 53–4). Particularly in time of crisis with Israel
or the West, the older generation of Arab nationalists and younger
Islamic militants have come together to put pressure on regimes
from below and it is chiefly the fear of de-legitimisation at home
which forces states to justify, disguise or refrain from policies that
affront the Arab–Islamic identity of their populations.
Islamic movements have in a few cases seized state power and in
the most significant case, that of Iran, the Islamic regime explicitly
sought to export a Pan-Islamic revolution. Iran aimed to create
similar Islamic states that would have been expected to pursue
similar policies, namely challenging ‘world arrogance’ –-the United
States and its regional client regimes – in the name of the oppressed
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(mustaza’fin) of the Muslim and Third worlds (George 1996: 82).
Iran’s example and encouragement did much to spread Islamic
movements and opposition across the region. But early post-Cold
War fears of an all-powerful supra-national Islamic threat sweeping
away status quo regimes proved unfounded. The export of Islamic
revolution was contained, not least by the alignment of the mildly
Islamic Gulf states with secular Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war. No secular
regime was overthrown; rather, it was Iran’s Islamic ideologues who
were pushed from power by pragmatists. Although there are now
more overtly Islamic states than hitherto, these regimes – in
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan – are too dif-
ferent from each other to constitute a Pan-Islamic axis: they profess
different versions of Islamic ideology and are more often than not
in open conflict with each other. 
At the supra-state level, there is no evidence of a Pan-Islamic
‘regime’ comparable to Nasserist Arabism, which could enforce
agreed norms regarding what constituted an ‘Islamic’ foreign
policy (George 1996: 79–80). There is a Pan-Islamic institution, the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), but, significantly,
its charter acknowledges state sovereignty, it has no power to co-
ordinate common action and it has been paralysed by rivalries, such
as that between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Many Muslim countries,
encouraged by the OIC, have provided aid to Muslims in conflict
with non-Muslims (as in Bosnia and Palestine); but few Muslim
states were prepared to take economic or military risks for such
causes. The OIC did have some success in articulating a Muslim
consensus on international issues that affected the Muslim world.
Thus, after the 11 September events, the OIC condemned terrorism
but rejected ‘any linkage between terrorism and rights of Islamic
and Arab peoples, including the Palestinian and Lebanese . . . to self-
determination . . . [and] resistance to foreign occupation [which are]
legitimate rights enshrined in the United Nations charter’ (OIC
Qatar communiqué, 10 October 2001 in Murden 2002: 204).
Ironically, at the international level, the OIC was a defender of state
sovereignty and international law – embracing the principles of the
states system as defensive barriers against Western hegemony
(Murden 2002: 197–204). But the OIC could hardly be said to con-
stitute an effective Muslim bloc in world politics. In Murden’s
judgement, it is in the battle for culture in the homes and streets of
the Islamic world that Islam is most potent: ‘In a world rapidly being
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swallowed by an all-pervasive global system, Islam [is] a diffuse
grassroots counter-hegemony’ (Murden 2002: 204). 
In summary, while decision-makers cannot wholly ignore politi-
cal Islam in foreign policy making, no Islamisation of foreign policy
has resulted. It is, however, probably premature to conclude that
political Islam has been tamed by the states system in a way similar
to the fate of Pan-Arabism. 
Territorial identity and foreign policy in the non-Arab periphery
Political identity is, of course, constructed and need not necessarily
be rooted in either Arab ethno-nationalism or political Islam. The
territorial state based on habitation of a common territory – espe-
cially where boundaries correspond to some historical memory –
and equal citizenship rights under a common government could
become an alternative or reinforcing basis of identity and legitimacy
in the Middle East. In the Arab states, this potential has been
retarded by the very limited extent to which citizens have acquired
the rights needed to feel the state is ‘theirs’. 
It is in the non-Arab states where territory has more closely coin-
cided with ethnic-linguistic identity and/or a history of separate
statehood that entities approximating territorial nation-states have
been consolidated. Turkey and Iran have long histories as separate
imperial centres and have constructed modern nations around their
dominant ethnic-linguistic cores with considerable success despite
the unfinished task of integrating a multitude of minorities, above
all the Kurds. Israel’s very identity as a state is inseparable from its
role as a homeland for Jews, despite its Arab minority and diverse
ethnic origins. This more established identity, in turn, has made
democratisation less risky, consolidating identification with these
states.
These relatively secure identities may be more compatible with
state-centric reason of state than are supra-state identities such as
Pan-Arabism, but they are not necessarily less revisionist or the pol-
icies they inspire less conflictual. Trans-national ideologies, such as
Pan-Turkism, Zionism and Islam, have still played important roles
in each of the non-Arab states, each is engaged in irredentist-
inflamed border conflicts with Arab neighbours; and each has, in
significant ways, constructed its identity in opposition to that of the
Arab core: Israel sees itself besieged by the Arab world and Turkey’s
modern secularity aims to differentiate it from its Arab-Islamic
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hinterland. Turkey and Israel remain at war with sub-state identity
groups – Palestinians, Kurds – which they cannot assimilate and will
neither accommodate nor allow to separate. Iran’s position is cur-
rently more ambivalent. The Persian–Arab cleavage was exacer-
bated by Pahlavi Iran’s aspirations to act as the regional guardian
against Arab instability and radicalism. This was superseded after
the revolution by an Islamic identity shared with the Arab world
that made Iran seek a leadership role there. But Iran’s Shi’ism still
differentiated it from the Sunni Islam predominant in the Arab
world and Iran’s leadership claims, based on Islamic paramountcy,
were not recognised by the Arab states, except as a threat. 
Conclusion
The incongruity of identity and territory continues to destabilise
the politics of the Middle East and to significantly qualify the
Westphalian model. While Arab states have consolidated their sov-
ereignty in the face of supra-state ideology, in the making of foreign
policy, legitimacy requires their leaders must still balance between
the two. Inter-Arab politics arguably remains qualitatively different
from ‘international’ politics. Irredentist conflicts continue to bedevil
two near-nation-states, Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile, Iran em-
braces its communal mosaic and projects its foreign policy under an
Islamic banner. 
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4
State formation and international
behaviour
Primitive state-building
State-building is the effort of rulers to institutionalise state structures
capable of absorbing expanding political mobilisation and control-
ling territory corresponding to an identity community. In the Middle
East, the flaws built into the process from its origins have afflicted
the states with enduring legitimacy deficits (Hudson 1977). Because
imperialism drew boundaries that haphazardly corresponded to
identity, installed client elites in them and created the power machin-
eries of the new states, state elites, long after independence, contin-
ued to depend on external protection and on resources provided by
external powers or markets rather than raised domestically through
consent; as such, most Middle East states were and remain relatively
less accountable to domestic society than where they are indigenous
products.
State-building was accompanied by class conflict because imperi-
alism had fostered dominant classes that privately appropriated the
means of wealth production, notably land at the expense of peasan-
tries or natural resources (petroleum), stimulating plebeian revolts
and political mobilisation which fragile state structures could not
initially contain. Later, state-building meant the expansion and
indigenising of imported instruments of rule used in ‘primitive
power accumulation’, a typically violent process entailing the co-
optation of some social forces and the exclusion of others. Only
gradually after 1970 did many individual states come to enjoy
increased stability as rentier monarchies and authoritarian republics
were relatively consolidated as the two dominant forms of state in
the Arab world. Neither type of regime, however, effectively resolved
the legitimacy deficit for both tended to centre on exclusivistic tribal,
personalistic or ethnic ruling cores, generated new, privileged, state-
dependent classes, and either brought the mass of citizens to trade
political rights for socio-economic entitlements or repressed their
demands for political participation. Such patterns of state formation
are likely to have profound consequences for foreign policy: if the
state itself is contested, foreign policy may entail its defence as much
against internal as external threat; if little welfare or political rights
are delivered, precarious legitimacy is exceptionally dependent on
the nationalist or Islamic credibility of foreign policy (Dawisha
1990).
Aspects of state formation
This study will argue that several aspects of state formation are
pivotal in determining the international behaviour of states and spe-
cifically to explaining variations in their foreign policies. 
(1) The circumstances of a state’s initial composition tend to set
it on a particular foreign policy tangent, either status quo or revi-
sionist. (a) Because state formation is coterminous with a contested
process of identity construction, whether a state’s boundaries satisfy
or frustrate identity shapes its foreign policy role. During the initial
formation of the states system, imperialist boundary drawing liter-
ally built irredentism into many states; however where indigenous
state-builders were able to achieve some correspondence between
the dominant political identity and the state’s boundaries, as for
example in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, foreign policy has been rela-
tively free of irredentist revisionism. (b) Because primitive state for-
mation always involves some degree of inclusion and exclusion,
whether the specific social forces incorporated at the founding of
regimes were largely satisfied (privileged) or dissatisfied (plebeian)
also tends to set states on opposing status quo or revisionist tan-
gents. Specifically, those, often monarchies, forged around tradi-
tional satisfied classes implanted, penetrated and supported by the
Western ‘core’ were biased toward status quo policies, while the
wave of revolt against this, in which states were captured from
below by dissatisfied plebeian forces and turned into radical repub-
lics, infused revisionist ideology into many states’ foreign policies,
at least until radical elites, becoming new classes, acquired stakes in
the status quo. 
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(2) The level of state formation (or consolidation) shapes the
rationality and effectiveness of states’ foreign policies. Rationality
in foreign policy denotes reason of state, that is, the choice of ends
through a cost-benefit calculation and the matching of ends with
means: scaling down ambitions to match capabilities and/or build-
ing up capabilities to sustain ambitions. Effectiveness denotes the
capacity to implement policies. Arguably, state consolidation de-
pends on some balance between the institutionalisation of state
structures and the incorporation of mobilised social forces into
them (Huntington 1968). A balance endows elites with both suffi-
cient autonomy to make rational choices and sufficient legitimacy
and structural capacity to mobilise the support and extract the
resources to sustain these choices. 
Traditional states (landed oligarchies, tribal monarchies) with
both low levels of political mobilisation and institutionalisation may
face limited opposition to their foreign policies at home but lack the
ability to mobilise support and resources there needed to project
power abroad. Consolidated states, with high levels of mobilisation
incorporated into strong institutions, enjoy both domestic support
and the military capabilities to be formidable foreign policy actors
(Israel with its citizen army). For a long time, most Middle Eastern
states have suffered from one or another type of structural imbal-
ance. Where there is insufficient institutionalisation to organise
mobilisation (praetorian regimes), the main threat to states may be
domestic and the ‘domestic vulnerability model’ of foreign policy
may hold in which policy is chiefly designed to contain internal
instability by exaggerating an external enemy or indulging in anti-
imperialist rhetoric (Calvert 1986; David 1991). Where, in reaction
to this, neo-patrimonial strategies, combining modern and tradi-
tional power techniques, were used to ‘over-develop’ state control
structures at the expense of political participation, elites were buf-
fered from accountability; this may be compatible with the ‘leader-
ship dominant model’ which assumes leaders face few institutional
constraints at home and can translate their personal values, styles –
and pathologies – into foreign policy (Clapham 1977). In either
case, foreign policy is arguably more likely to lack rationality and
effectiveness.
The traditional, praetorian, neo-patrimonial and consolidated
models may best be seen as four ideal types reflective of extreme
cases. Actual regimes may more or less approximate one or a
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combination of these models. Most important, a number of schol-
ars argue that, after several decades of state-building in the region,
partly consolidated regimes (combining aspects of the consoli-
dated with one or more of the other models), have become typical
(Dawisha and Zartman 1988; Mufti 1996: 9–16). Arguably, these
regimes are sufficiently institutionalised that foreign policies are less
directly shaped by the unconstrained biases of the top leader or by
internal instability and more by the external challenges which have
become so salient. 
(3) Finally, the affect of the structural type of the state – specif-
ically its authoritarian or democratic/pluralist character – on foreign
policy behaviour needs to be tested in the Middle East. Democratic
states, if consolidated, are likely to be strong foreign policy actors.
But those claiming that democracies are more pacific are disputed
by the argument that transitional democracies may actually be more
susceptible to war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) and by Middle East
evidence that ‘irredentist democracies’ are particularly belligerent
while authoritarian regimes may be either status quo or revisionist.
The phases of state-building
State-building in the Middle East has varied considerably over
time.1 Four identifiable stages in Arab state formation are adum-
brated below, with comparisons to the non-Arab states made where
appropriate. At each stage, the formation of the individual states is
a product of interaction between internal political forces and the
simultaneously developing systemic (international and regional)
structures in which the states are embedded. State formation, in
turn, is a major determinant of the foreign policy behaviour of the
individual states, for, as will be argued, at each stage in state forma-
tion different kinds of foreign policies are typical. 
Stage 1: Pre-consolidated traditional states (1920s–1948)
The pre-consolidation traditional era in the Arab world was one of
weak states governed by semi-independent, narrowly based, oligar-
chic republics, monarchies or dictatorships ruling over small albeit
mobilising middle classes and unmobilised masses. The colonial
powers had, in many countries, imposed borders, bureaucracies and
formally liberal institutions (parliaments, elections) and fostered or
co-opted the landed-commercial notability (ayan) out of which the
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first-generation nationalist elites arose. These elites represented a
thin upper stratum linked to society mostly through urban patronage
networks and control of landed estates; reluctant or unable to mob-
ilise sustained mass resistance to the imperialist powers, they could
not avoid compromises with them (e.g. permitting bases, treaties) in
return for formal independence which, together with irredentist dis-
satisfaction with borders, invariably tarnished their legitimacy.
For the Arab states, the continued presence of imperial powers in
the region, extreme economic dependence and limited military capa-
bilities meant the international system sharply constrained state
options. As long as societies were unmobilised, domestic constraints
were weaker, yet owing to intra-elite fragmentation and low institu-
tionalisation many regimes were too unstable and narrow-based to
conduct rational or effective foreign policies. Policy tended to take
one of two paths: either rhetoric meant to appease domestic oppo-
sition or efforts to secure outside security guarantees against it. By
contrast, Turkey, Israel and Iran, more the products of indigenous
state-builders than foreign imperiums, enjoyed the greater legiti-
macy that made possible more (although by no means wholly) inclu-
sive states. In Turkey and Israel, the combination of democratic
legitimacy and institutionalisation gave leaders the autonomy in
foreign policy making needed to pursue policies resembling classic
reason of state and directed chiefly at perceived external threats.
This unevenness of state formation, issuing from the earlier indepen-
dence of Turkey and the transplant of a mobilised Zionism into the
region meant the Arab states confronted much stronger non-Arab
opponents.
Stage 2: Preconsolidation praetorianism and divergent paths:
revolutionary republics, traditional survival (1949–70)
The Palestine War, the struggle to throw off imperialism and the
Arab-Israeli conflict rapidly accelerated political mobilisation in the
Arab region, ushering in the next, praetorian stage. Nationalist
politicisation dovetailed with middle-class demands for a share of
power and labour and peasant ferment over the region’s highly
unequal forms of capitalist development. Presidents and kings
sought to concentrate power but, given the weakness and fragmen-
tation of status quo parties and parliaments and the manipulation
of elections, their weakly institutionalised regimes could not
sufficiently incorporate the rising middle class to stabilise the state.
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Political mobilisation came instead through radical ideological
parties which turned the newly mobilised against the semi-liberal
oligarchic political order. The recruitment of the radicalised middle
class into the army led to widespread military intervention in poli-
tics which destroyed the rule of the notables in several of the settled,
more developed societies and opened the door to praetorianism – an
era of factional struggle for power marked by coups and counter-
coups which lasted until the 1970s. In a few settled societies (Jordan,
Morocco), external support or exceptional leadership allowed the
old order to survive while in the less-developed Arabian peninsula,
persistent tribalism, the smallness of the educated class and/or con-
tinuing British tutelage delayed these tendencies.
By the 1960’s (earlier in Egypt) and peaking in the 1970s, state-
building was underway across the region. It was initially driven by
the need to master domestic instability and trans-state penetration
and/or to dilute international dependency. However, state-building
put states on quite different (status quo or revisionist leaning)
foreign policy tangents. The main root of this differentiation was the
impact of imperialism. Where the length and intensity of the inde-
pendence struggle radicalised social forces (as in Egypt or Aden) or
where the imposition of the regional state system thwarted indige-
nous interests and identity (whether creating ‘artificial’ states in
Syria and Iraq or leaving irredentist ambitions unsatisfied), the dom-
inant status quo social forces were weakened and more radical,
middle-class or even plebeian forces were mobilised in the struggle
for power. Where this issued in revolutionary coups, the new regimes
harnessed foreign policy to the revisionist sentiments of the social
forces they incorporated. Conversely, the more the new states rela-
tively satisfied indigenous interests and identity, as in Turkey or
Saudi Arabia, or where independence was achieved without politi-
cal mobilisation (the Arab Gulf), the more status quo elites survived
and newly independent states followed policies accommodating
themselves to the West.
Although there were exceptions, the resultant regimes, differen-
tially incorporating satisfied or dissatisfied social forces, tended to
pursue one of two quite different archetypal state-building strategies.
Traditional monarchies tended to survive in small-population, un-
mobilised (or communally divided) societies, mostly in the Arabian
Peninsula. Tribal chiefs-turned-state-elites sought legitimacy through
traditional versions of Islam and the manipulation of tribal and
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kinship links now reinforced by the creation of new bureaucracies
and Western or oil-financed patronage. The main threat was from
Egyptian sponsored Pan-Arabism, which found resonance among
the small but dissatisfied middle and working classes (typically in
the petroleum sectors). These geo-politically weak states required
Western protection from regional threats, but, in the Pan-Arab era of
relative Western rollback from the region, needed also to appease
trans-state and domestic Arab nationalist opinion; this resulted in
policies which wavered between close Western alignment and a dis-
tancing from Western patrons in times of crisis or which used sym-
bolic politics – such as the banner of Islamic solidarity – to disguise
Western dependence and counter Pan-Arabism. The exception was
Iran’s larger more mobilised society where the Shah had to construct
a more elaborate technology of control, heavily dependent on clien-
talism, repression and external backing.
In the authoritarian-nationalist republics, where regimes origi-
nated in middle-class overthrow of Western client elites by nation-
alist officers, state formation meant the wholesale reconstruction of
states against the opposition of the displaced upper classes and
amidst Western hostility, requiring, therefore, a measure of mobil-
ised popular support. Charismatic presidents rose to power through
the army but directly appealed to the mass public. Especially in
those republics lacking oil, popular support and autonomy of the
dominant classes were sought through wealth re-distribution (e.g.
land reform) and statist development based on nationalisations and
a public sector. Economic dependency was eased or diversified as
state control of economic links to the world market displaced client
classes while aid and markets were accessed in the Eastern bloc.
These regimes attempted, with some success, to incorporate the new
middle classes, the organised working class and land-reform peas-
ants. But because the military remained the main vehicle of factional
politics, because these regimes lacked a secure social base in a dom-
inant class, and because opposition persisted among the traditional
landed, tribal and commercial elites and their often-Islamic follow-
ers, the republics remained unstable. Possessing neither traditional
nor democratic legitimacy, they sought legitimisation in radical
nationalism: hence foreign policy took the form of anti-imperialist
and anti-Zionist rhetoric while bi-polarity provided the necessary
conditions for these policies: protection from Western intervention. 
Because military power-projection capabilities remained limited,
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while the Arab states, Egypt aside, were vulnerable to trans-state
ideological penetration, the main threat elites faced was domestic
opposition exacerbated by external subversion (Maddy-Weitzmann
1993). Foreign policy was chiefly shaped by its expected domestic
consequences in the legitimacy contest between the radical Pan-
Arab and conservative camps. The divergent strategies of the rival
camps had their own risks and costs. The monarchies’ search for
external protection against domestic opposition only exacerbated
nationalist rejection of them, most evident in Iraq where the
regime’s identification with the Baghdad Pact was its undoing; but
appeasing Pan-Arabism also held its dangers, as when King Hussein
was swept into the 1967 war. In the republics, playing the national-
ist card risked Western-backed intervention, subversion and/or
Israeli attack, most notable against Syria during the 1950s. Finally,
the nationalist outbidding of regimes over the Palestine issue that
the ‘Arab Cold War’ encouraged (Kerr 1971), prepared the way for
the 1967 war, which opened an era of ‘hot wars’ that would have a
profound effect on state formation. 
Stage 3: Semi-consolidation and convergence (1970–1980s)
A third stage was apparent by the 1970s, namely the increased,
albeit incomplete, consolidation of both monarchies and republics.
The incentive for state consolidation against domestic threats was
now reinforced in key cases by high external military threat (partic-
ularly for the front-line Arab states in the conflict with Israel and
later with Iran). In making war, states ‘constructed’ a regional
system fraught with insecurity, which, in turn, precipitated a recon-
struction of the states in ways allowing their survival in this danger-
ous environment. Military threat spurred advances in defensive
state formation and a preoccupation with the accumulation of
power needed to balance against threats. Wars precipitated the oil
price explosions that gave states the means to consolidate them-
selves and expand their military capabilities, which, however, only
increased the security dilemma for each individual state. Against this
threatening regional background, state-builders deployed dual
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ strategies (Tripp 1996) that blurred the
difference between republics and monarchies. The resultant regimes
moved away from both the ‘traditional’ and ‘praetorian’ scenarios
toward semi-consolidated mixtures of the ‘neo-patrimonial’ and
‘consolidated’ models in the following key ways.
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(1) The character of leadership shifted within regimes from
radical demagogues and populist leaders challenging the status quo
to national security specialists – pragmatic generals, technocrats and
intelligence operatives – obsessed with stability.
(2) Executive centres were institutionalised and ruling elites
became more cohesive. While oil patronage reinforced the solidar-
ity of large extended ruling families in the monarchies, in the repub-
lics, years of intra-elite factional conflict were overcome by the
emergence of dominant leaders ensconced in virtual ‘presidential
monarchies’ endowed with cults of personality. Crucial to this was
the use of traditional sectarian, tribal and family assabiya to create
cores of trusted followers around the leader similar to royal fami-
lies in the monarchies. 
(3) In their search for legitimisation, state elites made use of
sub- and supra-state identities to make up for thin popular identifi-
cations with the state itself. In the monarchies patriarchal loyalties
and Islam were the favoured formula; in the republics Pan-Arabism,
the official ideology, was buttressed by the exploitation of sub-state
loyalties, whether it was Tikriti solidarity in Iraq or that of the
Alawis in Syria. 
(4) There was a widespread expansion of bureaucratic struc-
tures and the modern means of coercion and communications. In the
republics, presidents commanded expanding bureaucratic pillars of
power – army, bureaucracy, party and mukhabarat. In these regimes,
which had emerged from military coups, the military remained the
core pillar of power, but its disciplining and relative depoliticisation,
achieved through a combination of purges, controlled recruitment,
intelligence surveillance, privileges and professionalisation (driven
by the need to counter external military threats), turned armies from
sources of coups into reliable chains of command. Ruling parties
developed from small cliques into Leninist-like single or dominant
party apparatuses, loosely modelled on those in the East bloc, of
impressive size, complexity and functions, which now penetrated
the rural peripheries of society and were better able to incorporate
large cross-class bases of support. Corporatist structures such as
professional associations afforded control over the upper-middle
and middle classes. Where political parties did not exist, as in the oil
monarchies, enormous extended ruling families acted as surrogate
single-party systems while their use of tribal networks to funnel pat-
ronage downwards was analogous to the corporatist structures of
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the republics. Intelligence and security apparatuses, commanding
greater technology and manpower, proliferated in both kinds of
state: the ‘mukhabarat state’ had arrived. Thus, in both types of
state, inherited patrimonial strategies of control were grafted onto
modern technology and political organisation.
(5) Increased state penetration of society was reflected in
heightened government control of resources. As measured by
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Egypt pioneered
the process with a rise from 37 per cent in 1952 to 70 per cent in
1968 and 81 per cent in 1974 – a function of statism and war –
thereafter declining to 40–50 per cent. Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
only reached such levels in the 1970s and 1980s (Gause 1992: 460).
While this reflected, to a degree, the ability to collect oil rent and
disguised a limited ability to extract taxes from society, it neverthe-
less gave regimes autonomy of society and made good parts of the
population dependent on the state. State-sponsored education,
aiming to inculcate political loyalties as well as skills, increased dra-
matically in all states: from 1955 to 1980 the percentage of primary
and secondary school age children in the school system increased
from 24 per cent to 89 per cent in Iraq, from 51 per cent to 91 per
cent in Jordan and from 4 per cent to 48 per cent in Saudi Arabia
(Gause, 1991: 16). There was an enormous rise in state employ-
ment. Civil bureaucracies expanded regardless of regime type. In
Egypt from 1962 to 1970 the bureaucracy increased by 70 per cent.
In Kuwait, the bureaucracy employed 34 per cent of the labour force
in 1975 and 20 per cent in Syria in 1979. In Saudi Arabia, the civil
service grew from a few hundreds in the 1950s to 245,000 in
1979–80 (Ayubi 1988: 15–19). The more effective control that this
structural proliferation afforded over the territories of states made
them less permeable and susceptible to trans-state ideological pene-
tration.
(6) Movement toward state consolidation was associated with
the creation of new state-dependent classes, attaching to state struc-
tures the strategic class interests needed to anchor them against the
winds of trans-state popular sentiment. The expanding bureaucratic
strata’s command of public resources gave them stakes in the par-
ticular interests of their individual states. In the republics, the old
landed-commercial bourgeoisie was eclipsed by new state bourgeoi-
sies with a stake in the status quo and by the subsequent transfor-
mation of part of the surviving middle-sized business sectors into
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dependent clienteles thriving on state monopolies, commissions,
contracts and inputs. In the monarchies, commercial and tribal elites
were similarly transformed via state patronage into new bourgeoi-
sies.
(7) Long-term stability also depended on incorporation of a
sufficient segment of the middle and lower strata which, in turn,
depended on sufficient economic resources to give them a stake in
the status quo. In monarchies and republics alike, regimes forged a
sort of populist social contract: in return for support or acquies-
cence, the state provided jobs, free education, subsidised foodstuffs
and labour rights. In the republics, this initially relied on the ‘social-
ist’ redistribution of upper-class assets but with the oil price boom
it could be funded more generously. In the monarchies, the one-time
threat from the growing new middle class was contained by co-
opting it into state jobs but excluding it from the military.
Advances in state consolidation had foreign policy conse-
quences. Top elites, their power relatively consolidated and able to
balance conflicting social forces, generally attained hitherto lacking
autonomy of society in the making of foreign policy. How far this
resulted from a better balance between institutionalisation and par-
ticipation or from the neo-patrimonial de-mobilisation of civil
society is an empirical question that varies by case. Generally,
however, this elite autonomy, combined with increased regime
stability, declining vulnerability to trans-state ideology and rising
threats from neighbouring states, issued in increased weight being
given to geopolitical reason of state over identity issues in foreign
policy making. This meant more prudent and effective policies, but
also a certain sacrifice of longer-term Pan-Arab interests to more
immediate individual state interests. Power capabilities generally
increased as oil rent enabled states to make exceptional arms pur-
chases, stimulating arms races. Additionally, the increased oil
resources and military capabilities of regional states made them
more autonomous of external great powers. As the threat from
neighbouring states increased, more remote international powers
were seen less as threats and more as sources of protection and
resources in the regional struggle.
These tendencies spelled a significant convergence in the policies
of monarchies and republics. In the republics, radical elites, either
displaced or chastened by defeat in war, moderated their ideological
radicalism. Egypt and Syria were forced, by the need to recover the
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occupied territories from Israel, to bury the ideological cold war
with the monarchies, to moderate anti-Western policies and to seek
a negotiated peace with Israel while, at the same time, the monar-
chies used oil resources to subsidise nationalist states and briefly
attempted to win nationalist legitimacy by using the ‘oil weapon’.
Later, the Gulf monarchies would be driven by fear of Iran to seek
detente with republics such as Iraq. As such, the systemic level, spe-
cifically regional threats, tended to recast states, originally very dif-
ferent, into similar ‘realist’ moulds following similar pragmatic
foreign policies.
There were, however, important exceptions and counter-trends
to the regional tendency toward realism and moderation. Even as
Arab nationalism declined as a threat to regimes, it was replaced by
a new supra-state revisionist ideology, political Islam. The 1967
war, in discrediting secular Arab nationalism, had left an ideologi-
cal vacuum while the negative side effects of state-building – the cor-
ruption and inequality that oil money encouraged – turned those
who felt excluded to political Islam as an ideology of protest. These
factors precipitated revolution in Iran and the attempt of the Islamic
republic to export its revolution, leading to war in the Gulf. This
was paralleled by the rise of the revisionist Likud party in Israel
which similarly led to war in Lebanon. 
These developments in turn arrested the tendency toward conver-
gence as key republics, locked into intractable conflicts on the non-
Arab periphery, became major ‘war states’. Iraq’s regime was
consolidated in the crucible of the war with Iran and Syria’s but-
tressed by the war with Israel in Lebanon. War drove an upward tra-
jectory in the size of armies; Syria and Iraq, where wars and threat
levels were the highest, achieved exceptional levels of military
mobilisation – increasing from 6.4 and 6.7/1,000 pop. in 1955 to
36.2 and 62.4/1,000 of population in 1987. In good part this was a
necessary reaction to high levels of such mobilisation in Israel
(which reached 145/1000 in 1987) and in revolutionary Iran (Gause
1992: 457–8). 
As state construction matured, the once fragile republics showed
an ability to survive the worst crises, including defeat in war. In
1967 Egypt and Syria survived a greater defeat than the one which
brought down the ancien régimes and mobilised the power to chal-
lenge Israel in 1973; in the early 1980s, Syria survived back-to-back
Islamic rebellion and conflict with an Israeli–American combinazi-
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one in Lebanon. Iraq survived the enormous pressures of the war
with Iran and did not split along communal lines as might have been
expected; Saddam Hussein’s regime also survived the much more
intense pressures applied by the US in the Gulf War and its after-
math, including military defeat, economic blockade and loss of full
territorial control. By contrast, the monarchies, unable to trust the
middle class, kept their armies small and recruited from extended
royal families and loyal tribes. This forced them to rely for their
security on high-tech oil-for-arms purchases from the West and an
increasing US naval presence in the Gulf. 
The main consequence of the period was the considerable extent
to which the generalisation of external insecurity, state consolida-
tion, and reason of state brought the regional system into closer
approximation to the Westphalian model. It was, however, Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, injecting military insecurity into inter-Arab pol-
itics, where competition had hitherto largely remained at the polit-
ical-ideological level, which crowned this process. 
Stage 4: State vulnerability and global penetration (1980–2000+) 
A fourth stage, whose origins can be traced back to the 1970s but
which only fully emerged in the 1990s, was marked by growing
economic crisis and loss of Soviet patronage in the republics and by
military shock (Iran’s threat, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) in the
monarchies, exposing the fragility of state-building in both. This
coincidence of domestic vulnerability with major changes in the
international system – the end of bi-polarity, the globalisation of
capitalism – opened the door to a reconstruction of dependencies
that, in the previous period, had seemed to be minimised. 
The root of the new vulnerability in the republics lay in domestic
economic weaknesses. Inefficient public sectors, the exploitation of
economies for military ends, and populist distribution policies had
enervated capital accumulation and led to the exhaustion of statist
import-substitute industrialisation, driving moves to open econo-
mies to private and foreign capital: the so-called infitah. The
boom/bust cycle of the international oil economy also impacted on
state formation. Oil rent financed a burst of state-building that ended
in overdeveloped states exceeding the capacity of their own eco-
nomic bases to sustain. Enormous resources were expended on arms
races. Oil rent and infitah also encouraged import booms rather than
investment at home. This, combined with the 1980s oil bust, left the
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republics saddled with balance of payments crises and debt that
greatly increased their vulnerability to external pressures from
Western donors and to IMF demands for structural adjustment.
At the same time, a transformation in the social base of the
republics was taking place, with the old populist coalition being
replaced by new ‘infitah (internationalist) coalitions’. The roots of
this go back well before the 1990s. The authoritarian-populist state,
which initially had balanced ‘above’ classes, in time generated a new
dominant class from within. It was made up of an alliance of the
‘state bourgeoisie’ (formerly plebeian but embourgeoised military
officers, high-paid state managers and senior bureaucrats) with a
revived private bourgeoisie of contractors and middlemen doing
business with the state. As the public sector was exhausted as a
source of wealth and careers, the state bourgeoisie looked to eco-
nomic liberalisation to diversify the state’s economic base as well as
provide opportunities for it to invest its accumulated wealth in
private business and thereby transform itself into a property-owning
class; the private bourgeoisie saw new opportunities in infitah for
foreign partners and to acquire public sector assets. The revival of
private capitalism, first initiated by Sadat in Egypt, spread across the
region. Many states were increasingly entangled in a web of eco-
nomic relations with core states, whether they were forced into
export strategies to repay accumulated debt or perceived potential
opportunities to secure capital inflows. This required that investors
be favoured over the mass public, hence infitah was typically accom-
panied by a rollback in subsidies and welfare measures and the
beginnings of privatisation of public sectors. 
Authoritarian power structures largely persisted but whereas pre-
viously such power was used to attack privileged groups and to
broaden equality, it was now deployed to protect the new economic
inequalities that followed on infitah. This post-populist period is
associated with uneven political liberalisation: while the interest
groups of the bourgeoisie were given greater corporatist and parlia-
mentary access to power and safety valve opposition parties for the
middle class were tolerated within strict limits, mass organisations
and trade unions were brought under stricter control and excluded
from the access to decision-makers they often formerly enjoyed in
the populist era. 
Parallel alterations in the global power balance, also evident
before the 1990s, reinforced domestic change to drive a nearly
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uniform Westward re-alignment in foreign policies. The declining
Soviet ability to provide the Arab states with the military capability
to match that given to Israel by Washington, hence the perceived
indispensability of American power to ending the Israeli occupation
of Arab lands, was a major factor reinforcing Egypt’s repositioning
in the world order; where Egypt led, others followed. The decline of
the Soviet Union as an alternative market and source of technology
and aid also meant, once buffering oil rent also declined, that there
was no alternative to reintegration into the world capitalist market.
Crucially, the collapse of the Soviet Union left the radical republics
exposed, without the political protection or military patronage they
needed to pursue autonomous policies that challenged Western
interests.
The result was a further moderation in the foreign policies of for-
merly radical republics. Even as some of them had previously har-
nessed their economies to foreign policy, so economic troubles now
drove many to harness foreign policy to the economy – that is, into
the practise of ‘trading’ Western-friendly foreign policy for economic
aid and investment. This tendency was reinforced by economic glo-
balisation which seemed to provide new opportunities for inward
investment: an attractive investment climate and re-integration into
the international economy required moves toward settlement of the
Arab–Israeli conflict and a Western foreign policy alignment in place
of balancing between the superpowers.
A different kind of vulnerability was exposed in the oil monar-
chies. There, family states with tiny pampered citizen populations
dependent on expatriate labour, combined great wealth with low
military capability. Their chief liability was their location contigu-
ous to much larger, poorer and militarily stronger states – Iran and
Iraq. The Iran–Iraq war spared the monarchies their immediate
attentions throughout the 1980s, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
administered a shock to these regimes that paralleled the economic
crisis in the republics. It showed they could not survive in a world
of powerful predatory neighbours without much enhanced Western
protection. The resultant foreign policy change took the form of a
much more overt Western presence (bases, treaties). Their key secur-
ity interest was to maintain the flow of oil revenues needed to
appease constituencies at home while enlisting the Western protec-
tion against threats from their stronger neighbours. 
If the state-building of the 1970s and 1980s was driven in good
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part by external security threats, this started to decline in the 1990s
as enhanced Western penetration left far less scope for the ambitions
of potential regional hegemons, especially after the Iraq and Afghan
conflicts demonstrated a re-newed ability of the American hegemon
to project power into the region. Rather, the most salient determi-
nant of policy became the effort of regimes to balance between the
increased international demands on them and domestic resistance to
these demands. Regional states were becoming transmission belts
for the enforcement of Westcentric globalisation at the possible
expense of indigenous interests and identity: the imposition of struc-
tural adjustment, of unpopular and inequitable peace treaties with
Israel, of a US campaign against terrorism and so-called ‘rogue
states’. This, however, spelled increased domestic risks. While the
Middle East region has proven more resistant than others have to
the neo-liberal rules of the international economy, even its incremen-
tal integration into this order threatens to undermine the very foun-
dations of current states. Regimes that have built their legitimacy on
a distributive social contract are being pushed toward a policy of
trickle-down capitalism. At least in the short term, this is bound
to leave a more or less large segment of the public marginalised.
Marginalised strata are the most likely to be attracted to sub- and
supra-state identities and available for anti-system mobilisation by
counter-elites: indeed, the victims of economic liberalisation appear
to be among the main constituents of Islamic opposition move-
ments. If the stronger states now in place have contained and local-
ised the political threat of such movements, the gradual Islamisation
of society at the grassroots may ultimately spell longer-term indige-
nous resistance to the globalisation on regime agendas. Especially to
the extent economic integration into the world system facilitates
Western penetration of their societies, while conflict between the US
hegemon and a variety of Muslim states continues to assume a high
profile, regimes risk whatever Arab or Islamic legitimacy they might
enjoy without yet having found a credible substitute for these supra-
state identities.
Whether democratisation could serve as an alternative basis of
legitimacy was not really tested. It was obstructed or limited by
ruling elites’ dependence on trusted in-groups or privileged classes
and the consequent stunting of political institutions. Limited polit-
ical liberalisation left ultimate power in the hands of the executive,
while tending to disproportionately empower the educated and
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wealthy classes at the expense of the masses. However, where demo-
cratisation proceeded further, it empowered domestic reaction
against the tilt toward the West and Israel, which Islamic move-
ments exploited, prompting regimes to halt or reverse these experi-
ments. The case of Jordan showed dramatically how a regime’s
responsiveness to outside demands – for peace with an Israel unwill-
ing to concede Palestinian rights, the price of restored American aid
– was necessarily paralleled by a contraction of domestic democrat-
isation and responsiveness to domestic opinion. It also illustrated
how the dependence of many states’ revenue bases on aid from the
West, rather than taxes from their own population, made their
foreign policies more responsive to the former than to the latter. The
increased penetration of Middle East states by the core, combined
with the failure of democratisation, means that increasingly local
states are pursuing foreign policies in the face of broad if apparently
shallow opposition from their own publics. 
Conclusion: state formation and the system level 
At each stage the system level has been decisive in driving state forma-
tion. First, imperialism literally constructed the system and its state
components. Later, two trans-state forces rooted in persisting supra-
state identity – first Pan-Arabism, then radical Islam – stimulated the
state formation needed to bring their subversive potential under
control. Later yet, war motivated and legitimised state-formation
advances and precipitated the trans-state oil flows that provided
resources for it and for the militarisation that intensified the regional
security dilemma. Most recently, globalisation is threatening to turn
regional states from buffers against external intrusion into transmis-
sion belts of it. While these region-wide forces have shaped similar
patterns of state formation, the behaviour of any individual state can
only be explained by its particular state-formation path and its par-
ticular policy process, as chapters 5and 6 will show.
Notes
1 The following account of state-formation benefits from a number of
classic accounts including Anderson (1986, 1987); Ayubi (1995), espe-
cially chapters 6–10; Beblawi (1987); Berberoglu (1989); Bromley 1994:
119–54; Chaudhry (1997); Crystal (1991); Dawisha and Zartman
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(1988); Hudson (1977); Luciani (1990); Mufti (1996); Owen (1992);
Richards and Waterbury (1996), chapters 7–9, 11–13; Tachau (1975);
Trimberger (1978) and Zartman et. al. (1982), as well as numerous
single-country studies. 
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5
Foreign policy making in 
the Middle East
It is frequently claimed that foreign policy making in Middle East
states is either the idiosyncratic product of personalistic dictators or
the irrational outcome of domestic instability. In fact, it can only be
adequately understood by analysis of the multiple factors common
to all states, namely: (1) foreign policy determinants (interests, chal-
lenges) to which decision-makers respond when they shape policies;
and (2) foreign policy structures and processes which factor the
‘inputs’ made by various actors into a policy addressing these deter-
minants.
Foreign policy determinants 
In any states system state elites seek to defend the autonomy and
security of the regime and state in the three separate arenas or levels
in which they must operate, although which level dominates atten-
tion in a given time and country may vary considerably. 
The regional level: geopolitics In a states system like the Middle
East, where regional militarisation has greatly increased external
threats, these often take first place on states’ foreign policy agendas.
While, generally speaking, external threat tends to precipitate a
search for countervailing power or protective alliances (or, these
lacking, attempts to appease the threatening state), it is a state’s geo-
political position that specifically defines the threats and opportu-
nities it faces. It constitutes a state’s neighbourhood where border
conflicts and irredentism are concentrated and buffer zones or
spheres of influence sought. Position determines natural rivals: thus,
Egypt and Iraq, stronger river valley civilisations, are historical
competitors for influence in the weaker, fragmented Mashreq; Iran
and Iraq are natural rivals for influence in the Gulf. A state’s power
position in the regional system, shaped by its resources, size of ter-
ritory and population and the strategic importance or vulnerability
of its location, shapes its ambitions: hence small states (Jordan, Gulf
States) are more likely to seek the protection of greater powers and
larger ones to establish spheres of regional influence (e.g. Syria in
the Levant, Saudi Arabia in the GCC).
The international level: dependency The impact of the core great
powers and the international political economy constitutes a dilemma
for regional states. The core is both the indispensable source of many
crucial resources and of constraints on the autonomy of regional
states. The constraining impact of the core ranges from the threat of
active military intervention or economic sanctions to the leverage
derived from the dependency of regional states, maximised where
there is high need and a lack of alternatives for the client state. In
extreme cases, foreign policy may be chiefly designed to access eco-
nomic resources by appeasing donors and investors. Vulnerability to
core demands, such as structural adjustment, can inflame domestic
opposition. However, shared security and economic interests between
the core powers and status quo elites may make such costs seem worth
incurring.
The domestic level: identity In most Middle Eastern states identity
is complex, with sub- and supra-state identities contesting exclusive
loyalty to the state. Where sub-state identities are strong, they may
produce irredentist pressures on decision-makers. Where supra-
state Arab and/or Islamic identities are strong, regime legitimacy
may be contingent on adherence to Arab-Islamic norms in foreign
policy. This may mean contesting the penetration of the region by
the core powers and it may de-legitimise relations with certain
states: thus, while some Arab states have been pushed by economic
dependency or security considerations to establish relations with
Israel, these remain largely illegitimate at the societal level. 
The impact of identity is not, of course, uniform. Where there are
high levels of public mobilisation and low levels of state consolida-
tion, elites are more vulnerable to Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic opinion
in foreign policy making. Because supra-state identity is often an
instrument of opposition forces or of subversion by rival states,
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status quo elites have an incentive to create state-centric identities
compatible with sovereignty and to pursue the higher levels of state
formation that enhance their autonomy from such pressures.
However, where revisionist social forces dominate states, they may
foster and use supra-state identities in the service of their foreign
policy. 
Decision-making
Foreign policy making elites are ‘Janus-faced’, looking both inward
and outward, attempting to reconcile demands from domestic
actors with threats or constraints from external powers. Coping
with a threat at one level normally requires accessing resources at
another and maximising one value (autonomy, security, wealth,
identity) may require sacrificing some of another. Thus, for example,
to counter a regional threat may require protection by a core state,
increasing dependency at the international level at a possible cost in
domestic legitimacy. Conversely, mobilising the support of revision-
ist domestic forces in order to increase autonomy of core pressures
may increase the risk of regional war or of economic sanctions from
core states. The trade-off is well illustrated by the way the Rushdi
affair caught Iranian elites between the need to preserve the domes-
tic legitimacy derived from the Khomeini heritage, and the need, for
economic reasons, to repair relations with Western Europe which
this affair strained. According to David (1991), elites’ rational
choices determine policies, that is, their assessment of where the
threat is greatest at a particular time. The highest rationality may be
the ability to ‘omni-balance’ between threats at various levels.
However, because policy making is seldom simply a matter of a
rational actor weighing costs and benefits to identify the one obvi-
ously best course of action and because, as constructivists insist,
interests and threats, far from being self-evident, are a ‘constructed’,
function of identity, a state’s choices are ‘filtered’ by its historic
foreign policy role (Holsti 1970). A role is a durable tradition rooted
in identity that defines orientations toward neighbours (friend or
enemy), great powers (threat or patron) and the state system (revi-
sionist or status quo), and which incorporates a country’s experi-
ence in balancing and reconciling conflicting imperatives. State/
regime formation is one decisive factor in shaping role; thus, Israel’s
conception of itself as a besieged refuge for world Jewry is rooted in
its formation as a product of the Zionist movement. Geopolitical
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position is another: thus, Egypt’s regional centrality led its decision-
makers to seek influence in the Arab East, North Africa and the Nile
Valley. Although manipulated by elites, once a role is established
and shapes the socialisation of the next generation of policy makers,
it sets standards of legitimacy and performance, which, to a degree,
constrain elites, imparting a certain consistency to foreign policy
despite changes in leadership and environment.
Since roles seldom provide ready-made answers to particular
policy dilemmas, the personalities, perceptions and misperceptions
of leaders are inevitably pivotal in determining choices. Where elites
are themselves competing in a process of ‘bureaucratic politics’ to
promote rival policies, outcomes will be determined by the power
distribution among them as shaped by the state’s governing institu-
tions. The interests and differential weight carried by different
actors seeking to influence the ultimate decision-maker – public
opinion, business, the military, diplomats – will bias the direction of
choices; whether the internal power advantage is held by a nation-
alist/populist coalition or an infitah (internationalist) coalition may
be decisive. Even if elites are united, they must constantly build or
service the domestic coalitions that allow them the autonomy to
make their choices and provide the power to sustain them. 
Finally, outcomes depend on policy implementation, in part a
function of the instruments of influence available to state elites such
as economic rewards and punishments, propaganda machinery and
military capabilities. But outcomes cannot be adequately explained
merely by the balance of such tangible resources among states: the
diplomatic skills and bargaining strategies of leaders, including
intangibles, such as credibility and ‘will’, also count.
The foreign policy process
The following survey of the policy process examines the typical
actors, with the least influential treated first and the most decisive
last, while paying special attention to the consequence of the distri-
bution of power among the latter. 
‘Outside’ actors: inputs into the foreign policy process
Public opinion In the Middle East, public opinion normally plays
little direct role in foreign policy formulation, which is everywhere,
the special business of top elites. The majority of the population is
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often inattentive, uninformed, and divided by class or ethnicity,
hence easily manipulated by elites on foreign policy issues. This is,
in good part, because political opposition is typically repressed or
co-opted and the press controlled. The public itself may be depen-
dent on the patronage of a distributory state (especially in low-
population oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait) which trades
economic benefits for political acquiescence. Accountability mecha-
nisms are largely lacking in the Middle East and in most states elec-
tions do not allow the public to choose between different foreign
policies or to hold leaders accountable for them. 
When leaders have enjoyed external support or a consolidated
base, they have routinely ignored public opinion and although they
have paid a price, it has seldom been unacceptable. Thus, external
support allowed King Hussein of Jordan to escape unscathed from
his repeated defiance of public opinion, including his dismissal of an
elected pro-Nasser government in 1957, his repression of the
Palestinians in Black September 1970, and most recently his peace
treaty and normalisation of relations with Israel. Asad of Syria, atop
a consolidated regime at home, also defied public opposition to his
1976 intervention in Lebanon against the PLO, his alignment with
Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war and his joining of the Western coalition
against Iraq in the Kuwait crisis. Sadat defied the public and part of
elite opinion in pursuing a separate peace with Israel; while this
inflamed Islamic opinion, weakened the regime’s legitimacy and
played a part in his assassination and the subsequent Islamic insur-
gency Egypt faced, public opposition did not force a change in
Egyptian foreign policy.
Leaders can also reshape public opinion. Nasser was the prime
example of a charismatic leader who altered public opinion, bring-
ing Egyptians to see themselves as Arabs and raising Arab national-
ist consciousness across the region (Dekmejian 1971: 39–40, 76–80,
101–8). By contrast, for the last couple of decades, Arab leaders
have attempted to educate their publics as to the constraints they
face in pursuing Arab nationalist ambitions or the benefits to be
derived from abandoning them. Thus, from the time he took power,
Asad attempted to lower the Syrian public’s expectations from the
aim of liberating Palestine to that of recovering the occupied terri-
tories. Sadat’s Egypt and Jordan’s King Hussein campaigned for
their peace treaties with Israel, promising that they would bring
prosperity to ordinary people.
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One would expect public opinion to play a greater role in the
foreign policy process where regimes have electoral accountability
mechanisms. In the Arab world, increased susceptibility to public
opinion from even limited democratisation put pressure on elites to
distance themselves from the West: it was those Arab states which
were experimenting with democratisation – Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen
and Algeria – that proved most vulnerable to pro-Iraqi public sen-
timent during the Gulf War. As the cases of Turkey and Israel
suggest, if elites can win public support through nationalist rheto-
ric, the effect of elections may be less to restrain than to encourage
elite foreign policy activism. But elections do give the public the
ability to punish these elites when things go awry, as several Israeli
prime ministers have found out (see chapter 6, pp. 146–7; chapter
7, pp. 186–7). 
Even in personalistic and authoritarian regimes the public can
sometimes play an indirect role in affecting foreign policy. Especially
when the state is weak or state elites are in a power struggle or when
they fear the opposition can effectively use foreign policy issues
against them, informal mechanisms of accountability may operate.
Fear of public reaction can constrain ‘reforms’: the ‘food riots’ that
have been a region-wide response to structural adjustment deterred
regional responsiveness to pressures from international institutions
and arguably slowed the region’s integration into the world capital-
ist economy. When the public is aroused and unified by a crisis with
Israel or the West, it may even play a role in forcing decisions that
elites would not otherwise take. Thus, Sadat faced intense public
despair at the ‘no war-no peace’ situation in the early 1970s, making
even a risky war preferable to doing nothing; in Jordan when the
public was intensely aroused by the 1967 and Kuwait crises, the
same King who at other junctures defied the public, was pushed by
public pressures into policies at odds with the interests of his regime
(Salloukh 1996). The case of Iran, where the Shah’s pursuit of pol-
icies in defiance of nationalist and Islamic opinion helped stimulate
a revolution which turned those policies upside down, is quite
exceptional, but a precedent of which other leaders have not been
un-mindful.
Economics, business, and foreign policy making The extent to
which the bourgeoisies of the Middle East can or even try to act as
a political force or foreign policy pressure group, is debatable. The
96 The international politics of the Middle East
Syrian bourgeoisie’s opposition to Nasser’s statist policies helped to
engineer the break-up of the UAR and at the time Nasser reputedly
perceived a comparable threat from its Egyptian counterpart
(Dawisha 1976: 106), but this appears an exceptional case. Business
is relatively weak, especially in the Arab world: the top twenty
Middle East companies are in Israel, Turkey or are Gulf-based, oil-
linked or banking firms. Rent and indirect taxation such as import
duties relieve most states of dependency on the bourgeoisie for tax
revenues, which might give the latter the leverage to demand a share
of power, and business is often quite dependent on the state (for con-
tracts, licenses, etc.). Business lacks the institutionalised access and
clout it enjoys in developed capitalist states: in the authoritarian
republics, the military and bureaucracy and in the monarchies, royal
families dominate foreign policy making. In more liberal states such
as Israel and in Turkey, where a more developed bourgeoisie is well
organised in business associations such as the Turkish Association
of Industrialists and Businessmen, the bourgeoisie appears better
equipped to lobby for its interests as a class; but in both states it
takes second place to the national security establishment in foreign
policy matters. 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy choices that states make are inti-
mately connected to their internal socio-economic structure, specif-
ically, the social composition of the ruling coalition, the resulting
relation between the state and business, and the logic of the devel-
opment strategies these coalitions imply. Thus, in Marxist thinking,
the trajectory of Third World states has been intimately shaped by
the relative power of the internationalised ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie
– bankers, import-exporters, agents for foreign firms – which is seen
as a vehicle of Western influence versus that of the ‘national bour-
geoisie’ – local industrialists – whose interests are compatible with
an independent national economy (Hussein 1973). Where an alli-
ance of a radicalised military and a national bourgeoisie is ascen-
dant, the latter’s demands for protection from foreign competition
will overlap with the former’s desire to construct a base of national
power. The nationalist foreign policy such an alliance asserts
requires easing or diversifying foreign economic dependence – in the
Cold War era by relying on the Soviet Union for aid, technology and
markets.
By contrast, the oil monarchies incorporate alliances with tribal-
commercial bourgeoisies which, living on petroleum rent, Western
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investments and middleman operations with the Western market,
have a clear interest in pro-Western foreign policies. In states such
as Egypt and Tunisia, the new infitah bourgeoisie is likely to advo-
cate the liberal foreign economic policies needed to establish an
attractive investment climate and attract foreign partners; such
bourgeoisies, integrated into globalised money markets, enjoy lev-
erage over governments from their ability to damage the local
economy through capital flight. Where the top political elite are
themselves major business operators and investors – the ruling fam-
ilies in the Gulf states, the Turkish military, the presidential clan in
Tunisia – the personal ties and interlocking interests among overlap-
ping political and business elites may be decisive. 
A major issue is whether globalisation is increasing the power of
internationalised (infitah) bourgeoisies to advance the integration of
the Middle East into the world economy and whether this is likely
to spread the ‘zone of peace’ to the region since such economic inte-
gration arguably requires the resolution of regional conflicts and an
end to nationalist challenges to the West. In fact, even where busi-
ness has influence, it does not necessarily speak with one voice.
While it might be expected that business would lobby for the
enforcement of internationally accepted legal standards and for co-
operation with the neo-liberal prescriptions of international eco-
nomic institutions, it is by no means a monolithic champion of
unrestrained global integration. On the contrary, it is likely to be
divided between merchants and bankers with a stake in interna-
tional trade and finance and local industrialists who flourish on state
protection, subsidies and contracts. Industrialists themselves may
divide between exporters and importers over such issues as the
exchange rate of local currencies. Rentier capitalists flourishing on
privileged connections to the state may lack an interest in universa-
listic standards of law and regulation. 
It is normally assumed that the economic interests of capital-
ists affect their stances on foreign policy issues but, just as their
economic interests are competitive, not uniform, so they are not
monolithic on many foreign policy issues. Most business elites are
probably more pro-Western than other parts of the population
because their interests tie them to Western markets and partners.
They may be more dovish on war/peace issues than other parts of the
population because peace, in reducing the role of the military, would
increase their influence, and would provide a better investment
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climate and opportunity for foreign joint ventures. Leaders pursuing
dovish policies usually attempt to co-opt business with promises of
the new business opportunities improved external relations would
encourage. Sadat pursued this policy, but initially Egyptian business
was by no means an enthusiastic advocate of a separate peace with
Israel, which threatened to isolate Egypt from the Gulf and Arab
markets it needed. On the other hand, the Egyptian–American
Business Association subsequently emerged as a powerful block with
a stake in joint ventures with American firms and in the flow of
American aid to Egypt that rewarded this separate peace. Syrian
businessmen are often as nationalistic as other citizens and fear
peace with Israel could bring Israeli economic competition, not just
investment opportunities. Palestinian businessmen, insecure in the
Diaspora and convinced security for their wealth required a state of
their own, funded the PLO (Smith 1986). Many Jordanian business-
men boycotted an Israeli trade fair to protest Israel’s reversion to
hard-line policies after Oslo. In fact, to the degree they are seeking
Arab markets, Arab businessmen may be Pan-Arab nationalists and
fear Israeli economic competition under peace. The Turkish bour-
geoisie, perhaps the most developed in the region outside of Israel,
has an internationalist wing in partnership with MNCs which is a
strong advocate of entry into the EU and a provincial Islamic wing.
The latter, more oriented to the domestic market, provided support
for the Islamic Refah party which called for a reorientation to
regional Islamic markets. On the whole, Middle East business
cannot yet be seen as an engine of ‘internationalist coalitions’ able
to redefine states’ foreign policy agendas.
The national security bureaucracies: the pivotal role of the
military
The role of the military in the policy process carries greater weight in
most Middle Eastern states than elsewhere. The military literally
founded most of the authoritarian republics and remains the central
pillar of these regimes; in 1999, presidents were officers or ex-officers
in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, and Sudan. In most
Middle Eastern states the military was, for a long time, the most devel-
oped, modernised and weighty institution in the political system.
The political role of Middle East militaries has, however, changed
significantly over time. In earlier periods when traditional landed-
commercial elites ruled, the military, recruited to a great extent from
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the rising middle classes, expressed their desire for the reform or
overthrow of the old order, and the narrow-based old regimes
offered little obstacle to military intervention in politics (Ayubi
1995: 258–60; Halpern 1963: 251–80; Trimberger 1978). However,
as the military became politicised, it often fragmented along sectar-
ian, regional or personal lines. Factions vying for political power
destabilised Syria in the 1950s and 1960s and Iraq for a decade after
the revolution of 1958. The military might be colonised by particu-
laristic interests, as in Syria where the Alawi sect came, as a result
of intra-military political struggles, to dominate the officer corps.
Intra-military struggles often damaged the military as a fighting
force, discrediting military involvement in politics; thus, the 1967
defeat discredited military politicians in both Egypt and Syria and
enabled political leaders, themselves from the military, to appoint
professional commanders who rebuilt military discipline. But it
often took a power struggle for rulers to establish their authority
over the military. In Egypt, for example, Sadat had to defeat chal-
lenges from several politicised officers. Saddam Hussein, a civilian,
relied on the party and security forces to defeat or deter challenges
from the military, often pre-empting them by purges and executions. 
As state-building strengthened civilian institutions and authority
of office, the vacuum that had originally encouraged military inter-
vention was filled. The military relinquished overt political leader-
ship in many states and became more professionalised, depoliticised
and therefore more subordinated to quasi-civilian political control.
Policy makers were freed from the factional instability that had hith-
erto frustrated coherence in foreign policy making. Nevertheless, the
role of the military in policy making remains central. Political
leaders cannot dispense with military support to acquire office and
the propensity of the military to intervene in politics, though declin-
ing, requires that rulers attend to its concerns or risk instability. The
Minister of Defence, normally an officer, represents the military in
the government as much, or more, than he ensures government
control of the military. The high salience of national-security con-
cerns and hence the influence of national security elites ensures that
the de-militarisation of the polity remains within limits – even in
Turkey and Israel. As the case of Turkey shows, even a profession-
alised military may reserve the prerogative to intervene in politics
when the politicians are perceived to put national stability and secur-
ity at risk. Militaries have usually considered themselves entitled to
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a decisive voice in matters of war and peace, and are self-appointed
defenders of the borders and integrity of the state whether from
internal or external threats. Professionalised militaries routinely
operate as pressure groups on behalf of arms purchases, and for
better pay and conditions for soldiers, and their weight is enhanced
by a continuing perception of high external or internal threat.
Periodic cycles of modernisation needed to keep up with the new
generation of weaponry mean the military’s voracious appetite for
scarce resources can never be sated, locking it into zero-sum conflicts
with civilian groups over national budgets. In the 1980s when arms
purchases were at their height, Iraq, Syria and Israel – all of which
experienced wars – devoted 23 per cent, 18 per cent and 15 per cent
respectively of their GNPs to the military and Saudi Arabia and
Jordan 17 per cent (Korany, Noble and Brynen 1993: 305). Egypt,
Syria, Iran and Turkey had around a half million men under arms
and Iraq a million. Moreover, the military has everywhere extended
its reach into the economy, becoming, to an extent, a state within a
state, founding not only armaments industries but others aiming at
self-sufficiency in everything from food to housing (Ayubi 1995:
270–3; Sayigh, 1993; Zartman 1993: 249–54).
Perhaps most dramatic has been the gradual transformation in
the ideological outlook of militaries. In the 1950s and 1960s, young
Arab officers were radical, modernising and nationalist in orienta-
tion; the Egyptian officer corps saw itself as ‘defender of the revolu-
tion’ – until the 1970s. However, as the military became a pillar of
ruling establishments, as it accumulated privileges and, especially
where it went into business ‘on the side’, the military elite became a
main component of the state bourgeoisie with a stake in the status
quo. Everywhere, as a result of this process, officer corps have been
de-radicalised, becoming less nationalist, less populist and more sup-
portive of capitalism (Ayubi 1995: 273–6; Picard 1988). Moreover,
because the military is typically secular and because mass opposition
to regimes has come to be expressed in Islamic terms, the military
has become the bastion of secularism against Islamic radicalism.
This combination of conservatism and secularism is most obvious in
Turkey where, in the name of Ataturk, the military has regularly
intervened against the left and more recently against Islamists. It is
also apparent in Algeria, Egypt and Syria where the military has
repressed Islamist movements. Only in Iran has the military itself
been Islamised, although Islamic penetration of the lower ranks of
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the military is probably widespread elsewhere (Ayubi 1995: 264–5).
However, the armies that once challenged imperialism or cham-
pioned Pan-Arabism have for the most part become shields of state
autonomy from societal challenges, often enforcing re-integration
into the world capitalist market.
Nevertheless, there remain certain variations in the political
orientation of Middle East armies and in their effect on the state’s
foreign policy, in good part owing to differences in their historic
roles and bases of recruitment; this can be illustrated through a com-
parison of the Syrian and Turkish armies.
The military in Syria: persistence of a ‘praetorian’ army Syria is a
case where a radicalised military led a revolution from above and
where its special social composition – rural and plebeian – imparted
a radical nationalist, populist thrust to the state, the residues of
which continue to make a difference for Syria’s foreign policy orien-
tation.
The radicalisation of the Syrian army was partly a function of its
predominately lower-middle-class and ex-peasant social composi-
tion. Recruitment under the French from the Alawi and Druze
peasant minorities into the local military forces established a tradi-
tion of military service as a route out of poverty for them which con-
tinued after independence. The sons of the Sunni upper class, on the
other hand, eschewed a military career (Van Dusen 1975: 124) and
the small contingent of urban upper-class officers was decimated as
a result of the purges following Western conspiracies against the
nationalist government in the late 1950s (Seale 1965: 37, 48, 119). 
The politicisation of the officer corps was a function of its forma-
tion in a time of nationalist ferment. The loss of Palestine, blamed
on the corruption and incompetence of the traditional civilian elites,
was the direct catalyst of army intervention in politics. In the face
of the Israeli threat, the army was rapidly expanded and the military
academy provided scholarships to bright underprivileged appli-
cants; as a result, Sunnis from the provincial lower middle class and
the peasantry were also increasingly recruited into the army. Indeed,
by 1952, a majority of graduates were rurals. Particularly under the
influence of the radical politician, Akram al-Hawrani, youth entered
the military academy with political motives: an army career began
to be seen as a vehicle of political activism. The sons of impover-
ished Alawi smallholders or sharecroppers under Sunni landlords
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imbued with agrarian radicalism flocked to radical parties, notably
the Ba’th, before entering the army. Subsequent developments, such
as Israeli attacks on army positions at the front and the Suez War,
reinforced and accelerated the radical politicisation of the officer
corps. But political intervention split the army into factions in the
1950s and 1960s, making Syria the symbol of military praetorian-
ism. It was from this crucible that a small group of Ba’thist officers
carried out the 1963 coup which brought the Ba’th party to power
(Devlin 1976: 204; Perlmutter 1969: 835). 
From the moment Ba’thi officers brought the party to power, they
were the senior partner in the new military-party state. In the first
years after the power seizure, the Ba’thi ‘military committee’, a
secret organisation of Ba’thist officers dominated by Alawis and
Druze, acted as a unified body to extend its control over the army
through massive purges and wholesale recruitment of politically
loyal new elements, frequently Ba’thist teacher/reserve officers.
This Ba’thisation of the army turned it into a rural and, increas-
ingly, a minority stronghold. These officers also worked to achieve
dominant roles in party and government institutions. The army’s
Ba’thisation infected it with all the Ba’th’s internal conflicts while the
militarisation of the Ba’th meant that such conflicts were decided as
much by the command of tanks as by votes in party assemblies. The
resultant recruitment, dismissal and promotion of officers on the
basis of political loyalty displaced professional standards and as sec-
tarian solidarity became a shorthand for loyalty, intra-Ba’th power
struggles led to the decimation of non-Alawi groups in the army.
Initially, Alawi officers appeared the most militantly radical force
within the Ba`th, the most intense carriers of peasant grievances
against the urban establishment. Their strong solidarity, as opposed
to the more regionally and class-divided Sunni officers, accounts for
their success in establishing political ascendancy (Drysdale 1979;
Rabinovich 1972; Van Dam 1981). 
After a 1966 radical coup within the Ba’th regime, the victors
tried to transform the military into an ‘ideological army’ committed
to Ba’thism whose coercive power would give the regime the auton-
omy of the dominant classes necessary to launch the Ba’th revolu-
tion from above: indeed, in the following years the army repressed
no less than seven major anti-regime urban disturbances by some
combination of merchants aggrieved at state socialism and Islam-
ists alienated by minority dominance. However, once the radical
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Ba’thists’ politicisation of the army was discredited by its miserable
performance in the 1967 war, they rapidly lost support among the
officer corps. The moderate Ba’thist Defence Minister, General
Hafiz al-Asad, asserted control over appointments and transfers in
the name of rebuilding the army’s professional standards and this
allowed him to eliminate his rivals and seize power in 1970: when
party authority and Asad’s military command clashed, the latter tri-
umphed easily (Van Dam 1981: 83–97). 
Under Asad, the military, apparently triumphant, was gradually
turned from a vehicle of regime change into one of several pillars of
state subordinate to the presidency. As Drysdale (1979) points out,
Asad pursued a dual policy in seeking to reconcile Ba’thist political
control and military professionalism. On the one hand, praetorian
guards units primarily charged with regime defence and certain
coup-making armoured units were recruited on the basis of politi-
cal loyalty and (Alawi) sectarian and kin affiliation. On the other
hand, equally preoccupied with the conflict with Israel, Asad put a
new stress on professional competence and discipline in the wider
army and purged non-political officers were reinstated. Steadily
expanding in size and benefiting from a ‘cornucopia of sophisticated
modern weapons’, the reformed Syrian army acquitted itself res-
pectably in subsequent conflicts with Israel (Drysdale 1979: 372;
Picard 1988). 
This strategy, together with the social and political congruence
between the top political and military leadership, elaborate police
surveillance of the army, and its increasingly privileged position in
society, helped Asad to end the long era of coups, an achievement
crucial to his stabilisation of the Syrian state. Moreover, the steady
expansion in the size and firepower of the military made violent
opposition to the regime very costly, if not futile: the Alawi military
showed the extremes to which it would go to protect the regime in
its 1982 bombardment of an Islamic uprising in Hama. By the
1970s, the once radical officer corps had become an integral part of
a new political establishment with a stake in the status quo. It was
a powerful interest group advocating increased defence spending
and especially influential on security issues and matters of war and
peace with Israel. Senior politicised officers still manoeuvred to
insert allies and clients into top party and government posts and
ambitious politicians sought their backing. Ex-officers headed min-
istries and officers ran military-owned companies, were involved in
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smuggling rings or acted as brokers allocating state contracts and
goods to clients (Picard 1988: 139–44). Seemingly immune from
accountability, they became major obstacles to attempted reforms
of the corruption and power abuses in the regime. Moreover, in alli-
ance with the revived Damascene Sunni bourgeoisie, they came to
constitute a ‘military-mercantile complex’ bridging the ‘new’ state
and ‘old’ private bourgeoisies. Nevertheless, continued recruitment
of the military from Alawi villages and sectarian barriers to inter-
marriage between Alawis and the Sunni bourgeoisie, were major
obstacles to amalgamation of these elites into a new unified upper
class. Because the Sunni bourgeoisie was still better situated to bene-
fit from manipulation of the market and the Alawis from exploita-
tion of the public sector, the Alawi military remained a brake on the
economic liberalisation which was integrating other Middle Eastern
countries into Western-dominated markets. The military also
retained a residual commitment to Arab nationalism and militancy
toward Israel that was reflected in the country’s foreign policy. 
The Turkish military: above and against society? In Turkey the
military historically has had a strong sense of institutional identity.
Its view of itself as the guardian of the interest of the state against
particular societal interests was manifested in three coups carried
out against elected governments. But the social composition of the
officer corps inevitably shaped its conception of this interest, which
evolved over a century from a radical modernising to a conservative
one.
The military became a key actor in defensive modernisation from
the beginning of Ottoman reform when the defence of the empire
became inseparable from its rapid modernisation against the resis-
tance of ‘traditional forces’. The military was a key support for
modernising ministers and, when reform failed to ward off external
threats, it became a vehicle for a more radical revolution from above
under Ataturk which preserved while reshaping the state (Ahmad
1993: 3–4). 
This does not mean that the army was isolated from and unre-
flective of society. Liberal versus radical cleavages among officers
under the Young Turks and under Ataturk tended to reflect the
social strata from which such factions were recruited. However,
Ataturk used his prestige to insulate the military from politics,
turning it into a reliable and professionalised instrument of his
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regime. Then, in the post-Ataturk period, the military assumed the
role of defender of the Kemalist heritage, although its interpretation
of Kemalism altered as its social composition changed (Ahmad
1993: 6–9). 
The 1960 coup, launched in the name of defending the Kemalist
revolution, was the last gasp of military radicalism. It was engi-
neered by junior officers of provincial lower-middle-class back-
ground resentful of the Democrat Party government – and the
co-opted top brass – which impugned the army’s prestige and
allowed inflation to so erode military salaries that officers experi-
enced downward mobility even as the new business class was
enriched (Ahmad 1993: 9–10, 121–5). The coup opened the door to
a further democratisation of the political system and an opening to
the left, which included allowing workers the right to strike and the
formation of a socialist party. 
This experience taught the military high command and the state
establishment that the army had to be given a vested interest in the
system if future revolts against senior officers were to be prevented.
After the coup, centrist senior officers under General Gursel got the
upper hand, radical officers were purged and the high command
began the systematic policing of the political attitudes of the officer
corps. The army’s role as guardian of the state was institutionalised
in the National Security Council in which the high command
acquired the right to regular consultations with the cabinet. At the
same time, the officer corps was turned into a privileged elite, enjoy-
ing high salaries, pensions and perks. Retired officers were recruited
into state-run businesses and a military industrial complex emerged.
The Army Mutual Assistance Association began investing officers’
pension funds in private business, becoming the full or joint owner
of auto, insurance and petro-chemical companies, including a part-
nership with Renault of France. The officer corps thus became an
extension of the bourgeoisie with a stake in stability and order. It
became increasingly sympathetic to the conservative parties which
advocated market capitalism and alienated from Ataturk’s old
Republican Peoples Party (RPP) as the latter reinvented itself as a
social democratic party appealing to the middle and lower classes
and took a stand for a more independent, less pro-North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) foreign policy. The 1971 coup, while
made in the name of order, targeted the left while tacitly encourag-
ing the forces of the right (Ahmad 1993: 130–2). 
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This tendency reached its full dimensions in the next 1981 coup
under General Kenan Evren. The coup, according to Ahmad (1993:
174–80), in part reflected the growing responsiveness of the top mil-
itary to US government perceptions and interests at a time when the
Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan height-
ened the American need for a reliable ally in the region. The centre-
right Demirel government was resisting US requests to situate its
(anti-Iranian) rapid deployment force in Turkey, would not make
the concessions to Greece needed to protect the cohesion of NATO’s
south-eastern flank, and was dependent on the anti-American
Islamic Salvation Party. The military, bypassing the government,
made concessions to Greece and forced the signing of a defence
agreement with Washington which restored military aid suspended
over Cyprus. At the same time, Demirel began to implement an IMF
austerity plan which removed subsidies, reduced protection for
industry and started a shift from import substitute industrialisation
to the export strategy required to pay Turkey’s debts; but massive
worker strikes resisted this and the RPP and Islamic Salvation Party
came together to oppose closer links to the West. This precipitated
the coup that put an end to the ‘disorder’ that made Turkey seem a
dubious ally for Washington. The military regime embraced the eco-
nomic liberalisation and structural adjustment measures of Turgut
Ozal’s new government and provided the repression of labour
needed to enforce it. Foreign policy was reoriented to a close US alli-
ance. A new constitution invested the military dominated National
Security Council with responsibility for protecting the integrity of
the country and gave it the sole right to interpret its own mandate:
in short, elected politicians became accountable to the military, not
the reverse. 
The military was not, however, a complete monolith. In the mid-
1980s, as civilian rule was restored and Ozal emerged as the domi-
nant political leader, a new test of the political power of the military
developed. An ambitious general and leader of the 1980 coup, Chief
of Staff Necdet Urug was positioning himself to succeed to the pres-
idency after General Evren; contemptuous of civilians and little
Westernised, he had antagonised Washington by objecting to some
of its co-operation proposals. With US support – and that of
President Evren – Ozal passed over Urug’s candidate to succeed him
as Chief of Staff in favour of a Westernised general, and then – in
a ‘civilian coup’ – had himself elected President instead of the
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expected military candidate. Similarly, when in 1992 the Chief of
Staff resigned in protest of Ozal’s close alignment with the US
against Iraq, the military was too divided to act. While it is usually
the military that is united and the politicians divided, when the
opposite is the case, the military can be restrained (Ahmad 1993:
213–18; Mufti 1998). 
By the mid-1990s, however, the more usual situation had been
restored: weak civilian governments faced a more politicised mili-
tary seemingly united against perceived threats from the Kurdish
insurgency and the rise of political Islam. The military not only
carried out a virtual coup against the Islamist prime minister,
Necmettin Erbakan, but by-passed the politicians in striking a close
military alliance with Israel supposedly needed to win US support
for the counter-insurgency against the Kurds. Links with Israel were
also seen as crucial to the military’s massive modernisation pro-
gram. The military appeared increasingly determined to impose its
own conception of Turkey’s national security needs on the political
system.
Decision-making structures: variations in the concentration of
power
The state structure – the features and coherence of institutions and
the way they distribute power and channels of influence in the policy
process – determines actual foreign policy choices. 
In the Arab republics, often thought to approximate the leader-
dominant model, the chief executive does enjoy wide discretion and
autonomy in foreign policy making. Presidential dominance is typ-
ically enshrined in constitutional distributions of powers: the presi-
dent has the main, if not the exclusive, right to conduct foreign
policy and is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He is little
constrained by standard operating procedures or formal checks and
balances. Yet, the president’s actual ability to exercise his formal
powers of office cannot be taken for granted. Even in Egypt, which
has the most institutionalised presidency, presidential dominance
within the top political elite has been the product of power strug-
gles in which the leader had to acquire enhanced personal stature or
build sufficient coalitions in order to prevail. 
Nasser initially made policy in consultation with his Free Officer
colleagues and it was only the growth of his personal charismatic
stature combined with the 1956 establishment of a constitution
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endowing the presidency with enormous powers, that elevated
him above the rest of his colleagues; even then he continued to
meet opposition from other Free Officers and had to rule by exploit-
ing divisions among them (Cremeans 1963: 32–3; Dawisha:
1976: 104–5, 115, 117). Sadat, on assuming the office, immediately
asserted Nasser’s presidential prerogative. A major issue in the
power struggle with left-wing Free Officers in the ruling party after
Nasser’s death was Sadat’s insistence on his unilateral presidential
right to make foreign policy decisions such as his offer to open the
Suez Canal in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from its banks
and his decision to join the Federation of Arab Republics with Libya
and Syria. In the showdown over presidential power, Sadat bene-
fited from the respect of professional officers for the chain of
command which the presidency headed, but he had also to build a
coalition of more conservative officers, bureaucrats and elements of
the Westernised bourgeoisie and he only prevailed because his rivals
lacked effective links to their potential constituents among the
Nasserite masses. Although Sadat’s purge of these rivals gave him a
freer hand, before the October 1973 war he still lacked the legiti-
macy to take the biggest decisions alone; as such, the planning and
decision to launch this war was made in close consultation with the
military and political elite (Korany and Akbik 1986: 96–9). Even
after the war consolidated his stature, Sadat was only able to pursue
his intensely personal course toward a separate peace with Israel by
a wily step-by-step policy. Had he revealed at the outset that he
sought such an end – if indeed he did – much of the Egyptian polit-
ical elite might well have combined against him; however his first
steps along this path – the decisions to seek a diplomatic settlement
and a US opening to balance the Soviet alliance – were acceptable
to all but hard-line Nasserites. Further steps along the road – expul-
sion of the Soviet advisors, the decision to launch a merely limited
war in the Sinai – had the support of a majority of the elite. The final
steps, however – the first disengagement, the second disengagement,
the final break with the Soviets, Camp David – were presented by
Sadat to the elite as fait accompli, each of which further enmeshed
Egypt in a web of commitments while narrowing alternative options
(Hinnebusch 1985: 65–9).
Where the president’s authority is consolidated, he does normally
dominate decision-making. However, in some cases a more collegial
or factionalised ‘bureaucratic politics’ (Allison and Halperin 1972)
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may give other elites, speaking for rival branches of the bureaucracy
– army, ruling party, foreign ministry, national security council,
intelligence services, etc. – opportunities to influence decision-
making. Normally, the rival branches of the state seek to advance
their own particular role, budgets and solutions, with the chief exec-
utive choosing between them. Episodes of conflict between ideolog-
ical parties and the army were salient in late Nasserite Egypt (the
so-called centres of power), in pre-1970 Ba’thist Syria, and in post-
independence Algeria. Even where bureaucratic politics is more
muted, presidents may wish to consult within the elite in order to
generate a maximum consensus behind controversial or risky poli-
cies, and a National Security Council may regularise such consulta-
tion. The president’s national security advisors, who may be part of
his shilla – his network of long-time close personal supporters – may
exploit their personal relations with him in the battle over policy.
While the council of ministers (cabinet) normally discusses a deci-
sion after the leader has taken it and is basically a policy implement-
ing body, bureaucratic politics plays a role in shaping the ‘normal’
day-to-day administration of foreign relations in which the leader’s
commands may be variously interpreted or distorted by his subor-
dinates. That being said, the scope for bureaucratic politics in the
authoritarian republics is normally strictly limited: other elites, typ-
ically being the ‘president’s men’, are less likely than in more plura-
listic states to identify with the interests of their organisations or to
enjoy the support to make them power bases from which to stand
up to the president; this, in turn, reflects the lesser institutionalisa-
tion of the state in the Middle East (Ayubi 1994: 35; Korany and
Akbik 1986: 52–6). 
This is even more true of parliaments and the committees of
ruling parties, which, subservient to the president, are seldom
able to do more than approve executive initiatives. For example,
although the Egyptian parliament acquired more power under
Sadat’s limited political liberalisation, he brushed aside numerous
attempts by a near parliamentary consensus, remarkable in a body
dominated by the government party, to restrain his march toward a
separate peace. These included resolutions to give the Arab Defence
Pact priority over the peace treaty with Israel, to make normalisa-
tion of relations contingent on a comprehensive settlement, and to
link it to the West Bank autonomy provided for in the Camp David
accords. Eventually, a fed-up Sadat dissolved this parliament and
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made sure elections to its successor eliminated all leading critics
(Hinnebusch 1985: 175). 
In some of the Arab monarchies and in the more pluralist
regimes, foreign policy making is likely to be more collegial than in
the authoritarian republics. In the monarchies, the extended ruling
families often constitute an informal consultative group to which
the monarch is expected to listen and senior royal princes simulta-
neously head the various national security bureaucracies. In more
democratic states, such as Israel and Turkey, power is more diffused
among senior cabinet ministers and military officers, the foreign
policy professionals have more influence, and parliaments have
more power to hold the executive accountable. In Israel, where the
cabinet, in which each minister has one vote, must approve strate-
gic decisions, prime ministers, notably Ben Gurion and Begin, were
on several occasions restrained by fellow ministers (Brecher 1972:
211, 228, 280). In semi-pluralist Iran, power is diffused between the
spiritual leader, the president, and parliament. Aspects of bureau-
cratic politics have more scope to operate in pluralist regimes, espe-
cially when the top elite is factionalised, and although the chief
executive normally has the last word, he or she may have to arbi-
trate between opposing factions or make concessions to other elites
to maintain their support. 
Variations in the concentration of power, in the extent of bureau-
cratic politics, and in the range and character of actors included in
the policy process inevitably shape the character of policy outcomes.
The typically limited access to the policy process in most Middle
East states may narrow the alternatives considered and bias the pol-
icies adopted. Foreign ministries in principle provide much of the
information and diplomatic skills needed for the conduct of foreign
policy but in the Middle East they are, by world standards, weak in
professionalism, resources and influence over foreign policy. This
means a lack of institutional support (policy analysis and planning)
for decision-makers and limited institutional memory to ensure
policy continuity. Especially in the authoritarian republics, the
foreign minister is likely to be a client of the leader without an inde-
pendent power base, who can be dismissed with ease, and thus
cannot present an independent institutional view. Even in Egypt, the
Arab state with the most professional diplomatic corps, the extent
to which the president is guided by the foreign minister is, accord-
ing to Boutrus Boutrus Ghali (1963: 320), who served under Nasser,
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a matter of his personal choice; the ministry as an institution chiefly
deals with day-to-day transactions (Ayubi 1994: 8–9, 14). If the dip-
lomats are undervalued, the role of the security and intelligence
services is everywhere central to foreign policy making because
intelligence bosses are sometimes major political actors and because
they are pivotal in the monitoring of both external and internal
threats. The exceptions to this picture are only partial. In Turkey the
foreign ministry enjoys high prestige and in Israel it is highly profes-
sional; yet in both states the military, ex-military politicians, and the
intelligence services nevertheless frequently overshadow the diplo-
mats. The limited influence of professional foreign policy establish-
ments, together with the dominance of the policy process by military
and intelligence bureaucrats, may give special weight to the advo-
cates of the use of force over negotiation in achieving ends and to
‘national security’ considerations over other issues, such as eco-
nomic interests or identity, in the policy process. 
The over-concentration and personalisation of power so typical
of Middle Eastern states is widely thought to threaten the rational-
ity of decision-making. It may mean a lack of checks on the ability
of leaders to translate their idiosyncratic choices into policy. It may
obstruct the channelling of sufficient information and policy alter-
natives to the top decision-makers, making them more prone to
miscalculation. Yet, the ideal of a rational actor implies a unified
leadership and, where the elite is fragmented by competing factions
not effectively reconciled by the top decision-maker, foreign policy
issues may become weapons in the domestic political struggle. The
outcome may therefore represent less a rational plan to achieve
some geo-politically-defined national interest than a reflection of the
intra-elite power balance at a given moment. Rationality would
seem to be enhanced by a process which combines enough plural-
ism in the policy process to secure sufficient input into it with a rea-
sonably unified leadership enjoying the legitimacy to make decisions
free of constant worries about the domestic power struggle; but this
balance appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
There do not, however, seem to be hard and fast rules. The
personalisation of power in Iraq under Saddam led to disastrous
miscalculations. In Syria, by contrast, the fragmentation of the pre-
Asad Ba’th regime encouraged the factionalist outbidding which led
to the disastrous 1967 war while, after Asad’s personalisation of
power, foreign policy was widely seen to approximate the rational
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actor model. Sadat’s personalisation of foreign policy allowed him
to pursue a high-risk policy which, overriding the caution of his
bureaucrats and advisors, permitted key breakthroughs in reaching
peace with Israel. But as a result, mistakes, such as the total break
with the Soviet Union and the excessive reliance on the US, were not
corrected. Three successive foreign ministers resigned in protest
over Sadat’s tactics in the negotiations with Israel in which he made
seemingly impulsive concessions on matters he considered trivial
but which they regarded as crucial. In the Camp David negotiations,
Sadat’s lack of accountability to other elites or the public meant he
could not claim to be constrained by them from making conces-
sions. By contrast, Begin’s bargaining hand was strengthened by his
claim to be more constrained by his slim parliamentary majority and
his hard-line party in Israel’s more accountable political system
(Telhami 1990: 157–95). Nevertheless, the personality of the leader
and whether it is appropriate to the ‘needs’ of the period may be as
important a variable in determining the rationality of decisions as is
the character of the policy process.
The idiosyncratic variable: how much difference does the leader
make?
While an uncritical concentration by foreign policy analysts on the
leader has been rightly criticised (Korany & Dessouki 1991: 8–9),
where domestic political systems are in transition, as in the Middle
East, institutions and standard operating procedures which might
constrain the leader are not well established and, indeed, may be the
recent creations of the leader himself. Where society lacks strong
interest groups or classes, where the tradition of patrimonial rule
prescribes loyalty to the person of the ruler and where legitimacy
depends on his role as a hero, especially in foreign policy, the leader
is more likely to shape public opinion than to be constrained by it
(Ayubi 1994: 6–7). The relative absence of institutionalised checks
on leaders in the Middle East does not mean there are no informal
domestic constraints or pressures on them; the leader inherits the
foreign policy role conception of his country which affects his per-
ceptions and preferences and the preservation of regime legitimacy
may depend on foreign policy performance in the service of this role
(Dawisha, 1990). But rather than being sharply constrained by such
roles, leaders, to a considerable extent, construct or re-construct
them or implement them in idiosyncratically distinct ways.
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To the extent that foreign policy making is exceptionally person-
alised in the Middle East, a state’s foreign policy performance is
more dependent on the leader’s personal style, capabilities, values,
goals, strategies, perceptions – and misperceptions – than in more
institutionalised states. Choices, particularly in a crisis or a critical
bargaining situation wherein policy making tends to be especially
centralised, are inevitably to some extent idiosyncratic. The relative
weight of and role of the idiosyncratic variable can be assessed by
comparing different leaders in the same state facing similar situa-
tions (Nasser v. Sadat) and different leaders in similar states in the
same time frame (Asad v. Saddam). 
From Nasser to Sadat To what extent did the change in Egypt’s
leadership from Nasser to Sadat explain the radical change in
Egypt’s foreign policy after 1970 – specifically the turn from the
USSR to the US and from Pan-Arabism to a separate peace with
Israel? Nasser had, it is often argued, started the changes, in his
acceptance of the Rogers Plan for a peaceful settlement with Israel
under American auspices, which Sadat would take to their logical
conclusions. Nevertheless, this decision did not necessarily lead to a
separate peace and, indeed, such an outcome would arguably have
been incongruent with Nasser’s personality.
Nasser was, from his youth, a rebel against a world where unjust
force was perceived to govern (Ayubi 1994: 92–3). According to
Wynn, the humiliation Nasser experienced from being looked down
on for his baladi (plebeian) background sparked a psychological
drive to make himself and his people proud, not ashamed, to be
Egyptians (Dawisha 1976: 108) As a saidi, a product of upper
Egypt’s stress on honour and manhood, Nasser was, Dawisha
argues, ‘almost obsessed’ with personal dignity and extremely sen-
sitive to slights. He believed Egypt and the Arabs needed a hero who
would battle against superior malevolent powers and he sought this
role. It should not be imagined that Nasser’s policy simply grew out
of irrational or emotional flaws. At a time when most of his Free
Officer colleagues were Egypt-firsters, Nasser was the Free Officer
with a strategic regional vision, convinced that only together could
the Arab states ward off the imperialist and Israeli threats (Seale
1965: 193, 225). His experience in power convinced him, after a
period in which he sought accommodation with the West, that the
West’s interests in the reinforcement of Israel and control of Middle
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East oil were fundamentally at odds with those of the Arabs
(Dawisha 1976: 125). But his personality traits lent a particular
intensity and tenacity to his anti-imperialist orientation. This orien-
tation was, moreover, powerfully reinforced when Nasser’s defiance
of the West sparked enormous enthusiasm from the Pan-Arab
public; Nasser’s charisma grew out of the correspondence between
his own experience and that of the man in the street, between his
personal values and the dominant mass value system of the time
(Dawisha 1976: 129). Once he became a charismatic hero, his per-
sonal dignity and Egypt’s became, to him, inseparable. Nasser’s
deepest instinct when challenged was to go on the offensive, to seize
the psychological initiative needed to recapture the imagination and
enthusiasm of his followers (Kerr 1971: 27, 29). He would not give
in to superior power under threat and sought, instead, to mobilise
new resources to reconfigure the power balance. He was ready to
take risks rather than accept humiliation: the Suez Canal national-
isation, the Yemen intervention, the events leading up to the 1967
war and the War of Attrition – were all partly calculated risks, partly
emotional reactions to challenges (Dawisha 1976: 92–3, 95–107). 
The stunning defeat of 1967 was Nasser’s greatest reversal; but
his immediate response was a defiant call for the Arabs not to relin-
quish the fight against imperialism (Dawisha 1976: 50). Nasser
could not abandon his role as Arab hero or give up dignity by sub-
mitting to American or Israeli power. He was prepared for a just
political settlement but was deeply sceptical of American intentions;
US arms deliveries were maintaining Israeli superiority while Israel
rejected any return to the 1967 lines. Believing that, in a world
where force was respected, one could not negotiate from a position
of weakness, he launched a major overhaul and expansion of the
armed forces and, in the War of Attrition, contested Israel’s hold on
the Sinai peninsula (Dawisha 1976: 56–7); only when he had
thereby partly righted the power imbalance did he accept the Rogers
Plan and a ceasefire. 
Had Nasser lived, he would have faced similar constraints to
those faced by Sadat and, as an experienced strategist, was prag-
matic enough to have similarly mixed diplomacy and concession
with military force in seeking to roll back the Israeli occupation
(Kerr 1971: 156). But his intense anti-imperialism and the psycho-
logical difficulty of reversing the principles on which his heroic Pan-
Arab role rested, limited his flexibility in pursuing partial diplomatic
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solutions while his history of conflict with Israel and the US made
them little interested in accommodating him. To the end, he rejected
a separate solution (Dekmejian 1971: 99–101; Vatikiotis 1978:
266–309). Had Nasser not died young, Egyptian policy in the post-
1973 peace process would arguably have more closely resembled
that of Syria under Asad and have been pursued in co-ordination
with Syria. Whether this would have resulted in a comprehensive
settlement is debatable but it might have preserved the Arab lever-
age that was dissipated by Israel’s ability to divide its opponents. 
However much Egypt’s deteriorating economic and military sit-
uation may have made Anwar al-Sadat a man appropriate to his
time, his policies were by no means inevitable for, far from express-
ing an intra-elite consensus, he repeatedly made decisions in defi-
ance of elite opinion and these were quite distinct from those of his
predecessor: if, when facing superior power, Nasser’s instinct was to
‘balance’ against it, Sadat’s was to ‘bandwagon’ with it. Arguably
also, Sadat’s personality traits and personal style made a decisive
difference in Egypt’s negotiating stances and the sub-optimal separ-
ate peace reached with Israel. As Ajami suggests, his desire to be
accepted by the West led him into wishful thinking. According to his
Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy, he was ‘consumed by his desire to
become an international hero’ in Western eyes and Kissinger is said
to have admitted that Sadat squandered the leverage from the 1973
war and the oil embargo out of the weakness to be acclaimed as a
‘hero of peace’. He personalised relations between states, naively
convinced that his embrace of American leaders, including his
‘friend Henry’ (Kissinger), would be enough to change America’s
pro-Israeli policy. His eagerness to jettison Soviet support and rely
totally on American diplomacy was an eccentrically personal choice
that appalled his professional foreign policy advisors. To Sadat, the
Russians were ‘crude and tasteless people’ while Egypt’s alienation
from the US was unnatural, not the result of a conflict of national
interests but a matter of misunderstanding (which he would put
straight) or a product of Egypt’s Soviet alliance (which he would
abandon) or of Israel’s influence (which could be overcome by
embracing a US alliance). This craving for acceptance by the West
was, paradoxically, paralleled by over-confidence. A big-picture
thinker, uninterested in details, Sadat completely lacked Nasser’s
voracious appetite for information and did not like reading the
reports of his foreign policy advisors. Seeing himself as a ‘master of
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decision’ whose ‘electric shock diplomacy’ would upset the Arab-
Israeli status quo, he was unwilling to heed the advice of the foreign
policy professionals and enjoyed surprising them by his personal
initiatives. In negotiations over Sinai I and Sinai II, the disengage-
ment agreements with Israel after the 1973 war, he excluded his top
advisers from key sessions with United States Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and overrode their objections to many details of
these agreements, disregarding the warning of his senior general
that these agreements would forfeit the military option. He made his
momentous decision to go to Jerusalem without even bothering to
create an elite consensus behind him and allowed his top generals
little say at Camp David (Ajami 1981: 102, 109–16; Dessouki 1991:
168–71; Fahmy 1983: 14, 72–4, 136–7, 173–5, 283–90; Heikal,
1978a: 75–9, 113–16; Heikal 1983: 71; Karawan 1994: 250, 257;
Sadat 1978: 93–5, 107–19).
Telhami’s analysis (1990) of the bargaining at Camp David gives
sharper focus to the impact of the idiosyncratic factor. While
Telhami accepts that the power asymmetry with Israel was decisive
in forcing Egypt to seek a negotiated solution, he argues that the role
of leadership in the bargaining process decided the exact terms of
the settlement in Israel’s favour. At Camp David and thereafter,
Israel got all that it wanted – a peace treaty which took Egypt out
of the Arab–Israeli conflict and left it free to incorporate the West
Bank/Gaza area – while Egypt failed to get recognition of the prin-
ciple of Palestinian rights, failed to link normalisation of relations
with Israel to progress on the Palestinian front, and failed even to
get a freeze on Israeli settlements during the negotiations over
Palestine. Had Egypt been more successful in its diplomacy, it might
not have had to sacrifice its Arab leadership to attain peace. 
Bargaining theory advises keeping the opponent uncertain of
your bottom-line position. But Sadat had a history of making con-
cessions in advance. At his first meeting with Kissinger, he reputedly
declared that he was finished with the Soviets and that Egypt had
fought its last war with Israel (Heikal 1983: 75); in 1978 he told
Israeli Defence Minister Ezar Weizmann that he would make peace
whether or not Israel conceded a Palestinian state (Fahmy 1983:
289). At Camp David, he told President Carter he would be flexible
on Egypt’s official demands for a comprehensive peace; predictably,
once the Israelis learned this, they became more unyielding. Theory
also advises that the top man should not negotiate alone or settle the
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details and should allow subordinates who have limited authority
to prepare the way, but Sadat personally negotiated everything.
Sadat’s wishful thinking, his unwillingness to engage in a sustained
power struggle with Begin and his overconfidence led him to rely on
Carter to secure him an acceptable outcome. 
By contrast, Begin was a strategic thinker who never lost sight of
his strategic dream of a Greater Israel incorporating the West Bank.
Yet, he kept his eye on the details and never let his bottom line be
known. He bargained stubbornly, starting from an extreme posi-
tion, i.e. making such a fuss over retaining Israel’s Sinai settlements
that he diverted attention from other issues and was able to give the
impression that he had made a big concession when he gave way on
the issue. So stubborn was Begin that when Carter faced deadlock,
he went to Sadat for concessions – and got them. According to
Telhami, Sadat failed to understand that Begin also needed and
wanted a deal and hence gave in too readily to what would be a sep-
arate peace. After Camp David, Sadat’s yearning to be the hero of
peace made him so impatient with diplomatic bargaining over the
Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty that he undermined the efforts of
Egyptian negotiators to establish a firm linkage between the treaty
and the actualisation of the accompanying autonomy agreement for
the Palestinians: Sadat destroyed their hand when he let if be known
he would proceed with the former without the latter (Heikal 1983:
74–5; Telhami 1990: 157–95).
It is not that Sadat’s personality wholly explains the course Egypt
took; much of the foreign policy establishment – even Nasser for
that matter – constrained by Egypt’s limited resources, would have
adopted similar strategies of trying to manipulate the superpowers
to obtain a negotiated settlement with Israel; where Sadat made the
difference was the poor hand he played in this game and the subop-
timal outcome he achieved. 
Asad v. Saddam Syria and Iraq are ruled by branches of the same
party and have similar leader-army-party authoritarian regimes that
profess the same ideology of Arab nationalism. Both leaders rose to
power from the lower strata of society and the socialisation of both
took place in the heady days of Nasserism. Both were men of pride
and self-confidence, intolerant of opposition. Both enjoyed near-
absolute power over foreign policy making. But there the similarity
ends. Their foreign policy decisions could hardly have led to more
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contrasting outcomes. Asad turned Syria from a victim of stronger
neighbours into a formidable player that was generally thought to
punch above its weight in foreign affairs. Iraq, on the other hand,
enjoyed the most balanced combination of power resources in the
Arab world, but Saddam Hussein, in the course of two devastating
wars, dissipated these resources and turned Iraq into a victimised
pariah state. Do the personalities and attitudes of the leaders explain
a significant part of this different outcome? 
According to Seale (1988: 492–5), Asad was ‘a man of 1967’: his
harrowing experience when, as Defence Minister, he saw his un-
prepared forces mauled in a war brought on by the recklessness of
ideological-minded colleagues, decisively shaped his outlook. He
learned ‘realism’ which he compared with the ‘ideology’ of the pre-
1970 Ba`th radicals who, fatally neglecting the balance of power,
gave Israel an excuse to attack Syria. With a strong sense of Syria’s
limited resources, aware that he could not afford to make a mistake,
that, in Seale’s words, at every stage he risked being knocked out of
the game, Asad developed qualities necessary for battle in a tough
environment. According to Ma’oz (1988: 32, 34, 41–2), Asad dem-
onstrated a ‘winning’ combination of traits: consistency, patience,
caution, coolness and shrewdness. Aided by his huge capacity for
work and excellent memory, he never succumbed to wishful think-
ing or moved without a thorough analysis of the balance of forces.
He was ruthless but used violence with economy, while reserving the
carefully calibrated use of military force for the right time and place. 
Saddam Hussein was almost the opposite kind of personality: a
man of ‘pent-up violence’ with little sense of limits. Having begun
his career as a street fighter, his courage and fearlessness gave him a
reputation as a shaqawah – a tough man to be feared. He rose to
power through a combination of conspiracy, organisation and vio-
lence, including the Stalinist-like terror and purge of all who stood
in his way. Saddam admitted to an admiration for Stalin and his
favourite movie was said to be The Godfather. It may not be an
exaggeration to say that he epitomised a political culture where per-
sonal strength and ruthlessness enjoyed high respect, arguably
reflective of the Iraqi yearning for order amidst the chronic instabil-
ity that followed the 1958 revolution. In foreign affairs, Saddam
proved to be a high-risk taker with grandiose ambitions sought
through resort to violence. Arguably, Saddam externalised in the
international realm the violent political methods that had served
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him so well at home. But he overestimated the international permis-
siveness for such methods and repeatedly miscalculated the will and
capacity of his opponents – Ayatollah Khomeini, President Bush –
to oppose his plans. For example, expecting Iran to quickly submit,
he had no fall-back strategy once his initial attack failed to unseat
Khomeini (Devlin 1992: 1052; Khalil 1989: 118–20; Marr 1985:
218–20; Miller and Mylroie 1990: 24–41).
It is hard to escape the conclusion that leadership does indeed
make a big difference. Outcomes therefore depend on whether the
leaders’ qualities match the requirements of the external situations
in which they operate. Sadat was a wishful thinker who underplayed
his hand and was victimised by the stronger personalities of his
rivals, Asad and Begin were rational actors best able to combine
limited goals with flexible means, while Saddam’s risk taking led to
gross miscalculation that squandered Iraq’s power. The differential
results of their policies validate the realist maxim that success in
international politics depends on the prudent and effective use of
power. But the differences in their uses of power appear so largely
idiosyncratic that pluralism’s concern with leadership psychology
and perceptions seems vindicated. 
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6
Comparative foreign policies:
explaining foreign policy variation
What explains the similarities and differences in the foreign policy
behaviour of Middle East states? The relative explanatory weight
carried by domestic politics versus that of the systemic arenas in
which states operate is a matter of some dispute between pluralists
on the one hand, and realists and structuralists on the other. On the
face of it, if the domestic level is determinant, as pluralists tend to
argue, different kinds of states should follow different foreign poli-
cies and similar ones similar policies. If the systemic level is determi-
nant, as realism and structuralism hold, a state’s domestic features
should make little difference, at least over the long run; similar sys-
temic situations – power position, economic dependency – of ini-
tially domestically dissimilar regimes should drive a convergence in
their foreign policies while differing systemic situations should pull
initially similar regimes in divergent directions. Moreover, as, over
time, the system has moved toward the Westphalian model, its
power to drive a convergence of its ‘parts’ toward ‘realist’ behavi-
our should increase.
Neither view is wholly supported by the empirical evidence from
the Middle East. Rather, as this chapter will show, neither state fea-
tures or systemic forces alone but the interrelation between a state’s
specific position in systemic structures and its particular internal fea-
tures determines its foreign policy behaviour. Thus, as has been seen
(chapter 4, pp. 74–5), a state’s initial formation tends to put it on a
particular (status quo or revisionist) foreign policy tangent. Systemic
forces – the balance of power, economic dependency, trans-state
ideological tides – may subsequently deflect it from this course.
However, its level of consolidation determines whether a state
remains a victim of its systemic environment or becomes an effective
actor in it. A state’s consolidation, in turn, is affected by variables at
the system level where some (a neighbouring state) may constitute
the threat that motivates it, and others (bi-polarity) may determine
whether it gets the resources that enable it. Finally, leadership, by
virtue of its location at the intersection of the systemic and the
domestic, can make choices that set states on new tangents. This
argument about the interaction of system and state levels will be
illustrated by comparative case studies of divergence and conver-
gence in foreign policy.
Regime origins and the limits of convergence: Saudi Arabia and
Syria
Comparison of a conservative rentier monarchy, Saudi Arabia, with
Syria, a radical republic, highlights both the enduring effects of
contrasting state formation paths in differentiating foreign policy
tangents and the extent to which systemic forces make for conver-
gence in behaviour. 
Origins of the state 
Saudi Arabia was founded by the al-Saud clan’s dual mobilisation
of tribal military power and the Wahhabi Islamic movement. Unlike
most Middle Eastern countries, the state was, thus, founded by
indigenous forces, never experienced an imperialist occupation or
protectorate and was therefore spared the accompanying collabora-
tion with imperialism that often discredited traditional elites. This
does not mean that Saudi state-building was a wholly indigenous
product, for the impoverished Arabian peninsula lacked the eco-
nomic surplus to sustain more than ephemeral states and formation
of a stable state depended on assistance from Western powers
(Gause 1994: 22, 30, 42). The British provided state founder, Abd
al-Aziz Ibn Saud, with subsidies and the military means to discipline
the militant Ikhwan wing of his Wahhabi coalition which wanted
to carry on jihad against British client states in the region. The
American oil companies provided him with the financial resources
to incorporate unruly tribes into state-centred patronage networks.
Thus, external powers endowed the al-Saud regime with the hall-
marks of statehood – territorial demarcation and internal security –
in return for eschewing Wahhabim’s universalistic Islamic mission.
To minimise his consequent dependency, Ibn Saud sought to play off
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his British and American benefactors. But the Saudi state was, from
the outset, secure enough in its Islamic identity and autonomy to
pursue close mutually beneficial relations with the West (Bromley
1994: 142–7; Salame 1989). 
Saudi Arabia’s main vulnerability was a function of its large
sparsely settled territory, with long, difficult-to-defend borders, in a
dangerous region where the balance of power favoured the more
settled developed states. Once its oil reserves made it a potential
target of stronger states, insecurity became a constant in Saudi
policy. In addition to seeking external protection, the Saudis played
the regional balancing game, initially aligning with Syria and Egypt
against the Hashemite states to ward off their schemes for Arab
unity or revenge for the Saudi’s conquest of the Hijaz at their
expense. Then, much as today, the main threat to the al-Saud was
from regional, not Western powers. The combination of satisfaction
with its statehood, beneficial relations with the West and a sense of
threat from the region made Saudi Arabia a naturally status quo
power.
Syria, by contrast, was born frustrated and revisionist. In the
wake of the 1917 Arab revolt, Syrians expected the creation of an
independent Arab state in historic Syria (bilad al-sham) linked to a
wider Arab federation. Instead, betraying their promises to the
Arabs, the Western powers subjugated the Arab East and dismem-
bered historic Syria into four mini-states, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Palestine. Imperialism also sponsored the establishment of the
state of Israel in Palestine. Thereafter, a powerful revisionism was
rooted in the impulse to merge the Syrian state, seen as an artificial
creation of imperialism, in a wider Arab nation and in the utter
rejection of the legitimacy of Israel. 
The newly independent Syrian state was, however, weak, inse-
cure and the victim of acute domestic instability. It was governed by
a narrow-based traditional oligarchy that suffered a mortal blow to
the precarious legitimacy won in the independence struggle when
the government failed to defend Palestine against the 1948 establish-
ment of Israel. This weak state was exposed on all sides to countries,
which, at one time or another, constituted threats. The threat from
Israel was particularly keenly felt as Syrian–Israeli animosity esca-
lated from 1948 onward, feeding on border skirmishes over the
demilitarised zones left over from the war. Syria was also the object
of Hashemite ambitions to absorb it via the Greater Syria or Fertile
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Crescent unity schemes. Stronger Arab states financed and backed
rival Syrian elites and the coups that changed governments while all
Syrian players looked for patronage and protection abroad. It was
a combination of this vulnerability and its Arab identity that led
Syria to sacrifice its sovereignty to Egypt by joining the UAR in 1958
(Mufti 1996: 43–59; Seale 1965: 5–15: ). 
Political mobilisation
The era of political mobilisation impacted differentially on the two
states, propelling them further in contrasting directions, with Saudi
Arabia containing threats to its status quo orientation and Syrian
revisionism reaching a peak. 
Saudi Arabia faced the ‘King’s Dilemma’ which proved fatal for
several Middle East monarchies: how to modernise, yet prevent the
new social forces created by modernisation from destroying the tra-
ditional order (Huntington 1968: 177–91). In the 1950s and 1960s,
the regime was vulnerable to Pan-Arab ideology manipulated from
Cairo as the small, educated, new middle class and the working class
in the oil fields, attracted by Nasser, embraced Arabism and reform.
The al-Saud had, however, enough traditional legitimacy and
enough resources from oil revenues to combine limited modernisa-
tion in the economic and technical spheres, with the preservation of
the traditional culture and political order. 
Crucially, the regime incorporated conservative social forces,
enjoying the support of the tribal elite which controlled the tribal
masses and the ulama that legitimised the regime among the people
(Gause 1994: 158). A capitalist class emerged but rather than a
‘national bourgeoisie’ with an interest in industrialisation and reform,
it was satisfied with the status quo, including Saudi connections to the
West. Its dominant firms started as trading companies enriched as
importers and agents for foreign firms: the Alirezas were agents for
Ford or Westinghouse, the Juffaili were guarantors for foreign
contractors while Adnan Khashoggi made his fortune brokering
Western arms contracts. The bourgeoisie invested much of its surplus
in Western banks and real estate. The requirement that Western com-
panies have local partners widened this parasitic bourgeoisie during
the oil boom of the 1970s (Vassiliev 1998: 404–12, 461).
Also crucial to the survival of the Saudi regime was its ability to
bring under control the two groups that were the potential vehicles
of opposition, the military and organised labour. There was a string
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of coup attempts by Arab nationalist middle-class officers in the
1950s and 1960s. The air force, which was most exposed by its
higher education to politicisation, was particularly vulnerable: thus,
Saudi pilots sent to support Yemeni royalists defected to Egypt in
the 1960s and, as late as 1977, an Islamic/Libyan inspired plot was
crushed. Such periodic threats only fuelled the regime’s distrust of
its own military, the most common vehicle of regime change in the
Middle East. The al-Saud sought to control the military by keeping
it small and balancing it with a tribally recruited National Guard.
Pakistani mercenaries units were imported and royal princes,
trained in the West, packed the air force officer corps (Gause 1994:
123–6; Vassiliev 1998: 368–72). Organised labour, concentrated in
the oil fields, which became a crucible of Arab nationalist and leftist
opposition in the 1950s and 1960s, was controlled by repression.
Strikes of oil workers in 1953 and 1956, which challenged the
regime’s pro-Western foreign policy, were brutally suppressed –
including the flogging to death of two pro-Nasserite labour leaders. 
At first, the al-Saud tried to use foreign policy to appease Nasser
and the nationalist middle class by diluting its overt Western align-
ment. As Nasser became more threatening, however, Saudi policy
moved from bandwagoning with Cairo to balancing, together with
the Hashemite monarchies and the West, against Cairo. When
Nasser’s ideological threat became a more concrete military one
after the Egyptian army was sent to protect the republican revolu-
tion in Yemen, King Feisal responded with closer military links to
the US (Dawisha 1979: 1–5; Vassiliev 1998: 350–3). 
In Syria, by contrast, radical forces successfully challenged and
swept away the old order. Oligarchic-dominated political institu-
tions failed to absorb the political mobilisation of the middle class
and to address the growing agrarian unrest from the country’s
extremely unequal land tenure structure. The military, expanding to
meet the Israeli threat and recruited from the middle-class and
peasant youth, was a hotbed of populist dissent, radicalised by the
conflict with Israel and Nasser’s anti-imperialism. The West’s
backing of Israel inflamed the people against it and de-legitimised
pro-Western politicians and the Western economic ties of the com-
mercial oligarchy. This fuelled the rise of radical parties – notably
the Ba’th Party – and the military coups and counter-coups that
destabilised the state and gradually pushed the oligarchic elite from
power (Seale 1965; Torrey 1964). 
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The coup that brought the Ba’th party to power in 1963 ushered
in a new era of unstable radicalism (1963–70). The Ba’th regime had
a narrow support base, owing to conflict with mass Nasserism (over
failure of a 1963 Arab unity project) and from the opposition of
the old oligarchs and Islamic rivals. On top of that, the regime was
split into ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ wings which used foreign policy
as tools in their power struggle – each trying to win support by
advocating greater militancy against Israel. The radical faction
led by Salah Jadid seized power in a 1966 coup, ousting the more
moderate party founders, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din Bitar
(Rabinovich 1972). The radical Ba’th attempted to carry out a rev-
olution from above through land reform, nationalisations, and
government control over the market, and to contain the fierce urban
resistance this provoked by mobilising peasants on its side. The
Ba’thi radicals, driven by ideological militancy and seeking the
legitimacy to entrench their precarious rule, also aimed to make
Damascus the bastion of a war of Palestine liberation by supporting
Palestinian fedayeen raids into Israel. They also sought to push the
Arab states into confronting Israel and to stimulate the revolution
in the pro-Western monarchies needed to enlist Arab oil in the
battle. This, however, ignored the balance of power – Israeli military
superiority – and brought on the 1967 defeat and the Israeli occu-
pation of the Syrian Golan Heights (Hinnebusch 2001: 52–7; Yaniv,
1986).
Watershed wars and convergence
Two watershed wars propelled the Saudi and Syrian regimes on a
path of convergence in both structure and policy. The 1967 war, a
disastrous defeat for Syria, split the regime, discredited the radical
Ba’thists, and precipitated their ouster by the Defence Minister,
Hafiz al-Asad who set Syria on a new realist course. Asad put revo-
lution on hold to concentrate on the recovery of Syria’s occupied ter-
ritory and containment of the Israeli threat through a military
build-up. Since this required Saudi financing, Asad, as well as
Nasser, was ready to bury the ideological cold war with the tradi-
tional monarchies (Kerr 1975). For Saudi Arabia’s King Feisal this
was an opportunity to end the Arab nationalist threat and gain
nationalist legitimacy for his regime while moderating the radical
regimes. This convergence was consolidated in the 1973 war when
the Saudis’ use of the oil weapon won them enormous nationalist
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prestige and precipitated the oil price explosion which enabled them
to consolidate their regime at home (Vassiliev 1998: 383–92).
Transfers of rent to Syria allowed a similar consolidation there.
Although relations between the two states subsequently had their
ups and downs, their mutual ability to damage the other and their
shared interest in an equitable resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict
made them interdependent. 
Oil and state consolidation
Oil gave impetus to the consolidation of both states. Oil revenues
radically increased the Saudi regime’s autonomy of society, whose
taxes it no longer needed. At the same time, the centralisation and
bureaucratisation of the state enabled the al-Saud to subordinate
autonomous social forces. The once autonomous Hijazi merchants
were absorbed into corporatist relations with the bureaucracy; the
ulama lost their independent financial base and the regime fostered
a loyal Nejdi business class entirely dependent on state patronage.
Bureaucratic expansion absorbed at least a half of nationals into the
state-employed middle class and once-radical workers were trans-
formed into welfare recipients or white-collar employees. In a tacit
social contract, the mass public eschewed political rights in return
for vastly increased material and welfare benefits. The division of
the country into privileged citizens, many of whom did little work,
and non-citizens, who worked but were unentitled to benefits, argu-
ably gave citizens a stake in the status quo. At the centre, the Saudi
clan, with its more than 5,000 princes, presided over the levers
of government power and operated like a single-party system, an
enormous solidary force stretched throughout society. As a lion’s
share of the new wealth accrued to the Saudi clan, its position and
cohesion was consolidated: ‘reformist’ liberal or Arab nationalist
princes disappeared as enormous wealth gave the clan an over-
riding stake in the status quo (Chaudhry 1997: 43–76, 100–47;
Cordesman 1984: 373; Gause 1994: 11, 15, 42–77; Vassiliev 1998:
435–9, 474–82). 
The limits of Saudi state-building were, however, underlined by
the regime’s inability to mount a credible defence against external
threat. While its population is comparable to that of Syria and
Israel, they have armed forces about four times as large as its
111,500 troops (Cordesman 1984: 200; Gause 1994: 125). The
regime’s low capacity to mobilise defence manpower results, in good
Comparative foreign policies 127
part, from fear that a conscripted population would demand polit-
ical rights or that a large army would inevitably recruit from more
plebeian ranks of society whose loyalty to the monarchy could be
suspect (Gause 1994: 123–4). Instead, the al-Saud opted for a small,
high-tech military, especially an air force that could be realistically
dominated by Saudi princes; but this strategy intensified dependence
on the US for equipment, operations and training (Vassiliev 1998:
441–4).
In Syria, the state was also consolidated in the 1970s under Hafiz
al-Asad. Previously, Syrian regimes, unstable and unconsolidated at
home, were unable to pursue effective foreign policies, making Syria
the prize over which stronger states fought. Indeed, Asad’s power
concentration was accepted as necessary to confront the gravest
threat the country and regime had ever faced, a defeat and occupa-
tion brought on by the recklessness of a factionalised regime. It was
only as Syria attained relative internal cohesion and regime auton-
omy that foreign policy makers were able to act effectively in Syria’s
external environment.
Under the radical Ba’thists, the regime had already achieved
autonomy of the dominant classes by breaking their control over the
means of production and mobilising workers and peasants through
the Ba’th party. Within this regime, Asad increasingly concentrated
power in a ‘Presidential Monarchy’ through a policy of balancing
the elements of his political base. Thus, he used the army to free
himself from Ba’th party ideological constraints; then, he built up
his jama’a – a core of largely Alawi personal followers in the secur-
ity apparatus – to enhance his autonomy of both army and party. At
the same time, he appeased the remaining private bourgeoisie
through limited liberalisation and fostered a state-dependent new
bourgeoisie as a fourth leg of support to minimise dependence on
the others (Batatu 1981; Dawisha 1978a; Perthes 1995: 146–54).
While elements of the Damascene Sunni bourgeoisie entered into
tacit business alliances with Alawi military elites at the top, the party
and its auxiliaries incorporated a significant mass base, particularly
in the villages, Sunni as well as non-Sunni. New state-dependent
constituencies were widened as education and state employment
expanded the salaried middle class, while agrarian reform trans-
formed a large part of the landless peasantry into a smallholding,
co-opertised peasantry dependent on regime support. Thus, Asad
built a cross-sectarian coalition which held together even in the face
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of the major Islamic fundamentalist uprising of 1977–82 (Batatu
1982; Hinnebusch 2001: 93–103, 115–25; Seale 1988: 317–20,
455–60).
A sign of the autonomy of the regime was its ability to harness
the economy to its foreign policy and military strengthening. Syria’s
turn to statist ‘socialism’ from the late 1950s was, in good part,
driven by the belief that a nationalist foreign policy could only be
pursued by diluting dependency on the West and the world market.
The 1967 defeat stimulated a massive military build-up aiming at
recovery of the Golan while Egypt’s separate peace and Israel’s 1982
invasion of Lebanon set off similar build-ups, all of which had to be
financed. A high degree of state control over the economy allowed
Asad to devote 15–17 per cent of GNP and 20 per cent of manpower
to the armed forces at its height in the 1980s. Aid from the Arab oil
states was crucial to Syria’s military enhancement, but Asad escaped
the constraints such dependence could have put on his options by
balancing between rival Soviet/East European, West European,
Arab Gulf and Iranian sources of aid (Clawson 1989; Diab 1994:
87; Waldner 1995). By 1986, Syria had enormous armed forces for
a state of its size: 5,000 tanks, 500,000 men under arms, and some
400 ballistic missiles. According to Evron (1987), the result was a
mutual deterrence that relatively stabilised the Syrian-Israeli mili-
tary confrontation.
Decision-making
In Saudi Arabia, foreign policy decisions are taken consensually by
the King and senior princes of the royal family, producing caution
and continuity in policy, deeply reflective of Saudi Arabia’s charac-
ter as a status quo power. The muted competition which exists
within the royal family also encourages a risk-averse attempt to
appease – ‘bandwagon’ between – conflicting pressures from the
West and the Arab world. Thus, the preferences of the ‘Suderi Seven’
– notably King Fahd, Defence Minster Prince Sultan and Interior
Minister Prince Nayef – for a Western alliance and Western-backed
modernisation have been balanced by Crown Prince Abdullah’s
more Arab nationalist and socially conservative sympathies (Cor-
desman 1984: 182–3; 226, 376–8; Gause 1994: 120: Vassiliev 1998:
354–60).
The Saudi inner circle is not formally accountable for its deci-
sions but the ulama, under the obligation of an Islamic ruler to
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consult and because they head the institutions which can most cred-
ibly claim to represent wider public opinion, may represent a veto
group able to restrain regime policy; the Gulf War precipitated an
unprecedented attempt by a part of the ulama to exercise their right
of consultation (Gause 1994: 158). The threat of domestic dissent
also tends to keep the regime on a cautious centrist path. The 1979
attack on the Grand Mosque by hundreds of radical Islamists led by
a self-proclaimed ‘Mahdi’ and recruited from traditionally suppor-
tive tribes and shari’a students antagonised by the growth in corrup-
tion and Westernisation, awakened the regime to the dangers of a
conservative Islamic regime’s perceived departures from Islamic
probity. The subsequent growth of radical Islamic dissent – of which
Osama bin Laden was a product – tends to counter pressures on the
regime from Washington.
Faced with a more threatening environment, Syria developed a
more centralised command structure. Power was concentrated in
the hands of the president, enabling Asad to make decisions free of
overt constraints by hawkish or dovish factions. To be sure, at least
initially, he tried to govern by intra-elite consensus, taking account
of the ideologues of the Ba’th party, but he was also prepared to be
out in front of elite opinion and to subordinate ideology to realpol-
itik if external constraints demanded it. Thus, in the disengagement
negotiations after the 1973 war, Asad took pains to consult the
political elite (in contrast to Sadat’s unilateral decisions), but, in the
end, accepted Kissinger’s final proposal and dragged his reluctant
lieutenants along with him (Dawisha 1978b; Jourjati 1998: 51).
Thereafter, Asad took several unpopular foreign policy decisions,
notably the 1976 intervention against the PLO in Lebanon, the
alignment with Iran in the Iran–Iraq war, and that against Iraq after
its invasion of Kuwait. As long as he could justify these decisions
as necessary to the long-term struggle with Israel, he calculated that
opposition could be contained. They, nevertheless, had domestic
costs; arguably the 1976 conflict with the PLO so damaged the
regime’s legitimacy that it was much more vulnerable to the Islamic
rebellion of 1977–82. The link between the external and internal
arenas was not that foreign policy was designed to deal with
domestic threats, but that decision-makers could not ignore the
impact of policies designed to cope with external threats on their
precarious domestic legitimacy (Hinnebusch 2001: 147–9; Sheehan
1976).
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Foreign policy behaviour: the persistence of divergence 
Regional threats most immediately shape Saudi foreign policy. As a
weak, rich, pro-Western state nearly surrounded by stronger, more
populous, but poorer nationalist regimes, Saudi Arabia inevitably
faced significant security threats. The Saudis long feared encircle-
ment from various combinations of the republican and Marxist
Yemens in the south, Islamic Iran, and Ba’thist Iraq. External threats
all had a trans-state dimension: the Saudis perceive the Middle East
as a cauldron of instability that could spill across their borders, a
product of their experience with Nasserism in the 1960s. In the
1980s the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated a perception of
Soviet penetration of the region while revolutionary Iran, contest-
ing the validity of the Saudi’s ‘American Islam’, represented both a
military and ideological threat (Dawisha 1979: 20–5; Vassiliev
1998: 469–73). These threats have made Saudi Arabia highly
dependent on Western, particularly American, protection. 
Yet this, far from being a solution to the regime’s insecurity, it-
self created a major dilemma. On the one hand, the identity of
the Saudi state, astride the birthplace of Islam, the product of the
Wahhabi Islamic revivalist movement, and the guardian of Islam’s
holy places, was virtually indistinguishable from Islam; on the other
hand, the al-Saud had become a part of the international financial
oligarchy, utterly dependent for its continued wealth and security on
the US, a state widely perceived to be a main enemy of Islam and
backer of Israel. This dual character of the regime generated contra-
dictory pressures on its foreign policy: the first drove it to distance
itself, even oppose aspects of US policy connected with Israel; the
second dictated close partnership with Washington (Vassiliev 1998:
475–6).
The regime historically tried to reconcile this contradiction by
insisting that the main threat to Islam came, not from the West, but
from atheist communism, of which Zionism was claimed to be an
offshoot. The US alignment was therefore justified on the basis of
common anti-communism and the claim that good US relations
could bring Washington to pressure Israel into concessions to the
Arabs. The regime also historically sought to keep the US connection
as unobtrusive as possible: ‘over-the horizon’ and pre-positioned US
capabilities rather than overt US bases. However, the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait sharply exposed its dependency on the US, while the sub-
sequent US failure to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict, delegitimised
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this dependence, stimulating dissent among the strongly Islamic ele-
ments that were the regime’s putative constituency (Dawisha 1979:
23–34; Gause 1994: 121–2).
The regime’s built-in contradictions shaped certain characteristic
features of its foreign policy, above all a propensity to bandwagon
between (appease or bend before) the contrary pressures from the
region and the West. In the region, the Saudis’ style was to avoid
confrontation unless it was forced on them. In periods of greater
weakness or intense regional pressures, the Saudis bandwagoned,
seeking to appease radical Arab states: in the 1950s King Saud
attempted to appease Nasser and Pan-Arab opinion until they
became too hostile to the monarchy. King Faisal re-established the
regime’s anti-Zionist credentials by the use of the oil weapon in
1973 and by financing the Arab front-line states. As the Saudis’ eco-
nomic resources increased with the oil boom, they deployed ‘riyal
diplomacy’ to pre-empt threats, moderating radical Syria and the
PLO, mediating inter-Arab conflicts which could widen regional
instability and financing anti-Communist Islamic movements, such
as the Afghan mujahadin. That the last was driven less by Islamic
zeal than by a pragmatic desire to strengthen what they identified as
conservative forces is evident from the Saudis’ curbing of aid to
Islamic groups which sided with Iraq in the Gulf War and their
increasing support for governments fighting Islamic movements
(Dawisha 1979: 26; Gause 1994: 121, 172). 
Equally characteristic of Saudi Arabia’s policy has been its
failure, the brief oil embargo aside, to decisively deploy its seemingly
incomparable ‘oil power’ to achieve an end to the Arab–Israeli con-
flict, arguably the single most important source of the regional
instability and domestic dissidence which threatens it (Middle East,
January 1999, p. 23). In 1980 Saudi Arabia had some $111 billion
in financial reserves, 35–40 per cent of that of all IMF countries
(Dawisha 1979: 17), entitling it to a seat on the IMF. Yet, although
it used its petro-power to serve American interests – recycling pet-
rodollars, moderating oil prices, and rejecting renewed use of the oil
weapon – Washington failed to deliver the even-handed policy
needed to achieve a settlement of the conflict. The Saudis’ continued
deference to Washington in spite of this partly reflects their eco-
nomic interests in the West, partly their heavy dependence on the US
for their security. Yet far from trying to diversify this dependence,
the Saudis deliberately intensified it (Dawisha 1979: 28; Gause
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1994: 179–83; Vassiliev 1998: 398–404). This was, in great part, an
artifact of state formation: the domestic dangers of a popularly
recruited defence had to be avoided even if this meant deepening
dependence on the US. The al-Saud’s external insecurity and depen-
dency are, thus, intimately connected to its domestic vulnerability. 
The contradiction embedded in the Syrian state was that between
the revisionism rooted in its Pan-Arab identity – which stood for the
unification of the Arab states and the liberation of Palestine – and
geopolitical realities: the durability of the status quo state system
and the reality of permanent Israeli military superiority (Ma’oz
1972). The immediate challenge Asad faced was to eliminate the
consequences of Syria’s failed revisionism, Israel’s 1967 occupation
of Arab lands, amidst an unfavourable power balance and without
sacrificing nationalist legitimacy. It was only the autonomy and
stability with which Asad endowed the state that enabled him to
manage these dilemmas in a way approximating a rational actor.
First, he replaced Syria’s impotent irredentism – the messianic
goal of liberating Palestine – with the limited but still very ambitious
goals of recovering the Golan and achieving a Palestinian state in
the West Bank/Gaza. In pursuit of these goals he demonstrated great
consistency and tenacity: for a quarter of a century, he refused to
settle for less than a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan and
eschewed a separate settlement with Israel at the expense of the
Palestinians. When these vital interests were at stake, he was pre-
pared to take high risks, as illustrated by his obstruction of the 1983
Lebanese–Israeli accord at a time when Israeli and American power
were being projected right on his ‘Lebanese doorstep’ (Hinnebusch
2001: 151–3; Ma’oz 1988; Seale 1988: 494).
Second, Asad was the rational actor in his development of the
increased capabilities needed to match his goals. He proved himself
a master of adapting a mix of foreign policy instruments – alliance
formation, limited war, negotiations – to the changing and usually
unfavourable balance of power he faced. In simultaneously sustain-
ing alliances with the conservative Arab oil states, Libya, Islamic Iran
and the Soviet Union, he got the necessary economic resources, arms
and protection needed for the struggle. He built up the military forces
needed for the 1973 war to recover the Golan and, when this failed,
he entered the Kissinger-sponsored disengagement negotiations.
Although Asad was extremely wary of the pitfalls of negotiating
with Israel, he was prepared to do so when it could be done from a
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position of sufficient strength and when he judged he could exploit
US fears of Middle East instability to get pressure on Israel to with-
draw from conquered Arab territory. When Egypt’s separate peace
destroyed his bargaining position, rather than concede principle,
Asad preferred to work for a favourable change in the power balance,
while seeking to obstruct any further separate settlements with Israel
by Jordan or the PLO. As the Golan front stagnated, and the conflict
was diverted into a low-intensity proxy war in Lebanon, paralleled
in the 1990s by a diplomatic struggle over the conditions of a peace
settlement, Asad invested in the relative military parity with Israel
which allowed him to avoid bargaining from weakness, and even
enabled him to apply military pressure on Israel in southern Lebanon
at reasonable risk. After his Soviet patron declined, Asad seized the
opportunity of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to join the Gulf War coali-
tion as a way of building credit with the sole remaining superpower
and re-enlisting its diplomacy on behalf of a land-for-peace settle-
ment with Israel. Thus, Asad parleyed limited resources into greater
influence than would be expected from Syria’s base of national power
and turned Syria from a recurrent victim of its neighbours into a pow-
erful regional player (Cobban 1991: 112–38; Hinnebusch 2001:
147–63; Seale 1988: 226–66, 267–315, 344–9, 366–420).
The foreign policies of Syria and Saudi Arabia converged as both
states were consolidated enough to become rational actors pursuing
limited goals. However, the Israeli occupation kept Syria a dissatis-
fied power pursuing redress through the maximisation of power,
while Saudi Arabia’s satisfaction and inherent weakness made band-
wagoning its natural strategy. Differences in decision-making struc-
tures reflected these different priorities: one building in caution, the
other designed to enable the maximum in geopolitical manoeuvring.
So did the differential development of capabilities: Syria sacrificed its
economy to mobilise the power needed to reach its foreign policy pri-
orities just as Saudi Arabia sacrificed an independent foreign policy
and military strength for economic interests and domestic stability.
Similar regimes, divergent policies: Egypt and Syria seek exit from
war
The very different paths followed by similar regimes in Egypt and
Syria in dealing with their common Israeli enemy seems to demon-
strate the inadequacy of state formation patterns, in themselves, to
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explain foreign policy. Egypt and Syria were, by the mid-1960s,
ostensibly similar authoritarian nationalist regimes that had origi-
nated in similar plebeian revolts against imperialism and oligarchy
and initially promoted radical ideologies reflective of these origins.
Thereafter, commonly experienced systemic forces seemed to divert
them on to the same road toward moderation. They shared the
defeat of 1967 and the rise to power, in reaction, of newly ‘prag-
matic’ leaders – Sadat and Asad – in 1970. Both initiated limited lib-
eralisation at home and inter-Arab détente abroad. Together they
launched the October 1973 war and together they started on the
path of post-war negotiations with Israel. Together – and only
together – they might have reached a comprehensive Middle East
peace for, as Henry Kissinger remarked, the Arabs could not wage
war without Egypt or make peace without Syria. 
Yet this break with the radical past was much sharper in Egypt
under Sadat than in Asad’s Syria and by 1980 they had become
bitter rivals, as Egypt abandoned Nasser’s Arab nationalism, pur-
sued a separate peace with Israel which ignored the touchstone of
Arabism, the Palestine cause, and embraced alliance with America.
Syria became the main standard bearer of Arab nationalism, was
branded a rejectionist state in the West and remained locked in bitter
conflict with Israel. What explains this spectacular divergence? That
such similar states should pursue such different policies suggests
that, as realism holds, their different positions in the regional power
balance or, as structuralists might suggest, their differential economic
dependency, were ultimately decisive. Yet, as will be seen, subtle dif-
ferences in state formation and identity shaped different conceptions
of state interest which, given the right systemic factors, drew the two
states in opposing directions.
State formation
Identity and legitimacy For Egypt, a homogeneous society with a
long history of separate statehood and confidence in its own partic-
ular identity, pursuit of Egyptian ‘national’ interest was a viable
alternative to Arab nationalism and the sacrifice of Arab national-
ist principles much less damaging to regime legitimacy than it would
be in Syria. Even under Nasser, Arab nationalism was, to a consid-
erable extent, regarded instrumentally, and while there was consid-
erable recognition that Egyptian and Arab interests coincided, once
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the costs of Arab involvement exceeded the benefits, a more overtly
Egypt-first attitude appeared in the ruling establishment. After 1967,
Israel’s now dominant military position left few opportunities to
pursue Pan-Arab ambitions and after Nasser’s death Egypt could
no longer readily manipulate Arabism against other Arab states.
Egyptian elites had been ‘socialised’ by the costs of Arabism into
embracing the rules of a conventional state system in which sove-
reignty was valued above supra-state ideology. This change in elite
values did not include a consensus on a separate peace with Israel,
but such a peace could be justified as putting Egyptian interests first
and the elevation of sovereignty over Pan-Arabism meant that, once
the Sinai was returned, irredentist grievances against Israel would
be satisfied. In addition, Egyptian elites resented their new depen-
dency on the Arab oil states and Sadat hoped to use alignment with
the US to assert another sort of regional leadership based on medi-
ating between the West and the Arab world (Dawisha 1976: 78;
Dekmejian 1971: 105–8; Telhami 1990: 12–17, 90–106). 
By contrast, in Syria, a mosaic society lacking a history of state-
hood, the main alternative identities were initially either sub-state
sectarianism or Arabism, the main unifying ideology through which
a cross-sectarian coalition needed to consolidate the state could be
forged. In fact, the Ba’th regime’s Arab nationalist mission, as the
most steadfast defender of the Arab cause in the battle with Israel,
became the basis of its domestic legitimacy and the regional stature
that entitled it to the financial backing of other Arab states. This is
not to say that hostility to Israel was a mere function of the regime’s
need for an external enemy. Asad neither invented nor sought to
wilfully prolong the Arab–Israeli conflict; indeed, he scaled down
Syria’s definition of its Pan-Arab mission to liberation of the occu-
pied territories (Hinnebusch 2001: 139–42). What it does mean is
that the regime’s need to protect its Arab nationalist legitimacy and
regional stature put certain outside boundaries on policies that could
be safely pursued toward Israel, and a separate peace which aban-
doned the Palestinians would be seen as a dishonourable offence
against Arabism. Israel might have been prepared to concede the
Golan had it believed such a settlement would be legitimised and turn
Syria inward to its own state-centric affairs; but Israeli leaders were
convinced that, unlike in Egypt, Arab nationalism was too strong in
Syria for this to happen, at least without a contemporaneous settle-
ment of the Palestinian issue (Jourjati 1998; Sheehan 1976).
136 The international politics of the Middle East
Political structures and process Despite outward appearances of
similarity, differences in the structures of the Syrian and Egyptian
states also help explain their differential paths. In Egypt under
Nasser a strong state was early consolidated around Nasser’s char-
ismatic authority and command of a reliable bureaucratic appara-
tus ruling a hydraulic society conditioned to submit to the state.
Nasser made the presidency a powerful office, endowed with his
personal legitimacy and immense legal prerogatives; Sadat inherited
and was able to similarly exercise this presidential power but, iron-
ically, on behalf of a reversal of Nasser’s Arab nationalist policy
(Hinnebusch 1985: 78–91).
Sadat’s course cannot be detached from his needs and strategy in
consolidating his power. He inherited Nasser’s office but not his
popular support and he lacked Nasser’s capacity to use Pan-Arab
leadership to bolster his position at home. As such, he chose to root
his rule in the support of the bourgeoisie – the social force that was
both most strategic and most prepared to support a leader promis-
ing a reversal of Nasserism. The bourgeoisie wanted an end to war,
economic liberalisation and an opening to the West (Hinnebusch,
1985: 89–90).
While Sadat had to find some solution to the crisis of Israel’s occu-
pation of the Sinai if he was to survive, once he won legitimacy
in the 1973 war, he acquired a remarkably free hand in post-war
diplomacy. There were no domestic interests threatened enough
and strong enough to constrain his incremental movement toward
Western alignment and a separate peace. The military elite was
resentful of the USSR and attracted by promises of US weapons,
owed much to Sadat’s rehabilitation of them in the 1973 war, and
had no desire to risk the honour won in that war in another round
with Israel; the minority of officers who challenged this consensus
were easily purged by the dominant presidency (Hinnebusch 1985:
125–31; Telhami 141–3). Because the ease of Nasser’s power consol-
idation had not required him to create a strong ideological political
party, there was no corps of ideological militants with a stake in Arab
nationalism and socialism which could balance the bourgeoisie’s
growing interest in a Western alignment and economic liberalisation.
Once Nasser was gone, there was little obstacle to transformation of
the state’s social base through purges of the nationalist left and new
bourgeois recruitment under Sadat. The public was more concerned
with economic troubles than foreign policy and the official media
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stirred up their resentment of the rich Arabs who refused to share
their wealth with Egypt while promising that an economic bonanza
would follow from peace with Israel. Those opposed were prevented
from mobilising by the authoritarian state.
State formation proceeded differently in Syria. In Syria’s more
intractable society, the 1960s Ba’th regime, facing powerful urban
upper-class and Islamic opposition, relied on a dual strategy to
survive. Before 1970 a strong ideological party rooted in plebeian
strata had institutionalised Ba’thist Arab nationalism. Secondly,
especially under Asad, recruitment of the core military elite was
from property-less minorities, especially Alawites who had em-
braced secular Arab nationalism as an ideology which gave them
equal citizenship; yet because their Arabism was suspect to the Sunni
majority, they had to prove it by being more militant than their
Sunni opponents. Party and Alawi recruitment from plebeian strata
deterred solidification of a new bourgeoisie that might have had an
interest in a Westward tilt as in Egypt (Hinnebusch 2001: 67–88).
In Syria, the president also dominated foreign policy but Asad
was, at least until the 1980s, more dependent on a politicised mili-
tary and an ideological party that were less deferent than their
Egyptian counterparts and which still took ideology and anti-Israeli
militancy seriously. More concerned to sustain an elite consensus on
the extremely risky matter of dealing with Israel, Asad was less
willing to take diplomatic risks to get a breakthrough than was
Sadat, particularly since rivals could more readily mobilise public
opinion against policies seen to be a betrayal of Arabism (Sheehan
1976). Moreover Asad, having played a role in the loss of the Golan
for the sake of Palestine, had to recover it without abandoning
Palestine. He built and legitimised his regime for the struggle to do
so and to settle for less would mean his whole career was a failure
and the sacrifices he had imposed on Syrians for thirty years wasted. 
These differences in the political needs and power of the two
presidents shaped differences in their approaches to the post-1973
negotiations: Sadat’s willingness to make concessions to Israel and
Asad’s stubborn refusal to do so. 
Systemic forces
Geopolitics While state formation explains why Egypt, unlike
Syria, could readily make a separate peace, it was their comparative
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geopolitical situations which best explains why the leaderships actu-
ally did follow such divergent strategies. Since Egypt and Syria
failed in the 1973 war to militarily recover their occupied territo-
ries, a political settlement would have to be reached which satisfied
Israel and Israel sought a partial deal, not a comprehensive peace
that could satisfy both. These states’ quite different geopolitical
power positions vis-à-vis Israel determined which of the two would
be satisfied. Egypt was tactically weak but strategically strong.
Tactically, Israeli leverage over Egypt was higher since at the end of
the war Israeli forces had penetrated the West Bank of the Suez
Canal and encircled the Egyptian Third Army, putting intense pres-
sure on Sadat to accept an unconditional disengagement of forces.
On the other hand, as the most powerful Arab state, Egypt’s strate-
gic bargaining hand was strong since Israel had a strong interest
in reaching a separate peace which would take Egypt out of the
Arab–Israeli military balance and effectively end the Arab military
threat. Similarly the US, its interests threatened by the 1973 war
outcome, was prepared to extract the limited territorial concessions
from Israel needed to appease and win over Sadat in order to relieve
pressures for a comprehensive settlement at Israel’s expense, and to
exclude Soviet influence from Egypt. Tactical weakness set Egypt on
the road to a separate peace and strategic strength got it to the end
of that road (Fahmy 1983: 69–81; Riad 1982: 317–339; Sela 1998:
165–70; Sheehan 1976; Telhami 1990: 6–9). 
Syria, by contrast, was tactically stronger than Egypt. Because the
ceasefire on the Syrian front left Asad in a less vulnerable position,
he had less immediate need to make concessions and was even able
to start a war of attrition to strengthen his hand in the disengage-
ment negotiations. But strategically, Syria’s leverage over Israel was
weaker since Israel had little interest in a settlement with it, espe-
cially once Sadat showed his willingness to settle separately. The US
also had much less interest in satisfying Syria than Egypt. Syria was
not the key to the Arab world and it could not start another war
once Egypt was removed from the Arab-Israeli power balance; there
was, therefore, no need to antagonise Israel by pushing it into con-
cessions on a second front. Asad’s search for military parity after
Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli power balance reflected
the geopolitical reality that until the balance was restored he could
not effectively bargain with Israel. Lacking Egypt’s incentive to
be flexible, Damascus remained adamant for a total comprehensive
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settlement. Tactical strength and strategic weakness prevented Syria
from even getting on the road to a separate peace (Ma’oz 1988:
113–134; Seale 1988; 226–315, 344–49; Sela 1998: 153–154;
Sheehan 1976).
Geo-economics and dependency Economic factors did not deter-
mine the difference in regime paths but reinforced decisions that
were probably taken chiefly on other grounds and locked the two
states into their separate courses. Egypt’s economic crisis was much
deeper than Syria’s. It suffered from the worst population/resource
imbalance in the region. Egypt’s war-associated economic costs
from the loss of the Suez Canal, Sinai oil fields, and tourism income
were $350 million annually and Arab assistance only $250 million
into the early 1970s, while defence expenditures were enormous;
after the war, Arab aid to Egypt declined from $1,264 million in
1974 to $625 in 1976. The 1977 food riots shook the Egyptian
regime and increased the urgency of access to new sources of aid
from the US (Brecher 1972: 115; Telhami 1990: 96–9)
None of this necessarily had to lead to Sadat’s separate peace:
Egypt could have expected to continue receiving both US and Arab
aid by simply staying in the peace process and the riots could have
been resolved by less risky, potentially de-legitimising means; more-
over, the separate peace cost Egypt its Arab aid and peace did not
substantially lift its military spending burden. To be sure, infitah
spawned a business class wanting foreign investment and therefore
a peace settlement, but much of this class saw the Arab oil states as
their main market and capital source and these were jeopardised by
the separate peace (Telhami 1990: 6–9). However, it is true that, as
Sadat’s step-by-step moves toward a separate peace were rewarded
with increased American economic aid, a reversal of course would
have been very costly as Egypt became increasingly entrapped by
dependency on its yearly American aid ‘fix’. The infitah bourgeoisie
was enabled to enrich itself on the American aid and Western joint
ventures that in good part replaced the lost Arab aid. 
It does appear that Syrian foreign policy was free of comparable
economic pressures. Syria’s economic crisis was less severe and the
Golan had much less economic value than the Sinai; on the other
hand, Arab aid given to Syria in its role as front-line state against
Israel made a bigger difference to its smaller economy than the
impact of such aid in Egypt. While Syria’s economy did fall into
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crisis in the 1980s, Asad had diversified his economic dependencies
sufficiently that they could not be used to leverage his foreign policy.
While Sadat’s bandwagoning led Egypt into a total economic depen-
dency on the US, which locked the country into his separate peace,
Asad’s balancing between a multitude of powers allowed him to
avoid such a separate peace. 
Leadership
It is not uncommon to explain these different outcomes as functions
of the personalities and values of Sadat and Asad. Given the power
of the other variables analysed, it might, however, be thought that the
leadership variable is not needed to explain them. Where leadership
may have made a difference was in its effect on these deeper seated
factors: while Nasser would probably have worked against pressures
for a separate peace, Sadat’s power needs led him to push them
forward. Moreover, as was seen in chapter 5, Sadat’s wishful think-
ing, craving for Western approval and impulsive propensity to make
concessions led him to play his cards poorly in the extended peace
negotiations. By contrast Asad’s ‘realist’ view of international poli-
tics, which put no faith in the good intentions of either Israel or the
US, his extreme wariness of being tricked by them and his tenacious
bargaining may have better corresponded to reality than Sadat’s
world view. However, it may also conceivably have led Asad to let
plausible deals with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and later Ehud
Barak slip through his fingers. However, these differences were not
simply idiosyncratic but reflected divergent situations and interests:
Sadat’s separate peace, after all, conceded Palestinian and Syrian
interests for Egyptian gains and that, in turn, put Asad in a weaker
position in which he could not afford to readily give up any of his few
remaining bargaining chips.
Pluralism and foreign policy 
Does democratisation or even merely pluralisation of the political
system produce a generically different kind of foreign policy out-
come? Democratic peace theory suggests that Middle East wars are,
in part, a function of the region’s democratic deficits which prevent
publics from holding leaders accountable or constraining their
foreign adventures. Realists, however, argue that elites in all states,
regardless of internal features, act to maximise security and power
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and that the public largely defers to or is readily manipulated by
such elites. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) suggest that in unconsoli-
dated democracies, where electoral success may depend on playing
the nationalist card, competitive politics may actually introduce
higher levels of bellicosity into the policy-making process. The test
cases in the Middle East which arguably best approximate the
democratic-pluralist model are Israel and Turkey by virtue of their
higher levels of institutionalisation, tolerance of opposition, and
regular use of competitive elections in elite recruitment. 
The determinants of Turkish foreign policy: the primacy of state
formation
Turkey is, as pluralists would expect, essentially a status quo state
whose foreign policy has normally been cautious and defensive.
However, the evidence suggests that the primary determinant of
Turkey’s policy has been its initial state formation and that subse-
quent alterations in policy have been the products of geopolitical
struggles or shifts in economic dependencies, not democratic poli-
tics. Indeed, the structural type of the Turkish state, which has
varied from Ataturk’s authoritarian regime to today’s fragmented
parliamentary system, explains little variation in its foreign policy. 
Turkey’s state formation experience set it on a status quo, West-
centric tangent. Ataturk’s successful war of independence against
the Western designs on Anatolia imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres
spared Turkey colonial subjugation and enabled establishment of a
territorial state within boundaries that satisfied Turkish national
identity. The consequent eclipse of former alternative identities,
Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism, meant the eschewing of revisionist
ambitions in the Middle East and Turkic central Asia. The satisfac-
tion of identity also allowed independent Turkey to re-establish
relations with the West on an amicable basis. This was reinforced
by Ataturk’s investment of the nationalist legitimacy, with which
the independence war endowed him, in a Westernising brand of
modernisation, which created a large secular and Western-educated
middle class and wove a Western orientation into the fabric of the
state establishment. Thus, Turkey’s dominant social forces have,
from the state’s founding, been largely satisfied, not irredentist and
their identity durably Westcentric (Ahmad 1993: 47–51).
Until Turkey felt fully secure in its independence, it followed a
foreign policy of balancing between the rival European powers and
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a statist import substitute industrialisation policy to secure an inde-
pendent economic base. Once, however, Turkey opted for capitalist
export strategies, jump-started by US aid after W. W. II, economics
helped lock in a pro-Western foreign policy (Ahmad 1993: 67–8).
Turkey’s historic sense of geopolitical threat from its powerful
northern neighbour, Russia, revived by post-war Soviet pressures,
superseded post-Sèvres fears of the West and pushed the country
into NATO, consolidating its Western identity. Turkey’s desire for
admittance to the EU was advanced by its subsequent capitalist
development and this same political economy imperative – the need
for aid and markets – led the Ozal government to consolidate close
ties with the United States. 
Foreign policy making in Turkey: a ‘democratic pacifist deficit’
Turkey’s military and diplomatic establishment have long made
foreign policy relatively insulated from popular pressure. Foreign
policy has been the reserved sphere of elites, notably the military and
the foreign ministry bureaucrats, responding to external exigencies
and their view of the national interest rather than to public opinion
or domestic interest groups. This elite has pursued a policy of caution,
eschewing irredentist ambitions or entanglements in foreign conflicts,
whether under democratic or non-democratic regimes. The predom-
inantly defensive geopolitical considerations which governed the
elite’s calculations enabled Turkey to stay out of costly wars, remark-
able given its fraught location.
The gradual deepening of democratisation has opened the policy
process to a wider spectrum of influence from below, but the foreign
policy establishment has retained the last word. The political mobil-
isation and Islamisation of the mass public incrementally increased
the impact of Turkey’s long-suppressed Islamic identity on foreign
policy; thus, in the 1970s the Islamic Salvation Party was instru-
mental in forcing the government to abandon its friendly ties with
Israel. The rise of Islamic electoral power has, however, had little
impact on the pro-Western foreign policy establishment’s conviction
that Turkey is essentially European. Although the Islamist leader
Necmettin Erbakan tried, during his brief tenure as prime minister
in the 1990s, to strengthen ties with the Islamic world, he was con-
strained by establishment vetoes and ultimately removed by military
ultimatum. Similarly, various ethnic pressure groups sought to push
Turkey into post-Cold War involvement in the Caucuses and
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Central Asia but this was also rebuffed by the foreign policy estab-
lishment.
In the limited cases where electoral politics or public opinion has
significantly impacted on foreign policy, they have tended to produce
a more nationalistic, less pacific outcome. Elected politicians have
been more likely than the unelected state establishment to advocate
adventurous regional policies such as Adnan Menderes’ enlistment
of Turkey against Arab nationalism in the 1950s and Turgut Ozal’s
involvement of Turkey, against the caution of the establishment, in
the Gulf War (Robins 1991: 65–73). Rivalry with Greece was the one
foreign policy issue which had major domestic resonance: success in
this conflict could make or break politicians and party competition
discouraged diplomatic initiatives which could make leaders vulner-
able to the claim that they were soft on Greece. Turkish Cypriots
acted as a domestic pressure group of some potency, obstructing a
diplomatic settlement of the Cyprus conflict (Ahmad 1993: 174–80;
Fuller 1997: 53–7; Mufti 1998: 42–5; Robins, 1991: 3–16, 27–45).
Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour: the effect of systemic pressures
Systemic pressures largely reinforced Turkey’s initial foreign policy
tangent. While Ankara remained neutral in W. W. II, its subsequent
‘bandwagoning’ with the triumphant Western allies corresponded to
an influx of Western aid and capital, the Soviet threat and NATO
membership and democratisation, all of which consolidated Turkey’s
Westcentric orientation. Turkey joined the Western powers and Iran
in the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and made moves under the Eisenhower
Doctrine to ‘quarantine’ Syria’s Arab nationalism, briefly assuming
guardianship of the Middle East status quo on behalf of the West
(Ahmad 1993: 118–20, 224–5; Fuller 1997: 43–8).
Turkey has, on occasion, been partly and temporarily diverted
from its essentially Western and status quo orientations by several
systemic level factors encouraging it to ‘balance’ between the West
and other alignments. First, geopolitical rivalry with Greece and the
conflict over Cyprus drove a wedge between Turkey and the West,
especially when the US imposed an arms embargo after the Turkish
invasion of northern Cyprus. Turkish elites, no longer seeing Turkey’s
national interest as always compatible with that of the West, under-
took to diversify its ties to the Middle East and Third World (Ahmad
1993: 139–42, 225–6). This departure was reinforced by temporary
economic anomalies. Thus, in the 1970s, an economic crisis brought
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on by the rise in oil prices forced the government to seek oil at con-
cessionary prices from Saudi Arabia while Turkish business was
attracted by export markets in the newly oil-rich Middle East. These
developments were paralleled by a more pro-Arab foreign policy
which included the refusal to allow US use of Turkish bases in the
resupply of Israel in the 1973 war, support for the Palestinian cause,
condemnation of Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem, refusal to impose
sanctions on Iran over the American hostage crisis and Turkey’s adhe-
sion to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (Robins 1991:
74–86; Yavuz and Khan 1992). In periods when Turkey’s interna-
tional economic dependencies have been diversified in this way, its
predominately Western foreign policy alignment has been similarly
diluted (Robins 1991: 100–13). However Turgut Ozal’s sacrifice of
Turkey’s Iraqi market for American ones in the second Gulf War
expressed Ankara’s return to its deeper-rooted political-economy
tangent.
This reversion has been reinforced by the end of the Cold War.
The felt threat from Russia has declined while an opportunity for a
sphere of influence in Turkic central Asia has been perceived, but
Turkey’s main preoccupation has been fear that its value to the West
would suffer from the end of the Cold War. The rebuff of Turkey’s
bid for EU membership led, not to a Turkish reconsideration of its
Islamic identity, but to a compensatory tightening of relations with
the sole American hegemon. 
However, it was still unresolved aspects of nation-building,
reopened in the post-Cold War era, namely the Kurdish conflict,
which most immediately drove Turkey’s foreign policy, drawing it
into conflict with Syria, involvement in Iraq, alliance with Israel,
and back toward Washington. The GAP Dam project was seen as a
way of economically integrating the Kurdish regions into the state
and neutralising Kurdish disaffection through economic develop-
ment; however, the conflict which the diversion of Euphrates water
sparked with Syria and Turkey’s insistence that it would unilaterally
determine Syria’s share of Euphrates water, led Damascus to support
the Kurdish insurgency (Fuller 1997: 47–54; Robins 1991: 28–37,
87–99).
The Turkish establishment’s view of the Kurdish threat to
national security led it into a policy watershed – alliance with
Israel – which sharply underlined the supremacy of geopolitics over
domestic politics in the policy process. This axis is by no means an
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ideologically inspired alliance of democracies: it has no popular
constituencies in either country, is unpopular among Turkey’s
Islamist forces, and was largely imposed by the military. Its roots are
exclusively geo-political: Turkey and Israel perceive a common
threat from the Syro-Iranian axis: while Turkey felt threatened by
Syrian support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas (who
have had training bases in the Lebanese Bekaa valley), Israel
felt aggrieved by Syrian and Iranian support for the Lebanese
Hizbollah. Their co-operation in anti-terrorist measures and their
alliance was meant to encircle and pressure Syria. In addition,
Turkey used the alliance to enlist the Israeli lobby in the US congress
against the supporters of Greece. The alliance manifests the classic
checkerboard pattern of realpolitik power balancing wherein ‘the
enemy of my enemy is my friend’. But it is also compatible with
Ankara’s swing back to its pro-Western tangent and the post-Cold
War weakening of its links to the Middle East and the Third World
(Ahmad 1993: 226–7; Mufti 1998: 47–8). 
The limits of pluralist explanations
It seems clear that state formation, geopolitics and economics have
most directly shaped Turkish foreign policy. Public opinion and
democratic politics have had a modest impact on it, particularly in
forcing Westernised elites to take more account of the Islamic side
of Turkey’s identity. But where public opinion has forced a policy
alteration, it has been working in tandem with geopolitical or polit-
ical economic forces and issues (the Cyprus issue and the need for
Arab oil) and when these have pulled the other way, the elite has
ignored public opinion – as in the alliance with Israel. It is also far
from clear that democratic politics produces a more dovish kind of
foreign policy: in the cases where it has had an impact – most clearly
in the conflict with Greece – the effect has been to exacerbate the
conflict, not to constrain decision-makers. But because Turkey’s
identity is largely satisfied by its boundaries, the public harbours no
deep-seated irredentism and, as such, elite and public attitudes are
largely congruent in support of a basically status quo foreign policy. 
In Israel, covered in more detail in chapter 7, the impact of plural-
ism is somewhat different. Neither elections nor deepening party plu-
ralism have altered the disproportionate recruitment of the
policy-making elite from a security establishment which sees military
force as the main instrument for dealing with Israel’s neighbours
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(Jones 2001). Moreover, given the much more powerful irredentist
sentiment in a significant portion of the Israeli public (the Likud-
settler bloc), as compared to Turkey, electoral politics has much more
systematically rewarded politicians who profess hawkish rather than
dovish sentiments. Indeed, the deepening of Israel’s political mobil-
isation over time strengthened the revisionist ‘right’ at the expense of
the more status quo centre-left: Labour party dominance gave way
after 1977 to alterations in government in which the right-wing
Likud usually held the edge. According to Brecher (1972: 122), ‘elec-
tions are profoundly influenced by the degree of chauvinism in rela-
tion to the Arabs’, with each party claiming to be more resolute
against the Arab threat than the others. While Brecher (1972: 125)
insisted that this did not necessarily affect the strategic content of elite
decisions Roberts (1990: 43) argued that ‘the dominant fact of polit-
ical life confronting any peace initiative or “peace policy” was a
strongly hawkish climate of opinion in Israel’ which the leadership
had helped create but which thereafter constrained any leader who
might have thought a peace settlement in Israel’s interest. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, Israel, the most pluralistic state in the region, has
been in more wars than any other and has attacked its neighbours,
including semi-democratic Lebanon, more times than any other state.
The contrast between Turkey and Israel reinforces the evidence
that the form of government is of secondary importance, in deter-
mining the pacific or revisionist direction of foreign policy, com-
pared to whether the dominant social forces are satisfied or not.
Democracy’s main effect is, in strengthening identification with the
state, to facilitate the mobilisation of the population for national
ambitions. As such, in democracies with contested borders, irreden-
tist problems, or unrealised territorial ambitions, and above all, in
those founded as settler states – what might be called ‘irredentist
democracies’ – the putative pacific effect of widened political partic-
ipation is seemingly reversed. 
Explaining foreign policies: the state formation-systemic dynamic
Distinctive types of foreign policy orientation do appear to be asso-
ciated with variations in state formation in two important respects:
(1) whether identity needs and the dominant social forces in a
regime are satisfied or unsatisfied; (2) whether the level of consoli-
dation of the state is higher or lower. These variables come together
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in four ideal-typical scenarios associated with variations in foreign
policy behaviour, as indicated in Table 1. 
In less consolidated states, policy-making elites, buffeted by or
reflecting the views of powerful dissatisfied domestic/trans-state
forces, are likely to either (a) appease these forces through radical
nationalist rhetoric, or (b) seek external protection against them.
This choice tends to be determined by whether the ruling elites issue
from and/or seek support from plebeian forces rebelling against the
dominant regional order (1a) or have their power bases in satisfied
dominant classes (1b). Pre-Asad Syria corresponds to the first case
and pre-oil boom Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the latter. 
Table 1: State formation and foreign policy behaviour
State consolidation
lower higher




satisfied (1b) external protection (2b) status quo power
By contrast, only reasonably consolidated states can effectively act
to enhance the state’s external interests but the differentiation in
their ruling social forces will distinguish those (2a) which use
enhanced capabilities to mount revisionist challenge to the domi-
nant regional order (Nasser’s Egypt, Saddam’s Iraq) from those
which (2b) seek to defend the status quo (post-boom Saudi Arabia
and post-Ataturk Turkey). 
The importance of differential state formation experiences for a
state’s foreign policy orientation is evident in the comparison of
Saudi Arabia and Syria: satisfied identities and social forces produced
a status quo orientation in the first while frustrated identities and ple-
beian social forces produced revisionism in the second. It can be seen
even more dramatically in the contrast between Jordan and Syria
which, once part of the same country, bilad ash-sham, have been
taken in entirely different foreign policy directions by their differing
regimes. While the Hashemite monarchy is an outcome of Western
imperialism’s dismemberment of historic Syria, the Damascus regime
arose from nationalist rebellion against it. Consequent differences in
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the domestic constituencies of the regimes hardened their contrary
orientations: Jordan relied on conservative tribal forces to exclude
the Arab nationalist middle class and the innately irredentist
Palestinians, who make up at least half of the population, from pol-
itics. In Syria, the regime arose from the Arab nationalist middle class
and is dominated by a formerly deprived minority peasant commu-
nity seeking acceptance through the championing of Arab national-
ism. This case also underlines how differential state formation paths
differentially position regimes in the global political economy which,
in turn, reinforces the original tangent: thus both Syria and Jordan
depend on external rent, but Jordan got much of its support from the
West to sustain its role as a buffer state which obstructed the mobil-
isation of its Palestinian majority against Israel and kept the armies
of radical Arab states from its front line with Israel; Syria, by con-
trast, received Arab rent to sustain its resistance to Israel. Differential
state formation translated into opposing foreign policy alignments
and strategies: while Syria relied on the Soviets to balance American
support for Israel and to achieve the military capability to balance
Israeli power, Jordan bandwagoned, appeasing Israel through a long
history of secret relations, while relying on a US security umbrella
against other regional threats. These differences usually put them on
opposing sides of most regional issues and relations were more often
bad than good (Brand 1995; Harknett and VanDenBerg 1997;
Salloukh 1996).
Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Islamic Iran, while both ostensibly
Islamic oil states, are the product of quite different state formation
histories which have shaped opposing policies. In Saudi Arabia the
militant Ikhwan was early pushed out of the regime coalition in
favour of conservative ulama and a tribal elite subsequently turned
into a petro-bourgeoisie; in Iran the revolution’s catapulting to
power of utterly un-Westernised elites transformed Iran from main
surrogate of the US in the Gulf to its main challenger. Iran’s revolu-
tionary Islam, cast by Khomeini into an expression of revolt against
monarchy and Western dominance, was the opposite of the Saudis’
conservative establishment Islam. Arguably, these diametrically
opposed versions of Islam were expressive of the two countries’
opposing experiences of the West: while Saudi Arabia never experi-
enced colonialism and actually achieved independence with Western
support, Iranians perceived the West to have overthrown their
nationalist leader, Muhammad Mossadeq, in favour of the last
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Shah. The oil/population ratio in Saudi Arabia allowed a massive
export of capital giving Saudi elites a big economic stake in the
West; in revolutionary Iran, oil revenues were needed at home to
sustain the welfare of its much larger population and to conduct a
war brought on by the effort to export Islamic revolution.
Nevertheless, it also seems clear that ‘external’ systemic forces
can powerfully reinforce or divert regimes from their original tan-
gents. Thus, Arab nationalist Egypt was only able to pursue its Pan-
Arab challenge to the status quo because bi-polarity lifted the main
systemic constraint, Western dependency and/or intervention, while
the region-wide spread of Arab identity constituted an indispensable
system-level resource. However, changes in the balance of systemic
forces from the late 1960s, including the unfavourable Arab–Israeli
power balance and the oil-boom-induced flow of influence to con-
servative states, pushed revisionist regimes toward more moderate
policies not too different from those of the status quo states. This
began when, in the 1967 war, the costs of putting ideology over
realism shifted power in Syria and Egypt from revisionist ele-
ments toward national security pragmatists. Islamic Iran, similarly
‘socialised’ into the realist rules of the game by its war with Iraq,
also adopted more moderate policies. Mutually reinforcing system-
wide forces – the decline of trans-state ideology, the rise of military
threats, and the consequent consolidation of the individual states –
have arguably driven a convergence in the foreign policies of ini-
tially very different regimes toward ‘realist’ type behaviour (see
chapter 4). 
Nevertheless, such convergence never ends in uniform behaviour
for several reasons. The very different roads taken by Syria and
Egypt, operating under the same systemic pressures, in their attempts
to recover their lost territories from Israel, make the point that there
is never only one possible response to system pressures, even among
similar regimes. If at first these pressures drove the two states along
similar paths, ultimately they responded differently. In Syria, the
result was the state building and realpolitik through which Asad was
enabled to pursue more limited goals more effectively. The more
intense pressures on Egypt so shifted Sadat’s ruling coalition toward
embourgeoised class fractions that republican Egypt’s initially
nationalist foreign policy was turned on its head. Such an outcome
can only adequately be understood by analysis of the interaction
between the unique features of each state’s formation and the unique
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systemic positions each occupied. It was chiefly the difference in their
geopolitical power position that determined why Egypt had the
option of a separate peace and Syria probably did not. But domestic
features decided how the two states responded to their environ-
ments: differences in identity and levels of presidential dominance
explain why the Egyptian regime could make a separate peace at rea-
sonable cost and the Syrian one could not; differences in the bases of
the leaders’ support explain why Sadat had an incentive and Asad a
disincentive to take such a path.
Additionally, as realism itself acknowledges, the ‘realist’ be-
haviour supposedly imposed by the states system can take two
diametrically opposite forms, the balancing that stronger (and
autonomous) states tend to pursue and the bandwagoning typical of
weaker (and dependent) ones. It is differential state formation, locat-
ing states in varying power or dependency positions in the system
that makes the difference in state conduct. Thus, in spite of a sub-
stantial convergence toward realism by the Saudi and Syrian
regimes, driven by the shared Israeli threat and facilitated by the
similar effects of oil on state formation, differences persisted. These
were initially rooted in the contrasting impacts of imperialism on
identity, but were, in certain ways, reinforced by subsequent differ-
ences in their systemic positions. Syria, locked by the consequences
of its earlier revisionism into a drive to recover the occupied territo-
ries from a militarily superior Israel, restructured itself to match
Israeli power and, despite a certain post-Cold War bandwagoning
toward the US forced by the collapse of Soviet power, largely contin-
ued to balance against Israel. Saudi Arabia, a status quo power
enjoying Western protection had no comparable incentive for mili-
tary strengthening and domestic reasons to eschew it. Its weakness
wedded it to a policy of bandwagoning – temporarily bending before
the most intense pressure of the moment. Thus, in 1973 the threat
from trans-state ideological penetration initially bent the kingdom’s
policies in an uncharacteristically radical direction – the oil embargo
against its US patron – at odds with the interests of its conservative
ruling social forces; however, once released from Pan-Arab pres-
sures, it quickly reverted to its traditional deference to Washington.
More important, Saudi Arabia’s sheikhs, thereafter transformed into
wealthy partners with the Western oil companies, acquired such a
stake in the Western economy that Arab nationalism and Islam could
be no more than thin veneers of limited relevance to foreign policy.
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Finally, even where systemic forces divert states off their original
tangents, they have seldom been strong or sustained enough to
wholly overcome the biases built in by state formation. Thus, while
systemic pressures – the Iranian threat – drove a convergence in the
policies of Jordan and Iraq, making them close allies in the 1980s,
this did not persist. Iraq’s need for Western and Gulf support against
Iran temporarily moderated Saddam Hussein’s nationalism, but
when the Iranian threat was turned back, Iraq reverted to its origi-
nal revisionist tangent. Although the trans-state ideological arousal
of its population could temporarily force Jordan’s weak status quo
monarchy into policies incompatible with its interests, such as
joining Nasser in 1967 and Saddam Hussein in 1991, once such
pressures passed, the regime quickly reverted to its ‘natural’ pro-
Western posture. 
Globalisation is expected by some pluralists to transform states
through democratisation and, in consequence, to put an end to
realist dynamics at the system level by spreading the ‘zone of peace’
to the region. So far, however, the record suggests no such straight-
forward association between regime type and foreign policy beha-
viour. Authoritarian regimes can be status quo or revisionist:
Nasser’s Egypt fought three wars with Israel in the name of Arab
nationalism and Sadat’s Egypt made peace with it at the expense of
Arab nationalism. Absolutism is associated with foreign policy
caution in the Gulf monarchies and foreign policy recklessness in
Saddam’s Iraq. Nor do Turkey and Israel show there to be any nec-
essary relation in the Middle East between democratisation and
foreign policy behaviour. Pluralistic political institutions have incor-
porated significant levels of mass participation in each country but
its effect on policy making has been neither as important or as
‘pacific’ as the democratic peace thesis expects. In both, foreign
policy is primarily shaped by elite conceptions of security and geo-
political interest. Moreover, when non-elite influences impact on
policy, they tend to express irredentism, not pacifism but much more
so in Israel where dissatisfaction with status quo (pre-1967) borders
runs deep. Because such democratic states enjoy greater popular
support, hence mobilisable capabilities, they may well be more dan-
gerous than their ultimately weaker authoritarian counterparts. The
region’s most pluralist states stand out for their irredentist activism
in neighbouring territory: Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara,
Israel’s settlement of the occupied territories and Turkey’s role in
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northern Cyprus. Although democratic peace theorists will argue
that peace mostly obtains between democratic states and only kicks
in when they dominate a regional system, the Middle East evidence
suggests that the democratic peace may be chiefly an artifact of
regions where satisfied states enjoy secure identities. As long as irre-
dentism and insecurity remain basic features of the Middle East
regional system, the foreign policy impact of the form of govern-
ment will, as realism expects, be relatively limited (Goldgeier and
McFaul 1992).
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7
War and order in the regional system
The roots of war
War has profoundly shaped the Middle East regional system. The
Middle East has two of the world’s most enduring conflict centres,
each originating in the impact of the West on the region. The estab-
lishment of Israel at the expense of the indigenous Palestinians led
to a chain of wars, each of which added new grievances and issues
complicating the possibility of a resolution. In the Gulf, the struggle
over oil and oil routes has been expressed in another chain of wars
which can be traced back to the Western overthrow of Muhammed
Mossadeq who had attempted to nationalise Iran’s oil; this was a
major factor in the Iranian revolution which set the stage for the first
and second Gulf wars. Conflicts over Israel and oil have tended to
feed on each other, as in the 1973 oil embargo triggered by the
Arab–Israeli war of that year.
War has originated in domestic level dissatisfaction shaped by
these struggles which, when institutionalised in rival states, is
expressed in conflict at the states system level, frequently over terri-
tory. Everywhere, in a region afflicted with irredentism, domestic
politics encourages nationalist outbidding. Revolution in states such
as Egypt and Iran has brought leaders to power who seek to export
their ideology; in mobilising new social forces, it has tended to
strengthen certain states and upset power balances. Demographic,
ideological or political expansionist impulses have been built into
the very fabric of some states, as is arguably so of Israel (a settler
state) and Iraq (an artificial state), which, between them, have
launched five wars against their neighbours. Weak or authoritarian
regimes have made repeated miscalculations, plunging their states
into unplanned wars, as in 1967, or mis-planned ones, such as Iraq’s
misadventures. While the anarchic logic of a states system need not,
in itself, reproduce a struggle for power, each war has been a water-
shed in the ‘construction’ of such a Hobbesian system in the Middle
East. The security dilemma has been played out to the full, with
states’ fear-driven accumulation of power only increasing insecurity
for their neighbours and generating periodic power imbalances that
have provided occasions of war. The failure of order-building efforts
to address these war-inducing factors means the Middle East has
been immune to the spread of the ‘zone of peace’. 
The emergence of a Middle East system
Built-in irredentism: origins of the Arab–Israeli conflict
The irredentism built into the flawed states system imposed on
the region after World War I was epitomised by the conflict over
Palestine, perhaps the single factor which has most profoundly
shaped Middle East international politics. This conflict originated
in the rise of the Zionist movement whose profoundly irredentist
project was to literally recreate an ‘old nation’ on the ruins of a
newly awakening – Arab Palestinian – one. The Zionist movement
believed the Jews made up a nation and were entitled to a state,
logically on the territory of Biblical Israel. They convinced the
British government, which calculated that a Jewish presence in
Palestine would support its control over the area, to sponsor a
homeland for Jews in Palestine (the Balfour Declaration) although
contemporaneously Britain was (in the MacMahon–Hussein cor-
respondence) also making a largely incompatible commitment to
Arab self-determination in historic Syria (Gerner 1991: 29–30,
34–5; Knightly 1991: 11; Schulze 1999; Smith 1996: 45–6). After
Britain acquired the post-World War I mandate over Palestine,
Zionist settlement began in earnest. Although the Balfour Declara-
tion specified that the Jewish homeland should not ‘prejudice the
rights of the existing population’, the Zionist project meant two
peoples claiming the same land and conflict between incoming set-
tlers and the Palestinian community was inevitable. In 1890, Jews
made up 3 per cent of the population of Palestine and 11 per cent
in 1922 but by 1948 they constituted around one third. They were
initially concentrated in urban enclaves but by 1948 they were able
to acquire 8–10 per cent of the land, largely through purchase
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from absentee landlords (Gerner 1991: 11, 17–18; Smith 1996: 24,
107).
Zionist emigration provoked the political arousal of the Palesti-
nian community and engendered a distinct Palestinian identity.
Palestinian resistance took the form of protests and non-co-opera-
tion with the British authorities, and in 1936–39 a major uprising.
This rebellion failed due to Palestinian divisions and British impe-
rial might, but, to appease Arab opinion, Zionist emigration was
limited until World War II when the Jewish exodus from Europe
began. When the British withdrew from Palestine in 1948 and the
Palestinians rejected a United Nations (UN) resolution partitioning
Palestine at their expense, the Zionists declared the founding of the
state of Israel. The armies of Arab states intervened, ostensibly to
rescue the Palestinians. 
The first Arab–Israeli war is often depicted as an unequal contest
in which the infant Israeli state fought off Arab attempts to strangle
it in its crib. In fact, the virtual destruction of the Palestinian
national movement in the British repression of the 1936 rebellion
left the Palestinians nearly defenceless while the British had allowed
their Zionist counterpart to arm itself during World War II – thereby
sowing the seeds of the Israeli army (Gerner 1991: 44–6; Smith
1996: 115–17, 140). The well-organised and mobilised Zionist
movement entered the conflict as a state-in-formation while the
fragile Arab monarchies and oligarchies were too dependent on the
West and too paralysed by rivalries to adopt an effective position
against it. Far from being zealous for war, it was only their fear that
Arab public opinion would hold them responsible for the loss of
Palestine that led to their half-hearted intervention. Egypt’s Prime
Minister Nuqrashi told the Egyptian commander that intervention
would be a mere political demonstration for public consumption.
Saudi Arabia was completely unwilling to endanger its US relations
by adopting the anti-Western economic sanctions called for in Arab
League resolutions (Maddy-Weitzman 1993: 61–7). Jordan’s King
Abdullah reached an understanding with the Zionists to occupy the
Arab areas in the partition plan and thereafter maintained a tacit
ceasefire that permitted them to make gains at the expanse of the
Egyptian army in the south and in Galilee during the second round
of the war. In large part because of Abdullah’s ambitions and the
concern of the other Arab states to thwart them as much as to
counter Israel, the Zionists were able to wage successful offensives
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against each Arab army consecutively (Sela 1998: 40). Similarly,
in the truce negotiations with Israel, Egypt and Jordan eschewed
the common stand that might have improved their leverage. Sub-
sequently King Abdullah not only annexed the Palestinian territory
that his army controlled (the ‘West Bank’) to his Kingdom in defi-
ance of the Arab League and Palestinian claims, but was even pre-
pared to enter a separate peace with Israel. 
The first Arab–Israeli war created the conditions for further wars
since the fighting was ended by a mere armistice that left the main
issues unresolved. Israel had acquired much more territory than the
UN partition plan allowed, indeed over three-quarters of Palestine,
leaving the so-called ‘West Bank’ rump in the hands of Jordan and
the Gaza strip under Egyptian control. Fears of being caught in the
fighting, aggravated by Zionist terror, led to a massive flight of
Palestinian refugees who were not allowed by a triumphant Israel to
return to their homes when the fighting ended in spite of UN reso-
lutions to that effect. This Palestinian exodus left large concentra-
tions of them on the West Bank, significant numbers in refugee
camps in Lebanon and Syria, and smaller numbers in Egypt and the
Gulf. The loss of Palestine threatened Palestinians, now a stateless
people, with the loss of their identity. However, the Palestinian
Diaspora throughout the Middle East produced a stratum of polit-
ically active intellectuals who helped radicalise the rising middle-
class nationalist movements in the various Arab countries and kept
the Palestinian cause at the top of political agendas. The refugee
camps became the crucible of the Palestinian resistance movement,
reservoirs of disaffected youth increasingly educated under UN
administration, but without normal economic opportunities who
had little to lose by joining the national liberation movement which
would eventually become the PLO. A minority of Palestinian villag-
ers who remained in Israel received a second-class form of citizen-
ship which did not prevent continual creeping confiscations of their
land by the Israeli state. On the other hand, Jews from the Arab
countries immigrated to Israel, fleeing Arab animosity, sometimes
deliberately stirred up by Zionist agents. This allowed the construc-
tion of an undiluted Jewish identity for Israel (Gerner 1991: 50–6,
59, 62–3; Peri 1988: 44; Sela 1998: 40–1; Smith 1996: 142). 
The sub-state communal conflict of Palestinian and Jew had now
been transformed into an inter-state conflict between Israel and its
Arab neighbours (Gerner 1991: 49). The Arab states rejected peace
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with Israel. In Arab eyes, Israel was no ordinary state but an exten-
sion of the West, a bridgehead of world Jewry rejecting assimilation
into the area, and which, seeking to incorporate Jews from around
the world and with access to global resources, had a limitless appe-
tite for expansion. To head off popular pressures for a second round
– at least until there might be a decline in Israel’s external support –
the Arab League states refused to establish normal relations with
Israel and imposed an economic boycott against it. The Arab League
consensus was enforced against King Abdullah of Jordan who had
negotiated a non-belligerency agreement which even his own polit-
ical elite rejected (Sela 1998: 51) and which led to his assassination.
Before long, championship of the Palestinian cause would become
an indispensable nationalist credential for aspiring Arab political
leaders.
For Israel, the war left unfinished business that shaped its subse-
quent foreign policy. It lacked secure readily defensible borders,
especially with Jordan, while a portion of biblical Israel (the West
Bank) remained in Arab hands. Security was foremost on the agenda
of the new state because, although the military capabilities of the
Arab states were modest, Israel’s small geographic space, lack of
strategic depth and encirclement by a hostile Arab world with ten
times its population, led to a sense of permanent siege. David Ben
Gurion, Israel’s founding leader who shaped much elite thinking,
expressed Israel’s perception of the Arabs: Israel, he asserted, had
been inhabited by Arab invaders for 1,300 years but once the home-
less, persecuted Jews had finally achieved a small notch of territory,
the Arabs sought to reduce its territory, flood it with refugees, seize
Jerusalem, and ghettoise it by blockade (Brecher 1972: 552; Gerner
1991: 44). 
Israel responded to Arab hostility, as Brown (1988: 134) put it,
with ‘both bristling aggressiveness and poignantly stated yearning
for peace with its neighbours’. On the one hand, Israel sought to
negotiate a peace settlement that would relieve it of Arab hostility;
on the other hand, the Ben Gurionists urged the permanent applica-
tion of force to extract recognition and normalisation of relations
on Israel’s terms – i.e. Arab acceptance of its control of most of
Palestine without Israeli concessions over borders or the Palestinian
refugees. Ben Gurion insisted the Arabs would only accept Israel
once it was shown to be invincible; they had, moreover, to be taught
the costs of challenging it through disproportionate punishment.
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Incursions by displaced Palestinians, armed or not, across Israel’s
new borders with Jordan and Egypt were met by massive retaliation
against these countries, including the targeting of civilian popula-
tions suspected of harbouring guerrillas. Continual disputes
between Israel and the Arab states over poorly demarcated borders,
demilitarised zones and water rights also regularly escalated into
military clashes, particularly on the Syrian–Israeli frontier. The peri-
odic clashes with neighbouring Arab countries which Israeli policy
promoted had, however, the effect of inflaming and spreading Pan-
Arab nationalism which preached the idea of a common Arab
nation united against Israel and its Western backers. They contrib-
uted to the rise of more radical governments more motivated and
better equipped to confront Israel, and made trusteeship of the
Palestine cause a prize sought by states vying for Pan-Arab leader-
ship (Brecher 1972: 251–90: Roberts 1990: 17–21; Smith 1996:
157–9; Walt 1987: 57).
From oligarchic multi-polarity (1945–55) to the Egypt-centric
Pan-Arab system (1956–70)
In the aftermath of World War II, a rudimentary Middle East
order emerged amidst pervasive irredentism. The periphery states,
Turkey, Iran and Israel, more advanced in nation-building, militar-
ily stronger, and aligned with the West, flanked a weak, fragmented
Arab core just emerging from colonial control. The Arab regimes
were narrow-based oligarchies or dynasties, highly penetrated by
the great powers, above all by Great Britain, which retained bases
and treaty relations with regimes headed by its clients, and moder-
ated regional conflicts. 
Dissatisfaction with artificial boundaries was an immediate issue.
The initial source of revisionism within the Arab world was unful-
filled Hashemite ambitions: Iraq’s dreams of becoming an Arab
Prussia unifying the Fertile Crescent and Jordan’s Greater Syria
scheme. The counter-alliance of Egypt and Saudi Arabia with Syria,
which was most directly threatened by the Hashemite states, the
restraint put on the Hashemites by their British patron, and the
limited military capabilities on all sides helped preserve the systemic
status quo. In addition, the shared elitist (dynastic or oligarchic)
ideology of the regimes brought them to accept the rules of a multi-
polar system – that no state should endanger the vital interests of its
neighbours (Maddy-Weitzman 1993: Mufti 1996: 21–59; Seale
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1965: 5–99). The Arab League attempted to both institutionalise
respect for the sovereignty of individual states while acknowledging
shared Arab identities and facilitating a collective response to the
common threat from Zionism. Its legitimacy was, however, tar-
nished by its failure to co-ordinate the defence of Palestine and the
most it achieved was a consensus against relations with Israel. 
The main underlying threat to this early order was the instability
within the individual states: the weak popular loyalty to newly
imposed regimes within arbitrary boundaries, gross maldistribution
of wealth, still incomplete de-colonisation, and the loss of Palestine
– all soon more or less de-legitimised the regimes. Their weakness
meant the system could be rapidly transformed by the intersection
of two forces: the political mobilisation of the Pan-Arab middle
class and the rise of Egypt’s Nasser who sought, with considerable
success, to replace Western hegemony with an Egypt-centric Pan-
Arab order. 
Nasser successfully upset the oligarchic power balance on which
the existing order rested but not through military superiority. Part
of Egypt’s pre-eminence derived from its stature as the most stable
and coherent of the Arab states, with a developed bureaucracy and,
unusually, a coincidence between state borders and a relatively dis-
tinctive identity. Egypt was also the most populous Arab state,
having 30 per cent of the Arab population. It had, as well, the largest
GNP which gave it a limited ability to provide economic aid and
supported the largest army through defence expenditures double
those of any other Arab state (Noble 1991: 61–5, 74–5; Walt 1987:
53). But Egypt normally could not use its army to project power,
being cut off from the Arab East by Israel and constrained by inter-
national norms. What gave Egypt hegemony was Nasser’s asymmet-
rical ability to project trans-state ideological influence, that is, to
mobilise domestic pressure on other Arab leaders by appealing to
their own populations in the name of Pan-Arabism while his own
regime was relatively immune to similar penetration. 
Behind this asymmetry was the coincidence of several develop-
ments: Nasser’s successful incorporation of popular support at
home, giving his regime much greater stability than the Western-
dependent oligarchies and monarchies; the emergence of middle-
class nationalist movements across the region, radicalised by the
Arab–Israeli conflict, the struggle with imperialism, and the tradi-
tional elites’ unwillingness to share power; the advent of the
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transistor radio which allowed Radio Cairo to reach this audience;
and Nasser’s foreign policy victories against the West – notably the
Czech arms deal, his successful stand against the Baghdad Pact, and
the Western failure at Suez – which transformed him into a Pan-
Arab hero. Nasser was enabled to unleash an Arab nationalist rev-
olutionary wave which precipitated coups and movements against
pro-Western regimes across the region, culminating in the fall of
Hashemite Iraq, the pillar of the pro-Western order and the forma-
tion of the UAR which briefly united Egypt with the most intensely
Pan-Arab state, Syria. In time, this wave was consolidated in a series
of kindred Arab nationalist regimes in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the
Yemens, and later in Sudan and Libya. This outcome was a function
of an imbalance in state formation and ideological legitimacy, not
in military power (Barnett 1998: 100–3, 128; Cremeans 1963;
Dawisha 1976: 174–5). 
Egypt’s ideological hegemony positioned Nasser to lay down
standards of Pan-Arab conduct that forced even the remaining
Western-dependent regimes to observe common Arab nationalist
norms. Indeed, Nasser arguably created an informal ‘Pan-Arab
regime’ which, in enforcing values already pervasive in Arab politi-
cal culture, constrained the unfettered exercise of state sovereignty
in foreign policy. The power of one core norm, independence from
imperialism, was established by the defeat of Hashemite Iraq, which
had insisted on its sovereign right to protect its security through
the Baghdad Pact, against Egypt’s claim that all Arab states had
obligations toward a Pan-Arab community whose independence
could only be consolidated by shouldering its own collective de-
fence. Egypt’s victory was reflected in the widespread cancelling of
Western base rights and treaties and the reluctance of conservative
states to overtly align with their Western protectors as they sought
to appease – bandwagon with – Egypt. The second norm, the rejec-
tion of the legitimacy of Israel and support of the Palestine cause
(ideally the liberation of Palestine) did not translate into effective
common action against Israel but it did enforce Israel’s isolation;
thus, Jordan, even when most threatened by its Arab nationalist
neighbours, refrained from alliance with Israel, although covertly
the kingdom benefited from an understanding that Israel would
intervene if Jordan appeared in danger of absorption. Finally, lip
service, at least, was given to the view that inter-Arab conflict should
be settled peacefully in arenas such as the Arab League or through
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mediation and, in fact, such conflict was largely confined to low-
intensity ideological subversion. The ‘Pan-Arab regime’ was facili-
tated by the shared identity of Arab elites and enforced by their fear
of the internal opposition Nasser could mobilise against its viola-
tion. Nasser did not become the Bismarck of the Arab world but his
Pan-Arab hegemony imposed some foreign policy coherence on it
and made it much more impervious to Western influence and inter-
vention than heretofore (Barnett 1998: 8–18; Brown 1984: 88,
162–17; Gerges, 1994: 245–51; Kerr 1971; Walt 1987: 206–12).
This combination allowed establishment of a relatively autonomous
regional system. 
Nevertheless, the Pan-Arab ‘regime’ was always precarious. Dis-
agreements over Pan-Arab norms – the extent of permissible rela-
tions with the West, the degree of militancy toward Israel – and
Cairo’s attempt to impose its interpretation, especially when this
spilled over into a revolutionary challenge to the very legitimacy of
rival states, provoked an anti-hegemonic backlash. When the 1958
revolution toppled the Hashemites in Iraq and it looked as if the
conservative side would be overwhelmed, Western intervention in
Lebanon and Jordan checked the domino effect and helped stabil-
ise conservative regimes. After this, Nasser’s conservative rivals
were less reluctant to defy him. The consequent ‘Arab Cold War’
(Kerr 1971) interlocked with the competition of the two super-
powers whose aid and protection to the opposing camps reinforced
a regional polarisation, loosely mirroring bi-polarity. However,
Nasser’s unwillingness to share power even with ideological allies,
manifest in the failure of the UAR, stimulated an anti-Cairo reac-
tion among kindred Pan-Arab leaders, as well. Thus, the revolution-
ary camp split when Abd al-Karim Qasim, Iraq’s revolutionary
leader, rejected Egyptian tutelage and Nasser, in response, joined
Jordan and Saudi Arabia in sending troops to protect Kuwait from
Qasim’s 1961 challenge to its independence. The 1963 Ba’thist
coups in Iraq and Syria raised the potential of a powerful new Pan-
Arab bloc, but the Ba’thists’ fear of Nasser’s domination caused the
failure of the unity talks with Egypt: instead the weaker Syrian and
Iraqi regimes balanced against ideologically kindred Egypt and chal-
lenged Nasser’s leadership of the radical camp which again pushed
Nasser into detente with the conservative regimes. The ideological
bi-polarity which had so put pro-Western regimes on the defensive
was thus cross-cut by phases of ‘revolutionary polycentrism’ in
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which Nasser tacitly aligned with conservative regimes against Pan-
Arab rivals, relieving the pressure on the former. Moreover, in a
classic act of realist balancing, the periphery states, Israel, Iran and
Turkey aligned, albeit tacitly and intermittently, in the so-called
‘periphery pact’ to contain the putative radical nationalist threat
from the Arab core (Barnett 1998: 129–45; Kerr 1971; Walt, 1987:
67–79, 204). 
As such, from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s the regional
order combined features of the balance of power with those of a
supra-state community. On the one hand, the sovereignty of the
individual states and the status quo state system were preserved by
anti-hegemonic balancing and, in a crisis, outside intervention. On
the other hand, trans-state Pan-Arabism (amidst global bi-polarity)
reduced the historic permeability of the system to outside penetra-
tion and confined inter-Arab competition to the ideological level. As
a security regime, this order was, however, fundamentally unstable:
in institutionalising the cleavage with the non-Arab periphery, it
provided no instrument, other than a precarious power balance, for
addressing the security dilemma on these fault-lines; and its ideolog-
ical heterogeneity provoked the nationalist competition and, ulti-
mately, the crisis with Israel in May 1967, in which this balance was
destabilised.
Two Arab–Israeli wars and the reshaping of the Middle East
system
The June 1967 war
Wars are catalysts for changes in states systems and the 1967 war,
no exception, signalled the decline of Egyptian hegemony and the
Egypt-centric ‘Arab regime’. The 1973 war precipitated a second
watershed, the beginning of the Arab–Israeli peace process. These
two wars marked a transitional period toward a more multi-polar
state-centric system in which sovereignty started to eclipse Pan-
Arabism.
The roots of war: Israeli geopolitical needs Israel launched the
1967 war and its motives constitute its immediate cause. There was
a certain expansionist impulse literally built into the fabric of Israel’s
identity. Israel considers itself not an ordinary state or a Middle
Eastern society but the territorial base of World Jewry, the Diaspora,
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a trans-national sense of kinship which has no exact parallel in
world politics (Brecher 1972: 38). Although only about 17 per cent
of Jews lived in Israel in 1966 (2.3 million out of 13.4 million), it
was, in principle committed to their ‘ingathering’: according to the
Law of Return, Diaspora Jews have an automatic right of citizen-
ship (Gerner 1991: 59; Peri 1988: 44), and Israeli policy actively
promoted Jewish emigration, often settled on land from which
Palestinians were dispossessed. Absorbing a growing population in
an arid land led Israel to seek greater control over regional water
resources, initiating projects to divert the waters of the Jordan river
in the 1960s which the Arabs took as a provocation and a bid to
further emigration. The parallel pressure for more land was rein-
forced by dissatisfaction among many Israelis with the incomplete
Judaisation of the territory of ancient Eretz Yisrael and the conse-
quent belief, among militant nationalists, that the completion of
the Zionist project required the incorporation of Judea/Samaria –
before 1967 the Jordanian-controlled ‘West Bank’ of the Jordan
River. This ambition was explicit and institutionalised in the Herut
party but latent throughout Israeli society (Smith 1996: 193). 
It was, however, security needs that most immediately motivated
Israeli decision-makers. Even though Israel had twice defeated its
divided Arab neighbours, the loss of even one war could spell
national extinction. Israel’s frontiers were uniquely vulnerable; in
particular, the Jordanian-controlled West Bank was a salient pro-
truding into Israel from which an Arab thrust to the sea could cut
Israel in two. Moreover, the potential of Arab demographic and
resource superiority shaped Israeli security doctrine and military
practice in a way that was likely to provoke war. Given the vulner-
ability of its borders, Israel could not afford to fight a war on its ter-
ritory and had to take one into the enemy’s territory before it could
threaten the homeland. Because Israel’s superiority was problematic
if the Arab forces effectively combined and forced a multi-front war
on it, preventing such a combination was a constant of Israeli policy
and this required a proactive military stance. Additionally, because
Israel, being reliant on the mobilisation of reserves, could not
sustain a prolonged war without great damage to its economy, wars
had to be won quickly through overwhelming force. These vulner-
abilities resulted in a doctrine favouring a ‘pre-emptive’ (first strike)
strategy that aimed at quickly smashing the enemy and, in a multi-
front war, allowing one opponent to be neutralised in order to cope
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with the other/s. Since collective Arab action had normally been a
function of Egyptian success in uniting the Arabs and, particularly
co-ordinating with Syria and Jordan, Israel considered a whole
range of Egyptian-initiated actions to be a casus belli justifying a
first strike, notably the concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai
and the ascendancy of Egyptian influence over Jordan: the Israeli
1967 first strike responded to such an emerging scenario (Brecher
1972: 51, 67).
Later wars are often the continuation of earlier rounds and 1967,
no exception, was a product of dissatisfaction at the outcome of
the 1956 Suez War which was, itself, a continuation of the unfin-
ished business left over from 1948. Egypt’s arming of displaced
Palestinians in Gaza, who launched incursions into Israel in the
early 1950s, had precipitated disproportionate retaliation against
Egyptian positions and sparked an arms race between Egypt and
Israel, with France becoming Israel’s main supplier and the Soviet
Union Egypt’s. In the years before 1956, there had been some dispute
within the Israeli elite over whether to escalate or de-escalate this
rising conflict through diplomatic conciliation. Moshe Sharrett,
Foreign Minister and briefly Prime Minister, urged the latter and Ben
Gurion the former; it took Sharrett’s ouster from power by the Ben
Gurionists to prepare the way for war while Nasser’s nationalisation
of the Suez Canal, facilitating Israeli collusion with Britain and
France, made the international environment permissive for a first
strike on Egypt (Brecher 1972: 389–92). Israel’s 1956 attack, in
which it occupied Egypt’s Sinai peninsula, aimed to destroy Egypt’s
new military capabilities, force it to reopen the Strait of Tiran which
it had closed to Israeli shipping after 1948, and either destabilise
Nasser’s Arab nationalist government or force it to concede a peace
treaty in return for evacuation of the Sinai. Israel achieved the
opening of the straits and a UN force on the border which ended infil-
tration from Gaza, but US President Dwight Eisenhower forced its
withdrawal from the Sinai without any political gains and in fact, the
Israeli use of force achieved the opposite of its aims. It accelerated
the spread of Arab nationalism and consolidated Nasser’s stature as
a Pan-Arab leader carrying responsibility for the Palestinian cause,
thereby locking Egypt into confrontation with Israel. Egypt was also
dissatisfied by what it considered to be the rewards Israel had
received for its aggression, notably the opening of the Strait of Tiran,
and in the pre-war crisis of May 1967 Nasser again closed them.
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Israel’s powerful Ben-Gurionists, whose ambitions for defensible
borders and/or more living space had been frustrated in 1956, found
in this same crisis another opportunity to realise them (Gerner 1991:
66–9; Smith 1996: 171–4; Walt 1987: 66).
Israeli elites were, nevertheless, initially divided and the decision
for war was, in some ways, a product of intra-elite power rivalries.
An activist camp, dominant in the military and led by disciples of
Ben Gurion such as Moshe Dayan, the hero of the Suez campaign,
Yigal Allon and Shimon Peres, saw the Arabs as an implacable
enemy and Nasser as the new Hitler. They were convinced that Israel
enjoyed the decisive military superiority to take on the enemy
(Brecher 1972: 552; Smith 1996: 196). At the same time, the irre-
dentist Herut party of Menachem Begin was growing in influence as
a pressure group for expansion and also had its advocates in the mil-
itary (Brecher 1972: 247; Roberts 1990: 36; Smith 1996: 192). A
pragmatic tendency in Israeli elite thinking, normally a minority
view in the establishment but temporarily on the ascendancy in the
mid-1960s, was more prepared to seek accommodation with the
Arabs and argued against military actions that could alienate Israel’s
supporters in the West. The cautious and pragmatic Levi Eshkol,
Prime Minister in 1967, was closer to the moderate camp. 
The Ben-Gurionist hawks, who had split from the ruling Mapai
party, used their image as war heroes to paint the pragmatists as soft
on the Arabs. Backed by the military establishment, they used the
May 1967 crisis to demand key cabinet positions in a national unity
government from which they would push Eshkol into a first strike.
Dayan became Defence Minister while Begin also received a portfo-
lio in this government. While Dayan and Allon were planning a war
to enlarge Israel’s borders, Eshkol, innocent of such strategic
visions, wished to rely on American diplomacy to defuse the crisis
and was averse to a pre-emptive strike. However, he succumbed to
military pressure and the hawks took charge of actual military deci-
sion-making (Kimsche and Bawly 1968: 45, 57, 62, 69; Peri 1983:
244–51).
Domestic-driven Arab regional dynamics Israel’s attack on its
neighbours unleashed the war but it was the dynamics of Pan-
Arabism which gave Israeli hawks the opportunity to realise their
ambitions; specifically Nasser’s need to protect his Arab leadership
against challenges from both the left and the right led him into fatal
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brinkmanship in the spring of 1967 (Barnett 1998: 153–9; Stein,
1993: 62–7). 
From the mid-1960s, Egypt, as Pan-Arab leader, was under
growing pressure to act against Israel’s diversion of the Jordan
River. The Palestinian refugees were increasingly impatient for Arab
action to resolve their plight; indeed, newly founded groups such as
al-Fatah launched a guerrilla struggle against Israel that they hoped
would detonate a wider Arab–Israeli war. Nasser argued that the
Arab world had to build up its forces, modernise and unify before
it would be ready for confrontation with Israel and, with his best
forces tied down in the Yemen civil war, he could hardly afford a
war. But his Arab rivals, particularly Syria, used the issue to put him
on the defensive (Sela 1998: 52–3, 78). The Syrian–Israeli conflict
dated back to differences over the demilitarised zones established by
the 1948 armistice. Israel’s ‘creeping annexation’ of these zones
(Gerner 1991: 70), Syrian shelling of the paramilitary settlements
Israel implanted in them, and the resulting massive Israeli retalia-
tion, generated a particularly radical version of Arab nationalism in
Syria and was a factor in bringing the Ba’th party to power in 1963.
The radical but narrow-based Ba’thist regime began championing
the Palestine cause to win domestic legitimacy and outbid Nasser for
Pan-Arab leadership. To contain revisionist Syria, Nasser initiated
Arab summit meetings to spread responsibility for inaction among
the Arab leaders. The summits agreed to counter Israel by diverting
the Jordan River sources which, since these rose in Syria, would
force Damascus to bear the consequences of its own militancy.
However, the Syrian Ba’th used Israeli attacks on its diversion works
to embarrass Nasser, criticising the UN buffer force in the Sinai
(UNEF) which prevented him from deterring Israel. Saudi Arabia,
at odds with Egypt over Yemen, taunted Nasser for having troops
in Yemen when they were needed against Israel. Syria took advan-
tage of this to entice Nasser into a radical Cairo–Damascus axis.
While Nasser hoped this would remove Syria’s incentive for nation-
alist outbidding, Damascus viewed it as the essential backing for its
sponsorship of Palestinian guerrilla warfare against Israel. This
fedayeen action was the immediate precipitant of the escalation that
would lead to war (Kerr, 1971: 96–128; Sela 1998: 75–90; Walt
1987: 86–7). It also prepared the ground for bringing Jordan into
the Arab coalition encircling Israel. An Israeli raid on Jordan
because of guerrilla attacks sponsored by Syria had convinced King
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Hussein that Israel did not reward moderation. He responded to the
Cairo propaganda attacks that were stirring up his population by
goading Nasser for his inaction, helping to bring about the inflamed
crisis of May 1967 in which aroused public opinion forced him to
stand against Israel. Even knowing it could cost him his territory
and army, domestic pressure left Hussein no choice but to align with
Egypt and Syria as war approached (Stein 1993: 65–66). 
From unstable strategic environment to crisis A situation of stra-
tegic instability existed in the Middle East in 1967 because the
decisive military advantage lay with the offence: since weapons, par-
ticularly aircraft, were vulnerable while no country enjoyed much
strategic depth, a first strike could give decisive advantage once one
or more sides had acquired a significant offensive capability. Both
the Soviet Union and the West (France and the US) stepped up arms
deliveries in the 1960s. While Soviet deliveries to Egypt, Syria and
Iraq were quantitatively greater they were mostly defensive in
nature while Israel received weapons giving it an offensive capabil-
ity (Smith 1996: 196). Although far from evident to the Arabs, an
imbalance of power in Israeli’s favour had emerged and the Israeli
generals’ planning for a pre-emptive war was entirely rational.
However, it took a crisis to translate this predisposition into actual
war. 
That crisis was provoked when in May 1967 Israeli retaliations
for guerrilla incursions by Syrian-backed Palestinians climaxed in
an Israeli threat to attack and overthrow the Syrian regime. The
Soviet Union prodded Nasser to deter Israel and, as leader of the
Arab world, he felt obliged to do so. Nasser realised the power
balance, with his best forces tied down in Yemen, was unfavourable
and did not, therefore, want a war but he could not remain passive.
He therefore requested UN withdrawal from the Sinai and sent
troops into the peninsula as a deterrent and with defensive instruc-
tions which assumed an Israeli first strike. Israel abandoned plans
for an attack on Syria but began a counter-mobilisation which put
it in a position to launch a more general war (Gerges 1994: 213;
Gerner 1991: 71; Sela 1998: 91–3; Stein 1993: 64). 
Nasser could have de-escalated but he allowed himself to be
pushed into further brinkmanship by the expectations raised by his
own nationalist rhetoric. Seeing a chance to win another political
victory and perhaps extract some concessions from Israel on the
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Palestinian issue, he reclosed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
Popular euphoria that the Arabs were finally confronting Israel
swept the front-line states into a defence pact encircling Israel. In
essence, the Arab-nationalist ‘outbidding’ in which the rival Arab
states had engaged was leading them into a war none wanted. In
Israel, the crisis raised the public’s sense of threat to its maximum:
Egyptian troop movements, the closing of the strait and the three-
front Arab alliance, gave the Israeli hawks their causus belli. Once
Israel began to mobilise, at economic cost, it would not long wait for
diplomacy to raise the closure of the Straits. The actual military
threat to Israel was moderate: Nasser had no intention of striking
first and the Israeli generals were confident of victory. The real threat
was political: a superpower-brokered resolution which could
strengthen Nasser and further embolden the Arabs (Gerner 1991:
71–2; Smith 1996: 199). For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a
threat than an opportunity – to smash Nasserist Egypt and the Pan-
Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority, to achieve
secure borders, force the Arabs to accept Israel and, for some, such
as Menachem Begin, to realise Eretz Yisrael. Pre-emption was
Israel’s historic strategy and the main restraint on it had always been
fear of the international repercussions, but in June 1967 the interna-
tional situation was unusually permissive. (Barnett, 1998: 146–59;
Peri 1983: 244–51; Sela 1998: 91–3; Smith 1996: 196–202).
International permissiveness Even as expansionist pressures were
peaking in Israel, the great power restraints that had long main-
tained relative stability on the Arab–Israeli front were breaking
down. While the Tripartite Declaration had initially restrained the
arms race, the French were now giving Israel sophisticated weap-
onry out of resentment at Nasser’s backing for Algerian indepen-
dence. Nasser’s challenge to Western interests in the region,
inescapable if he wished to retain his leadership of Arab national-
ism, had earned him accumulated resentment in the West where he
was increasingly perceived as a Soviet client who should be brought
down (see chapter 2, p. 30). 
Nasser overplayed his hand in the crisis of spring 1967 in part
because he had become complacent about his ability to manipulate
bi-polarity. With the Suez precedent in mind, he miscalculated that
the US would restrain Israel for fear a war would inflame Arab
opinion against the West or bring confrontation with the USSR.
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Nasser’s defence minister, General Shams ad-Din Badran apparently
misled him into believing the Soviets had promised intervention to
deter Israel; but, in fact, it was Moscow that would be deterred
when war broke out by fear of a confrontation with the US (Gerges
1994: 224–5). Moreover, Nasser had given the US a commitment
that Egypt would not be the one to initiate war and was led to think
that the US was trying to broker a negotiated settlement of the crisis
that would give him a Suez-like political victory (Gerges 1994:
218–22). But unlike the Suez War in which Egypt, clearly the victim,
benefited from world opinion, in 1967 Arab rhetoric allowed Israel
to portray itself as the victim of aggression to world opinion, gen-
erating a permissive environment for an Israeli first strike.
Meanwhile, US President Lyndon Johnson, a Cold War ideologue
and friend of Israel, initially counselled Israeli restraint. He expected
Israel would win a war, but did not want to have to intervene on
Israel’s behalf if the outcome was less than decisive (Gerges 1994:
230). But because he was also not ready to use US forces to open the
Strait of Tiran he became resigned to letting Israel do it. Once con-
vinced that an Israeli attack on the Arab states would not draw
Washington into the conflict, Johnson, according to Israeli elites
such as Dayan and Peres, gave Israel a tacit green light (Kimsche and
Bawly 1968: 57). Indeed, according to Abba Eban, the US actually
encouraged Israel to move against Syria once it had defeated Egypt
(Gerges 1994: 222–4). When the Soviets warned the US that they
would intervene to stop Israel’s attack on Syria in defiance of a
Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, Johnson sent a counter-
warning by moving the US Sixth Fleet, although he did advise Israel
to stop once it had taken the Golan Heights. The Soviets’ failure to
prevent the defeat of their allies was a first step in the restoration of
American power in the region. 
Explaining the 1967 war The 1967 war was the product of a con-
vergence of forces on several different levels. The root cause lay in
a protracted conflict of sub-state ethno-nationalisms which had
become institutionalised in a system of rival states: on the Israeli
side, a settler state with built-in insecurity and expansionist im-
pulses pursuing a strategy of force to impose acceptance by its neigh-
bours, and, in the process only inflaming their resentment; on the
other side a displaced Palestinian Diaspora well positioned to drag
the Arab states into support for its cause. In these conditions war
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was always possible but it was the dynamics of the states system –
a fluid imbalance of power in Israel’s favour, an unstable strategic
environment and international permissiveness – which allowed the
war to happen at this particular time. 
The war was not, of course, inevitable and, on the contrary,
resulted from leadership choices; hence it can only be fully under-
stood by factoring in leadership rivalties, ambitions, perceptions
and miscalculations. Janice Stein (1993: 56–7) differentiates be-
tween ‘wars of vulnerability’ in which external and domestic threats
combine in such a way to make war or at least brinkmanship seem
the least costly course, and sought-after ‘wars of opportunity’ in
which elites believe a power advantage will allow them to make
gains through the use of force. The 1967 Arab–Israeli war is surely
a mixed case. For Israeli elites, it was an opportunity to end Israel’s
strategic vulnerability by acquiring more defensible borders and
forcing its acceptance in the region. For the Arab leaders, the actions
they took which gave Israel an excuse to go to war issued from vul-
nerability rooted in the regional and domestic power struggles in
which firmness against Israel was essential to legitimacy; this
resulted from the rise of Pan-Arab nationalism and the inter-Arab
rivalry played out through dangerous ‘outbidding’ and brinkman-
ship (Barnett 1998: 159). Far from being a mere accident, this was
a war waiting to happen which could only have been prevented by
international and regional statesmanship, both of which were
utterly lacking. 
The consequences of the 1967 war The 1967 war ushered in
major alterations in the Arab–Israeli balance of power and in the
regional map to Israel’s advantage. Israel not only decisively de-
feated the Arab armies but seized the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip
from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the Palestinian pop-
ulated ‘West Bank’ from Jordan. In upsetting the status quo, the war
might have led to an Arab–Israeli peace. United Nations Security
Resolution (UNSC) Resolution 242, jointly sponsored by the super-
powers in the aftermath of the war, provided an internationally
accepted framework for a settlement. It amounted in essence to a
proposed trade of ‘land for peace’; in linking the inadmissibility of
the acquisition of land by conquest to a call for all states in the
region to be recognised as having the right to live in peace, it
affirmed that the Arab states would now have to finally accept the
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existence of Israel and Israel would have to withdraw from the occu-
pied territories. Although Israel denied the resolution required it to
withdraw from all the territories, all other states, including the US,
interpreted the resolution to mean virtually complete withdrawal
(Smith 1996: 211–13). 
The 1967 war also unleashed a major transformation in Arab
attitudes to Israel. To be sure, in the short term, the conquest of the
1967 territories further locked the Arab states into the conflict with
it. The defeated Arab nationalist regimes could not yet overtly
accept a directly negotiated peace settlement and wanted a UN-
sponsored end to belligerency and Israeli withdrawal. But they were
under no illusion that they could avoid a formal peace treaty if they
were to recover their lost lands. Despite some short-term inflamma-
tion of radical public sentiment, the 1967 defeat, in giving a mortal
blow to Pan-Arab dreams, started the process of Arab acceptance of
the permanence, if not the legitimacy, of Israel. Egypt’s defeat pre-
cipitated a realist pragmatism in the hegemonic Arab state as Nasser
himself began looking to mend relations with the US and to find a
diplomatic solution to the Israeli occupation (Gerges 1994: 228,
236); Asad’s rise in Syria marked a similar moderation of national-
ism there. Radical Arab states that had challenged Israel on behalf
of the Palestine cause, in disregard of the power imbalance against
them, were ‘socialised’ the hard way into the rules of realist pru-
dence needed to survive in a dangerous states system. King Hussein’s
1970 crushing of the Palestinian fedayeen’s attempt to turn Jordan
into a base of operations against Israel was another watershed that
started the gradual moderation of the PLO leadership: it would soon
reduce its goal to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza. To be sure, as the chance of a diplomatic settlement
faded in the years after 1967, the survival of the front-line regimes
would require they re-vindicate themselves against Israel: they could
not rest until the occupation of their territory, touching on vital state
and regime interests more directly than the Palestine cause had ever
done, was rolled back. However, as the notion of the liberation of
Palestine gave way to the aim of recovering the occupied territories,
an irreconcilable ‘existential’ conflict between the two sides was
gradually transformed into a limited one over territory that was
much more amenable to a compromise settlement (Sela, 1998:
27–30, 97–109; Smith 1996: 235–7). 
Unfortunately, if 1967 marked the beginning of the end of Arab
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nationalist revisionism, it had the opposite effect on a triumphant
Israel. Although the military hegemony Israel achieved in the war
gave it cause to feel more secure, the success of a military solution
to its insecurity not only reduced its motivation to reach a perma-
nent settlement with the Arab states but actually whet its irredentist
appetites. Israel insisted that a peace settlement would require the
Arab states to accept direct negotiations and that it was unprepared
to return to the 1967 lines. It wanted to keep strategic parts of its
conquests that it insisted were needed to give it ‘secure borders’
including the Golan Heights, control of the Jordan River Valley, and
parts of the Sinai (Roberts 1990: 25–30). Additionally, the simulta-
neous rise of an irredentist right-wing settler movement and of the
Likud party, which, beginning in 1977, started to win elections, pro-
pelled attempts to colonise and incorporate the territories even
though this meant permanent repressive rule over a large Palestinian
population in violation of international law (Peleg 1988: 60; Peri
1988). The settlement drive decisively obstructed the potential to
trade the occupied lands for peace. In essence, the 1967 war did not
result in the compromise settlement outlined in UN Resolution 242
because the power asymmetry gave the Israelis no incentives to
concede it and the Arab states no capacity to extract it. As a result,
1967 set the stage for three more wars in the space of about a
decade, the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition (1969–70), the 1973
Arab–Israeli war and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Gerner
1991: 72–5; Smith 1996: 201, 208–11, 228–30). 
The Arab states system from Arab triangle to separate peace (the
1970s)
The Arab Triangle Another effect of the 1967 war was to trans-
form the Arab system from the Egypt-centred Pan-Arab one to what
Ajami (1977–78) called the ‘Arab Triangle’. Nasser’s death and
replacement by Sadat overnight reduced Egypt from hegemon of the
Pan-Arab order to the status of a ‘normal’ state. Egypt had never
had the resources of a well-rounded hegemon. It never enjoyed
much capacity to project military power in the Arab world and its
one attempt to do so, in Yemen, ended in stalemate; Egypt’s eco-
nomic superiority was never enough to allow it to provide much in
economic rewards and by the late 1960s, the costs of hegemony –
first from Yemen, then from the 1967 defeat – were impoverishing
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the country while the growing oil revenues accruing to the oil mon-
archies was shifting the balance of economic power to them. Cairo’s
hegemony had been based largely on the ideological appeal of
Arabism, but this was shattered by the 1967 defeat while growing
state formation made other states less permeable to ideological pen-
etration. Sadat, having neither the will nor Pan-Arab stature to con-
tinue Nasser’s Pan-Arab role, subordinated all other concerns to the
recovery of the occupied Sinai. The Pan-Arab regime had lost the
hegemon which had enforced and held it together. 
With the decline of the Egyptian hegemon, other Arab states
acquired greater freedom to pursue state interests but those interests
were now shaped by the much-increased threat from Israel. Before
1967, the expectation that the great powers would restrain Israel,
the greater immediate threat Arab rivals posed to each other, and
the little practical possibility of liberating Palestine had deterred
effective alliance-building against Israel (Walt 1987: 265–6); after-
wards, a militarily preponderant and expansive Israel had to be con-
tained while the occupied territories were potentially recoverable.
This was only possible through inter-Arab co-operation and the
much-reduced threat of Cairo made this co-operation less risky for
the other Arab states. Thus, Israel’s military preponderance sparked
an effort on the Arab side to balance it through alliance formation
and military build-up (Walt 1987: 117, 120–1).
Egypt was still the pivotal Arab state and the natural leader of an
Arab coalition against Israel, but it had now to lead by consensus.
Gradually Egypt and Syria, under new pragmatic leaders, were
thrown together by their common interest in a war for recovery of
the occupied territories while Saudi Arabia took advantage of their
need for financial backing to moderate their policies and achieve full
partnership in core Arab affairs. If no one state had enough assets
to play the Arab hegemon, an axis of the largest (Egypt), the richest
(Saudi Arabia), and most Pan-Arab (Syria) states could pool com-
plementary resources and forge an Arab consensus on war and
peace. This ‘Arab Triangle’ would, for a period, replace Egyptian
hegemony as a new basis of Arab cohesion based on the greater
equality, hence trust, between the main leaders, Sadat, Asad and
Feisal (Ajami 1977–78; Sela 1998: 142–5, 148; Taylor 1982:
49–56).
The three leaders began exploring two tracks for the recovery of
the occupied territories. Egypt and Syria continued rebuilding their
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armies with Soviet arms financed by Arab oil money, while Sadat
and the Saudis tried to enlist American pressure on Israel for a dip-
lomatic settlement. Nasser’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan had laid
the grounds for a settlement and Sadat made new efforts to enlist
US help in reaching one. However, another Arab–Israeli war became
inevitable when the US rebuffed Sadat’s diplomatic initiatives: in
October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a co-ordinated attack on
the Israeli-occupied territories while Saudi Arabia deployed the oil
weapon to force the intervention of American diplomacy (Heikal
1975; Sheehan 1976, Smith 1996: 226–8; Walt 1987: 117–21).
The fourth Arab–Israeli war of 1973 The conduct and outcome
of the 1973 war were both shaped by and reshaped the Arab–Israeli
power balance. On the one hand, tactically, Egypt’s fears about
Israeli air superiority led it to adopt a flawed war plan aiming at the
mere seizure of a strip of land on the East bank of the Suez Canal
(in order to break the diplomatic stalemate); this allowed Israel to
separately concentrate on its northern and southern fronts, forfeit-
ing the advantage of the two-front joint Egyptian–Syrian assault.
When a ceasefire was called, Israeli forces were entrenched on the
West bank of the canal and the Egyptian Third Army surrounded
and in bad need of American intervention to restrain Israeli viola-
tions of the ceasefire and bring about a disengagement of forces. On
the other hand, overall, the war altered the strategic power imbal-
ance that had deprived the Arabs of all leverage to negotiate an
acceptable settlement with Israel. The Arab armies failed to liberate
the occupied territories, but their ability to challenge Israel and
inflict high costs on it and the oil embargo, in threatening vital
Western interests, sufficiently upset the status quo to force American
intervention on behalf of a negotiated settlement. At the same time,
the relative Arab success in the war (compared to 1967) endowed
the front-line states with a legitimacy windfall that made it less polit-
ically risky for them to move toward a peace settlement. Arab
summits following the war, led by the ‘Arab Triangle’ powers, legit-
imised a ‘comprehensive peace’ with Israel in return for its full
withdrawal from the occupied territories and the creation of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They also designated
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians in peace nego-
tiations. Arguably, the war gave the Arab states increased leverage
to extract the settlement they wanted if they stuck together and
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played their cards right. Israel, for its part, still had the military
upper hand at the end of the war and had an interest in a partial set-
tlement, that is, one with Egypt, if that left it free to avoid settle-
ments on its other fronts (Sela 1998: 211–13). 
A new Arab order – stillborn The 1973 war seemed to revive the
defunct Pan-Arab system, albeit in new form. The war caused a
massive resurgence of Arab nationalism which drove all Arab states
to close ranks behind Egypt and Syria: Iraqi and Jordanian forces
played crucial roles in containing Israeli counter-offensives against
Syria while Morocco and Saudi Arabia sent token contingents to the
front lines and Algeria and the Gulf states provided finance for
Soviet arms deliveries (Sela 1998: 145). Not just the shared threat
but also a shared resource, the new oil wealth from the price boom
unleashed by the oil embargo generated interdependence between
the Arab states. The expectation that the new wealth would be
shared with the states that had fought and sacrificed for the common
Arab cause was partly realised by significant transfers of wealth to
the latter, the migration of excess labour to the oil producers and the
transfer of remittances home. The ‘Arab Cold War’ was decisively
buried as the conservative states used aid to moderate the radical-
ism of the nationalist republics; subversion and media wars gave
way to inter-state diplomacy (Dessouki 1982: 319–47).
These developments seemed to lay the foundations for a new
more state-centric version of Pan-Arab order organised around the
Arab summit system. Summits had been initiated by Nasser in 1964
in an early acknowledgement that Egypt’s hegemony could no
longer be imposed and that an Arab order had to be negotiated
among sovereign states. Aiming not to promote Pan-Arab action but
to contain Syria’s demands for it by spreading the responsibility for
inaction, summits began and continued as a mechanism for revers-
ing the radicalisation of Pan-Arab norms from inter-Arab ‘outbid-
ding’ (Barnett 1998: 122; Kerr 1971; Sela 1998: 75–94). But it was
only after Israel replaced Egyptian hegemony as the main threat to
Arab elites that summits took on sustained momentum. Summits
reaffirmed the qualified sovereignty embodied in the Arab League,
pledging participants to refrain from intervention in each other’s
internal affairs while co-ordinating the policies of the individual
states to defend the common Arab interest. In the early 1970s
summits legitimised and set the conditions for a peace settlement
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with Israel while marginalising radical regimes which sought to use
outbidding to derail the peace process. In the late 1970s summits
tried to contain Egypt’s unilateralism in negotiations with Israel. In
the 1980s, they were called to mobilise all-Arab resources, above all
financial aid, to counter threats on the non-Arab periphery – from
Israel and Iran. 
Summit agendas were pre-negotiated by the major states, their
resolutions, normally reached by consensus, were reflective of the
lowest common denominator and their implementation was depen-
dent on the cohesion of the ‘Arab triangle’ powers. Reflective of the
growing Arab fragmentation after Egypt’s separate peace shattered
the triangle, was the decline in the effectiveness of summits in the
1980s when they were often boycotted by key feuding states. But
Saudi Arabia filled the vacuum, using financial incentives agreed at
summits to preserve some cohesion or to heal splits. Thus, the Arab
summit of May 1989 healed the split over Egypt’s separate peace
with Israel. By 1996 there had been nineteen summits and they argu-
ably had made enough difference in inter-Arab politics to establish
a system somewhere between Pan-Arab aspirations of collective
action and a purely state-centric ‘Westphalian’ system (Sela 1998:
2–23, 341–6). 
Yet, simultaneously, centrifugal forces were deepening. Con-
solidation of the individual states meant their increased ability to put
state sovereignty over Arabism. If the 1973 war and associated oil
boom fuelled inter-Arab interdependencies, at the same time relative
wartime success restored some of the legitimacy of the individual
states and the new oil money fostered state building. The distribu-
tion of oil revenues across the system allowed states to build large
armies and bureaucracies, generate new bourgeoisies with a stake in
regimes, and co-opt the middle class, which, once the constituency
of Arabism, now became or aspired to be part of the new state estab-
lishments. The very durability of the states as the customary frame-
work of political life fostered their growing acceptance, if not strong
affective support for them. States became far less vulnerable to
Pan-Arab penetration as the Pan-Arab movements, once so readily
manipulated by Nasser against his rivals, virtually disappeared or
were ‘statised’: thus Ba’thism became the official ideology and the
Ba’th party an instrument of state co-optation in Syria and Iraq. The
Sadat regime, once it opted for a separate peace with Israel, fostered
an Egypt-centric reaction against Arabism, exploiting resentment of
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the failure of the ‘rich’ Arabs or ‘ungrateful’ Palestinians to fund and
appreciate Egypt’s long sacrifice of its economic well-being to
defence of the Arab cause. Indeed, the single most important event
that unhinged the new Arab order was the defection of its very
centre, Egypt (Barnett 1998: 183; Noble 1991: 65–70; Sela 1998:
148–50)
The shattering of the Arab triangle: Egypt’s separate peace Just as
the conflict with Israel gave birth to the Arab triangle, so disagree-
ments over the conflict’s resolution destroyed it as, after the 1973
war, Egypt’s Sadat proceeded step-by-step, down the road to a sep-
arate peace at the expense of his Arab partners.
Although Sadat was amenable to a separate solution from the
start, it was Egypt’s military vulnerability at the time of the cease-
fire that actually started him down this road. Sadat embraced US
mediation to reach a first disengagement agreement with Israel that
rescued his position on the banks of the Suez Canal; but the price of
this was the virtual abandonment of the war option as Egyptian
offensive forces were rolled back from the Sinai front. Needing the
US to deliver Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the aid to solve
Egypt’s economic crisis, Sadat gradually sacrificed all other options
to appease Washington: he further weakened the Arabs’ hand and
undermined Syria by pushing for a lifting of the oil embargo before
there was even a first disengagement on the Syrian front and well
before any comprehensive peace was on the cards; he broke his
pledge to Jordan that similar Israeli withdrawal on the West Bank
would have to precede further disengagement on the Egyptian front
and in 1975 agreed to Sinai II, a second disengagement that left
Jordan and Syria sidelined. Sinai II, in accelerating Sadat’s advance
along a separate road to peace and in neutralising Israel’s southern
front, sharply reduced Israel’s incentive to reach a comprehensive
settlement (Fahmy 1983: 170–87, Heikal 1983: 72–81, 188–251;
Taylor 1982: 54–81). Knowing Israel was prepared to trade the rest
of the Sinai for a peace that would remove Egypt, the strongest Arab
state, from the Arab–Israeli power balance, and that if he stuck with
Syria and the PLO in insisting on a comprehensive settlement and a
Palestinian state, that he might get nothing, Sadat entered into nego-
tiations at Camp David for what would be a separate peace (Sadat
1978: 302–4: Smith 1996: 256). For Israel’s Begin, the Sinai was
a price worth paying since, as it became apparent that Sadat
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would abandon the Palestinians, he saw the chance to keep the West
Bank. While ostensibly the Camp David agreement provided for
Palestinian ‘autonomy’, the subsequent failure of this to be realised
did not deter Sadat from signing a separate peace with Israel in
1979. At the second Baghdad summit, Iraq and Syria jointly forced
Saudi Arabia and other wavering states to ostracise Egypt. This, in
forcing Egypt into greater dependence on the US, allowed the virtual
neutralisation of the core Arab state by a superpower deeply biased
toward Israel (Smith 1996: 256–8). 
The failure to reach a comprehensive peace showed the cen-
trality of the balance of power to order-building. The relative
Arab–Israeli power balance resulting from the 1973 war meant
neither side could hope to impose its will, hence each had an incen-
tive to seek a diplomatic solution. This chance was, however,
missed, in part because US arms deliveries to Israel and Egypt’s sep-
arate peace, restored Israel superiority. This not only reduced its
incentive to reach a comprehensive peace but radically upset
the regional power balance as well. Egypt’s opting out of the
Arab–Israeli power balance amounted to a form of ‘buck-passing’,
a practice which enervates the alliance stability needed to deter pow-
erful states. In this case, the resulting power imbalance would lead
directly to the fifth Arab–Israeli war of 1982. 
Sadat’s move toward a separate peace had, from at least the mid-
1970s, profoundly damaging consequences for the Arab system.
First, it generated deepened insecurity throughout the Arab world
that intensified the retreat to state-centric self-help by the Arab
states, notably Syria, while disillusioning the PLO that Palestinian
interests could be peacefully attained. The first and most destructive
symptom of these tendencies was the Lebanese civil war, unleashed
by conflicts over the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Sinai II agreement
sparked a showdown between a coalition of Palestinians and radical
Lebanese Muslims who wanted to challenge Israel in southern
Lebanon and Maronite Christians determined to eradicate this dis-
ruptive threat to Lebanese sovereignty. At the same time, Syria, left
extremely vulnerable to Israeli power by the collapse of its Egyptian
alliance and seeking to redress the imbalance, tried to use the
Lebanese civil war to impose its leadership in the Levant, especially
on Lebanon and the PLO. This precipitated a PLO–Syrian conflict
that would never be wholly healed (Barnett 1998: 191–200; Sela
1998: 153–213; Smith 1996: 242–53). 
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Thus, if, in the 1973 war, co-operation between the Arab states
benefited all, thereafter – caught in a classic prisoner’s dilemma –
none could trust the other not to seek individual gains unilaterally.
While the Arabs as a bloc may have had the leverage to extract a
comprehensive settlement if no one of them settled for less,
Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy had divided them and henceforth
forced them to individually play weakened hands in negotiations
with Israel. When such vital interests as recovery of territory, per-
haps even political survival, were at stake, each actor fell back on
the self-help typical of a states system. Even as Nasserite Egypt’s
hegemonic role had established Pan-Arab constraints on sove-
reignty, its promotion under Sadat of sovereignty over Arabism
released many remaining such constraints. By the middle-1980s
major Arab leaders were effectively insisting that Arabism had to
take a back seat to sovereignty in foreign policy making. King
Hussein argued that to make Arabism the norm required collective
institutions that were lacking. Sadat’s successor, Husni Mubarak,
told the Arabs that the only way to limit inter-Arab conflict was tol-
erance of a diversity of foreign policies since each state best knew its
own interests. In this way, the individual states were ‘deconstruct-
ing’ the Arab system (Barnett 1998: 206–7; Seale 1988: 185–213;
Sela 1998: 189–213).
The consequent popular disillusionment precipitated a decline in
mass Arabism in the 1980s, but identifications did not necessar-
ily attach to the states. Rather, the negative side effects of state-
building – notably the explosion of corruption and inequality
accompanying the oil bonanza – left states with legitimacy deficits
and with no convincing substitute for Arabism or Islam as legitimat-
ing ideologies. Indeed, the vacuum left by the decline of Arabism
was filled by heightened identification with either smaller sub-state
identities or with the larger Islamic umma, especially after the
Iranian Islamic revolution endowed political Islam, an alternative
supra-state ideology, with enormous new credibility. Both tenden-
cies were manifest in the Lebanese civil war in which, over time,
nationalist movements fragmented into sectarian or regional fac-
tions or were displaced by the rise of Hizbollah, a trans-national
Islamic movement.
While stronger states facing less mobilised, more fragmented
publics were now better positioned to pursue reason of state to the
neglect of Arab norms, they nevertheless still paid a legitimacy cost
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which opened the door to Islamic opposition. There were Islamic
uprisings in both Syria and Egypt at the end of the decade. Iraq was
especially threatened by Iran’s trans-state penetration of its large
Shi’a population. Even Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states who sought
legitimation through Islam were vulnerable to Islamic Iran’s denun-
ciation of their ‘American Islam’. As Maridi Nahas (1985) argues,
the decline of Pan-Arabism made regimes especially vulnerable to
revolutionary Islam because the same ills and identities that had
fuelled the rise of Pan-Arabism persisted but the disaffected now
turned to Islam because many states had appropriated Arab nation-
alism as their legitimating ideology while blatantly violating its
norms.
War and revolution on the peripheries (the 1980s)
Egypt’s separate peace and Iran’s revolution set the stage for two
wars on the ‘peripheries’ of the Arab core which again reshaped the
Middle East system. These events massively intensified insecurity
which states sought to address not through collective institutions
but through self-help: state strengthening and arms races. Even as
the Arab states were better enabled to manage trans-state pressures
at home, each one, by thus strengthening itself and freeing itself of
Pan-Arab constraints also started to become more of a potential
threat to and less of a potential ally for its neighbours. This and the
collapse of the Arab triangle, leaving the Arab world centre-less,
spread the security dilemma from the peripheries to the heart of the
Arab system. In these conditions of fragmentation, the classic realist
balance of power increasingly became the main source of order. This
balance, however, proved disastrously unstable, in good part be-
cause Arab fragmentation radically weakened the Arab states in the
face of the non-Arab peripheries. The coincidence of abrupt power
imbalances and the rise of revisionist leaderships in Israel, Iran and
Iraq led to two major wars which accelerated movement toward
something more closely approximating a ‘Westphalian’ type multi-
polar states system.
The emergence of Arab multi-polarity
Within the Arab core, a multi-polar struggle for power among
several contending states, pursuing reason of state yet still ambitious
to exercise Pan-Arab leadership, had emerged by the 1980s. This
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was a function both of Egypt’s relative decline and the rise of other
Arab powers. Military capabilities were now much more equally
distributed: in 1970 Egypt’s military expenditure was still much
higher than other Arab states but by 1979 Syria and Iraq matched
it and Saudi Arabia had soared ahead. In 1965 Egypt’s GNP was still
almost three times Saudi Arabia’s; by 1978, Saudi wealth was triple
that of Egypt. Egypt’s percentage of Arab GNP declined from 23.4
per cent in 1965 to 7.9 per cent in 1977 (Noble 1991: 65; Telhami
1990: 96–7). Economic decline was paralleled by the eclipse of
Cairo as the Arab world’s political hub, registered in a decline of the
percentage of inter-Arab official visits to Cairo from 52 per cent in
1958–63 to 23 per cent in 1970–75 and completed by its isolation
after the separate peace with Israel (Thompson 1981). Formerly
Egyptian-dominated inter-Arab institutions were now funded by
and under the increased influence of the oil monarchies. Other states
also caught up with Egypt in their levels of state formation: the con-
servative states were now stabilised through the use of oil wealth to
incorporate middle strata while Ba’thist Syria and Iraq grew organ-
isational muscle to control their fractious societies.
But no new hegemon or concert emerged to regulate inter-Arab
conflict or defend the Arab core from external threats. Iraq, in a
peripheral location and long contained by hostile Turkey and Iran,
was finally internally consolidated and, strengthened by oil and
Soviet arms, made a bid for Arab leadership. It remained marginal-
ised under the banner of rejectionism but when Sadat forfeited
Egypt’s Arab leadership and the Pahlavi gendarme of the Gulf col-
lapsed, Saddam Hussein perceived power vacuums Iraq could fill;
however he soon dissipated Iraq’s potential in his war with Iran.
Asad’s Syria, internally stabilised and with diversified (Gulf and
Soviet) resources, took advantage of Egypt’s isolation and Iraq’s
embroilment with Iran to assert Pan-Arab leadership against Israel;
but it was handicapped by the decline of Pan-Arab sentiment and,
in the 1980s, the pre-occupation of Arab regimes with the Gulf
conflict. Saudi Arabia hesitantly assumed inter-Arab leadership,
building on the leverage it could potentially wield in the West on
behalf of Arab interests as the swing producer in OPEC and by
using its wealth to moderate inter-Arab conflicts: indicative of this,
in the 1970s it became the focus of most inter-Arab official visits.
However, its military weakness made it vulnerable and therefore
extremely cautious and the decline of its oil revenues after the mid-
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1980s oil bust and its growing dependency on the US for protection
from Iran checked its rise. Each Arab state was strong enough to
prevent hegemony by the other, but all were too driven by particu-
lar interests to forge an axis of states able to engineer all-Arab cohe-
sion and security (Mufti 1996: 197–252; Noble 1991: 65, 71–2;
Walt 1987: 137). 
Its fragmentation made the Arab world exceptionally vulner-
able to the powerful revisionist impulses that were being unleashed
on its peripheries. Initially, the Iranian revolution snapped the
Tehran–Tel-Aviv axis against Arab nationalism and threatened to
shift the power balance against Israel; but Iran’s effort to export rev-
olution to its neighbours, Iraq and the Gulf states, at a time when
its own military capabilities had been decimated by revolution, pre-
cipitated the Iraqi invasion of its territory and the eight-year-long
Iran–Iraq war. This immediately reshuffled the deck to Israel’s
advantage: Iraq’s marginalisation combined with Egypt’s removal
from the Arab–Israeli balance, freed Israel, where a revisionist
government took power in 1977, to project its power in the Arab
world with little restraint: in the early 1980s, Israel attacked an Iraqi
nuclear reactor, bombed PLO headquarters in Tunis and invaded
Lebanon. At the same time, the feeling of vulnerability of the Arab
Gulf monarchies was greatly heightened by a dual perceived threat:
on the one hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, plus Soviet
activity in the Horn of Africa and in Democratic Yemen; on the
other hand, once Iran reversed the Iraqi invasion, its intense military
pressure on Iraq, on Kuwait and on Gulf shipping (Sela 1998:
217–46).
The fifth Arab–Israeli war: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
The roots of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon lay in the ascendancy
of irredentism, always latent in Israel, at a time of regional power
imbalance favouring it. Israeli irredentism grew out of the militarist
Zionism of Vladimir Jabotinsky, of which the Irgun movement
led by Menachem Begin was a leading element. This Israeli ‘right’
saw the world as a permanently hostile place for Jews and the
Arab–Israeli cleavage as irreconcilable. As Israeli right-wingers saw
it, in a world where the strong dominated, Israel had to use any
means necessary to attain its goals, a world view that, according to
Peleg (1988: 62–4), expressed a ‘monumental overcompensation’
for the repression of Jews in the East European Diaspora. At a time
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when the mainstream of Israeli politics had considered the 1949
armistice lines as Israel’s final borders, Begin had refused to accept
their legitimacy. He rejected any return of the occupied territories
which he identified as ancient Judea and Samaria, part of ‘Eretz
Yisrael’. Historically the ‘right’ also laid claim to Jordan in contrast
to the Labour party (Mapai) which valued good relations with the
Hashemite dynasty. 
The Labour party’s relative failure in the 1973 war shattered its
traditional dominance of Israeli politics and shifted the Israeli polit-
ical spectrum toward the irredentist ‘right’. In 1974, Begin’s Herut
party joined with militant disciples of Ben Gurion, who had split
from Labour, to form the Likud party. The National Religious Party,
previously more centrist, joined the irredentist camp after 1967
while several rightist splinter parties later emerged holding even
more radical views, such as the Tehiya party which regarded the
return of the Sinai as a Begin sell-out, the Moledet faction which
advocated expulsion of the Palestinian population to Jordan and the
militant settler movement, Gush Emunim, which promoted illegal
settlements in the occupied West Bank. When the Likud party won
the 1977 elections, a former ‘terrorist’ leader, Menachem Begin,
became Prime Minister of Israel (Roberts 1990: 45–88)
The likelihood of a more militant foreign policy under Begin was
initially checked by Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, which generated such
public euphoria, and such a strategic opportunity that Begin had to
respond (Peretz 1988: 32). He pursued two tracks, a more accom-
modationist diplomacy toward Egypt and simultaneously a highly
revisionist thrust in the occupied territories. Even while accepting
the ‘autonomy’ for the West Bank prescribed by Camp David, Begin
claimed Israeli sovereignty over the area, insisting that it was
Israeli land temporarily and illegally occupied by Jordan in 1948.
Settlements increased threefold and settlers tenfold while Israeli
acquisition of land and control of water resources was greatly accel-
erated. Arab mayors were dismissed and expulsions, demolition of
houses and seizure of property increased (Peretz 1988: 33–5). Begin
decreed the annexation of Jerusalem in 1980 and of the Golan
Heights in 1981. The 1981 elections brought an even more radi-
cally irredentist leadership to power including Begin, Defence
Minister Ariel Sharon, and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. While
the previous Begin government had included moderates such as
Ezer Weizmann who had promoted peace with Egypt, the new
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government saw this peace as an opportunity to use military power
to remake the map of the Middle East.
The 1980 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, far from ending the
Arab–Israeli conflict, had merely displaced the battle lines to the
occupied West Bank/Gaza and to Lebanon. The PLO, expelled from
Jordan in 1970, had in the following decade entrenched itself in
Lebanon from which it sought to carry on a desultory guerrilla war
against Israel. Israeli retaliation against Lebanon was a major factor
in sparking the Lebanese civil war; the consequent collapse of the
Lebanese government had left a no-man’s land in southern Lebanon,
eliminating remaining restraints on PLO activity there, and facili-
tated the 1976 Syrian intervention in Lebanon which had opened up
a potential new front between Syria and Israel. The emergence of a
PLO ‘state-within-a-state’ in southern Lebanon followed by the
removal of Egypt, via its separate peace, from the Arab–Israeli
power balance, and the consolidation of a revisionist government in
Israel, set the stage for Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
The Likud government’s aim was to establish unchallenged
regional hegemony by smashing the PLO and punishing Syria, the
last obstacles to its incorporation of the West Bank and Golan into
Greater Israel. It aimed to drive both out of Lebanon and impose a
client regime there, thereby isolating and encircling Syria. Hitherto,
such ambitions would have been restrained for fear of the unpre-
dictable international consequences, but at this juncture the inter-
national system was again exceptionally permissive: specifically, the
very pro-Israel Reagan administration in Washington, seeing Syria
and the PLO as Soviet surrogates in a new Cold War it was waging
against Moscow, gave Israel a virtual ‘green light’ for the invasion
(Peleg 1988: 64; Schiff and Ya’ari 1984: 31–43, 71–7; Seale 1988:
373–6; Smith 1996: 267–70). 
Because of the simultaneous Iran–Iraq war and Egypt’s separate
peace, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon did not, as it would once have
done, stimulate a Pan-Arab counter-coalition in defence of Syria and
the Palestinians. Neither Egypt nor the Gulf Arabs, who were pre-
occupied with the Iranian threat, could afford to antagonise Israel’s
US patron and were, in any case, not unhappy to see Syria pum-
melled because of its alignment with Iran in the Iran–Iraq war (Sela
1998: 256–7). Militarily, Syria took a beating at the hands of Israeli
forces driving into Lebanon, and although the Syrian army
extracted a price from Israel and stubbornly refused, as Israel
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expected, to retreat from Lebanon, Israel pushed Syrian forces from
strategic sectors of Lebanese terrain, including the nerve centre,
Beirut. Moreover, it expelled the PLO from Lebanon and, in the
wake of the war, an American–Israeli combinazione installed a
Maronite client regime in Beirut, tried to impose a virtual peace
treaty on Israeli terms and made Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon
contingent on Syria’s. The US and Israel believed a militarily
weakened and isolated Syria had no choice but to accept the
Lebanese–Israeli accord and withdraw or face continued Israeli
occupation of Lebanon. Yet Syria chose to defy their overwhelming
military power and in a short time brought about a remarkable
turnabout in the balance of forces (Petran 1987: 295–334, 345–8;
Rabinovich 1987; Schiff and Ya’ari: 1984: 286–300; Seale 1988:
366–93).
Unprecedented Soviet arms deliveries, including a sophisticated
air defence network, cast a protective umbrella over Syria. Syria
took advantage of Iranian backing and the growing resentment of
Lebanese Muslims, especially the Shi’a, against Israeli and Maronite
domination to strike an alliance with them. Buttressed by Syria,
Muslim militias checked the Maronite Jumayyil government’s con-
solidation of power over the country and the intervention of
American guns and planes on its behalf could not deter them. Israel,
wearied by the casualties of Lebanese occupation and aware of the
risks of a renewed drive against a Soviet-backed Syrian army, chose
to withdraw from Lebanon. The car-bombing of US Marine posi-
tions and the downing of American bombers flying against Syrian
forces in Lebanon demonstrated to the US the costs of involvement
and brought about its withdrawal, too. The weakened Maronite
government was forced to annul the accord with Israel. Israel, under
Syrian-backed guerrilla threat, withdrew southward, ending the
immediate military threat to Syria, although an Israeli ‘security
zone’ in the south was consolidated. Thus, through a shrewd use of
proxies, steadfastness under threat and Soviet backing, Syria’s Asad
snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. Israel found that its envi-
ronment had become far more intractable than in 1967 when mili-
tary power had so successfully redrawn the regional map in its
favour; in particular, Syria was far better armed, organised, and
determined while Lebanon proved to be an ungovernable swamp
(Seale 1988: 394–420; Smith 1996: 272–5).
The Israeli leadership, in overreaching itself, had destroyed the
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domestic consensus it needed to carry on. Israeli society was pola-
rised and Israel suffered international condemnation for its siege of
Beirut and the subsequent massacres of Palestinian civilians, while
thereafter the occupation of Lebanon meant mounting military
casualties for no perceivable gain (Gerner 1991: 87–8). Lebanon
exposed the limits put by Israel’s pluralistic political system on the
conduct of foreign policy: a hawkish leadership had little trouble
stirring up an irredentist population, but when the costs to Israel
seemed to exceed the attainable gains, the loss of public support
sharply constrained leadership options and electoral politics permit-
ted a change in leadership and policy. The public mood shifted
under Begin’s feet and in the 1984 elections neither major party won
enough support to form a government and a national unity coali-
tion had to be formed to extricate Israel from Lebanon. Israel’s
failure in Lebanon marked the beginning of a realisation that it, no
more than its Arab neighbours, could attains its ends chiefly by mil-
itary force. Thereafter under the Likudist Yitzhak Shamir, Israel
pursued the more modest and negative ambition of evading pres-
sures for peace long enough to irrevocably settle and incorporate the
West Bank. 
The Lebanon venture was to have enduring costs for Israel. It
alienated Lebanon’s Shi’a community and unwittingly helped give
birth to Hizbollah, an Islamic resistance movement backed by Iran
which contested Israel’s continued hold on its southern Lebanon
‘security zone’, embroiling Israel in its own version of a Vietnam
quagmire until it finally unilaterally withdrew in 2000. Moreover,
the 1981 defeat of the PLO in Lebanon, rather than demoralising
the Palestinians, stimulated the West Bank population to take its
fate in its own hands, unleashing, in Gaza and the West Bank, the
‘intifada’ – a sustained civil uprising between 1987 and 1992 which
made Israel’s continued occupation more materially and morally
costly than hitherto. Ironically, at the very time when its Egyptian
peace treaty had virtually neutralised the external security threat to
Israel from Arab armies, its irredentist drive to incorporate the occu-
pied territories and impose its will in Lebanon resulted in new low-
intensity but on-going security threats which were now
‘internalised’ within the bounds of territories Israel controlled. A
final consequence of the war was Syria’s drive for military parity
with Israel which established a ‘deterrence relationship’ between the
two states in which the level of armaments made a war too costly
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and probably unwinnable for both (Evron 1987; Schiff and Ya’ari
1984: 306–7; Smith 1996: 293–300). 
The Islamic revolution and the first Gulf War 
Revolutions, in bringing revisionist leaders to power and upsetting
power balances, frequently lead to war which, in turn, reshapes
states (Halliday 1994: 124–46). The radical transformation in Iran’s
foreign policy – from a main supporter of the pro-Western Middle
East status quo under the Shah to its main challenger after the rev-
olution – seemingly demonstrates the power of domestic politics to
shape international behaviour. On the other hand, the case also
underlined the resilience of the state system: the limited success of
Islamic Iran in exporting its revolution revealed the extent to which
regional states had become more immune to trans-state ideology
while power balancing against Iran imposed constraints and costs
which, in time, tilted the balance of Iranian domestic forces against
foreign policy revisionism. 
The foreign policy roots of revolution The Iranian revolution had
its roots in domestic inequality and political repression but the inti-
mate connection between this and its position in the international
system inevitably made the revolution a nationalist one with pro-
found international repercussions. The origins of the revolution go
back to the 1952 nationalisation of Iranian oil by the nationalist
prime minister Muhammed Mossadeq. Mossadeq acted in the belief
that foreign control kept Iran’s elites in the pockets of Britain and the
Anglo-Iranian oil company. The consequent boycott of Iranian oil by
Western oil companies ignited an economic crisis which paved the
way for the CIA-backed military coup which brought him down and
restored the Pahlavi Shah to power (Cottam 1979). Thereafter, Iran
had to agree to the virtual denationalisation of its oil industry in
which the Americans now took a 40 per cent share (Ramazani 1986:
202). For Iranian nationalists, the US was perceived to have eclipsed
Britain and Russia as the main threats to Iranian independence.
The Pahlavi Shah’s whole domestic strategy and regime were
shaped by a profound legitimacy deficit rooted in his restoration by
foreign powers at the expense of Iran’s nationalist hero. Feeling
intensely threatened at home by nationalist and leftist opposition,
sometimes backed by the Soviets, the Shah naturally opted to rely
on the Americans to consolidate his rule. Yet, a conservative nation-
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alist and driven to prove himself to Iranians, he sought to make Iran
a regional power and major player in the world political economy.
This, ironically, led him to pursue policies that would undermine his
own regime. His oil-fuelled development program, in its spread of
education, modern employment, and the consequent growth of the
middle class, and in its neglect of agriculture and consequent rapid
urbanisation, greatly increased the potentially politically conscious
and active population. The rapid expansion of higher education
created a large student body and a much-enlarged intelligentsia sus-
ceptible to opposition ideologies. At the same time, however, lacking
nationalist legitimacy, the Shah could not afford to establish effec-
tive and legitimate political institutions which could accommodate
their aspirations for political participation. On the contrary, his
power consolidation meant repression of both the nationalist centre
– Mossadeq’s National Front – and the Marxist left, the main polit-
ical vehicles of the modern middle and working classes, and an
increasingly authoritarian concentration of power in his own hands
at the expense of parliament, largely the preserve of the landed oli-
garchy. To reduce his dependence on the oligarchy and win wider
support, he launched a land reform program but this alienated not
only the landed elite but the Shi’a religious hierarchy whose waqf
lands were threatened, both social forces which would otherwise
have been natural props of monarchy. The Shah’s control of grow-
ing oil revenues gave him an autonomy that led him to neglect the
class base of his regime, making him increasingly dependent on
support in the army and bureaucracy and his main instrument of
control, SAVAK, the Shah’s feared secret police (Cottam 1979:
320–49; Green 1982: 146–50; Halliday 1996: 53–5). 
The oil-fuelled economic boom and bust of the late 1970s created
the conditions for the mobilisation of discontent among the excluded
middle and lower strata. State spending and massive corruption
enriched a new bourgeoisie of contractors and middlemen between
the state and the external market. At the same time, however, infla-
tion (from massive state spending) eroded fixed incomes, while
capital-intensive industrialisation generated insufficient jobs to
absorb urbanised job-seekers. The frustration of raised expectation
combined with growing inequality, which was de-legitimised by the
egalitarian norms preached by both Marxists and oppositionist
Islam, stimulated revolutionary sentiment (Halliday 1996: 50–3). At
the same time, the Westernisation of Iran associated with oil-based
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development antagonised those, notably the Islamic clergy, who
feared the threat of ‘Westoxification’ to the integrity of Islamic
values and culture (Menashri 1990: 3). The clergy were the natural
political leaders of the urban slums and semi-urbanised masses
streaming in from the villages; their mobilisation of the urban plebe-
ian strata shifted the balance of power within the opposition from
the secular nationalists to Islamic leaders (Halliday 1996: 57–63).
The Shah’s insecurity meant that he needed to maximise US com-
mitment to the stability of his regime against nationalist and leftist
opposition at home and in the Gulf region. The Shah’s strategy was
to position his regime, in line with the Nixon Doctrine, as a bulwark
against Soviet power and radicalism in the Gulf. This meant such
policies as support for Iraqi Kurds against the Iraqi Ba’th and inter-
vention against Marxist insurgency in Oman in the early 1970s.
Financing the military build-up needed to play regional gendarme
made the Shah a price hawk in OPEC and might have put him at
odds with his American patron but the recycling of much of the new
revenues into arms and capital purchases from the US placated
Washington (Cottam 1979: 333–42). However, the American con-
nection only deepened public alienation. Though Iran had become
a regional power, nationalists took no pride in this status, believing
that the regime was a surrogate for American Middle East interests.
Many believed Ayatollah Khomeini’s claim that ‘the Shah has
squandered the oil revenues . . . on buying weapons at exorbitant
prices’ and that Iran’s oil money had ended up in the pockets of spec-
ulators and arms dealers (Menashri 1990: 28–9). Anti-Americanism
was also inflamed by the combination of Washington’s support for
Israel and the Shah’s alliance with Israel, which trained the hated
SAVAK (Cottam 1979: 333). 
Gradually, a broad anti-regime coalition came to embrace the
liberal nationalist followers of Mossadeq, radical leftist and ‘Islamic
Marxist’ student groups, clergy threatened by Westernisation,
bazaar merchants alienated by price controls and foreign competi-
tion, leftist unionised workers, and the urbanising masses. As oppo-
sition mounted, the role of the United States was decisive. President
Carter’s urging of the Shah to observe human rights spread the per-
ception in Iran that the US would not necessarily intervene to protect
him, emboldening insurgents; during the revolution itself, Carter
actually discouraged the massive military repression that would have
been needed to turn back the revolution (Halliday 1996: 57–67).
190 The international politics of the Middle East
The anti-regime mobilisation was directed from abroad by the
charismatic leader, Ayatollah Rouallah Khomeini, who enjoyed the
aura of an ‘imam’ (vice-regent of God) and preached an ideology
of Islam mixed with nationalism and hatred of the United States.
The beginning of the end for the Shah was when the killing of thou-
sands of unarmed demonstrators in September 1978 led to strikes
in the oil fields demanding an end to SAVAK and to the US pres-
ence. This caused a dramatic drop in oil production and precipi-
tated a state revenue crisis. Massive street demonstrations that
carried on for weeks paralysed the country; the lower ranks of the
army refused to fire on demonstrators, military indiscipline spread
and the military hierarchy gradually unravelled. None of the props
of the Shah’s rule – oil, the army, or his American ally – could save
him from the non-violent protest of a largely unarmed population
alienated by his image as a foreign puppet beholden to the West and
hostile to Islam.
The revolutionary roots of foreign policy Islamic Iran epitomises
the case of regimes which, arising from revolutionary movements,
are initially intensely driven by revisionist ideology that impugns the
legitimacy of status quo states and even the regional states system.
But, as with other revolutions, Iran’s followed the ‘natural history’
delineated by Brinton (1938): first the radicals pushed the moder-
ates out of power as the masses were increasingly mobilised against
external threats to the revolution. Then came a ‘Thermidor’, in
which the economic costs of revolution and the requirements of war
and post-war economic reconstruction tilted the balance of power
back to pragmatic elements. 
The primacy of radical ideology in the formation of Iran’s foreign
policy under Khomeini had multiple roots. Deepest was the social-
isation of the generation that took power in the revolution. Many
were Khomeini’s students, imbued with his intense hatred of the
Shah and his American backers. Many were brought up on the
teachings of Ali Shariati, the ideologue of the revolution, whose
fusion of anti-imperialism and populism with Islam provided the
basis for a coalition between the clergy and militant lay youth. The
revolutionary situation itself – that is, the ideological mobilisation
of militants and the radicalisation of the population in the revolu-
tionary struggle – raised great expectations for a transformation;
since the revolution was in part a reaction against the Shah’s policy
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of defending the pro-Western status quo, it dictated an absolute
reversal of Iran’s role. The new regime won widespread support
when it withdrew Iran from CENTO, joined the non-aligned move-
ment, broke relations with Israel and turned its embassy over to the
PLO. Relations were severed with Sadat’s Egypt for its peace with
Israel and the asylum given to the Shah. By the end of 1980, Iran
had cancelled $9 billion worth of Western arms contracts: it had no
intention of continuing the recycling of petrodollars that made local
control of oil resources acceptable in the West. Instead, Iran would
seek to reduce the dependency which reliance on oil dictated and
pursue an inward-looking road to development which maximised
self-sufficiency.
Reinforcing the ‘ideologisation’ of foreign policy, was its use by
the new elites to legitimise the initially unstable revolutionary
regime. For a revolution advocating a universalistic (not purely
national) ideology such as Islam, legitimation required revolution-
ary success abroad. The revolutionary leaders, buoyed by the success
of their revolution, expected that the Muslim masses across the
region would similarly respond to their Islamic da’wa and rid them-
selves of client regimes; they were, therefore, ready to embark on
dangerous challenges to the regional status quo. At the same time,
though, the export of the revolution was meant to overcome the rev-
olution’s dangerous isolation amidst status quo states: as Khomeini
put it, ‘if we remain in a closed environment we shall definitely face
defeat’. The revolution actually fed off external threats and sacrifice;
the threat from the US and then the sense of siege and the sacrifices,
particularly of sons, in the Iran–Iraq war invested ordinary people
in the revolution. And, as the revolutionaries split, rivals in the post-
revolutionary power struggle had to prove their revolutionary cre-
dentials through radical stances in foreign policy – freezing out
moderate voices.
Khomeini’s world view and the conflict with the US Khomeini’s
world view was central to revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy. For
him, the US was a major preoccupation. As he saw it, the world was
dominated by ‘satanic’ imperialist powers – headed by the US, the
‘Great Satan’, and the USSR, the ‘Little Satan’ (especially after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) – which were enemies of Islam and
sought to oppress the weak (mustaza’fin) and to plunder their
resources (oil). This view, growing out of Iran’s modern experience
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under imperialism and the Shah, was arguably reinforced by
Shi’ism’s historic strong sense of being the underdog; but while
Shi’ism has often been quietist Khomeini’s activist version preached
a duty of Muslims to struggle against imperialism whose control
over the region’s oil could never be challenged by quietism (Hunter
1988; Menashri 1990: 71). Iran’s revolution, Khomeini declared,
would be a role model for the Muslim world, showing that it was
possible to stand up against ‘world arrogance’ (Chubin 1994:
11–16). Khomeini also sought to challenge the regimes of the region
which he saw as Western clients and as illegitimate obstacles to the
unity of the Islamic umma. The key to revolution was the mobilisa-
tion of the mustaza’fin against an oppressive status quo. 
After the Shah was given refuge in the US, Khomeini stirred up
anti-American feeling, precipitating the seizure of the US embassy in
November 1979. While this may initially have been designed to
block any US effort to return the Shah to power, the demand for his
extradition and the return of his wealth held abroad as a condition
for release of the hostages was also meant to mobilise domestic
support and to show the invincibility of Islam over the ‘Great
Satan’. The struggle with America also became a tool and issue in
the post-revolutionary power struggle between the clerical radicals
and moderates. The moderates, led by Prime Minister Bazargan,
wanting to resume ties with the US although on a new equal basis,
tried to arrange the hostages’ release. Bazargan’s attempts to nor-
malise Iran’s US relations alarmed a public fearful that any of this
would ‘let the US in through the back door’, and allowed his
enemies to sweep him from power.
The cost of the hostage crisis with the US was Iran’s international
isolation: general condemnation, hostile UNSC resolutions, US-
engineered economic sanctions and the seizure of Iranian assets.
Iranian relations with the USSR were little better and Iran actually
rejected a Soviet offer of protection, warning it against using Iran as
a cold war battleground and condemning the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan (Menashri 1990: 155–6). It was this international iso-
lation that enabled Iraq to attack Iran and face virtually no interna-
tional disapprobation. Thereafter France also became an enemy for
its arms deliveries to Iraq in the war. To overcome its isolation, Iran
sought alternative friends – radicals or underdogs such as Syria and
North Korea – and sought to foster the rise of kindred Islamic states
by exporting the revolution.
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Exporting the revolution The clerical consolidation of power
positioned militant ideologues to use state resources to export the
revolution: the Revolutionary Guards, the Interior Ministry and the
Intelligence Ministry each sponsored rival revolutionary networks
abroad. They sponsored an Islamic revolutionary council which
grouped Iranian backed and financed revolutionary organisations
like the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the
Islamic Liberation Movement of Bahrain. The Ministry of Islamic
Guidance promoted cultural missions, provided preachers and pub-
lications, hosted conferences of ulama from outside Iran, and
broadcast the Voice of the Iranian Revolution. Iran was also able to
exploit a ready-made trans-state ideological network, the Shi’a
ulama throughout the Muslim world, especially those who had been
trained in Iran’s holy cities. The hajj was seen as a unique opportu-
nity to convert pilgrims from all parts of the Islamic world
(Menashri 1990: 157). 
The impulse to spread the revolution encouraged Iranian inter-
vention in Arab politics. If Iran was to export the revolution to the
Arab heartland of Islam and overcome the barriers which its Sunni-
dominated Arab–Gulf neighbours sought to erect, its Islamic dawa
(call) had to be seen as universal, not specifically Shi’a. Indeed, the
message of Islamic revolution had a powerful trans-state appeal,
similar to Nasserism, throughout the Arab world. Responding to
similar grievances – that is, Israel, regimes seen to be subservient to
the West, corruption, inequality and Westernisation – it exploited
domestic discontent prevalent throughout the region. Its demonstra-
tion effect stimulated imitative movements in every Middle East
state, including Turkey and the Israeli occupied territories (Nahas
1985).
The attempt to export revolution to Iran’s traditional Gulf neigh-
bours was a high priority. Khomeini insisted that Islam denied the
legitimacy of monarchic rule and deprecated the Gulf states for their
‘American Islam’. The Iranian model of Islam, anti-American, mass
mobilising, anti-monarchic, and appealing to Shi’a minorities, was
especially threatening to these states owing to their own liabilities:
retarded nation-building, reliance on expatriate labour, and large
subservient Shi’a communities. The political demonstrations con-
ducted by Iranian hajj pilgrims, attacking the Saudi regime’s US
alignment, were meant to discredit Saudi Arabia as an alternative
(and conservative) centre of Islam in Sunni Muslim opinion. 
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Iran’s message, was, however, obstructed by the Sunni-Shi’a
divide and it found its strongest reception where there were concen-
trations of Shi’a, not only because of Shiite connections with Iran
but because they were typically deprived communities, often living
in states with great oil wealth. Iran inspired and aided Shi’a Islamic
movements in Bahrain, where the Shi’a were 72 per cent of citizens,
Iraq (60 per cent) and Kuwait (23 per cent, plus 14 per cent of
Iranian origin). Iran’s encouragement of Islamic rebellion against
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan found resonance among the
Afghan Shi’a who it backed through the Hizb al-Wahdat militia.
The export of revolution was most successful in Lebanon where the
Shi’a were already mobilising in the context of civil war and where
a failed state could not protect its borders from massive trans-state
penetration. Iran used its Syrian alliance to jump over the ‘Sunni
Arab barrier’, insert revolutionary guards in western Lebanon,
sponsor Hizbollah, and achieve a front in the Arab–Israeli conflict
(Hunter 1987; Ramazani 1986:140). 
The Iran–Iraq War The Iran–Iraq War appeared to grow out of a
(secular-religious) clash of ideologies but if revolutionary ideology
was the sole driving force of Islamic Iran’s foreign policy there might
well have been no war. Ba’thist Iraq was a radical force no less than
Ba’thist Syria with which Tehran had formed a close alliance against
the American–Israeli combinazione in the region. Yet Iran played its
full role in the cycle of provocation and counter-provocation that
led to war with Iraq. The outlook of the revolutionary elite was, in
the case of Iraq, seemingly shaped by inherited Sunni Arab–Persian
Shi’a animosity exacerbated by Iraq’s mistreatment of its religious-
minded Shiites. Iran calculated that Iraq, because of its majority
Shi’a population, was extremely vulnerable to Islamic revolution
and began encouraging Shiite dissidence especially through the
Islamic Dawa Party.
From Baghdad’s point of view, interests, not ideology were deci-
sive in its decision to launch a pre-emptive war against Iran. Shiite
revolutionary Islam posed a serious subversive threat to a secular
regime dominated by Sunnis. But, there were certainly less risky
ways than war of containing this threat and ambition was at least
as important a consideration in Baghdad’s decision-making. Iraq
and Iran were geopolitical rivals for dominance in the Gulf but Iraq,
being smaller, less populous, more vulnerable to subversion by Iran
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and its oil export lifelines exposed, had a slimmer and less secure
base of national power for this contest. However, Iran’s revolution-
ary turmoil had temporarily enervated its military capabilities while
Iraq’s power potential was simultaneously on the rise as its oil pro-
duction, exceeding Iran’s, reaped it $31 billion in currency reserves
(Ramazani 1986: 57). Saddam Hussein believed the fall of the Shah
created a power vacuum that he could fill as well as an opportunity
to assume the Shah’s role by offering the Gulf states protection from
the Islamic revolution. He also aimed to reverse the humiliating
1975 Iranian imposition of joint control over the Shatt al-Arab with
which he was personally identified. He may even have imagined he
could seize and keep Iran’s Arabic-speaking, oil-rich Khuzistan
province. As such, a classic overlapping of threat, ambition and
opportunity from an apparent power imbalance shaped Iraq’s deci-
sion to go to war. 
Yet Iraq was biting off more than it could chew. Saddam Hussein
miscalculated that he could quickly knock Iran out of the war and
impose a settlement, but the Iraqi army was unable to even seize the
border oil town of Abadan and Iran’s ideologically mobilised forces
proved unexpectedly tenacious. Saddam hoped Iran’s fragmented
revolutionary regime would collapse but wartime ideological mobil-
isation consolidated it. Iran managed to cripple Iraqi oil exports in
the Gulf and its Syrian ally shut down Iraq’s trans-Syria pipeline
(Ramazani 1986: 70–85). Iraq also miscalculated its ability to get
Soviet arms replenishments for the Soviets were wooing Khomeini
and Iraq had condemned their invasion of Afghanistan. Two years
after the war started, Iraq had been expelled from Iran and had
expended its currency reserves. By 1983, Iran was on the offensive
in Iraqi territory with the aim of overthrowing the regime and
spreading the revolution. 
Iraq, on the defensive, sought to regionalise and internationalise
the war while Iran, enjoying natural superiority and poor relations
with most states, tried to contain it to the two parties. Iran and Iraq
put competing pressures on the Gulf states but an attempted Shi’a
coup in Bahrain, blamed on Iranian subversion, precipitated a Saudi
initiative to promote security co-ordination against Iran, leading to
the founding of the GCC. Iran was in a dilemma: pressure drove the
Arab Gulf states into Iraqi arms but relaxing the pressure let them
contribute more to the Iraqi war effort (Ramazani 1986: 49). At the
1982 Fez summit, most of the Arab states united behind Iraq. Iraq’s
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escalation of the ‘tanker war’ which targeted tankers loading from
Iranian ports, aimed to force a Western-imposed halt to the war. In
1984–85 Iran retaliated with attacks on Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers
and stopped ships to search for Iraq-bound war material. But Iran
was deterred from further widening the war by growing US involve-
ment in the Gulf and the need to avoid dissipating its forces
(Calabrese 1994: 48–51).
In the event, Iraq was saved by the backing of status quo states
against a revolutionary threat. Saudi and Gulf aid poured in, alter-
native Saudi and Turkish routes for Iraqi oil were established, and
military equipment and workers arrived from Egypt. Iran was sub-
ject to Western arms embargoes while Saddam Hussein’s regime
was deliberately built up by the West; Western arms dealers made
lucrative deals for Iraqi oil which put Iraq deeply in debt and would
be a factor in its later invasion of Kuwait. France, in particular, sup-
plied high-tech arms while US intelligence allowed Iraq to pinpoint
and counter Iranian offensive build-ups. The Soviet Union also
began to supply Iraq with arms once Iraqi territory was at risk.
Iran, by contrast, had to resort to the international black market
and seek supplies from other ‘pariah’ states like North Korea and
its only close ally, Syria. The war continued far longer than it might
otherwise have done owing to this ‘borrowed capacity’ (Ramazani
1986: 84).
Iran thought the faith and motivation of its troops would over-
come Iraq’s superior firepower, but its army’s lack of military pro-
fessionalism eventually weakened its offensives which ground to a
halt in the face of improved Iraqi defensive capabilities (Chubin
1994: 17). Iraq’s chemical weapons were effective in its 1988
counter-offensive; the war of the cities, in which Iraqi missiles rained
on Iranian cities, demoralised the population which began to desert
the cities, enervating the legitimacy of a leadership that could not
protect its people (Chubin 1994: 21). The economic base of Iranian
war capacity was also under threat. Iran needed to expand its oil
quota as well as keep up prices but in 1986 Saudi Arabia flooded
the market to moderate prices and recover its falling market share;
this, together with Iraqi raids, crippled Iran’s economic war-making
capacity (Calabrese 1994: 57–62). 
As long as it appeared that the war would not disrupt oil sup-
plies, the US and the West were content to merely contain it, argu-
ably pleased that these two potential candidates for Gulf hegemony
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checked and enervated each other to the benefit of the fragile pro-
Western monarchies. However, the escalation of the war of the
tankers raised alarms in the West while the US perceived an Iranian
threat to close the Straits of Hormuz if its own oil exports were
stopped (Chubin 1994: 80–1). The US presence in the Gulf was
stepped up during the later stages of the war: Kuwaiti tankers were
‘reflagged’ to prevent Iranian attacks on them, in 1987 there were
naval engagements between Iranian and US forces, and the West
made tacit threats to blockade Iran if it did not agree to UN condi-
tions to end the war (Chubin 1994: 42). As Iran’s forces were driven
out of Iraq and Iran increasingly besieged, realists in the Iranian
leadership were strengthened. Iran accepted the UN resolution
ending the war, with Iraq enjoying the upper hand. 
The war and the revolutionary regime Iran’s case shows dramati-
cally the impact of war on domestic politics. The war was provoked
by the attempted ideological export of revolution and initially had
the effect of consolidating the regime. On the one hand the revolu-
tionary elite exploited Shiite traditions of martyrdom (shehadat) to
energise the public and the fighters, especially the basaj, volunteers
for whom revolutionary zeal substituted for training and arms; on
the other hand, Iranian victories beginning in 1982 were exploited
to demonstrate the rightness of the Islamic cause. The war diverted
attention from troubles at home and wartime success boosted the
self-confidence of the regime and the people (Hooglund 1987b;
Menashri 1990 228–30). 
The Iranian leadership shared a consensus on the war, namely,
that it would continue until Iraq’s defeat and the fall of the Ba’th
regime. But, as the costs mounted, this consensus unravelled. Popular
support for the war started ebbing away; a sign of this was the decline
of volunteerism and the rise of draft dodging. The Musavi govern-
ment’s campaign against war profiteering and its provision of
rationed subsidised commodities for the poor alienated merchants
while its proposals for the nationalisation of foreign trade and land
reform were blocked by conservative clerics tied to bazaari interests.
Militant ‘transnationalists’ heading the revolutionary organs wanted
to continue the export of revolution, notably Interior Minister Ali
Akbar Mohteshemi, who was behind Hizbollah’s attempt to create
an Islamic republic in Lebanon. On the other side, a more pragmatic
faction, including Parliament speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, Prime
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Minister Musavi and President Khamenai, put the Iranian state’s sur-
vival interests over ideological zeal (Hooglund 1987a; Menashri
1990: 305–68; Ramazani 1986: 255). The two sides also split on the
role of government-to-government relations. The transnationalists
held to Khomeini’s original line that, since there were no just govern-
ments in the region, Iran should aid their overthrow rather than
make friends with them. Rafsanjani countered that through deliber-
ate rejection of the legitimacy of the states system and the conven-
tions of diplomacy, Iran had so isolated itself that Iraq was able to
mobilise global and regional resources on its side. ‘By the use of an
inappropriate method . . . ’, he argued, ‘we created enemies for our
country’ and failed to actively seek allies. His self-criticism was often
pointed: ‘If Iran had demonstrated a little more tactfulness in its rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, they would not have supported
Iraq’ (Menashri 1990: 389, 393).
The balance between these shifting factions was fluid and often
dependent on Khomeini’s stand. In 1984 Khomeini came down
against the transnationalists, warning that Iran would be annihi-
lated if it did not overcome isolation; when, in retaliation, the trans-
nationalists exposed the regime’s ‘hostage for arms’ negotiations
with the ‘Great Satan’, they were curbed (Ramazani 1986: 256,
264). As war reverses, falling oil prices and mounting international
pressure, especially the threat of American intervention, closed in on
Iran, the internal balance shifted further toward the moderates
whose leader, Rafsanjani, persuaded Khomeini to accept the UN-
sponsored ceasefire resolution. Khomeini consented to drink the
‘poisoned chalice’, as he put it, to save the revolution from internal
demoralisation and external encirclement (Hooglund 1989).
Thereafter, the Iranian Thermidor accelerated as Rafsanjani, in
charge after Khomeini’s death, subordinated ideology to post-war
reconstruction, not only reviving the private sector but even
seeking foreign loans and investment. Gradually, the economic self-
sufficiency at which the revolution had aimed was abandoned. Each
step Iran took in seeking reintegration into the world economy
spilled over in the moderation of its foreign policy without which
economic relations to the outside could not be repaired. An increas-
ingly ‘realist’ foreign policy re-established relations with Iran’s Gulf
neighbours and economic links to the West. Export of revolution
was replaced with a more conventional attempt to create spheres
of influence in Iran’s immediate neighbourhood. The imprint of
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ideology survived only in the continued hostility to Israel and the US
(Ehteshami 1995; Harrop 1991).
In the end, the international system tamed the Iranian revolution:
it used Iraq to wear Iran down and derail its attempts to restructure
its economy; having failed to overcome its dependence on oil ex-
ports, and in dire need of resources to reconstruct a war-damaged
economy, Iran’s now chastened realists pushed the radicals aside
and sharply moderated its foreign policy ideology in the face of
these realities. 
The states system and the periphery wars
The Iranian and Israeli threats on the eastern and western flanks of
the Arab world, rather than uniting it, polarised it into two rival
coalitions shaped by differential perceptions of the greater threat. A
‘moderate’ coalition, which came to include Iraq, Egypt, northern
Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC states, combined
against the Iranian threat. Owing to the Gulf states’ intense fear of
Iran, massive resources were diverted from the Israeli front to
support Iraq’s war with Iran while the need for Egyptian arms and
manpower on the anti-Iranian front drove Cairo’s inter-Arab reha-
bilitation despite its adherence to its separate peace with Israel.
Moreover, the US was allowed to expand its anti-Iranian presence
in the Gulf despite its bombing of Libya, complicity in the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon and designation of Israel as a US strategic asset.
These developments, in turn, drove Syria and Iran into a defensive
counter-alliance, with Iran mobilising Lebanese Shi’a on behalf of
Syria’s resistance to Israel in Lebanon and Syria obstructing the iso-
lation of Iran in the Arab world. This axis, together with a so-called
‘Steadfastness Front’ of radical states – Libya, Democratic Yemen,
Algeria – saw Israel and the US as the greater threats and sought
support in Moscow. 
This inter-Arab split further ‘de-constructed’ Arab nationalism at
both elite and popular levels while, at the same time, bringing the
alternative basis of regional order, the balance of power, more fully
into being. Two anti-hegemonic alliances, cutting across the ideo-
logical and Arab–non-Arab fault lines, blunted the ambitions of
revisionist states on the eastern and western flanks of the Arab
world. Iran’s revolutionary mobilisation of its superior resource
base was countered by the financial aid and arms to Iraq from its
Arab and Western allies, generating a stalemate in which the two
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dominant Gulf powers wore each other down. The Iranian revolu-
tion was contained, no state succumbed to Islamic revolution and
the Americans were enabled to enhance their presence and influence
in the Gulf, quite the opposite of what either of the two parties to
the war had intended. On the Western front, Syria, sheltered by a
Soviet deterrent, used the Iranian-assisted mobilisation of Lebanese
Shi’a to frustrate the American–Israeli combinazione in Lebanon.
The 1980s ended with the Middle East having reached a precarious
peace as the costs of war exhausted all sides in both conflict arenas.
This, however, was only to be the pause before the ‘desert storm’.
Conclusion: order without peace?
The search for solutions to regional conflict, for a basis on which to
create a secure order, has been ongoing since the founding of the
Middle East states system. There are, indeed, sources of order in the
region which have managed to preserve the states system, and, to a
much lesser extent, to keep the peace for limited periods. However,
each of the major attempts to build regional order proved defective,
in varying degrees ameliorating or containing conflict but also either
failing to deal with its roots or sometimes actually exacerbating it. 
Order and supra-state identity: a Pan-Arab regime 
Western efforts to impose an anti-communist security order on the
region stimulated an indigenous response, Egypt’s attempt to forge a
Pan-Arab regime that would ensure Arab collective security against
Israel andautonomyofWesternpenetration.This regimedeterred the
consolidation of a system of fully differentiated states, confined inter-
Arab conflict to the ideological level and rolled back Western pene-
tration in the interests of a more autonomous Arab world (Barnett
1993, 1995, 1998). However, the threat Nasser posed to other Arab
elites precipitated anti-hegemonic balancing which obstructed his
attempt to enforce the ‘regime’; it also stimulated defensive state for-
mation which, in time, made the individual Arab states more immune
to ideological penetration. It may be that anti-hegemonic balancing
preserved the sovereignty-based states system against the potential
imposition of a more integrated Cairo-dominated Pan-Arab order
but the outbidding that came with this balancing also led to the dis-
astrous 1967 war. The consequent much-increased external threat
fostered an alternative sort of Pan-Arab regime based on recognition
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of sovereignty and formally realised through consensus-generating
inter-state institutions, notably the Arab summits. In these forums,
peerpressuresandmaterial inducementshelped settle inter-Arabcon-
flicts and unify the Arab states against shared threats. However, the
weakening of Pan-Arabism by conflicts over peace with Israel
increased insecurity and encouraged states’ resort to self-help. The
Pan-Arab regime also offered no bridge to overcome the security
dilemma on the fault lines with the Middle East’s non-Arab states. But
the decline of Pan-Arabism, far from making for a more stable Middle
East, merely spelled the replacement of Arab ideological conflicts
with much more violent and sustained military conflicts on the
Arab–non-Arab periphery.
Toward a Westphalian order: war and the balance of power
The growing incidence and cost of war forced states to adapt them-
selves to the survival imperatives of a threat-drenched system. Thus,
in 1967 the radical Arab states, Egypt and Syria, driven by supra-
state ideologies to challenge the status quo in defiance of the balance
of power, suffered high costs. Their leaders were chastened or
replaced by realists with the autonomy and capacity to more ration-
ally match ends and means. Two decades later revolutionary Iran
was similarly brought by the costs of war to adopt less ambitious
and ideological foreign policies. War and threat of war also induced
the adoption of realpolitik power balancing as states built up deter-
rent capabilities and combined against threats from ambitious pow-
erful states. The insecurity of an anarchic system was reconstructing
the states that made it up and transforming their behaviour. 
Despite the socialisation of states into the traditions of balancing,
the region nevertheless proved all too vulnerable to power imbal-
ances that provided renewed occasions for war. Power imbalances
were built into it by the creation of small super-rich mini-states
alongside large dissatisfied ones – an ingredient of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait – and by the unevenness of state formation which posi-
tioned early state-builders, notably the non-Arab states, to threaten
those where state formation was delayed. ‘Buck-passing’ frustrated
the construction of stable collective deterrents against such power-
ful threatening states; the most extreme case was the dramatic upset
in the power balance resulting from Egypt’s opting out of the
Arab–Israeli power balance. The security dilemma was also fully
operational: as high insecurity drove states to improve their power
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position, the threat they posed to their neighbours stimulated arms
races, jeopardising existing power balances. This was exaggerated
by the rapid power advantages achieved by states that enjoyed
exceptional oil revenues or foreign aid and hence access to massive
arms deliveries from external powers. Arguably, a decade of war,
including Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and Iraq’s two Gulf
wars, was partly the product of such power imbalances. In time, such
ambitious states overreached themselves, stimulated anti-hegemonic
alliances, and incurred high costs which restored the balance of
power. The Middle East came, therefore, to exhibit certain of the
self-equilibrating features of a states system: but if this was enough
to preserve the system it was not enough to keep the peace.
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The Middle East in a decade 
of globalisation (1991–2001)
While for much of the world globalisation is associated with
growing interdependence and the spread of ‘zones of peace’, in the
Middle East the decade of globalisation was ushered in by war, was
marked by intrusive US hegemony, renewed economic dependency
on the core and continuing insecurity, and ended with yet another
round of war in 2001. 
In the early 1990s, prospects looked different to some observers:
the end of the Cold War, the second Gulf War, and the advance of
economic globalisation seemed to provide a unique opportunity to
incorporate the area into a ‘New World Order’ in which the struggle
for power would be superseded by the features of the pluralist model
– complex interdependence, democratic peace. The defeat and dis-
crediting of Iraq’s militaristic Arab nationalism, the beginnings of
the Arab–Israeli peace negotiations, and a Washington-imposed Pax
Americana were to facilitate creation of the co-operative security
arrangements needed to tame the power struggle. The consequent
dilution of insecurity, together with the exhaustion of economies
from arms races, would allow economic development to push mili-
tary ambitions off state foreign policy agendas. Access to the global
market and investment would both require and encourage poli-
cies of peace (Solingen 1998) which, in turn, would foster regional
economic interdependence and co-operation in resolving common
problems such as water scarcity. This would create vested interests
in peace, while public opinion, exhausted by war and acquiring
enhanced weight from democratisation, would restrain state leaders.
In consequence, the regional system would move, in Korany’s words,
‘from warfare to welfare’. The final displacement of Pan-Arabism by
the doctrine of state sovereignty would allow ‘normal’ state-to-state
relations based on shared interests and accord non-Arab states such
as Turkey and Israel legitimate membership in a ‘Middle East system’
(Barnett 1996–97; Ehteshami 1997; Korany 1997; Tibi 1998).
In fact, few of these benign expectations for regional order were
realised in the first decade after the Gulf War. Globalisation proved
to be very uneven in its economic impact on the region and seemed
to benefit a few at the expense of the many; as such, it was an obsta-
cle to rather than an impetus to democratisation. The Arab–Israeli
peace process dead-ended and arms races actually accelerated.
While the intractability of regional conflicts and problems helped
derail the benign promise of globalisation, an equally important
factor was the way the much-intensified penetration of American
hegemonic power was applied in the region. There is much debate
over whether a world hegemon exercises its power in a largely self-
interested way or whether successful hegemony means satisfying the
interests of a wide range of lesser powers. In the developed core,
where Washington must deal with other major powers and is itself
locked into interdependencies, its role may be relatively benign; but
in the Middle East its power was applied so systematically on behalf
of a minority of privileged clients and so aggressively against others
that it was widely perceived as a malign hegemon. Many regional
states sought to use, evade or appease American power but, given
the weakness of the region, it was perhaps inevitable that actual
resistance would chiefly take a non-state form. The September 11
2001 attack by Islamic terrorists on the very heart of America led
the US into its second Middle East war in a decade. At the end of
2001, the region, far from entering the ‘zone of peace’, was at risk
of becoming the arena for a ‘clash of civilisations’. What went
wrong? Such an outcome might have been anticipated given the way
globalisation was ushered into the Middle East – namely by a pro-
foundly unequal war whose outcome gave the Western victors
excessive power over the region and insufficient incentive to satisfy
the interests and values of the region’s states and peoples. 
The second Gulf War 
The second Gulf War represented a watershed event in the Middle
East that sharply underlined how far it is a ‘penetrated system’, its
politics a product of interaction between global and local forces.
The war, likewise, can only be understood by recourse to variables
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on multiple ‘levels of analysis’. Regional level conflicts and Iraqi
political economy largely explain the Iraqi choices that unleashed
the war. However, there would have been no war without global
level factors, namely, an American attempt to secure global hege-
mony that was intimately connected to a struggle over the interna-
tional oil market. Finally, despite the grave issues at stake, it was the
peculiarities of the policy process inside the two main protagonist
states that made a violent resolution of the conflict unavoidable.
Without the interaction of all these levels, there would have been no
second Gulf War. 
Level one: formation of a ‘war state’ 
Saddam’s Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait provoked the second
Gulf War but this was not a purely idiosyncratic choice, for Iraqi
state formation produced a certain kind of state which made war
possible, in certain circumstances even likely, though not necessary.
The very weakness of Iraq at its birth as a state produced a reaction,
a drive to overcome this weakness at home and abroad, which
turned Iraq, in Mufti’s words (1996: 220–30), into a ‘war state’.
Iraq’s weakness was a function of its formation as a artificial
state, arbitrarily carved by Great Britain out of conquered Ottoman
domains and combining three ethnically different regions which
shared no history of statehood or common identity – the Sunni Arab
centre around Baghdad, a majority Shi’a south and the Kurdish
north. None of Iraq’s pre-Ba’th regimes found a viable state-building
formula which could stabilise this centrifugal society. The monarchy,
resting on a thin stratum of landlords and tribal chiefs and lacking
popular support and nationalist legitimacy, was only kept in power
by the British; ironically, the one issue which united most of Iraq’s
disparate politically active population and produced the 1958 revo-
lution was opposition to British tutelage. The 1958 revolution
marked the mobilisation of the masses into politics but the military
regimes that emerged from it were too fragmented to build the insti-
tutions needed to incorporate the mass public; their attempts to stay
in power by balancing competing forces resulted in fragile regimes
barely controlling a country seemingly made ungovernable by the
rival mobilisation of Shi’a communists, Arab nationalists, Ba’thists
and the Kurdish KDP (Batatu 1978; Bromley 1994: 135–8; Frankel
1991: 18; Mufti 1996: 98–167).
All this only changed after the second Ba’th regime, which seized
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power in a 1968 coup, finally found a workable power formula.
First, the Ba’thist leadership, a product of a decade of unrestrained
power struggle, was convinced that only utterly ruthless treatment
of opponents could defeat the natural rebelliousness of Iraqi society.
Moreover, the man who survived the post-1968 power struggles
within the regime, Saddam Hussein, an urban guerrilla turned
Stalin-like organiser, was arguably the ‘fittest’ to survive in this envi-
ronment. To consolidate his position, he relied on kin and sectarian
assabiya to construct a patrimonialised power centre while bru-
tally purging rivals and forging new instruments of power. The
Ba’thisation of the army and intensive intelligence surveillance rid
the officer corps of factionalism and finally put an end to the age of
coups; the army’s massive increase in size gave the regime, for the
first time, thorough control over Iraqi territory. In a burst of organ-
isation building, the Ba’th party expanded from a conspiratorial
group into a 500,000-member ‘institutionalised and deeply inva-
sive’ Leninist apparatus with another million supporters or sympa-
thisers (Miller and Mylroie 1990; Mufti 1996: 204; Norton 1991:
25).
The 1970s nationalisation of the oil industry and the oil boom put
soaring oil revenues in the hands of the government: its share of GNP
doubled from 39 to 60 per cent and its share of investment from 50
to 70 per cent (Mufti 1996: 202–3). This control of the economy
gave the regime massive patronage resources, enabled bureaucratic
expansion which recruited nearly a million state workers dependent
on the government for their livelihoods, and provided the where-
withal for crash modernisation in which infrastructure – roads, tele-
phones – doubled and state penetration of society increased. Oil
relieved the state of the need to extract taxes, giving it considerable
autonomy of society. It also allowed the public sector to remain dom-
inant in an age of infitah. Although private crony capitalism was
encouraged among regime clients, the party and the regime’s clien-
talist networks remained ladders of political recruitment from ple-
beian strata, diluting the consolidation of state elites into a new
bourgeoisie. No bourgeois class formed to balance the state elite or
with a stake in economic infitah as in Egypt where this class helped
subordinate nationalist ambitions to participation in the world
economy (Bromley 1994: 139–41).
Lacking a class base, the regime remained threatened by deep-
seated sectarian-ethnic cleavages which, in the absence of a secure
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Iraqi national identity, could only be contained by extraordinary
means. Autonomous civil society was eradicated and citizens incor-
porated in all-encompassing totalitarian structures of control, co-
opted by material benefits and the developmental achievements of
the regime, or demobilised by fear enforced by a vast network of
informers and a pervasive secret police (Norton 1991: 25). State
patronage was used to divide the population, favouring or disfa-
vouring groups on the basis of perceived loyalty (Bromley 1994:
139). All opposition from the Kurdish or Shi’a communities was
brutally repressed; indeed, during the Iran–Iraq war, 250,000 Shi’a
supposedly of Iranian origin were expelled to Iran, Kurdish villages
suspected of rebellion were razed and relocated and mass killings
were carried out (Khalil 1989; Mufti 1996: 229–30). 
At the same time, Arab nationalist ideology was used to legitim-
ise the state, in the first instance to consolidate a Sunni support base,
but also to bridge the gap with the Shi’a. Many Sunnis felt limited
affinity for a separate Iraqi state in which, indeed, they were a
minority and found Pan-Arabism a much more attractive identity.
Paradoxically, the regime also secured support from Sunnis by ex-
ploiting the threat to the integrity of the secular state and its offi-
cially dominant Arabism from Kurdish separatism and Islamist
Sh’ia groups inspired by Iran. Many Shi’a were attracted by upward
mobility through state jobs and by their systematic recruitment into
the ruling Ba’th party, which promoted the Arab identity they poten-
tially shared with the Sunnis. The Iran–Iraq war was the test of this
control strategy. That the majority of the population and the bulk
of wartime conscripts were Shiite and hence possibly susceptible to
the appeal of Iranian revolutionary Islam against their own Sunni-
dominated secular state, was the regime’s potentially fatal liability.
Yet there were no Shi’a uprisings or defections to Iran during the
war even in the face of major defeats (Gause 1991: 17). 
Iraq’s state formation had several key consequences for its
foreign policy. First, the credibility of its state-building Arab nation-
alist ideology required Iraqi leadership on the Pan-Arab stage. Iraqi
leaders, from the very founding of the state, imagined that Iraq had
the potential to be the Prussia of Arab politics but for years this role
fell to Egypt while Iraq was preoccupied with instability at home.
With the rise of the Ba’thists to power an ideological thrust was
given to the notion that the arena of political competition was not
within a single state, but a contest for Pan-Arab leadership; once
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they consolidated the state at home, they started to act on these
ambitions in the region (Mufti 1996: 194). 
Secondly, if the arbitrary drawing of Iraq’s borders had created
an artificial state within, it also artificially excluded much as well.
In particular, Iraq’s southern and south-eastern borders with Iran
and Kuwait were forced on it by Britain explicitly to limit its
access to and power projection in the Gulf, its economic lifeline.
This built a powerful irredentism into Iraq’s very fabric. Recurrent
Iraqi leaders, from King Ghazi to Abd al-Karim Qasim, contested
Kuwait’s independence, insisting it had been a part of Iraq under the
Ottomans until separated under British tutelage. The disputed and
ill-defined Iran–Iraq border along the Shatt al-Arab put Iraq into
permanent conflict with a more powerful Iran against which it was
mostly on the defensive. Iran under the Shah supported Kurdish
insurgency against Baghdad which forced Iraq to accept a 1975
readjustment of the boundary to its disadvantage. This situation
both generated considerable insecurity in Baghdad and inflamed
irredentist grievances (Frankel 1991: 17–18; Tripp 2001: 168, 170,
179–82).
Third, the regime, which always rested on a military pillar of
power, created, during the Iran–Iraq war, an enormous, profession-
alised military machine with some 1 million soldiers under arms at
the end of the war. It was, moreover, well equipped with advanced
weapons financed by oil or debt and provided by Western states
seeking profits or anxious to see Iran contained. What had once
been a defensive Iraq, barely able to control its own territory against
Kurdish insurgency, was, by the end of the Iran–Iraq war, in a posi-
tion to pursue an activist foreign policy against weaker neighbours. 
Fourth, the paradox of Iraq’s oil-driven development was that the
investment of oil revenues in rapid modernisation, education and
welfare created what seemed to be the Arab world’s most developed
state with the most balanced power assets; but, at the same time,
oil-fuelled development created a new dependency on imported
machinery, food and consumer goods which would make Iraq par-
ticularly vulnerable to economic pressures and fluctuations in the
price of oil (Mufti 1996: 202–3). Indeed, in the aftermath of the
Iran–Iraq war, Iraq, deeply indebted to both Western and Gulf Arab
creditors, suddenly discovered its access to foreign imports restricted
and the leverage of its rich Gulf funders over it enhanced. Iraq’s
massive build-up of military power in excess of its own substantial
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economic base had bankrupted it. For Saddam, the invasion of
Kuwait appeared to be a solution to this dilemma. However, addi-
tional regional level factors, specifically Saddam’s Pan-Arab ambi-
tions, the Kuwait–Iraq conflict, and a regional power imbalance
helped create the environment in which this decision could seem
rational.
Level two: an unstable region
Regional conflicts, ambitions and power imbalances Once the
Iraqi state was, by the late 1970s, relatively secure at home, it was
better positioned to act on its regional grievances and ambitions.
Saddam made Iraq into an aggressive actor in inter-Arab politics,
seeking to destabilise the rival Ba’thist regime in Syria and to isolate
Egypt after Camp David. He promulgated a National Covenant,
which, in Nasser style, sought to lay down Pan-Arab standards for
the Arab states. While acknowledging the reality of independent
Arab states, Saddam insisted that they should not allow foreign
bases or troops and that the richer should share their wealth with
the poorer (Mufti 1996: 221–9), an overt challenge to the Arab Gulf
monarchies. In 1980, the threat from Iran was met, not by appease-
ment as in 1975, but by aggression. Saddam evidently saw this war
as a way of mobilising the Arabs behind his ambitions (Mufti 1996:
220–30). In fact, it forced him to dilute his challenge to the Gulf
monarchies whose financial help he needed for the war, but, by con-
trast to Egypt after its 1967 war, the costs of the war only tempo-
rarily moderated Saddam’s ambitions. 
Indeed, the most salient theme in regional geopolitics in the after-
math of the Iran–Iraq war was Iraq’s bid for Pan-Arab leadership.
Iraq saw itself as the victor in a war which had successfully defended
the Arab eastern flank against Iran. It saw itself and was widely seen
in the Arab world as the Arab state with the greatest power poten-
tial that entitled it to Arab leadership. At the same time, Saddam
perceived threats and opportunities issuing from the end of the Cold
War of which he sought to take advantage to assert this leadership.
The decline of the Soviet Union and the tide of Soviet Jewish emi-
gration to Israel threatened to shift the regional balance against the
Arabs at a time when, under the Likud, Israel was rejecting the latest
bid for a negotiated settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Taking
advantage of the damage this did to moderate Arab leaders, notably
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Egypt’s Mubarak who promoted his role as Arab-Israeli inter-
locutor, Saddam proposed a confrontational stand against Israel’s
American backer, urging the use of the oil weapon, and, in response
to Israeli threats, warning that he would burn half of Israel (with
chemically armed missiles) if it attacked any Arab country. The
enthusiastic mass response to this strengthened and emboldened
Saddam. But his bid was rejected by Egypt and Saudi Arabia which,
together with Syria, started forming a new anti-Iraq axis. Invading
Kuwait was, in part, a gamble to force his leadership and strategy
of confrontation on his rivals, but, in fact, it only strengthened their
opposition to him (Khalidi 1991a: 170–1, 1991b: 60–1; Christian
Science Monitor, 4 December 1990, 4 January 1991; The Econo-
mist, 29 September 1990).
The Kuwait–Iraq dispute was, of course, the immediate occasion
of the invasion. Iraq’s historic reluctance to accept Kuwait’s legiti-
macy conditioned Iraqi attitudes in the dispute, but a more im-
mediate issue was Iraq’s attempts to secure access to the Gulf by
either incorporating or leasing the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and
Bubiyan. Kuwait rejected this and sought to use Iraq’s economic
vulnerabilities to impose a final settlement of the boundaries be-
tween the two states to its advantage. The most immediate bone of
contention, however, was what Saddam Hussein declared to be
Kuwait’s ‘economic warfare’ against Iraq: its ‘over-pumping’ of oil
in excess of its OPEC quota, driving down the price of Iraq’s oil
exports; its encroaching on the Iraqi share of the jointly-held
Rumailan oil fields; and its insistence on repayment of loans made
to Iraq for the war with Iran – which Iraq interpreted to be a quid
pro-quo for protecting Kuwait and the Gulf from the Iranian threat
(Bahbah 1991; Khalidi 1991b: 62–5; Christian Science Monitor, 10
September 1990, p. 8). 
Many states have comparable grievances against their neigh-
bours, but few invade them. The relative permissiveness of the
regional environment toward the use of force conditioned Iraq to
opt for such means. To be sure, there was a Pan-Arab norm of peace-
ful settlement of disputes, underpinned by a tradition of inter-Arab
mediation; both Egypt and Saudi Arabia tried to mediate the dispute
with Kuwait but this ‘Arab solution’ failed: Kuwait seemed to play
a reckless out-of-character game, apparently with American en-
couragement, of provoking rather than conciliating its powerful
neighbour. But Arab political culture lacks the powerful normative
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barrier to the violation of state borders which restrains states else-
where: Saddam Hussein seemingly believed that he could legitimise
his invasion as a blow for Pan-Arabism against artificial borders and
the approval of segments of the Arab public suggests he was not
wholly wrong (Halliday 1991: 395–8).
In the absence of institutionalised norms, it is the balance of
power that must keep the peace. However, the Gulf region was
afflicted by built-in chronic power imbalances from the contiguous
position of weak rich states and large poorer ones. The build-up of
Iraq’s huge military machine in the Iran–Iraq war and the enerva-
tion of Iran as a check on it as a result of the war’s outcome exacer-
bated these imbalances. Potential Soviet restraints on Iraq – a Cold
War function of preventing local conflicts from escalating into
superpower confrontation – had declined as Iraq became less depen-
dent on Soviet arms and the USSR disengaged from the area under
Gorbachev. In this situation, the map imposed on the region, specif-
ically, the Iraqi giant contiguous with the Kuwaiti midget, was a
structural invitation to war (Hiro 1991b; Khalidi 1991b). 
Formation of an anti-Iraq Middle East coalition Without creation
of an anti-Iraq Arab coalition that could facilitate US intervention
against Iraq, there would have been no war and possibly a very dif-
ferent kind of ‘Arab solution’ to the invasion. Remarkably, however,
the US managed to co-opt the three most pivotal Arab states into a
Western-led coalition against another Arab state. Saudi Arabia,
most crucial, provided the territorial base and a lot of the financing
for the US intervention, while Egyptian and Syrian participation in
the coalition were essential to managing Arab public reaction to it.
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait had violated the norms of sovereignty
which had been incorporated into the Arab elite consensus, but their
support for Washington’s assault on Iraq was itself such an egre-
gious violation of Arabism that, arguably, they must have had other
vital interests at stake to so risk the very bases of their domestic legit-
imacy. While each had its particular motives, the dependence of all
three states, in one way or another, on the US gave Washington
crucial leverage over them. This construction of the coalition was
both a symptom of – and a major watershed in deepening – the
increasing American penetration of the region. 
Saudi Arabia’s motives for inviting the Americans in were, of
course, security-centred. The Saudis probably did not expect an Iraqi
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invasion, but in an anarchic system, one must prepare for the worst-
case scenario and if Iraq succeeded in keeping Kuwait, it would be
in a position to intimidate Saudi Arabia over the longer term. The
driving factor in the Saudis’ perceptions was that, being weak and
rich in a dangerous neighbourhood, they could not do without an
external protector and to deny the US the access to their territory it
was demanding could well cost them American protection.
As the Arab world’s pivotal state, Egyptian support for the Gulf
coalition was crucial. If Saudi Arabia was motivated by its security
dependency, Egypt’s choice was ultimately motivated by its eco-
nomic dependency. President Mubarak had worked assiduously to
position Egypt as the ‘moderator’ of the Arab system: enjoying
American confidence and Arab leadership, Egypt would be pivotal
to resolving or containing regional conflicts, especially the Arab–
Israeli conflict. It was in this capacity that Egypt was valuable to the
West and entitled to the foreign aid on which its economy had
become dependent. However, at a time when Egypt faced a growing
debt crisis and the possibility of default, Saddam Hussein’s promo-
tion of a confrontational strategy toward the US and Israel threat-
ened Egypt’s role. On the other hand, the invasion presented a
welcome opportunity to demonstrate Egypt’s continued importance
to regional stability and thereby win debt relief. In fact, Cairo was
promised and given unprecedented debt forgiveness (Abdalla 1991;
Haseeb and Rouchdy 1991; Hetata 1991). 
Syria was essentially engaged in geo-political balancing. Iraq
under Saddam was a major rival for Pan-Arab leadership and a
potential military threat (especially after its war with Iran was over);
the war was a chance to cut Saddam Hussein down to size. More
important, however, was Syria’s conflict with Israel over the Golan
Heights for, with the end to Soviet patronage and protection in the
post-Cold War era, Syria was exposed to a power-imbalance in
Israel’s favour and left without the military option needed to cred-
ibly threaten war in the absence of an Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied Arab territories. Syria had no alternative to a negotiated
recovery of the Golan and it could only hope to secure one if the US
was prepared to broker an Arab–Israeli settlement that recognised
its legitimate interests. Syria’s diplomatic dependency on the US
meant it had to bring Washington to put aside old animosities and
accept Syria as a responsible power on the side of regional stability.
The Gulf War was a golden opportunity to do so (Hinnebusch 1997).
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Level three: the political economy of oil 
The concentrated oil reserves of the Gulf were, of course, the main
stake in the war: in one sense, the war was a north–south conflict
over resources – specifically over the determination of the north, and
especially the US hegemon, to keep control of vital resources located
in the Arab Gulf but central to the economic health of the whole
world capitalist economy. Direct US control over world oil was
declining: its own proportion of world reserves shrunk from 34 per
cent in 1948 to 7 per cent in 1972 and its share of production
decreased from 20 per cent in 1970 to 10 per cent in 1991. Yet, in
the same period that its imports had risen from 12 per cent to 50 per
cent of its consumption (1970–91), OPEC had diluted the control
of US MNCs over oil produced abroad. To be sure, in 1990 only
about 12.5 per cent of US oil consumption was from Gulf sources
and, in the short run, Iraq and Kuwait together supplied only 7 per
cent of world oil demand. However, looking to the longer term,
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia controlled 40 per cent of world oil
reserves. The concentration of oil reserves in such a turbulent region
made guaranteed reliable access to them a vital interest that would
have to be defended by whatever means (Kubursi and Mansur 1993:
7; Tanzer 1991: 264; Christian Science Monitor, 10 September
1990).
A shorter-term threat was Iraq’s influence over the price of oil.
Some argue that prices are determined by the global oil market, not
producers – so there is some debate over the extent to which Iraq
would have been able to control prices. However Saudi Arabia, with
a 21 per cent share of world exports, was crucial to moderating
prices and had great influence over the price of oil on the ‘spot
market’. Were Iraq to have retained Kuwaiti fields and remained
in a position to intimidate Saudi Arabia, it might have been able
to dictate prices, causing major economic headaches for Western
governments. However, regardless of who controls the oil fields,
they must sell oil on the international market where excessive prices
reduce demand, eventually forcing prices down; moreover, even in
the short run, Iraq, desperate for revenues (for reconstruction and
debt re-payment) would likely have needed to maximise production,
thus keeping prices at moderate levels. Hence, oil access and price
are insufficient explanations for the high US/Western perception of
threat from Iraq (Christian Science Monitor 7, 8 August 1990). In
any case, if Iraqi intimidation of Saudi Arabia was the main lever by
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which it could influence oil prices, this could have been neutralised
by the deployment of defensive forces there, stopping far short of
the war that was actually launched by Washington. 
Equally important, however, to the oil relation between the ‘core’
and the oil-producing ‘periphery’ was the ‘recycling’ of the petro-
dollars accruing to the oil producers through Western banks and
through the purchase of Western arms. The conservative Gulf mon-
archies moderated prices and recycled proceeds on a massive scale
without threatening the West. Iraq, by contrast, had not acquired a
stake in Western economic health through large-scale investment
and while its arms purchases recycled petrodollars, once Iran was
defeated this could not be allowed to continue since it overly
strengthened Iraq. 
A strengthened Iraq was all the more unacceptable because it
threatened to politicise the oil relation. What was most alarming to
the US was that Saddam Hussein had explicitly proposed the reacti-
vation of the oil weapon, which meant making Western access to oil
conditional on a favourable Western policy in the Arab–Israeli con-
flict. The West could not afford to have such an independent, even
hostile regime in charge of ‘the world’s’ concentrated oil reserves.
Rather, it was crucial that oil remain in the hands of friendly regimes
which, by virtue of their dependence on the US for security and their
Western investments, had a shared interest with the West in ensur-
ing stable unpoliticised access to oil at moderate prices. Iraq’s power
intimidated these regimes and its example threatened to destabilise
them. What was at stake, therefore, was not access to oil but access
on Western terms (Thomas Friedman, NYT, 12 August 1990, p. 1;
Andrew Kopkind, The Nation, 10 September 1990; Doug Bandow,
NYT, 17 September 1990).
Level four: the international system and US hegemony
The systemic transformation of the international system at the end
of the Cold War and the looming end to US–Soviet bi-polarity pro-
vided the global context of the Gulf War. The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait was the precipitant of the conflict but it resulted in a global
war partly because the US took it as a challenge to the world order
that it wanted to shape and defend. Had such an invasion taken
place during the Cold War or in some obscure part of the world
where no global interests were at stake, there would have been no
comparable global war. 
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With the end of the Cold War, the US was positioning itself as
the unchallenged world hegemon. Wallerstein (1974) argues that,
owing to the political fragmentation of the international capitalist
system, its maintenance and expansion depends on a hegemon – a
state qualitatively different in function from others, which enjoys
preponderant economic, political and military power that is used to
police challenges to global order. The hegemon also sustains the
functioning of the world capitalist political economy by breaking
down barriers to international trade and investment, protecting the
interests of the international capitalist class (i.e. the multinational
corporations) and ensuring the capitalist core’s access to vital eco-
nomic resources in the periphery, above all to cheap energy. The
hegemon’s success depends in part on the ideological hegemony of
liberalism which generates a measure of consent but while this ideol-
ogy dominates the core it is periodically challenged in the periphery
and hegemony there is more likely to require the application of mil-
itary power. Historically Great Britain played the role of hegemon,
providing the main power and capital for dragging the Middle East
into the international division of labour. After W. W. II, however, the
US superseded Britain, seeking to absorb most of the Third World
into the world capitalist system while militarily containing Soviet or
radical nationalist challenges to it. 
However, the US ability to play the hegemon was in doubt from
the mid-1970s through the 1980s owing to the apparent economic
decline attributed to its ‘imperial overreach’ – excessive military
spending and lack of domestic investment combined with rising
economic competition from Europe and Japan which were less
willing than heretofore to defer to the US. Indeed, a Pentagon plan-
ning document in the late 1980s discussed the need for the US to
defend its hegemonic power from such competitors. At a time when
some of the other ingredients of US economic hegemony, such as
financial assets and trading capacity, had declined, control of
Middle East oil, including petrodollar recycling, was an all-the-
more crucial instrument of hegemony and source of leverage over
economic competitors.
It is no accident that US foreign policy and its watershed doc-
trines – from the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines through those
of Nixon, Carter and Reagan – all explicitly identified control of
Middle East oil as central to the US national interest (Kubursi and
Mansur 1993: 8). In the view of some structuralist analysts, the US
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orchestration of the Gulf War was used to demonstrate the contin-
uing indispensability of US hegemony to protecting the world capi-
talist core’s control of oil against Third World challenges and
restored the US protectorate over global oil resources. The war also
ensured that Gulf petrodollars would continue to be recycled
through US institutions and firms and therefore serve US competi-
tiveness. In addition, in the Gulf War the US actually managed to
make its imperial policing profitable by inducing its economic com-
petitors (Germany, Japan) and clients (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) to pay
for the service (Aarts 1994; Bina 1993; Darnovsky, Kauffman and
Robinson 1991; Kubursi and Mansur 1993).
US hegemony was also threatened by the perceived decline of the
utility of military force. The US needed an opportunity to show the
world that American military power was still usable and essential to
world order. A Pentagon planning document before the Iraqi inva-
sion identified the main potential threats to Pax Americana as mili-
taristic Third World nationalist regimes. Iraq was fingered as a
possible troublemaker owing to its attempt to acquire missiles and
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD) and its challenge to Israel.
Once Iraq invaded Kuwait the advantages of confronting it came
into focus. The Pentagon had wanted enhanced military bases in the
Gulf since the mid-1970s, but the Arab Gulf states had demurred
for domestic reasons; the invasion was a perfect opportunity to
establish a greater presence and enhance America’s ability to pro-
ject power globally. It was also an opportunity to demonstrate US
resolve to protect its regional clients, as a credible hegemon must.
The military defeat of Iraq would demonstrate that US military
force was effectively usable and send a warning to other potential
troublemakers that, as President Bush put, it: ‘what we say goes’
(Klare 1991).
If the US was to retain hegemony, the US public had to support
a globalist role but with the end of the Soviet threat, the US military-
industrial complex needed a new mission to justify continued mili-
tary spending. This new mission would be a Pax Americana, the
defence of the liberal world order emerging from the defeat of com-
munism against the remaining threat of Third World – especially
Islamic – pariah states. Moreover, the Pentagon was determined that
the war would be fought with the unrestrained application of its
massive firepower and new high-tech military capabilities. Only if
fought in this way would a war assure the American public that
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international policing could be cheap and incur minimal casualties.
The Iraqi invasion posed a perfect opportunity to banish the
Vietnam syndrome at home (Klare 1991).
Whatever the US might have wished to do in the Gulf War, it was
the collapse of bi-polarity that gave it the opportunity to act. In the
Cold War bi-polar world, the risks of superpower confrontation
would probably have restrained it. It was only the USSR’s with-
drawal from global competition with the US and, specifically, the
end of Soviet opposition to the projection of US military power that
made it possible for the US to mount an international coalition and
to intervene in the Gulf on such a massive scale. The war hastened
the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Gorbachev’s pro-Western policy
was part of the disaffection that produced the failed conservative
coup and Soviet collapse. The collapse of East Bloc alternatives to
capitalism and the end to Soviet patronage of Third World nation-
alism enormously increased the self-confidence of US elites that a
capitalist Pax America could be imposed against lingering resistance
in the Third world. 
This is not to argue that the US planned the war or even that it
was waiting for the opportunity that the Iraqi invasion presented.
Indeed, the invasion apparently took Washington by surprise and
it was not even initially prepared or seemingly keen to act. But
once policy makers assessed their options and realised the oppor-
tunities could outweigh the risks of intervention, they quickly
determined on one and set out to mobilise the support needed to
undertake it.
Level five: decision-making
While geopolitical analysis tries to identify the ‘objective’ interests,
threats, opportunities, and capabilities of states, analysis of the deci-
sion-making process is necessary to understand how and why a
country reacts to its geopolitical situation as it does. Analysis of how
states choose between conflicting goals and match means with them
frequently reveals leadership flaws, such as misperceptions, and
domestic pressures, which, to the analyst, distort the geopolitical
rationality of decisions. Specifically, in explaining war, analysis
seeks to understand why leaders reject compromises that could
satisfice their interests at less risk and cost than going to war. This
is most important in understanding Iraq for which the costs and
risks were exceptionally high.
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Iraq Regime stability had always been a decisive calculation for
Iraqi leaders and arguably, this was under some threat in the period
running up to the war. The end of the Iran–Iraq war was trumpeted
as a Pan-Arab victory, but Iraq had paid a high cost and made little
tangible gains while Iraqis expected a peace dividend. But repay-
ment of Iraq’s economic debt and Kuwaiti over-pumping were per-
ceived to threaten post-war recovery (Bromley 1994: 142; Chaudhry
1991). The invasion of Kuwait, besides realising Saddam’s Pan-
Arab ambitions, promised to alleviate this dilemma: Saddam sought
to reinforce domestic support by giving Iraqis war spoils and
portraying the annexation of Kuwait as a Pan-Arab challenge to
imperialism.
Yet, there were other less risky ways of securing the regime and
the decision to opt for the military occupation of Kuwait resulted
from a profound leadership miscalculation of international permis-
siveness for such a venture. Arguably, Saddam’s risk-taking person-
ality made him prone to such miscalculation and his seeming victory
over Iran had, no doubt, reinforced his recklessness (see chapter 4).
Tripp (2001: 172) argues that Saddam and his inner circle projected
their unforgiving view of politics and the ruthless methods which
were a product of the internal power struggle, onto the external
arena, failing to understand that such behaviour was outside the
pale of the emerging post-Cold War world order. Moreover, the
nature of the decision-making process meant that there were no
effective checks on Saddam. The totalitarian state of fear and the
boundless cult of personality he had created turned his lieutenants
into submissive sycophants who, knowing the cost of opposition,
were bound to tell him what he wanted to hear. 
As such, Saddam repeatedly miscalculated the situation or mis-
played his hand. He underestimated the US and Western reaction to
his invasion, perhaps because they had built him up against Iran. He
may have thought the US would acquiesce because of US ambassa-
dor April Glaspie’s remark that Washington considered the dispute
with Kuwait to be an inter-Arab matter and the assurances he gave
her that Iraq respected US oil interests in the region. On the basis of
the Vietnam experience, Saddam believed the US could not sustain
casualties and that air power was of limited importance, but the par-
allel of Vietnam and Iraq was faulty. He either miscalculated the
reaction of states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which had been recent
close allies against Iran, or falsely believed that the pro-Saddam
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acclaim of the Arab street would deter their timid rulers from taking
the side of the US. He also falsely believed the Soviets would block
an American intervention and was astonished and outraged that
they took the American side against their old ally (Hitchins 1991:
115–17; Christian Science Monitor, 17 January 1991; The Glaspie
Transcript).
In the post-invasion diplomatic contest in which attempts were
made to secure Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait without war, Saddam
played a poor diplomatic hand. Once it was clear there would be a
robust international reaction, he could have bargained withdrawal
for some Kuwaiti concessions. But the formal annexation of
Kuwait, enacted in reaction to the dispatch of American troops,
made it impossible to compromise without losing face. Whether this
was a rational tactic to show his enemy he had no way back and
thus that he would fight any attempt to get him out of Kuwait or a
prideful refusal of concessions to what he saw as the arrogance of
the UN demand for unconditional withdrawal, such obduracy cost
Iraq chances to forestall or divide the coalition (Christian Science
Monitor, 3 January, 11 February 1991). Later, the decision to with-
draw from Kuwait on the eve of the coalition ground offensive only
sowed confusion in Iraqi ranks and made for a very poor defence. 
The US There is no doubt that the US could have achieved many
of its objectives short of war but domestic politics and the charac-
ter of its leadership made war inescapable. First, US Middle East
policy seldom takes the form of the rational calculation of national
interests that, had it been in evidence, might have advised serious
consideration of a peaceful resolution. This is because the policy
process is so uniquely vulnerable to colonisation by pressure groups.
In this case, the Middle East lobbies, normally in conflict, tended to
come together against Iraq. The coalition of conservative Arab state
lobbyists, oil companies, and arms exporters, including big contrib-
utors to the Republican party, were for containment of and perhaps
action against Iraq, although they feared the effect of the latter on
Arab opinion could undermine their Middle East interests. Zionist
pressure groups, however, had no such hesitation: since Saddam’s
speech threatening to burn half of Israel, a campaign of demonisa-
tion of Iraq had begun. Zionists were well positioned in the national
security bureaucracy as well as the press and Congress to argue for
action and offending this lobby is dangerous to the political health
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of American politicians. Public opinion, being split and vulnerable
to media manipulation, was largely neutralised as a check on either
pressure groups or elite belligerency.
President Bush and his inner circle made the decision for war and
the outcome was no accidental war from miscalculation or misper-
ception in Washington. There was, perhaps, some residual element
of irrationality. Bush felt a need to counter his ‘wimp’ image by
acting tough; his demonisation of Saddam – the Hitler image –
deterred negotiations on both sides. However, the Bush administra-
tion wanted a war, not a diplomatic settlement and the proof is that
US policy makers openly feared Saddam might make concessions
which could deprive them of this opportunity – the so-called ‘night-
mare scenario’ of a partial Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. It was a
rationally calculated ‘preventive war’ by men imbued with the zero-
sum national security ethos fostered by the Cold War. Saddam had
to be beaten because his ‘linkage strategy’ – offering withdrawal
from Kuwait in return for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied ter-
ritories – dramatically exposed the double standards by which the
US exempted Israel from the norms it enforced against others. Any
sign of US weakness would, it was believed, encourage Arab nation-
alists and Islamists to challenge US interests across the region. Were
Saddam to retreat with his military assets intact, he would be a future
threat needing constant containment and in a position to revive Arab
nationalism, play on the double standards and thus threaten both
Israel and the Arab clients that ensured US access to oil. It was far
better for the US to deal with Saddam while it had the coalition and
the UN behind it and before Iraq got the nuclear deterrent that
would prevent such action. Thus, the US rejected Iraq’s offer to with-
draw from Kuwait on the eve of Washington’s ground offensive.
Moreover, once Iraq was defeated, Washington imposed a victor’s
dictat meant to destroy the country as a viable power. A different set
of decision-makers might have seen things differently, might have
calculated that permitting Iraq to retreat or at least accept an hon-
ourable defeat would better serve regional stability than attempting
to destroy it. But given the men in power in Washington, the war and
its aftermath was virtually over-determined (Elizabeth Drew, ‘Letter
from Washington’, New Yorker, 4 February 1991; John Mack and
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Los Angeles Times, 31 January 1991; Coleman
McCarthy, Washington Post, 17 February 1991; Christian Science
Monitor, 25 January 1991).
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The consequences of the Gulf War: new world order or disorder? 
The Gulf War did not, as some expected, radically transform the
Middle East system which, instead, remained locked into the old
power politics. What it did do was open the region to much greater
external penetration and shift the regional balance of power to the
advantage of the non-Arab peripheries. While the war opened a
window of opportunity to advance a resolution of the Arab–Israeli
conflict, Arab weakness, American hegemony and Israeli superiority
prevented the equitable compromises that alone might have issued in
a settlement. Without such a settlement, any attempt to shape a new
order based on legitimacy rather than force was doomed.
Power politics in a Pan-Arab vacuum
The second Gulf War both reflected and contributed to the further
enervation of the remnants of Arab solidarity that had heretofore
contained inter-Arab conflict. Saddam Hussein’s use of Arabism to
justify his invasion of another Arab state discredited the sentiment
among Gulf Arabs. The formation of the anti-Iraq coalition showed
how decision-making in the Arab states was driven almost exclu-
sively by individual geo-political interests and Western economic or
security dependency and hardly at all by supra-state identity. That
a majority of the states of the Arab League voted to invite foreign
intervention against Iraq demonstrated that the sanctity of borders
had achieved legitimacy – at least among governments – at the
expense of Arab identity and norms against Western intervention
(Barnett 1998: 217). Inter-Arab institutions were much weakened:
the coalition states, led by Egypt, once the champion of Pan-Arabism,
had manipulated the Arab League into facilitating Western interven-
tion against another member of the League at the expense of an
‘Arab solution’ to the crisis. 
In the post-war period, the Arab League was paralysed, with no
agreement possible on holding an Arab summit between 1990 and
1996 even though momentous decisions were being taken affecting
the common Arab interest, notably in the Arab–Israel peace process.
This paralysis reflected, above all, the inability to heal the rift
between Iraq (and to a degree its supporters) and the Gulf Arabs,
especially Kuwait, which distanced themselves from Arab core con-
cerns such as Palestine. The Arab League Secretary-General, pre-
sumably the keeper of the common interest, announced that
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henceforth no Arab state could interfere in another’s definition of
its own interest and security. Brief hopes for the creation of a new
collective Arab security framework embracing Egypt, Syria and
the GCC under the Damascus Declaration failed when the latter
chose to rely on Western treaties, further enervating the Arab norm
against overt foreign treaties and bases (Barnett 1998: 227–8; Faour
1993: 84–5). While Saddam’s arousal of the Arab street in the Gulf
War had showed the durability of mass Pan-Arab sentiment, it was
contained by authoritarian regimes, receded in the wake of Iraq’s
defeat, and ceased to be a constraint on states in the post-war
Arab–Israeli negotiations. 
A main effect of Arab fragmentation was the increased ability of
hostile periphery states to exploit Arab divisions and their greater
engagement in balancing against Arab states. The virtual collapse of
Arab collective security was sharply exposed amidst the intensifica-
tion and cross-border spillover of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict. The
conflict not only drew Turkey into punitive expeditions in northern
Iraq against Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) guerrillas, but also sharp-
ened disputes with Syria, which gave sanctuary to the PKK. This
dovetailed with a conflict over Turkey’s control of Euphrates water
on which Iraq and Syria were dependent in which Syria was trying
to use the PKK as counter-leverage against Ankara. For this and other
reasons, Turkey and Israel entered a security pact, which, in enabling
Israeli forces to use Turkish territory, encircled Syria and threatened
Iraq and Iran. Arguably, the water dispute between Turkey and
downstream Arab states was a precursor to an increasing struggle
over control of an ever scarcer and utterly vital resource that could
become as important to the region as the older battle over oil.
Arguably, too, both the military and water security of Arab states
were at stake in this conflict but the continued paralysis of Arab col-
lective institutions was underlined by the outcome of the conflict.
When, in 1998, Turkey’s threats of war against Syria forced it to
expel the PKK, not only was Arab support for Syria ineffective but
Jordan was actually tacitly aligned with the Israeli–Turkish alliance.
If there was any check to this alignment it was the countervailing
power of the Syrian–Iranian alliance. This episode made it clear that,
far from a new collective security system taking hold, intractable
conflict and military power remained central to the region’s interna-
tional relations. This was all the more so because the promise that
the post-war Arab–Israeli peace process would resolve the region’s
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most enduring conflict also proved illusionary (Carley 1995: 16–19;
El-Shazly and Hinnebusch 2001: 78–80; Kirisci 1997).
A flawed peace process 
The 1990s did begin with movement, starting with the 1992 Madrid
Peace conference, toward the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The peace process had its roots in the rising costs of the conflict in
the 1980s and a very gradual and uneven realisation by both sides
of the declining utility of force in reaching their goals. For both
Israel and the PLO the 1982 Lebanon War was decisive. Israel paid
a high cost but failed to reach many of its objectives while the
PLO’s loss of its south Lebanon military front made armed struggle
obsolescent as a method of realising Palestinian national rights. The
focus of Palestinian resistance became the ‘intifada’ – an unarmed
rebellion in the occupied territories, which the Israelis tried to
repress by force and economic deprivation. The intifada put
Palestine back on the world agenda and cost Israel international
opprobrium. Only as the PLO thus achieved international legiti-
macy could it afford to recognise Israel and in November 1988
it accepted UN Resolution 242, contingent on acquisition of a
Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The consequent US deci-
sion to start a dialogue with the PLO after it renounced terrorism,
presented a new opportunity but was taken by the Israeli elite to be
a threat against which the Labour and Likud parties joined in a
‘wall-to-wall coalition’ government. 
However, the two main Israeli parties were drawing apart. The
Likud government continued its drive to expand Jewish settlements
in occupied territory, ‘creating facts’ which it expected would put a
‘land-for-peace’ settlement beyond reach. This stimulated the rise of
terrorism by Islamic militants which pushed Israel both toward and
away from a negotiated settlement (Smith 1996: 302–8). Inside the
Labour party, by contrast, the traditional realist security doctrine
stressing the primacy of military power and territorial defence was
incrementally being challenged: on the one hand, by the new threat
to Israel from the regional spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), against which the occupied territories provided no
defence, a reality underlined by Iraq’s use of Scud missiles against it
during the Gulf War; on the other hand, by the growing effective-
ness of sub-state guerrilla warfare (in southern Lebanon), insur-
gency (the intifada) and terrorism which seemed to enervate Israel’s
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ability to translate conventional military superiority into security
and political ends. The increasing costs of containing the Palestinian
intifada raised doubts about the viability of the occupation status
quo. At the same time, Labour’s constituency, rooted in the new
technocratic-entrepreneurial middle class, was embracing an eco-
nomic strategy of globalisation and viewed peace negotiations as
crucial to overcoming Israel’s poor record in attracting investment
and to breaking out of the international diplomatic isolation which
obstructed its access to markets (Solingen 1998). 
However, it took global transformation and a watershed election
to stimulate a new peace initiative in Israel. The end to the Arabs’
Soviet patron, the defeat of Iraq and the grave weakening of the
PLO in the Gulf War reduced the conventional security threat to
Israel while a peace settlement offered the chance to neutralise both
the WMD and the internal Palestinian threats. Some Israelis, more-
over, believed the increasing readiness of the Palestinians and the
Arabs generally for a settlement presented a new opportunity to end
the conflict. The beginning of the Madrid peace talks and, in partic-
ular, of Syrian–Israeli negotiations, presented Israel with a very real
opportunity to finally attain regional acceptance and security. The
rejectionist Shamir government had no interest in taking up this
opportunity, but the US, motivated to consolidate its new domi-
nance in the area by engineering a settlement, pressurised Shamir to
enter negotiations at Madrid and he was forced to go through the
motions.
Then, in the 1993 Israeli elections, the electorate was given a
choice between the Likud’s rejectionism and the promise of serious
peace negotiations. The Israeli public was alarmed by how Shamir’s
intransigence had brought relations with the US to an unprece-
dented low, but, equally, his diversion of resources to the expansion
of settlements in the occupied territories at the expense of invest-
ment and jobs needed by his Sephardi constituency and the new
Soviet immigrants turned many of the latter against him; hence for
once, the domestic economic costs of foreign policy intransigence
came together with a favourable external situation, to stimulate a
shift in Israeli public opinion. The election of the relatively dovish-
leaning Labour–Meretz coalition under Rabin produced a govern-
ment with a unique composition. It incorporated younger more
dovish leaders around Shimon Peres, notably Yossi Beilin, who were
prepared to take some risks for peace while Prime Minister Rabin’s
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hard-line credentials gave him the credibility to break Israel’s tra-
ditional paralysis and seize the new opportunities (Aronoff and
Aronoff 1998: 14–15). The immediate outcome of this change in
Israeli policy was considerable progress in the peace negotiations.
But even this government, still ultimately driven by hard-headed
national security priorities, remained determined to extract the
maximum and concede the minimum in the negotiations. Given the
profound power imbalance in its favour, it was well situated to con-
front the Arabs with a choice between no settlement and one that
would concede them less than the internationally recognised land-
for-peace trade they had long considered their bottom line. 
This power imbalance was in part global, the disappearance of
Soviet backing on the Arab side and the American deployment of its
newly hegemonic power largely on Israel’s behalf. It was also,
however, a result of the decline of Arabism, which, fragmenting the
Arab states, put them at a major disadvantage in negotiating a new
order. This was sharply exposed by the inability of the Arabs to
convene a summit and reach a consensus on a common strategy
toward Israel. The US, on Israel’s behalf, insisted on and the Arab
states conceded separate negotiating tracks between the individual
Arab states and Israel, rather than an all-Arab team bargaining
jointly for a comprehensive settlement. The resulting inability of
Syria, the PLO and Jordan to hold to a common front in the nego-
tiations, and the consequent ease with which Israel played them off
against each other, weakened the leverage of each individual Arab
party. Despite protests by Syria that Israel should not enjoy the fruits
of peace before conceding its reality (Barnett 1998: 235), premature
normalisation by the Gulf states weakened pressure on Israel to
concede a comprehensive settlement. Barnett argues that Arab soli-
darity, rooted in the we-they fault fostered by threat, weakened as
the perceived Israeli threat declined in an environment where peace
seemed realistic and attainable. 
Given the weakness of an Arab collective stance, the Palestinians
may have seen no alternative to the unilateral deal reached at
Oslo. The Oslo accord produced the breakthrough of mutual
Palestinian–Israeli recognition and raised the prospect of Palestinian
self-determination, even statehood. However, the PLO negotiators,
seemingly victims of wishful thinking, appeared to assume Oslo
would lead inevitably to a Palestinian state and critically failed
to insist that the accord stipulate the minimum condition for
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confidence-building, namely, an end to further Jewish settlement on
the Palestinian land which would potentially constitute such a
Palestinian state. The accord merely committed Israel to negotiate
with the PLO over a vague set of principles and, given the power
imbalance between a regional superpower and a non-state actor, the
outcome of such negotiations was bound to be inequitable. To reach
an equitable settlement, the more powerful side would have to make
the most concessions; only if a mediator had weighed in to right the
power imbalance was such an outcome likely but, perversely, the
Americans consistently reinforced the more powerful Israeli side
(Murphy 1997: 122–3). 
Nor did the Arab world add any serious weight to the Palestinian
side. The PLO, in striking a separate deal with Israel, assumed full
responsibility for the fate of the Palestinians, marking a watershed
in releasing remaining constraints from public opinion on the Arab
states to pay even lip service to the Palestinian cause. Oslo thus pre-
cipitated Jordanian and Syrian moves toward their own separate
agreements with Israel. Subsequently, neither Syrian objections nor
domestic opposition deterred King Hussein from reaching a peace
treaty and normalisation with Israel despite the lack of a compar-
able settlement on the Palestinian and Syrian fronts. Most remark-
ably, Israel and Syria tacitly agreed on the principles of a land for
peace settlement over the Golan Heights and made considerable
progress in negotiating the details of the necessary security arrange-
ments. The state-to-state conflict between Israel and the Arab states
was, thus, largely neutralised: it seemed very unlikely the Arab states
would ever again combine against Israel. Israel came to believe that
it could have peace with the Arab states without necessarily conced-
ing the minimum to Palestinian self-determination, although most
Arab states still felt it the better part of wisdom to refrain from more
than incremental moves toward normalisation of relations prior to
such a comprehensive settlement.
The development of Israeli–PLO negotiations under the Oslo
accords, including the proposals of Ehud Barak in 2000, pointed
toward a grossly inequitable settlement that risked merely legitim-
ising and systematising an indirect form of Israeli rule. To be sure,
an autonomous Palestinian Authority (PA), possessing the rudimen-
tary institutions of statehood, was established under PLO leader-
ship on limited parts of West Bank and Gaza territory. However,
Israel continued the expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied
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territories and by 2000 Israel had seized 42 per cent of Palestinian
land on the West Bank for settlement (Guardian, 15 May 2002, p.
11). Israel made it clear it hoped to satisfy the Palestinians with
autonomy on the remaining parts of this territory without accord-
ing them sovereign statehood. It seemed likely that in any final set-
tlement the Palestinian entity would incorporate perhaps 77 per
cent of the West Bank and Gaza while substantial blocks of settle-
ments around Jerusalem would be incorporated into Israel (in
return for desert land). Palestinian self-rule areas were likely to be
Bantustans, lacking territorial contiguity, surrounded by Israeli
security roads and settlements, and always vulnerable to reoccupa-
tion. While Barak’s proposals insisted on Israel retaining sixty-nine
Jewish settlements where 85 per cent of the settlers lived – in viola-
tion of the Geneva convention – in the Gaza strip alone, 1.2 million
Palestinians were penned into a tiny area with little economic pros-
pects. The Palestinian entity, reduced to a captive export market and
a source of cheap labour for Israel, and deprived of all but a frac-
tion of the water resources (that had been appropriated by Israel),
was unlikely to be economically viable and certain to remain finan-
cially dependent on Western donors for the foreseeable future.
Needing to appease Israel, the PA was reduced to the role of enforc-
ing Israeli security demands against its own people, saving Israel the
costs of direct occupation. The emerging Palestinian entity would
enjoy few of the attributes of true sovereignty, including control of
its airspace, sea coast and borders, but in return for self-rule would
be required to forfeit the rights of return or compensation of the
exiled Palestinian Diaspora which are enshrined in UN resolu-
tions (Hagopian 1997; Karmi 1999; Kubursi 1999; Murphy 1997:
123–30; Zunes 2001).
Indicative of the precarious grounding of this elite-led peace
process in domestic society was its periodic breakdown into vio-
lence. Continued Israeli settlement activity inflamed Islamic terror-
ism against Israelis; this led to election of the hard-line Netanyahu
government which tried to renege on the implementation of Oslo
and pushed a Syrian–Israeli settlement off the agenda. This finally
precipitated an Arab summit, the first since the Gulf War, which
resolved to make normalisation of relations with Israel dependent
on implementation of the peace process (Barnett 1998: 221–6). The
Ehud Barak government elected in 1999 briefly revitalised the
process. Syria and Israel, between whom there was a rough power
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balance, came very close to a settlement, but each, playing realist
hardball, missed the chance and much the same happened in Barak’s
negotiations with the PA.1 The failure of the latter negotiations pre-
cipitated the second and much more violent al-Aqsa intifada in 2000
which coincided with the rise of the ultra-rightist Ariel Sharon to
power in Israel and the resurrection of militant Islamic alternatives
to Arafat’s PLO among the Palestinians. The failure of the moder-
ates to reach an equitable agreement had allowed the rejectionists
on both sides to escape their early-1990s marginalisation and to
reclaim the dominant ground. Even if the application of massive
Israeli repression forces the PA to accept an Israeli-imposed settle-
ment, such a false peace would lack the legitimacy necessary to
endure without continuing massive repression and economic subju-
gation. As such, it would be likely to de-legitimise the PA and any
Arab leaders that accepted it, undermining rather than cementing
the region’s precarious stability. 
Failed pluralist designs
The peace process was promoted as an opening wedge to regional
economic integration and globalisation. The multilateral talks held
within the Madrid framework on water and economic co-operation
between Israel and the Arabs were expected to build confidence,
while economic normalisation was to be an incentive and guaran-
tor of peace. Several conferences, bringing together officials and
business people from the Arab states and Israel promoted trade and
joint ventures and a Middle East Development Bank was proposed
to facilitate this. A Middle East Common Market was advocated by
Shimon Peres in which Israel would contribute technology, the Arab
oil states capital and markets and the non-oil states labour. The
resulting economic interdependence would arguably create cross-
national business interests with a stake in peace. 
However, the practical prospects for Arab–Israeli economic
integration appeared quite selective at the end of the 1990s. Israel
and the oil-poor Arab states had little in common and Israeli eco-
nomic relations with Egypt, in spite of their long peace treaty,
remained minimal. Amidst continuing political mistrust, the Israeli–
American-backed Middle East market was perceived by some Arabs
as an Israeli bid to conquer through market power what it could not
do militarily. Given that Israel’s GNP equalled that of Egypt, Syria
and Jordan combined, economic integration would likely make
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Israel the core of the regional economy, enabling it to exploit cheap
Arab labour and energy and turning neighbours such as Jordan and
the Palestinian entity into economic satellites (Aarts 1999; Korany
1997). While the small Arab entrepreneurial classes that could
benefit from such lopsided development might acquire a stake in
peace, it was also likely to inflame nationalist/Islamist opposition. 
An alternative project envisioned globalisation advancing
regional peace, not because regional partners were economically
integrated but because individual states were tied into the global
economy by economic liberalisation. In this scenario, influence
would flow away from the military and toward liberal internation-
alist elements in ruling coalitions which understood that regional
access to global investment and markets was dependent on regional
peace and Western alignment (Solingen 1998). Indeed, an early pre-
cursor of this route was Sadat’s Egypt where economic liberalisa-
tion, Western alignment and peace with Israel went hand in hand;
Jordan, likewise, opted for peace with Israel to restore the economic
aid it had lost for siding with Iraq in the Gulf War and to revitalise
a depressed economy badly needing foreign investment. Iran’s post-
war need for investment was paralleled by the moderation of its
foreign policy. 
But these developments were far from creating the ‘complex
interdependence’ that makes war unthinkable, as the record of the
region’s two most ‘globalised’ states makes clear. It was Israel that
most successfully pursued globalisation as an alternative to regional
integration, using Oslo to end the Arab secondary boycott which
had effectively limited its economic relations and the peace process
to attract high-tech MNCs which would export to East Asia and
Europe (Murphy 1997: 132–4); yet this did not prevent the election
of the ultra-nationalist Sharon, a leader prepared to jeopardise
Israeli prosperity in defence of Likud’s irredentist project. Turkey,
similarly prioritised the repression of the Kurdish insurgency over
good relations with the EU. 
The notion that globalisation spreads the zone of peace rests, in
part, on the expectation that it delivers economic prosperity which
populations will not wish to sacrifice in conflicts; but in the Middle
East this is doubtful, at least in the short run. As chapter 2 showed,
the region as a whole continues to suffer from a massive export of
capital, continuing debt and dependency and very limited economic
development amidst high population growth (Guerrieri 1997). The
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spearheads of globalisation, notably the IMF, harnessed regional
states to enforce their neo-liberal agenda against recalcitrant popu-
lations, splitting societies between new bourgeoisies who benefited
and the marginalised masses that turned to radical Islam as a vehicle
of protest (Abdel-Fadil 1997; Farsoun and Zacharia 1995). The
Euro-Mediterranean initiative, designed to consolidate and acceler-
ate globalisation in the region by systematically imposing the core’s
liberal order on each of the regional states, made breakthroughs in
Morocco and Tunisia. But this scheme, in opening Middle East
industries to ruinous European competition while maintaining the
protection of Europe’s agricultural markets from Middle Eastern
exports, merely reflected the profound power imbalance between
Europe and the Middle East (Joffe 1999; Owen 1999). 
Nor did globalisation stimulate the political democratisation
and ‘democratic peace’ its advocates expected. While economic lib-
eralisation was accompanied by limited political liberalisation
experiments, these were stalled and even reversed by the rise of
Islamic political movements, fuelled by the damaging impact of
structural adjustment on marginal populations and by the West-
ward foreign policy alignments and accommodations with Israel
which accompanied economic liberalisation. Egypt’s Mubarak,
whose government’s IMF-imposed structural adjustment was re-
versing the populist social contract and who portrayed his fight
against political Islam as a stand on behalf of the Western world,
could hardly afford democratisation and reversed his previous
halting steps toward it. Intense though peaceful domestic opposition
to Jordan’s separate peace with Israel forced King Hussein to put
Jordan’s democratisation on hold. Generally, externally-driven
peace agreements and economic liberalisation have been obstacles
to rather than facilitators of democratisation in the Middle East.
The region’s ‘internationalist coalitions’, thus, remain dependent on
Western support, not domestic legitimacy. At the end of the century,
the pluralist design showed little sign of generating a new political
order in the Middle East. 
The failure of Pax Americana
American attempts to substitute for an indigenous order with a Pax
Americana were also failing. To be sure, the Middle East was excep-
tionally impacted by the rise of US hegemony for, unlike other
regions, there was no regional great power, comparable to China or
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India, which could balance it. The defeat of Iraq and the much-
enhanced American military presence in the Gulf seemed to effec-
tively deter any future challenges to Washington. Its manipulation
of the UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq demonstrated its
ability to punish recalcitrant actors as never before. The US spon-
sorship of the Arab–Israeli peace process also made it pivotal to the
interests of all regional actors, including Arab nationalist Syria, and
fostered a potential Israeli regional hegemony working in concert
with Washington. US influence was also exercised indirectly through
the other most powerful states in the region – Egypt, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia. The dependence of the Arab Gulf, especially Saudi
Arabia, on American protection from a resurgent Iraq and Iran
abetted US determination to maintain its enhanced military pres-
ence. Those regional powers not yet resigned to American hegemony
– Syria, Iraq, Iran – were surrounded and contained or co-opted.
However, if there ever was a chance for the US to use its unri-
valled power to foster a stable regional security order, Washington
missed it and instead, in certain ways, it actually exacerbated the
insecurity of the region. First, massive arms sales to the Gulf states
and Israel, largely by the US, threatened the military balance and
spurred a counter-build-up by the Syro-Iranian axis and hence an
increased level of regional militarisation. The expectation of a
decline in the utility of military force after the Cold War hardly
applied to the Middle East where weapons proliferation continued,
with all its repercussions for the ‘security dilemma’. Insecurity
also fuelled a drive by regional states to acquire non-conventional
deterrents. Of the twenty-five countries having or developing bal-
listic missile capabilities, eleven were in the Middle East (Norton,
1991: 20–1). Again, the US passed up a chance to check the non-
conventional arms race by backing Israel’s refusal to sign the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact; inevitably, despite US efforts to
prevent it, when one side acquires non-conventional weapons and
delivery systems, other states will seek the capability to deter the
threat they pose.
Washington’s policy of designating and isolating ‘pariah states’
was also ultimately destabilising. The ‘Dual Containment’ of Iran
and Iraq obstructed the moderation and normalisation of Iran’s role
in the region. But it was the American exacerbation of the problem
of Iraq that was the main source of regional instability. In the wake
of the Gulf War, the American-dominated Security Council imposed
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unprecedented demands on Iraq – to dismantle its chemical and
biological weapons and missiles, to recognise a Kuwaiti border
imposed without consultation with Iraq, to pay reparations from oil
exports and forgo claims to compensation, to seek permission for all
imports, and to submit to international inspection. Later, no-fly
zones were unilaterally imposed and enforced by an on-going US–UK
air campaign against Iraq. A decade after the Gulf War, Washington
continued to obstruct all initiatives to lift economic sanctions on the
country.
The aim was not just to strip Iraq of non-conventional weapons,
but to impose sufficient suffering that Saddam would be toppled
from within or, that failing, to keep Iraq permanently weak. While
the limits imposed on imports of food and medicine by the sanctions
regime were an irritant, the major damage was its use to prevent the
reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, preventing the restoration of
irrigation and industry and the repair of disease-controlling sanita-
tion systems. The consequences were devastating for Iraq. From
6,000 to 7,000 children a month were dying of sanctions-related
causes according to Denis Halliday, the UN humanitarian co-
ordinator for Iraq who argued that the Washington-imposed sanc-
tions regime ‘amounted to genocide’ (Middle East International, 12
February 1999, p. 23). Radiation from the depleted uranium
weapons used by the US was reported to have contaminated wide
areas. Yet Washington remained oblivious to the human costs of its
policies which Secretary of State Madeline Albright notoriously
declared to be ‘worth paying’. Keeping Iraq as a pariah state,
however, only postponed and exacerbated the unavoidable problem
of rehabilitating and readmitting it to the regional system. The sanc-
tions – making Iraqis more dependent on state rations for daily sur-
vival – actually strengthened Saddam Hussein’s hold on power while
his external ambitions could easily have been contained without
the intrusive and punitive measures that constantly inflamed
Iraqi–Western relations. The refusal to let Iraq get on with post-war
reconstruction deterred it from what would otherwise likely have
been a natural turning inward to its own problems. A whole gener-
ation of Iraqis, victimised by Western sanctions backed by Iraq’s
Gulf neighbours, had legitimate grievances possibly mobilisable by
revanchist leaders in the future (Graham-Brown 1999; Niblock
2001; Simons 1996). 
There, were however, recessive but important counterforces to
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US hegemony. Its ability to lead in the Gulf War had been a function
of the broad threat Saddam Hussein posed to a variety of actors –
both the economic interests of the industrialised states, and the sanc-
tity of borders so dear to Third World states – but this threat had
been largely neutralised (Norton 1991: 23). US hegemony depended
in good part on the acquiescence of other world powers and major
regional powers. This could only be readily sustained if the hegemon
consulted with and satisfied the interests of these partners and if it
was effective in dealing with the two main threats to regional stabil-
ity, Iraq and the Arab–Israel conflict. Yet the special relation with
Israel which was supposed to allow the US to broker a resolution of
the Arab–Israeli conflict had failed to deliver an equitable or perma-
nent solution ten years after the start of the Madrid peace process.
The US was more successful in containing Iraq, a conflict in which
its military power was most readily deployed; however, even in this
case, US policy, in keeping the conflict going, actually exacerbated
regional instability and was pursued in increased disregard of the
interests of other states. 
Washington’s inability to mobilise the UNSC in the 1998 Iraq
inspections crisis indicated an erosion in its hegemony that allowed
Iraq to exploit conflicts of interest between the core states. US unilat-
eralism had its limits: since it did not finance the Gulf War, it is ques-
tionable whether the US could act alone in a future land confrontation
with Iraq. The attempt of the US to impose, through extra-territorial
legislation, the isolation of Iran also aroused impatience with its uni-
lateralism. US policy provoked a similar dissatisfaction and an
increased independence among even its closest regional allies. Egypt
proved a disappointment to Washington by its campaign to force
Israel into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in the late 1990s and
its refusal to pressure the PA into an inequitable final status deal with
Israel in 2000. Saudi Arabia refused the use of its bases to stage air
attacks on Iraq and later Afghanistan. Increased co-operation
between Syria and Iraq raised the possibility of a Syrian–Iraqi–Iranian
axis seeking to contain American intrusion.
At the popular level revulsion against American hegemony was
much more advanced. The Middle East was the one region where
Western ideological hegemony remained contested: to this extent
Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, though exagger-
ated, had a core of truth, for Western penetration did stimulate
a resurgence of cultural and religious resistance: ‘Islamic jihad’
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reacting to McDonaldisation (Barber 1992). However, the West was
not chiefly resisted for its supposedly antithetical values, many of
which were actually shared by local people or for its material super-
iority, the products of which were widely embraced in the region.
Rather, the West was resented because it was seen to pursue an
agenda targeting the Muslim and Arab worlds. The Western-identi-
fied enemies of the New World Order, the ‘terrorist’ groups and the
‘pariah states’ were exceptionally concentrated in the Middle East –
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan. The double standards of the US – its
ongoing attacks against a virtually defenceless Iraq and the victim-
isation of the Iraqi people by an unending sanctions regime in the
name of UN resolutions, juxtaposed to the approval of overt Israeli
violations of UN resolutions and the pressure to accept a trium-
phant Israel without the satisfaction of internationally recognised
Palestinian national rights – were blatant in the eyes of Middle
Eastern publics (Salem 1997: 32). To the considerable extent US
hegemony therefore lacks ideological legitimacy in the region,
American influence is always on the verge of ‘deflating’ to the threat
and use of crude military force which is much more costly to employ. 
The dilemma in which this put Arab governments, caught be-
tween the US and their own people, was captured by Rami Khouri’s
(1998) comments on the resolutions of a conference of Arab parlia-
mentarians condemning the 1998 ‘Desert Fox’ air campaign against
Iraq:
The Arab parliamentarians express their people’s intense emotional
and political anger with the US and UK, and make rhetorical and
symbolic gestures of solidarity with Iraq; but they cannot change
Anglo-American . . . policies to Iraq . . . [as] many Arab states depend
heavily on the United States (and Europe) for financial support, tech-
nical assistance, food, markets, armaments, diplomatic support, or
sheer survival through direct military protection . . . [while] Arab par-
liaments will not defy Arab . . . power elites . . . the exercise of polit-
ical power that is not subjected to checks-and-balances . . . results in
tyranny by the powerful and dependency by the weak. 
Laura Guazzone (1997: 237–58) points out the paradox of US heg-
emony in the region: while at the military level it stabilises the
Middle East against revisionist states, its biased and inequitable
application continually stimulates the nationalist and Islamic re-
action at the societal level that keeps the regional pot boiling. As
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such, it is questionable whether the US actually delivers the stabil-
ity expected of a hegemon.
Magnet for terrorism
In this situation, indigenous resistance increasingly took the form of
small group terrorism, the weapon of the weak. It is no accident that
the Middle East, the most penetrated regional system, has witnessed
by far the most international terrorist incidents or that the US is
increasingly the target. The September 11 2001 attacks by Osama
bin Laden’s terrorist network on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon raised this to a new level. While some interpreted the
attacks as a symptom of a ‘clash of civilisations’, in fact, Osama bin
Laden and his following of ‘Arab Afghans’ were partly a US crea-
tion, fostered against the Soviets in Afghanistan. They were turned
against the US, not by religious or cultural differences, but by its
continued presence in Saudi Arabia, ‘home of the two mosques’, its
perceived control over Arab oil, its siege of Iraq, and its support for
Israeli oppression of the Palestinians. The attacks were also a reflec-
tion of globalisation in that Bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida was a function of
the acceleration of global transportation, communications, and
immigration; multi-national in composition, it was a ‘post-modern’
terrorist network. In a globalised, intensely interdependent but
anarchic world, every US action now produces a multitude of unan-
ticipated reactions. Moreover, the geographic scope of opposition to
US policy has progressively widened from the Arab world to the
much wider Islamic world: first to Iran, then Afghanistan, now
increasingly publics are being inflamed by animosity toward
Washington from Pakistan to Indonesia, to the Islamic Diasporas in
the West itself. 
While most Middle East regimes have themselves been the targets
of ‘terrorism’ from disaffected elements of their own societies and
are either dependent on the US or fearful of its power, their overt
enlistment in an indiscriminate US ‘anti-terror’ campaign will likely
only further cost them precarious legitimacy and nourish radical
groups at home. Middle East public opinion, while shocked at the
loss of life in the 11 September attacks, widely believed that US
policy bore major responsibility for having stirred up the deep ani-
mosity on which terrorism flourished; but Washington denied that
fighting terrorism requires addressing its roots or that it was, itself,
part of the problem. If the US seeks to punish uninvolved groups,
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such as Hizbollah, which are perceived in the region as liberation
movements, or to act against the states on its ‘terrorism list’, includ-
ing Iran, Libya, Syria and Iraq, it will be perceived as initiating a war
against the Arab–Islamic world, not just certain terrorist groups or
pariah states. This would risk further inflaming populations across
and beyond the region and making the ‘clash of civilisations’ a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Pan-Arab revival?
In the first years of the new millennium, there were signs of a Pan-
Arab revival. This was driven firstly by common threats. The
massive repression of the al-Aqsa intifadah revived a sense of threat
from an Israel which, under Sharon and backed by the American
hegemon, seemed to be acting without restraints; the prospect of
peace gave way to the possibility of renewed war. The intense post-
September 11 pressure to enlist regional states in the American
‘war on terrorism’ and the prospect that the US might unleash
destabilising wars, beginning with an assault on Iraq, also tended
to bring Arab elites together in defence of shared Arab interests.
The revival of the summits systems gave some institutional expres-
sion to this new sense of Arabism at the inter-state level while the
deepening of trans-state discourse fostered by Arab satellite televi-
sion revived consciousness of a common Arab community at the
societal level. The most dramatic manifestation of the reconstruc-
tion of an Arab identity was the reconciliation of Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait with Iraq at the March 2002 Arab summit. Yet, the eco-
nomic and security dependency of key Arab states sharply limited
their capacity to withstand American pressure and the tendency of
each to seek individual security or gains by appeasing Washington
remained powerful.
Conclusion
The Gulf War and its aftermath massively heightened Western pen-
etration of the region in a way the architects of the Baghdad Pact
could only dream of. If this had been the price of increased regional
security and prosperity, many people in the Middle East might have
considered it worth paying. But American hegemony, far from in-
creasing either individual or collective security proved to be counter-
productive for regional order. 
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The collapse of the Arab–Israeli peace process was the nub of the
failure and suggests that it is not hegemony but symmetry in power
that facilitates order-building. At the Arab–Israeli level, conflict res-
olution was more likely to succeed when a relative power balance
inflicts a certain symmetry of costs on the parties, giving each the
incentive to accommodate the others’ interests. The relative Arab–
Israeli power balance emerging from the 1973 war provided the
incentive for both sides to enter the first peace process; a decade
later, mutual disaster in Lebanon provided another incentive for
Israel and the PLO. Where there was a reasonable balance of power,
each party could hope to secure its vital interests as Egypt and Israel
did in their peace settlement and as Israel and Syria later came close
to doing. Where the imbalance is too great an effective mediator
must try to right it; instead, however, the peace process was contin-
ually set back by massive American aid to Israel which, relieving it
of much of the costs of the conflict and reinforcing its military super-
iority, enabled it to insist on a peace settlement on its own terms.
Where the power symmetry was especially sharp, as in the Israeli–
Palestinian relation, the basic needs of the weaker party predictably
went unsatisfied and the conflict therefore remained intractable.
Assymetry at the regional level was inextricable from that at the
global level: for while the end to bi-polarity seemed to give America
the power to shape the Middle East order, it had removed much of
the incentive to make it an equitable one. 
Not just a power balance but normative agreement is important
to order-building. As Barnett argues (1996–97: 614–16), a stable
order depends on congruence between the normative expectations
of society and those of state elites. While the international hegemon
and key regional elites may believe there is no viable alternative to
the Middle East status quo, significant parts of indigenous society
retain visions of an Arab-Islamic order free of Western and Israeli
dominance. There remains a gap between the state-centric behavi-
our of Arab state elites, which privilege sovereignty, and the norma-
tive expectation, partly ‘domestic’ but still embedded in trans-state
discourse, that states should act on behalf of the shared (Arab) com-
munity. This gap taints the legitimacy of regimes and encourages
challenges to the regional order by sub- and trans-state movements
and ‘terrorist’ networks. The separation between elites and society
was sharply underlined by the 1994 Sharm al-Shaikh meeting of
a concert of state leaders, both Arab and Israeli, who identified
238 The international politics of the Middle East
the main security threat as internal – from radical Islamic terror
(Barnett 1996–97: 617).
To a very considerable extent, therefore, the regional status quo,
lacking indigenous popular legitimacy, is erected on hegemonic
external force and on economic and security relations which benefit
a relative few. The continued application of American force in the
region is thus essential to maintain the status quo but, paradoxically,
further undermines its legitimacy. What is now also becoming in-
creasingly clear is that regional instability cannot be confined to the
region. At least once per decade a major regional crisis, fed by fes-
tering conflicts, has erupted and spilled over into a world crisis. In
the latest case, the 11 September events, the particular character of
the crisis was shaped by the dominant features of the current inter-
national system, namely US hegemony and globalisation. The US
response, an intensification of its military intervention in the region,
appears likely to exacerbate the problem it seeks to address. 
Notes
1 It is a myth that Arafat rejected a ‘generous’ offer from Barak of a
Palestinian state on over 90 per cent of the West Bank/Gaza. See Malley
and Agha (2001); Clark (2002); and the interview with Robert Mallay
in Middle East Insight, 16:5, November–December 2001, 57–62. 
The Middle East in a decade of globalisation 239
Bibliography
Aarts, Paul (1994), ‘The New Oil Order: built on sand?’, Arab Studies
Quarterly, 16:2, 1–12.
——(1999), ‘The Middle East: A region without regionalism or the end of
exceptionalism?’, Third World Quarterly, 20:5, 911–25.
Abdalla, Ahmad (1991), ‘Mubarak’s gamble’, Middle East Report, 21:1,
no. 168, January–February, 18–21.
Abdel-Fadil, Mahmoud (1997), ‘Macroeconomic tendencies and policy
options in the Arab region’, in Laura Guazzone, ed., The Middle East in
Global Change, London, Macmillan Press, 119–34.
Ahmad, Feroz (1993), The Making of Modern Turkey, London, Routledge.
Ajami, Fouad (1977–78), ‘Stress in the Arab Triangle’, Foreign Policy, 29,
90–108.
——(1981), The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice
since 1967, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Allison, Graham and Morton Halperin (1972), ‘Bureaucratic politics: a
paradigm and some policy implications’, World Politics, 24 (Supple-
ment), 40–79.
Alnasrawi, Abbas (1991), Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political
Economy of Dependency, New York and London, Greenwood Press.
Amin, Samir (1978), The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles,
London, Zed Press.
Anderson, Lisa (1986), The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and
Libya, 1830–1980, Princeton, N J, Princeton University Press.
——(1987), ‘The state in the Middle East and North Africa’, Comparative
Politics, 20:1.
——(1991), ‘Legitimacy, identity and the writing of history in Libya’, in E.
Davis and N. Gavrielides, eds, Statecraft in the Middle East, Miami,
Florida International University Press.
Aronoff, Myron J. and Yael S. Aronoff (1998), ‘Domestic determinants of
Israeli foreign policy’, in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East and
the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, Gainesville, FL,
University Press of Florida, 11–34.
Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), The Third World Security Predicament, State
Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Boulder, CO,
Lynne Rienner Press.
Ayubi, Nazih (1988), ‘Arab bureaucracies: expanding size, changing roles’,
in A. Dawisha and I. W. Zartman, eds, Beyond Coercion: The Durability
of the Arab State, London, Croom Helm, 14–34.
——(1995), Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle
East, London, I. B. Taurus.
Ayubi, Shaheen (1994), Nasser and Sadat: Decision-Making and Foreign
Policy, 1970–1972, Lanham, Maryland, NY, London, University Press
of America.
Bahbah, Bishara (1991), ‘The crisis in the Gulf: why Iraq invaded Kuwait’,
in Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, eds, Beyond the Storm: A
Gulf Crisis Reader, New York, Olive Branch Press, 50–4.
Barber, Benjamin (1992), ‘Jihad v. McWorld’, Atlantic Monthly, March,
53–63.
Barnett, Michael (1993), ‘Institutions, roles and disorder: the case
of the Arab states system’, International Studies Quarterly, 37:3,
271–96.
——(1995), ‘Nationalism, sovereignty, and regional order in the Arab
states system’, International Organization, 49:3, 479–510.
——(1996–97), ‘Regional security after the Gulf war’, Political Science
Quarterly, 111:4, 597–617.
——(1998), Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order,
New York, Columbia University Press.
Batatu, Hanna (1978), The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary
Movements of Iraq, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
——(1981), ‘Some observations on the social roots of Syria’s ruling mili-
tary group and the causes of its dominance’, Middle East Journal, 35:3,
331–44.
——(1982), ‘Syria’s Muslim Brethren’, MERIP Reports, 12:9, no. 110,
November–December, 12–20.
Battah, Abdullah and Yehuda Lukas (1988), eds, The Arab–Israeli Conflict:
Two Decades of Change, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Beblawi, Hazem and Giacomo Luciani (1987), The Rentier State, London,
Croom Helm.
Bibliography 241
Berberoglu, Berch (1989), Power and Stability in the Middle East, London,
Zed Books.
Bina, Cyrus (1993), ‘The rhetoric of oil and the dilemma of war and
American hegemony’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 15:3, 1–20.
Brand, Laurie (1995), Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political
Economy of Alliance Making, New York, Columbia University Press.
Brecher, Michael (1972), The Foreign Policy System of Israel, London,
Oxford University Press.
Brinton, Crane (1938), An Anatomy of Revolution, New York, Norton.
Bromley, Simon (1990), American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry,
the State System and the World Economy, Oxford, Polity Press.
——(1994), Rethinking Middle East Politics, Oxford, Polity Press.
Brown, L. Carl (1984), International Politics and the Middle East: Old
Rules, Dangerous Game, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
——(1988), ‘The June 1967 war: a turning point?’, in Yehuda Lukas and
Abdalla M. Battah, eds, The Arab–Israeli Conflict, Boulder, CO, West-
view Press, 133–46.
——, ed. (2001), Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International
Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, London and New York, I.
B. Tauris, 2001.
Bull, Hedley (1995), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics, Second edition, London, Macmillan Press.
Buzan, Barry (1991), ‘New patterns of global security in the twenty-first
century’, International Affairs, 67:3, 246–7.
Calabrese, John (1994), Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy
in Post-Khomeini Iran, New York and London, St. Martins/Macmillan.
Calvert, Peter (1986), The Foreign Policies of New States, Sussex,
Wheatshift Books.
Cantori, Louis J. and Steven L. Spiegel (1970), The International Politics of
Regions: A Comparative Approach, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice
Hall, 192–207.
Carley, Patricia (1995), Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, Washington, DC,
US Institute of Peace.
Chatelus, Michel (1993), ‘From the mirage of rent to the burden of debt:
adjustment and insecurity in Arab economies’, in B. Korany, P. Noble
and R. Brynen, eds, The Many Faces of National Security in the Middle
East, New York, Macmillan, 145–68.
Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz (1991), ‘On the way to the market: economic liber-
alization and Iraq’s invasion’, Middle East Report, 21:3, no. 170, 14–23.
——(1997) The Price of Wealth, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
242 Bibliography
Chubin, Shahram (1994), Iran’s National Security Policy, Capabilities,
Intentions, Impact, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace.
Clapham, Christopher (1977), Foreign Policymaking in Developing States,
Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, Saxon House.
Clark, David, ‘The brilliant offer Israel never made; Guardian, 10 April,
2002.
Clawson, Patrick (1989), Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria’s Military Buildup
and Economic Crisis, Washington, DC, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.
Cobban, Helena (1991), The Superpowers and the Syrian–Israeli Conflict,
New York, Praeger, The Washington Papers, no. 149.
Cordesman, Anthony H. (1984), The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability, Boulder, CO and London, Westview Press and Mansell
Publishing.
Cottam, Richard (1979), Nationalism in Iran, Pittsburgh, PA, University of
Pittsburgh Press.
Cremeans, Charles (1963), The Arabs and the World: Nasser’s Arab
Nationalist Policy, New York, Praeger.
Crystal, Jill (1991), Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants
in Kuwait and Qatar, New York and London, Cambridge University
Press.
Darnovsky, Marcy, L. A. Kauffman and Billy Robinson (1991), ‘Warring
stories: reading and contesting the New Order’, Socialist Review, 91:1
David, Steven (1991), ‘Explaining Third World alignment’, World Politics,
43:2, 233–56.
Dawisha, Adeed (1976), Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign
Policy, New York, Wiley.
——(1978a), ‘Syria Under Asad, 1970–1978: the centres of power’,
Government and Opposition, 13:3, 341–54.
——(1978b), ‘Syria’s intervention in Lebanon, 1975–1976’, Jerusalem
Journal of International Relations, 3:2–3, 245–64.
——(1979), Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, Adelphi Papers, no. 158.
——(1990), ‘Arab regimes: legitimacy and foreign policy’, in Giacomo
Luciani, ed., The Arab State, London, Routledge.
Dawisha, Adeed and I. William Zartman (1988), Beyond Coercion: The
Durability of the Arab State, London, Croom Helm.
Dekmejian, R. Hrair (1971), Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political
Dynamics, Albany, State University of New York Press, 105–8.
Bibliography 243
Dessouki, Ali ad-Din Hillal (1982), ‘The new Arab political order: implica-
tions for the eighties’, in Malcolm Kerr and El Sayed Yassin, eds, Rich and
Poor States in the Middle East, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 319–47.
——(1991) ‘The primacy of economics: the foreign policy of Egypt’, in
Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, The Foreign Policies of
Arab States: The Challenge of Change, Boulder, CO, Westview Press,
156–85.
Devlin, John (1976), The Ba`th Party: A History from its Origins to 1966,
Stanford, Hoover Institution Press.
——(1992), ‘Leadership style and oil policy: Syria and Iraq’, Energy Policy,
November 1992, 1048–54.
Diab, Zuheir (1994), ‘Have Syria and Israel opted for peace?’, Middle East
Policy, 3:2, 77–90.
Dorraj, Manochehr (1993), ‘Will OPEC survive?’, Arab Studies Quarterly,
15:4, 19–32.
Doyle, Michael (1995), ‘On the democratic peace’, International Security,
19:4.
Drysdale, Alasdair (1979), ‘Ethnicity in the Syrian officer corps: a concep-
tualization’, Civilisations, 29:3–4, 359–73.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (1995), After Khomeini: The Iranian Second
Republic, London, Routledge.
——(1997), ‘Security structures in the Middle East: an overview’, in Haifaa
Jawad, ed., The Middle East in the New World Order, London,
Macmillan, 97–109.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (1997), Syria and
Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, London,
Routledge.
Eickelman, Dale F. (1998), ‘From here to modernity: Ernest Gellner on
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism’, in John A. Hall, ed., The State
of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 258–71.
El-Shazly, Nadia and Raymond Hinnebusch (2001), ‘The challenge of
security in the post-Gulf war “Middle East System,”’ in Raymond
Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds, The Foreign Policies of
Middle East States, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Press, 71–90.
Evron, Yair (1973), Nations, Superpowers and Wars, London, Elek Books.
——(1987), War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Syrian–Israeli
Deterrence Dialogue, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Fahmy, Ismail (1983), Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press.
244 Bibliography
Faour, Muhammed (1993), The Arab World after Desert Storm,
Washington, DC, US Institute of Peace Press.
Farah, Tawfiq and Feisal Salam (1980), ‘Group affiliations of children in
the Arab Middle East (Kuwait)’, Journal of Social Psychology, 111.
Farsoun, Samih (1991), ‘A new balance of forces’, Middle East Report,
21:1, 4–7.
Farsoun, Samih and Christina Zacharia (1995), ‘Class, economic change,
and political liberalization in the Arab World’, in Rex Brynen, Bahgat
Korany and Paul Noble, eds, Political Liberalization and Democrat-
ization in the Arab world, v. 1, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Press,
261–80.
Frankel, Glenn (1991), ‘Lines in the sand’, in Micah Sifry and Christopher
Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books, 16–29.
Fuller, Graham (1997), ‘Turkey and the Middle East northern tier’, in Laura
Guazzone, ed., The Middle East in Global Change, London, Macmillan
Press, 43–57.
Galtung, Johan (1971), ‘A structural theory of imperialism’, Journal of
Peace Research, 8:2, 81–98.
Gause, F. Gregory III (1991), ‘Revolutionary fevers and regional contagion:
domestic structures and the export of revolution in the Middle East’,
Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, 14:3, 1–23.
——(1992)’,Sovereignty, statecraft and stability in the Middle East’,
Journal of International Affairs, 45:2, 441–67.
——(1994), Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab
Gulf States, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press.
——(1997), ‘Arms supplies and military spending in the Gulf’, Middle East
Report, 27:3, no. 204, July–September, 12–14.
George, David (1996), ‘Pax-Islamica: an alternative New World Order?’, in
A. Sidahmad and A. Ehteshami, eds, Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder,
CO, Westview Press, 71–90.
Gerges, Fawaz (1994), The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and
International politics, 1955–1967, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Gerner, Deborah (1991), One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over
Palestine, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Ghali, Boutrus Boutrus (1963), ‘The foreign policy of Egypt’, in J. E. Black
and K. W. Thompson, eds, Foreign Policy in a World of Change, New
York, Harper and Row.
Goldgeier, James M. and Michael McFaul (1992), ‘A tale of two worlds:
core and periphery in the post-Cold War era’, International Organiza-
tion, 46:2.
Bibliography 245
Graham-Brown, Sarah (1999), Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of
Intervention in Iraq, London, I. B. Taurus.
Green, Jerrold (1982), Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermo-
bilization, New York, Praeger Publishers.
Guazzone, Laura (1997), The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics
and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, London,
Macmillan Press.
Guerrieri, Paulo (1997), ‘Globalism and regionalism in the world economy
and the Middle East’, in Laura Guazzone, ed., The Middle East in
Global Change, London, Macmillan Press, 153–73.
Hagopian, Elaine (1997), ‘Is the peace process a process for peace? A
retrospective analysis of Oslo’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 19:3, 1–28.
Halliday, Fred (1988), ‘The great powers and the Middle East’, Middle East
Report, 18:2, no. 151, March–April, 3–6.
——(1991), ‘The crisis of the Arab world’, in Micah Sifry and Christopher
Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books, 395–401.
——(1994), Rethinking International Relations, London, Macmillan.
——(1996), Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London and New York,
I. B. Taurus.
Halpern, Manfred (1963), The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East
and North Africa, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Harik, Iliya (1987), ‘The origins of the Arab state system’, in Ghassan
Salame, The Foundations of the Arab State, London, Croom Helm.
Harknett, Richard J. and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg (1997), ‘Alignment theory
and interrelated threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf crisis’, Security
Studies, 6:3, 112–53.
Harrop, William Scott (1991), ‘Iran’s emerging World Order’, Middle East
Insight 8:2, September–October, 46–9.
Haseeb, Dina and Malek Rouchdy (1991), ‘Egypt’s speculations in the Gulf
crisis: the government’s policies and the opposition movements’, in
Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds, The Gulf War and the New
World Order, London, Zed Books, 1991, 70–6.
Heikal, Muhammed Hassanein (1975), The Road to Ramadan, New York,
Reader’s Digest Press.
——(1978a), The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet
influence in the Middle East, London, Collins.
——(1978b), ‘Egyptian Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 56:4.
——(1983), The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, London,
Corgi Books.
Hetata, Sherif (1991), ‘What choice did Egypt have?’, in Phillis Bennis and
246 Bibliography
Michel Moushabeck, eds, Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, New
York, Olive Branch Press, 241–7.
Hinnebusch, Raymond (1982), ‘Children of the elite: political attitudes of
the westernized bourgeoisie in contemporary Egypt’, Middle East
Journal, 36:4, 535–61.
——(1985), Egyptian Politics under Sadat, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
——(1993), ‘Revisionist dreams, realist strategies: the foreign policy of
Syria’, in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, The Foreign
Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, Boulder, CO,
Westview Press, 374–409.
——(1997), ‘Syria’s role in the Gulf war coalition’, in Andrew Bennett,
Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in
the Gulf War, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 219–40.
——(2001), Syria: Revolution from Above, London, Routledge.
Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2001), The Foreign
Policies of Middle East States, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hiro, Dilip (1991a), The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict,
London and New York, Routledge.
——(1991b), ‘A few of our favorite kings’, in Micah Sifry and Christopher
Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books, 408–11.
——(1992), Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War, New
York, Routledge.
Hitchins, Christopher (1991), ‘Realpolitik in the Gulf’, in Micah Sifry and
Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books,
107–18.
Holsti, Kal (1970), ‘National role conception in the study of foreign policy’,
International Studies Quarterly, 14, 233–309.
Hooglund, Eric (1987a), ‘The search for Iran’s moderates’, Middle East
Report, January–February, 17:1, 5–6.
——(1987b), ‘Iran and the Gulf War’, Middle East Report, September–
October, no. 148, 17:5, 12–18.
——(1989), ‘The Islamic Republic at war and peace’, Middle East Report,
January–February, no. 156, 19:1, 4–12.
Hourani, Albert (1970), Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939,
London, Oxford University Press.
Hudson, Michael (1977), Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, New
Haven, Yale University Press.
——(1999), Middle East Dilemmas: The Politics and Economics of Arab
Integration, London and New York, I. B. Taurus.
Bibliography 247
Hunter, Shireen (1987), ‘Islamic Iran and the Arab World’, Middle East
Insight, 5:3, 17–25.
——(1988), ‘Islam in power: the case of Iran’, in Shireen Hunter, ed., The
Politics of Islamic Revivalism, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University
Press, 265–80.
Huntington, Samuel (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, New
Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
——(1993), ‘The clash of civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, 72:3, 22–49.
Hussein, Ahmad (1973), Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945–70, New York,
Monthly Review Press.
Ibrahim, Saad ad-Din (1997), ‘From Taliban to Erbakan: The case of Islam’,
in Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World, Elizabeth Ozdalga
and Sune Persson, eds, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul,
Transactions, vol. 7, distributed by Curzon Press, 33–44.
Ionides, Michael (1960), Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955–1958,
London, Geoffrey Bles.
Ismael, Jacqueline (1993), Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier
State, Gainsville, University Press of Florida.
Ismael, Tareq Y. (1986), International Relations of the Contemporary
Middle East: A Study in World Politics, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse
University Press.
Issawi, Charles (1982), An Economic History of the Middle East and North
Africa, New York, Columbia University Press.
Joffe, George (1999), ed., Perspectives on Development: The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, London, Frank Cass.
Jones, Clive (2001), ‘The foreign policy of Israel’, in Raymond Hinnebusch
and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East
States, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Press, 115–39.
Jourjati, Murhaf (1998), ‘Syrian foreign policy: an institutional perspective
on why Asad did not emulate Sadat’, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Utah.
Karasapan, Omar (1986), ‘Turkey’s super-rich’, Middle East Report, no.
142, September–October, 16:5, 30–4.
Karawan, Ibrahim (1994), ‘Sadat and the Egyptian–Israeli peace revisited’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26:2, 249–66.
Karmi, Ghada (1999), ‘A binational state in Palestine’, Middle East
International, 7 May, 20–2.
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (1977), Power and Interdependence:
World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little, Brown.
Kerr, Malcolm (1971), The Arab Cold War: Jamal Abd al-Nasir and
248 Bibliography
his Rivals, 1958–1970, London, Oxford University Press.
——(1975), ‘Hafiz al-Asad and the changing patterns of Syrian politics’,
International Journal, 28:4, 689–707.
Keyder, Caglar (1987), State and Class in Turkey, London: Verso.
Khadduri, Majid (1970), Political Trends in the Arab World, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Khalidi, Walid (1991a), ‘Why some Arabs support Saddam’, in Micah Sifry
and Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times
Books, 161–71.
——(1991b), ‘Iraq vs. Kuwait: claims and counterclaims’, in Micah Sifry
and Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times
Books.
Khalil, Samir (1989), The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq,
London, Radius.
Khouri, Rami (1998), ‘Tyranny, dependence, power and the rule of law’, A
View from the Arab World, 29 December, RamiKhouri@nets.com.jo
Kienle, Eberhard (1990), Ba’th vs. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and
Iraq, London, I. B. Taurus.
Kimsche, David and Dan Bawly (1968), The Sandstorm: The Arab Israeli
War of June 1967: Prelude and Aftermath, New York.
Kirisci, Kemal (1997), ‘Post Cold-War Turkish security and the Middle
East’, MERIA Journal Issue 2, posting 6, June, Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University.
Klare, Michael (1991), ‘The Pentagon’s new paradigm’, in Micah Sifry and
Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War, New York, Times Books, 466–79.
Knightly, Philip (1991), ‘Imperial legacy’, in Micah Sifry and Christopher
Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books, 3–15.
Korany, Bahgat (1987), ‘Alien and besieged yet here to stay: the contradic-
tions of the Arab territorial state’, in Ghassan Salame, The Foundations
of the Arab State, London, Croom Helm 1987, 47–74.
——(1988), ‘The Dialectics of inter-Arab relations, 1967–1987’, in
Abdullah Battah and Yehuda Lukas, eds, The Arab–Israeli Conflict: Two
Decades of Change, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 164–78.
——(1997), ‘The Old/New Middle East’, in Laura Guazzone, The Middle
East in Global Change, London: Macmillan Press, 135–49.
Korany, Bahgat and Selma Akbik (1986), ‘Decision-making in a non-state
actor – OPEC’, in Bahgat Korany, ed., How Foreign Policy is made in
the Third World, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Korany, Bahgat and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds (1991), The Foreign Policies
of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Bibliography 249
Korany, Bahgat, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen, eds (1993), The Many Faces
of National Security in the Middle East, New York, Macmillan.
Krasner, Steven, ed. (1983), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY, Cornell
University Press.
Kubursi, Atif (1999), ‘Prospects for Arab economic integration after Oslo’,
in Michael Hudson, ed., Middle East Dilemmas, London and New York,
I. B. Taurus, 299–319.
Kubursi, Atif and Salim Mansur (1993), ‘Oil and the Gulf war: an American
century or a “New World Order”?’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 15:4, 1–18.
Love, Kenneth (1969), Suez: The Twice-Fought War, New York, McGraw-
Hill.
Luciani, Giacomo, ed. (1990), The Arab State, London, Routledge.
Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (1993), The Crystallization of the Arab State
System, 1945–1954, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press.
Malley, Robert and Hussein Agha, ‘Camp David: the tragedy of errors’,
New York Review of Books, 9 August, 2001.
Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder (1995), ‘The dangers of democratiza-
tion’, International Security, 20:1, 5–38.
Mansfield, Peter (1991), A History of the Middle East, London and New
York, Penguin Books.
Ma’oz, Moshe (1972), ‘Attempts at creating a political community in
modern Syria’, Middle East Journal, 26:4, 389–404.
——(1988), Asad, the Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography, New
York, Grove Weidenfeld.
Marr, Phebe (1985), The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press.
Menashri, David (1990), Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution, New
York, Holmes and Meier.
Miller, Judith and Laurie Mylroie (1990), Saddam Hussein and the Crisis
in the Gulf, New York, Times Books.
Moon, Bruce (1995), ‘Consensus or compliance? Foreign-policy change
and external dependence’, International Organization, 39:2, 297–329.
Mufti, Malik (1996), Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political
Order in Syria and Iraq, Ithaca and London, Cornell University 
Press.
——(1998), ‘Daring and caution in Turkish foreign policy’, Middle East
Journal, 52:1, 33–50.
Murden, Simon (2002), Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global
Hegemony, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Murphy, Emma (1997), ‘The Arab–Israeli conflict in the New World
250 Bibliography
Order’, in Haifa Jawad, ed., The Middle East in the New World Order,
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 110–39.
Nahas, Maridi (1985), ‘State systems and revolutionary challenge: Nasser,
Khomeini and the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, 17:4, 507–27.
Niblock,Tim (1990), ‘The need for a new Arab order’, Middle East
International, 12 October, 17–18.
——(2001), ‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya,
Sudan, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Press.
Noble, Paul (1991), ‘The Arab system: pressures, constraints, and oppor-
tunities’, in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign
Policies of Arab States: the Challenge of Change, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 41–78.
Norton, Augustus R (1991) ‘The security legacy of the 1980s in the Third
World’, in Thomas Weiss and Meryl Kessler, Third World Security in
the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Press,
19–33.
Owen, Roger (1981), The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914,
London and New York, Meuthen.
——(1992), State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle
East, London, Routledge.
——(1999), ‘Inter-Arab economic relations during the twentieth century:
world market vs regional market?’, in Michael Hudson, Middle East
Dilemmas, London and New York, I. B. Taurus, 217–32.
Padoan, Piercarlo (1997), ‘The political economy of regional integration in
the Middle East’, in Laura Guazzone, ed., The Middle East in Global
Change, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 174–200.
Parker, Richard (1993), The Politics of Miscalculation, Bloomington, Ind.,
Indiana University Press.
Paul, James (1986), ‘The new bourgeoisie in the Gulf’, Middle East Report,
16:5, no. 142, September–October, 18–22.
Peleg, Ilan (1988), ‘The impact of the Six-Day War on the Israeli right: a
Second Republic in the making?’, in Yehuda Lukas and Abdalla M.
Battah, The Arab-–Israeli Conflict, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 54–66.
Peretz, Don (1988), ‘Israeli policies toward the Arab states and the
Palestinians since 1967’, in Yehuda Lukas and Abdalla M. Battah, The
Arab–Israeli Conflict, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 26–40.
Peri, Yoram (1983), Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
——(1988), ‘From political nationalism to ethno-nationalism: the case of
Bibliography 251
Israel’, in Yehuda Lukas and Abdalla M. Battah, The Arab–Israeli
Conflict, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 41–53.
Perlmutter, Amos (1969), ‘From obscurity to rule: the Syrian army and the
Ba`th Party’, Western Political Quarterly, 22:4.
Perthes, Volker (1995), The Political Economy of Syria under Asad,
London, I. B. Taurus.
Petran, Tabitha (1987), The Struggle for Lebanon, New York, Monthly
Review Press.
Picard, Elizabeth (1988), ‘Arab military in politics: from revolutionary plot
to authoritarian state’, in Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman,
Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, London, Croom
Helm, 116–46.
Quandt, William (2001), ‘The United States’, in Leon Carl Brown, ed.,
Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional
and Outside Powers, London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 59–74.
Rabinovich, Itamar (1972), Syria under the Ba’th, 1963–1966: The
Army–Party Symbiosis, New York, Halstead Press.
——(1987), ‘Controlled conflict in the Middle East: the Syrian–-Israeli
rivalry in Lebanon’, in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. DeWitt, eds,
Conflict Management in the Middle East, Lexington, Mass., Lexington
Books, 97–111.
Ramazani, Rouhollah (1986), Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response
in the Middle East, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Riad, Mahmoud (1982), The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, London
and New York, Quartet Books.
Richards, Alan and John Waterbury (1996), A Political Economy of the
Middle East, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Roberts, Samuel J. (1990), Party and Policy in Israel: The Battle between
Hawks and Doves, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Robins, Philip (1991), Turkey and the Middle East, London, RIIA/Pinter.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. (1977), Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet–Egyptian
Influence Relationship since the June War, Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press.
Rustow, Dankwart (1984), ‘Realignments in the Middle East’, Foreign
Affairs, 63:3.
Sadat, Anwar (1978), In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, New York,
Harper and Row.
Sadowski, Yehia (1991), ‘Arab economies after the Gulf War’, Middle East
Report, no. 170: 21:3, 4–13.
Salame, Ghassan (1989), ‘Political power and the Saudi state’, in B.
252 Bibliography
Berberoglu, Power and Stability in the Middle East, London, Zed Books,
70–89.
Salem, Paul (1997), ‘Arab political currents, Arab–European relations and
Mediterraneanism’, in Guazzone, Laura, ed., The Middle East in Global
Change, London, Macmillan Press, 23–42.
Salloukh, Bassel (1996), ‘State strength, permeability, and foreign policy
behavior: Jordan in theoretical perspective’, Arab Studies Quarterly,
18:2, 39–66.
Sayigh, Yezid (1993), ‘Arab military industrialization: security incentives
and economic impact’, in B. Korany, P. Noble and R. Brynen, The Many
Faces of National Security in the Middle East, 214–38.
Sayigh, Yusuf (1999), ‘Arab economic integration: the poor harvest of the
1980s’, in Michael Hudson, Middle East Dilemmas, London and New
York, I. B. Taurus, 233–58.
Schiff, Zeev and Ehud Ya’ari (1984), Israel’s Lebanon War, New York,
Simon and Schuster.
Schulze, Kirstin (1999), The Arab–Israeli Conflict, London, Longman.
Seale, Patrick (1965), The Struggle for Syria, London, Oxford University
Press.
——(1988), Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley, University of
California Press.
Sela, Avraham (1998), The End of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Middle East
Politics and the Quest for Regional Order, Albany, NY, State University
of New York Press.
Shafiq, Nemat (1999), ‘Labour migration and economic integration in the
Middle East’, in Michael Hudson, Middle East Dilemmas, London and
New York, I. B. Taurus, 279–98.
Sharabi, Hisham (1970), Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative
Years, 1975–1914, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Shazli, Saad al- (1980), The Crossing of the Suez, San Francisco, American
Mideast Research.
Sheehan, Edward (1976), ‘How Kissinger did it: step by step in the Middle
East’, Foreign Policy, 22.
Sifry, Micah (1991) ‘US intervention in the Middle East: a case study’, in
Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New
York, Times Books, 27–33.
Simons, Geoffrey (1996), The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and
Natural Justice, London, Macmillan.
Smith, Charles D. (1996), Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict, New
York, St. Martin’s Press.
Bibliography 253
Smith, Pamela Ann (1986), ‘The exile bourgeoisie of Palestine’, Middle East
Report, 16:5, no. 142, September–October, 23–7.
Solingen, Etil (1998), Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and
Domestic Influence on Grand Strategy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press.
Spero, Joan Edelman (1990), The Politics of International Economic
Relations, 4th Edition, New York, St. Martins.
Springborg, Robert (1989), Mubarak’s Egypt: The Fragmentation of the
Political Order, Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Stein, Janet (1993), ‘The security dilemma in the Middle East: the progno-
sis for the decade ahead’, in Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, Rex Brynen,
The Many Faces of National Security in the Middle East, London,
Macmillan, 56–75.
Stork, Joe and Martha Wenger (1991), ‘From rapid deployment to massive
deployment’, Middle East Report, no. 168, January–February, 21:1,
22–6.
Tachau, Frank (1975), Political Elites and Political Development in the
Middle East, Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman/Wiley.
Tanzer, Michael (1991), ‘Oil and the Gulf crisis’, in Phyllis Bennis and
Michel Moushabeck, eds, Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, New
York, Olive Branch Press, 263–7.
Taylor, Alan (1982), The Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse
University Press.
Telhami, Shibley (1990), Power and Leadership in International
Bargaining: the Path to the Camp David Accords, New York, Columbia
University Press.
Thompson, William R. (1970), ‘The Arab sub-system and the feudal
pattern of interaction: 1965’, Journal of Peace Research, 7, 151–67.
——(1981), ‘Delineating regional subsystems: visit networks and the
Middle East case’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 13:2.
Tibi, Bassam (1998), Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate
war to New Security, London, Macmillan.
Torrey, Gordon (1964), Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–1958,
Columbus, Ohio State University.
Trimberger, Ellen Kay (1978), Revolution From Above: Military
Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, New
Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books.
Tripp, Charles (1996), ‘Islam and the secular logic of the state in the Middle
East’, in A. Ehteshami and A. S. Sidahmad, Islamic Fundamentalism,
Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 51–69.
254 Bibliography
——(2001), ‘The foreign policy of Iraq’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds, The Foreign Policies of Middle East
States, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Press, 167–92.
Van Dam, Nikolaos (1981), The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism,
Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980, London, Croom
Helm.
Van Dusen, Michael (1975) ‘Syria: downfall of a traditional elite’, in Frank
Tachau, ed., Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle
East, Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman/Wiley, 115–55.
Vassiliev, Alexi (1998), The History of Saudi Arabia, London, Saqi Books.
Vatikiotis, P. J. (1978), Nasser and his Generation, New York, St. Martin’s
Press.
——(1987), Islam and the State, London, Routledge.
Vitalis, Robert (1997), ‘The closing of the Arabian oil frontier and the
future of American–Saudi relations’, Middle East Report, 27:2, no. 204,
July–September, 15–21.
Waldner, David (1995), ‘More than meets the eye: economic influence on
contemporary Syrian foreign policy’, Middle East Insight, 11:4, May-
June.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), The Modern World System, New York,
Academic Press.
Walt, Steven (1987), The Origin of Alliances, Ithaca, NY, Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Waltz, Kenneth (1979), Theory of International Politics, Boston, Addison-
Wesley.
Weulersse, Jacques (1946), Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient, Paris,
Gallimard.
Yaniv, Avner (1986), ‘Syria and Israel: the politics of escalation’, in Moshe
Ma’oz, and Avner Yaniv, Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and
Regional Risks, London, Croom Helm, 157–77.
——(1987), ‘Alliance politics in the Middle East: a security dilemma per-
spective’, in Auriel Braun, ed., The Middle East in Global Strategy,
Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Khan, Mujeeb (1992), ‘Turkish foreign policy
toward the Arab Israeli conflict’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 14:4, 69–94.
Yergin, Daniel (1991), ‘Oil: the strategic prize’, in Micah Sifry and
Christopher Cerf, eds, The Gulf War Reader, New York, Times Books,
21–6.
Zartman, I. William, ed. (1982), Political Elites in Arab North Africa, New
York and London, Longman.
Bibliography 255
——1993, ‘State building and the military in Arab Africa’, in B. Korany, P.
Noble and R. Brynen, eds, The Many Faces of National Security in the
Middle East, New York, Macmillan, 239–57.
——(1999), ‘The ups and downs of Maghrebi unity’, in Michael Hudson
ed., Middle East Dilemmas, London and New York, I. B. Taurus,
171–86.
Zunes, Stephen (2001), ‘The United States and the breakdown of the
Palestinian–Israeli peace process’, Middle East Policy, 8:4, 66–85.
256 Bibliography
Abdullah, Crown Prince (Saudi)
129
Abdullah I, King (of Jordan) 
156–7
Afghanistan 183, 195, 234, 236
Alawis 56, 102–5, 128, 138
Albright, Madeline 233
Arab Cold War 80, 162
Arab collective security 23, 64,
161, 201, 223
Arab–Israeli conflict 155–9, 222,
227, 238; 
see also wars
Arab League 158, 160, 176, 222
Arab nationalism 19–30, 58–69,
135–7, 149, 200–9
and outbidding 65–6, 169, 171,
176; see also Pan-Arabism
Arab summits 66, 176–9, 222,
228, 237
Arab Triangle 173–5, 177, 181
Arab world 19, 58–62, 158, 200–1
armaments
expenditure 182; races/build-ups
83–4, 129, 203; transfers 24,
29, 33, 42–3, 168, 175, 186,
232
Asad, Hafiz al- 104, 118–210, 126,
128, 130, 133–5, 138–41,
174, 182, 186
Ataturk, Mustafa Kamal 18, 105,
142
authoritarian republics 73, 79–80,
108, 142, 152
Azm, Sadiq al- 15
Baghdad Pact 22–4, 64, 80, 144,
161
balance of power (also balancing,
power imbalances) 2, 3,
10–11, 23, 31, 64, 86, 151,
155, 160, 163, 181, 188, 200,
202–3, 212, 213, 222–3,
226–7, 232
Arab–Israeli 33, 171, 179, 183,
185, 220, 238
Balfour Declaration 155
bandwagoning 4, 34, 132, 151
Barak, Ehud 227–9
Barnett, Michael 62–5, 226, 238
Ba’th party 103–4, 125–6, 128,
130, 138, 167, 177, 198, 207
Bazargan, Mehdi 193
Begin, Menachem 113, 118, 166,
169, 178, 183–4, 187
Ben Gurion, David 158, 165–6,
184
Bin Laden, Osama 236
bourgeoisie 83, 86, 96–9, 177,
189, 207, 231
comprador 97; infitah 11, 98,




Brown, Leon Carl 14
Bull, Hedley 62
bureaucratic politics 94, 109–11
Bush, George, Sr 221
business and foreign policy 96–9
Buzan, Barry 15
cabinets 110–11
Camp David negotiations 117–18,
179, 184
Carter, Jimmy 117–18, 190
Christians 56
clash of civilizations 234, 237
Cold War 4, 21–35, 52, 185, 212
end of 4, 215, 218
constructivism 2, 10, 12, 62, 65–6
core–periphery relations 2, 3–4,
14–53
Cyprus conflict 144, 146, 152–3
David, Steven 8, 93
decision-making 8–9, 93–4, 21
Iraqi 219–20; Saudi 129–30;
structures of 108–13; Syrian
130; US 220–1
defensive modernisation 17 
democracies 76, 111, 147, 153
see also pluralist states
democratic peace theory 11, 141,
152–3, 204, 231
democratisation 11, 88–9, 96,
141–2, 152, 231
dependency 35–51, 89, 92, 140–1,
151, 212–13
development, regional 45–51
Dual Containment doctrine 232
Dulles, John Foster 24–7
economy, regional 45–51
capital flight from 48; crises
85–6; debt 47; dependency of
35–51, 140; liberalisation of
85–6, 230–1; Ottoman 16–17;
structural adjustment in 48,
86, 88, 231; trade of 48
Egypt
foreign policy 134–41, 150–1,
174–5; identity 60–1, 135;
1956 war 165; 1967 war
30–2, 165–70; 1973 war 33,
137–41, 174–6; and Pan-
Arabism 22–8, 63–7, 160–2,
167–8; presidency 108–10;
resources 160, 173–4, 182;
second Gulf war, 213;
separate peace with Israel
33–5, 178–80, 185, 202, 230;
state formation 136–7, 160;
and the West 22–35; see also
Mubarak; Nasser; Sadat
Eisenhower Doctrine 25, 144
Erbakan, Necmettin 108, 143
Eshkol, Levi  166





determinants 8, 91–4; role 9,
93–4, 113
foreign policy making 91–120
Galtung, Johan 3
Gaza strip 165, 172, 228
geopolitics 83, 91–2, 94–5, 138–9,
143–4, 151, 163–5, 213
globalisation 85, 87–9, 204–5,
225, 229, 230, 239
Golan Heights 133–4, 136, 170,
171, 184, 227
Gorbachev, Mikhail 212, 218
Great Britain 14, 18, 19, 22–5, 37,
122, 206, 216
Guazzone, Laura 235
Gulf states 36, 41–52, 194–5,
196–7, 200, 209, 210, 217, 222
Halliday, Fred  14
HAMAS 69
258 Index
Hashemites 26, 123, 159, 161
hegemony 11, 14–15
Egyptian 10, 65, 161–3, 173–4;
US 4, 15, 37, 88, 205–6,
216–18, 231–7
Heikal, Muhammed Hassanein 31,
45
Hizbollah 69, 146, 180, 187, 195,
237
Hussein, King (of Jordan) 25,
95–6, 172, 180, 227, 231
see also Jordan
Hussein, Saddam 119–20, 196,
206–7, 210–12, 219–20, 233
Ibn Saud, Abd al-Aziz 122
identity 5–6, 17, 54–72, 74, 78,
81, 83, 92–3, 135–6, 142, 151
ideology 11, 20–1, 28, 55, 59, 63,




IMF 47, 86, 231
imperialism 3, 5, 14–15, 15–20,
78, 89
infitah 45, 85–6
see also economy, liberalisation of
institutions 75, 77, 94, 112, 113
interdependence 11, 36, 45, 177,
204, 229, 230
internationalist coalitions  11, 86,
94, 98–9, 230
international system 14–53, 215
intifada 187, 224–5, 229
Iran
conflict with US 192–3; export
of revolution 69–70, 194–5;
foreign policy 188–200;
identity 55, 72; Iraq war
195–200; revolution 96, 154,
181, 183, 188–201; state
formation 149–50, 187, 198;





dispute with Kuwait 211–12;
foreign policy 152, 182,
208–10; invasion of Kuwait
67, 87, 131, 134, 206–12,
219–20; revolution in 
26–7, 206; state formation
206–10; as war state 
206–10; war with Iran 195–8,
208, 219; see also Hussein,
Saddam
irredentism 5, 56, 72, 74, 78,
152–3, 155–9, 173, 230
Islam
and international relations
67–71; and Iran’s revolution
191–5; movements/opposition
88, 99, 122, 128, 130, 143,
181, 189–92; political 67–71,
84, 180, 231
Islamic Conference Organisation 6,
70–1
Israel
foreign policy making 111,
146–7; and globalisation
225, 230; identity 71–2;
invasion of Lebanon 183–8,
224; 1967 war 163–6; and
peace process 224–30;
politics, 146–7, 187, 224–6;
public opinion 96, 147; and
Sadat 178–9; security policy
158–9, 164–5; settlements of
173, 184, 224, 227–8; state
formation 77, 154;
worldview 158, 183–4; see
also Barak; Begin; Ben
Gurion; Labour party; Likud
party; Peres; Rabin; United
States, alliance with Israel
Jerusalem 184
Johnson, Lyndon 30, 170
Index 259
Jordan
alliances 161;  crisis of 1957 25;
democratisation 89; 1967 war
167–8; public opinion 95–6;
state formation 148–9, 152;
see also Hussein, King
Khomeini, Ayatollah Rouhollah
149, 190, 191–3, 199
Kissinger, Henry 32–5, 116, 130,
180
Korany, Bahgat 5, 204
Kurds 5, 55–6
and Iraq 190, 206, 208; and
Turkey 145, 223–4, 230
Kuwait 41, 52, 60, 209, 211–12
labour migration 46, 48, 50, 58
Labour movements 20, 79, 125
Labour party (of Israel) 147, 184, 
224–6
leadership 141, 171, 219
Lebanon
civil war 179–80, 185; conflict
in south 134, 185; crisis of
1958 26–7; identity 56; Syrian
intervention in 179, 185
legitimacy 8, 15, 20, 21, 49, 57,
67, 69, 72, 74–89 passim,
177, 180–1, 212, 229, 231,
235, 238–9




Madrid Conference 224–5, 229,
234
see also peace, process
Maghreb 60
middle class 17, 21, 65, 67, 68,
77–8, 100, 125, 160, 177, 225
Middle East Common Market 229
military in politics 21, 78, 79, 81,
99–108, 109–10
minorities 55
Mohteshemi, Ali Akbar 198
monarchies 73, 74, 78–9, 87, 111
Moon, Bruce 3
Mossadeq, Mohammed 37–8, 149,
154, 188–9, 190
Mubarak, Husni 180, 211, 231
Mufti, Malik 206
multipolarity  159–60, 181–3
Musavi, Mir Hussein 198–9
Muslim  brotherhood 20
Nasser, Gamal Abdul 22–32
passim, 63–4, 95, 108–9,
114–16, 125, 137, 160–70
passim
nation-building 54–8, 71–2, 145











and Arabism 49–51, 67; boom
and bust 39–51; companies
36–8; and dependency 35–6,
46–8; effect on states 41–9,
67, 80–6, 85–6, 127–9, 177,
180, 182, 207; embargo
(weapon) 39–41, 126, 176,
211, 215; and Gulf war
214–15; market 37–9, 43–4,
214–15; nationalisation of
38–9; swing producer 4, 41,
43, 214
OPEC 36–44




Ottoman Empire 15–18, 58, 105
Ozal, Turgut 107–8, 143, 144, 
145
Palestine 19, 62, 65, 123, 126,
133, 136, 138, 155–9, 161,
167, 174
Palestinian Authority (PA) 227–9
Palestinians 149, 187
exodus 157; identity 156; and
Oslo agreement 226; revolt of
1936 156; and war of 1967
167
Palestinian state 133, 172, 175,
226–9
Pan-Arabism 5–6, 10, 49–50, 56,
58–67, 133, 161–3, 177,
201–2, 208, 210–12, 222,
223, 226, 237
Pan-Arab system 159–63, 176–8,
201–2
pariah states 232–3, 235
parliaments 110
Pax Americana 204, 231–6
see also US
peace
process 204–5, 224–9, 238;
settlement 177, 179; treaty,
Egypt–Israel 185; zones of 12,
230–1
penetrated system 14, 205
Peres, Shimon 166, 225, 229
Periphery Pact 29, 163
personalisation of power 112–13
PKK 146, 223
PLO 130, 157, 172, 175, 179,
183, 185–7, 224–9
pluralism 2, 11–13, 121, 141–7,
152, 204, 229–31
pluralist states 111, 146–7
populist coalitions/regimes 86, 94
praetorian 75, 77, 78
presidents 79, 81, 108–10, 137
public opinion 94–6, 144, 146,
221, 227, 236
al-Qa’ida 236
Qasim, Abd al-Karim 27, 162
Rabin, Yitzhak 141, 225
Rafsanjani, Hashemi 198–9
rational actor 2, 6, 7–9, 93, 112,
120, 133
realism 3, 11, 12, 63, 121, 141,
151
regime
international 10–11, 65; Pan-
Arab 161–2, 201–2
regional system 9–12, 155–203
rentierism 46
revisionism 7, 9, 15, 74 181, 188,
191
revolution 188–92
Roger’s Plan 32, 175
Sadat, Anwar al- 32–5, 95, 100,
109–10, 113, 116–18, 137,
141, 177–80, 184
Said, Nuri al- 23–4
Saudi Arabia
decision-making 129–30; foreign
policy 131–3, 156, 174, 177,
182, 212–13; and Iran 194,
197; and oil 39–45; state
formation 18, 122–8, 148–9,
151; and US 39–45, 52, 125,
131–3
security  dilemma 10, 67, 80, 155,
202, 232
September 11 events 205, 236, 239
Shah, Muhammed Pahlavi 29, 96,
188–91
Shamir, Yitzhak 184, 187, 225
Sharon, Ariel 184, 229, 230
Shi’a Muslims 55–6, 186–7,
193–5, 198, 200, 206, 208
Sinai peninsula
agreements over 117, 178;
occupation 137, 140
sovereignty 5–6, 61–7, 72, 212,
228, 238
Index 261
Soviet Union (USSR) 4, 21–35
passim, 87, 168, 170, 183,
186, 192, 193, 210, 212, 218,
220
state-building 57, 73–4, 127, 177
state formation 7–8, 56, 73–90,
138, 147–9
state structural type 76
Stein, Janice 171
structuralism 2, 12, 121, 216
see also dependency
Sunni Muslims 55, 128, 138,
194–5, 208
Syria
crisis of 1957 26; decision-
making 130; identity 61, 136;
foreign policy 133–4, 139–41,
167–8, 174–5, 179, 182, 213;
Iran alliance 200, 223, 234;
and Israel in Lebanon 185–7;
military 102–5; and peace
process, 178, 179, 227, 228;
state formation 123–30, 138;
see also Asad; wars
Telhami, Shibley  117–18
terrorism 70, 205, 224, 236–7,
239
traditional states 75, 76–7
Tripp, Charles 219
Turkey 
alliance with Israel 145–6, 223;
conflict with Syria 145, 223;
foreign policy 26, 29, 144–6,
230; foreign policy
determinants 142–3; foreign
policy process 97, 143–4;
identity 71–2; military 100,
101, 105–8; state formation
18, 77; see also Ataturk;
Ottoman Empire; Ozal
UAR 26
ulama 124, 129–30, 149, 194
umma 17, 54–5, 68, 180, 193
UNEF 167
United Nations 193, 199, 232,
234, 235
and Palestine partition 156;
Resolution 242 171–2, 173,
224; sanctioning Iraq 233
United States
alliance with Israel 24, 29, 32,
39, 186, 238; in Gulf 51–2,
200–1; and Iran 188–9,
192–3, 197–8; and Iraq
215–18, 220–1, 232–3; policy
process 220–1; role in region
21, 24–7, 30–5, 39–41, 51–3,
170, 186, 205, 212, 237–9;





Walt, Stephen 63, 64
wars
Arab–Israeli: of 1948 156–7; of
1956: 165; of 1967: 30–1,
115, 126–7, 133, 163–73; of
1973: 33–4, 39–40, 67,
126–7, 135, 139, 175–8; of
attrition 31–2, 67; effect on
states 202; Gulf 52, 205–21;
Iran–Iraq 51–2, 67, 183, 185,
195–200; in Lebanon 183–8;
roots of 154–5
water disputes 223
weapons of mass destruction 217,
224, 232
West Bank 164, 185, 187, 227–9
autonomy plan 184
Young Turks 17, 105
Zionism 19, 71, 93, 155–6, 183,
220
262 Index
